REESE   LIBRARY 


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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

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Great  Commarfters 

EDITED  BY  JAMES  GRANT   WILSON 


GENERAL   THOMAS 


ZTbe  Great  Commanders  Series. 

EDITED  BY  GENERAL  JAMES  GRANT  WILSON. 


Admiral  Farragut. 

By  Captain  A.  T.  MAHAN,  U.  S.  N. 
Zachary  Taylor. 

By  General  O.  O.  HOWARD,  U.  S.  A. 
General  Jackson.  By  JAMES  PARTON. 

General  Greene. 

By  Captain  FRANCIS  V.  GREENE,  U.  S.  A. 

General  J.  E.  Johnston. 

By  ROBERT  M.  HUGHES,  of  Virginia. 
General  Thomas. 

By  HENRY  COPPEE,  LL.  D. 

IN  PREPARATION. 

General  Washington. 

By  General  BRADLEY  T.  JOHNSON. 
General  Sherman. 

By  General  MANNING  F.  FORCE. 
General  Grant. 

By  General  JAMES  GRANT  WILSON. 
General  Scott. 

By  General  MARCUS  J.  WRIGHT. 
Admiral  Porter. 

By  JAMES  R.  SOLEY,  late  Assist.  Sec.  of  Navy. 
General  Lee. 

By  General  FITZHUGH  LEE. 
General  Hancock. 

By  General  FRANCIS  A.  WALKER. 
General  Sheridan. 

By  General  HENRY  E.  DAVIES. 


New  York  :  D.  APPLETON  &  Co.,  i,  3,  &  5  Bond  St. 


D.APFLETON   &  C< 


GREAT    COMMANDERS 

*  *  *  * 


GENERAL  THOMAS 


BY 

HENRY   COPPEE,   LL.  D. 

PROFESSOR   IN    THE    LEHIGH    UNIVERSITY,    AND    FORMERLY    AN    OFFICER 
OF   ARTILLERY    IN    THE    UNITED    STATES    ARMY 


NEW    YORK 
D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY 

1893 


6  2-02^0 

COPYRIGHT,  1893, 

BY  D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY. 


All  rights  reserved. 


TO    THE 
MEMORY  OF  THE   OFFICERS   AND   SOLDIERS   OF  THE 

ARMY   OF    THE   CUMBERLAND 

WHO   FELL  WHILE   FIGHTING  WITH   THOMAS, 

AND   TO   THE   NOBLE   SURVIVORS   WHO   CONTRIBUTED   TO 

HIS   RENOWN   AND   CHERISH   HIS   MEMORY 


PREFACE. 


WHEN  I  undertook,  at  the  request  of  the  editor, 
to  write  a  biographical  sketch  of  General  George 
H.  Thomas,  as  one  of  the  series  of  Great  American 
Commanders,  I  soon  found  that  my  chief  difficulty 
would  be  to  condense  within  the  small  compass  of  a 
work  like  this  the  different  portions  of  the  great 
history  in  which  he  played  a  distinguished  part.  It 
was  manifest  that  the  battles  in  which  he  com 
manded  in  person,  and  those  in  which  under  other 
commanders  he  held  a  very  prominent  place,  must, 
of  course,  be  more  elaborately  described.  Those  in 
which  he  had  only  a  subordinate  position  need  only 
such  partial  notice  as  will  show  what  he  individu 
ally  did.  These  latter  are  fully  portrayed  in  the 
other  volumes  of  the  series,  containing  the  lives  of 
those  generals  who  commanded  in  'them.  And  yet 
even  in  such  cases  enough  must  be  shown  of  the 
general  field  to  enable  the  reader  to  see  the  relation 
sustained  by  the  subject  of  our  sketch  to  the  other 
participants  in  the  action. 

To  illustrate  :   Mill  Springs  and   Nashville  must 


viii  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

be  written  out  in  full  —  they  belong  to  Thomas. 
Chickamauga  requires  a  great  deal  of  attention,  be 
cause  there,  although  another  was  in  command,  he 
stemmed  the  rushing  tide  and  saved  the  day.  At 
Chattanooga  also,  although  Grant  was  in  command, 
Thomas  played  so  prominent  a  part  that  the  whole 
field  must  be  kept  before  the  reader  in  order  to 
appreciate  his  great  achievements  there.  Thus  it 
may  happen,  unavoidably,  that  the  same  field  will 
be  described  in  several  works  of  the  series,  but  as 
far  as  possible  this  will  be  avoided.  Without  enter 
ing  into  further  details,  thus  much  has  been  said  on 
this  point  in  order  that  the  reader  may  not  look  here 
for  what  is  to  be  found  elsewhere,  well  done  by  com 
petent  hands.  I  would  mention  also  as  a  bar  in 
judgment  of  the  work  that  the  name  of  the  critics 
is  legion  ;  every  intelligent  man  who  was  in  a  battle 
has  a  word  to  say  with  regard  to  at  least  that  por 
tion  of  the  field  in  which  he  served. 

Many  vital  authorities  are  not  yet  within  the  his 
torian's  reach  ;  such  as  are,  are  extremely  volumi 
nous,  and  impose  a  severe  task  of  examination.  Nor 
can  there  be  left  out  of  the  account  the  prejudiced 
and  contradictory  claims  of  rival  commanders,  with 
their  trains  of  followers,  more  persistent  than  the 
chiefs  themselves. 

It  is  more  than  probable,  therefore,  that  I  have 
fallen  into  errors  and  made  mistakes  in  spite  of  the 
strongest  desire  to  avoid  them.  Wherever  this  is 


PREFACE.  IX 

shown,  I  stand  ready  and  anxious  to  correct  them 
and  make  the  amend.  My  chief  object  has  been  to 
show  what  General  Thomas  was  and  what  he  did, 
not  by  odious  comparisons  with  other  generals,  but 
in  the  light  of  a  shining  record,  unrivaled  in  the 
history  of  the  war. 

To  General  John  M.  Schofield,  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Army,  I  am  indebted  for  a  copy  of  that 
famous  work,  The  War  of  the  Rebellion,  Official 
Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies.  It 
is  a  monument  of  industry  and  painstaking,  with  no 
rival  in  war  records.  With  it  alone  the  book  might 
have  been  written.  Without  it,  it  could  not  have 
been. 

General  William  F.  Smith,  U.  S.  A.,  kindly  fur 
nished  me  some  papers  and  information,  especially 
concerning  the  campaign  of  Chattanooga,  in  which 
he  bore  so  distinguished  a  part. 

General  Thomas  J.  Wood  has  given  me  valuable 
information  concerning  Chickamauga  and  Chatta 
nooga,  in  both  which  he  commanded  a  division  with 
great  skill  and  gallantry. 

To  Colonel  Sanford  C.  Kellogg,  U.  S.  A.,  I  owe 
some  important  suggestions  and  the  correction  of 
certain  errors  into  which  I  had  fallen. 

My  thanks  are  due  to  General  James  H.  Wilson 
for  corrections  and  suggestions,  mainly  with  refer 
ence  to  the  campaign  of  Nashville,  in  which  he 
played  so  splendid  a  part,  and  to  Major  William  H. 


X  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Lambert  for  the  loan  of  letters  and  material.  The 
latter  has  the  finest  and  most  complete  collection  of 
relics,  letters,  and  authorities  written  and  published 
with  reference  to  General  Thomas  which  exists. 

Many  other  friends  have  given  me  counsel  and 
aid,  but  they  are  none  of  them  responsible  for  the 
use  I  have  made  of  such  assistance. 

I  have  appended  to  the  account  of  each  battle 
extracts  from  the  reports  of  both  Union  and  Con 
federate  commanders. 

H.  C. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PACK 

I. — EARLY  LIFE  AND  MEXICAN  WAR  i 

II. — THE  CAMPAIGN  WITH  PATTERSON  .        .        .        .20 

III. — APPOINTED  A  BRIGADIER  GENERAL         .  .37 

IV.— MILL  SPRINGS 51 

V.— CORINTH  AND  PERRYVILLE 74 

VI. — THE  BATTLE  OF  STONE'S  RIVER     .        .        .        .94 

VII. — FORWARD  TO  CHATTANOOGA 118 

VIII. — THE  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAMAUGA       .        .        .        .135 

IX. — THOMAS  AT  CHATTANOOGA 160 

X. — THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN 199 

XI. — ON  TO  NASHVILLE. — FRANKLIN       ....  233 

XII.— THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS   .        .  264 

XIII.— LAST  SERVICES  AND  DEATH    ...  .298 

INDEX  321 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS. 


FACING   PAGE 

Portrait  of  George  Henry  Thomas         .         .         .  Frontispiece 
The  Battlefield  of  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  or  Mill  Springs      .       56 

The  Battlefield  of  Stone's  River 98 

The  Battlefield  of  Chickamauga 144 

The  Battlefield  of  Nashville  .  .     268 


LIST  OF  AUTHORITIES  CONSULTED. 


War  of  the  Rebellion,  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Con 
federate  Armies. 

The  Rebellion  Record,  edited  by  Frank  Moore. 

History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  by  Chaplain  Thomas 
B.  Van  Home. 

General  Turchin's  History  of  the  Battle  of  Chickamauga. 

Steedman  at  Chickamauga. 

Memoirs  of  General  William  T.  Sherman,  by  himself. 

Memoirs  of  General  Ulysses  S.  Grant,  by  himself. 

Sherman's  Historical  Raid,  by  H.  P.  Boynton. 

Life  of  Thomas,  by  Thomas  B.  Van  Home. 

Life  of  Thomas,  by  General  R.  W.  Johnson. 

Notes  on  Chattanooga,  by  General  William  F.  Smith. 

Memoirs  of  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  by  himself. 

Pollard's  First,  Second,  and  Third  Years  of  the  War. 

Cullom's,  General  George  W.,  Biographical  Register  of  the 
Officers  and  Graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 

Shank's  Characteristics  of  our  Generals. 

General  J.  W.  De  Peyster's  Memorial  Paper  before  the  New 
York  Historical  Society. 

Address  by  General  O.  O.  Howard  before  the  Loyal  Legion, 
New  York,  1891. 

The  Life  of  Grant,  by  Dana  and  WTilson. 

Chickamauga,  by  General  Henry  M.  Cist. 

General  Emerson  Opdycke's  article  entitled  The  Tennessee 
Campaign,  New  York  Times,  September  10,  1882. 

Franklin  and  Nashville,  by  General  J.  D.  Cox. 

Letter  of  General  Schofield  to  General  Henry  M.  Cist,  Sep 
tember  15,  1880. 

Answer  to  the  same,  by  Colonel  S.  D.  Kellogg. 

Oration  on  General  Thomas,  delivered  at  Rochester  by  Major 
William  H.  Lambert. 

Life  and  Character  of  General  Thomas,  by  General  James  A. 
Garfield. 

And  many  minor  works. 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

EARLY    LIFE    AND    MEXICAN    WAR. 

Parentage  and  birthplace — Huguenot  and  cavalier — Mechanical 
taste — Enters  a  law  office — Offered  an  appointment  as  cadet 
by  the  Hon.  Mr.  Mason — Life  at  West  Point — Graduated  in 
1840 — Florida  War — Brevet  first  lieutenant — Stationed  at 
Charleston,  Baltimore,  and  other  posts — Mexican  War — With 
General  Taylor — At  Fort  Brown — Monterey — Brevet  captain 
— Buena  Vista — Brevet  major — Sword  presented  by  citizens 
of  Southampton  County,  Va. 

THE  following  pages  have  been  written  to  set 
forth  the  principal  events  in  the  life  of  a  man  who, 
in  the  words  of  his  classmate  and  comrade,  General 
Sherman  (in  the  General  Order  announcing  his  death 
to  the  army),  "never  wavered  in  battle;  who  was 
firm  and  full  of  faith  in  his  cause;  who  never  sought 
advancement  of  rank  or  honor  at  the  expense  of  any 
one ;  who  was  the  very  impersonation  of  honesty, 
integrity,  and  honor ;  and  who  stands  as  the  beau 
ideal  of  the  soldier  and  gentleman." 

This  eulogium,  written  immediately  after  his  death, 
strikes  with  a  ringing  tone  the  keynote  for  the  bi- 


2  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ographer.  Let  it  be  added,  if  any  further  praise  be 
needed,  that  he  was  modest  and  retiring ;  that  he 
sought  nothing  for  himself  by  politic  and  pedantic 
means  ;  that  he  never  lost  a  battle,  but  won  several 
splendid  victories ;  that  he  did  not  receive  the  full 
meed  of  advancement  and  praise  due  to  his  merits 
during  his  life ;  and  that,  feeling  this,  he  declared 
that  "time  and  history  would  do  him  justice."  Such 
is  the  character  which  it  is  sought  to  present  to  the 
world  in  this  sketch  of  his  life,  with  the  claim  for 
him  of  that  justice  at  least  from  history  to  which  he 
confided  his  reputation. 

GEORGE  HENRY  THOMAS  was  born  in  Southamp 
ton  County,  Virginia,  on  July  31,  1816.  This  county 
is  in  the  southeastern  part  of  the  State,  bordering  on 
North  Carolina,  and  separated  from  the  Atlantic  by 
only  three  intervening  counties.  It  was  thus  a  more 
secluded  region  than  northern  Virginia.  His  father, 
John  Thomas,  lived  in  one  of  the  few  settlements, 
and  was  of  English  lineage,  or  rather  of  Welsh  an 
cestry,  that  came  to  this  country  after  some  residence 
in  England.  John  Thomas  is  remembered  as  a  man 
strong  in  body  and  mind,  of  perfect  honesty  of  pur 
pose  and  decision  of  character.  His  mother,  Eliza 
beth  Rochelle,  was  descended  from  one  of  those 
Huguenot  families  which  were  driven  out  of  France 
by  the  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  in  1685  by 
Louis  XIV,  and  some  of  whom  were  very  glad  to 
find  an  asylum  in  America.  Not  much  is  known 


EARLY   LIFE   AND   MEXICAN   WAR.  3 

of  the  Thomas  family,  but  the  little  that  has  come 
to  our  notice  informs  us  that  they  had  inherited  the 
traditions  and  the  prestige  of  both  the  Cavaliers 
and  the  Huguenots ;  that  they  were  well-to-do  and 
eminently  respectable,  ranking  among  the  best 
people  in  that  part  of  Virginia. 

His  father  died  (so  it  is  recorded  in  General 
Thomas's  policy  of  insurance)  at  forty-five  years, 
as  the  result  of  an  accident,  and  his  mother  at 
sixty,  curiously  enough  also  by  an  accident.  He 
had  three  sisters  and  two  brothers,  of  whose  his 
tory  little  is  known  but  that  they  were  the  general's 
relatives  ;  they  were  a  quiet,  retired  family,  and  he 
was  an  uncommonly  reticent  man,  who  did  not 
speak  much  of  his  domestic  affairs. 

After  the  opening  of  the  civil  war,  and  upon  his 
deciding  to  remain  in  the  United  States  service, 
there  seems  to  have  been  an  entire  separation  be 
tween  him  and  his  family,  with  the  probable  excep 
tion  of  his  brother  Benjamin,  with  whom  he  was  on 
good  terms  after  the  war,  in  Tennessee,  and  who  was 
the  only  one  he  saw  after  the  year  1860.  The  family 
were  in  possession  of  a  goodly  home  property,  on 
which  the  surviving  members  still  reside  ;  these  are 
two  sisters. 

Such  attempts  as  have  been  made  to  collect  inci 
dents  of  his  boyhood  have  not  been  very  successful. 
General  Howard,  when  he  was  writing  the  sketch  of 
his  life  for  the  Loyal  Legion,  wrote  to  his  sisters  on 
2 


4  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

April  12,  1890,  for  reminiscences  of  his  early  life,  but 
failed  to  elicit  the  desired  information.  One  of  his 
schoolmates  pithily  describes  him  as  a  boy  of  few 
words  and  of  an  excellent  spirit.  An  old  negro 
named  Artise  remembered  him  as  secretly  trying  to 
teach  the  little  negroes  to  read,  contrary  to  the  judg 
ment  of  his  father.  He  is  represented  to  have  been 
of  a  mechanical  turn  ;  to  have  made  a  saddle  and 
several  pieces  of  house  furniture.  A  quiet  and 
thoughtful  boy,  there  is  doubtless  little  more  to  say 
about  him.  He  lived  a  secluded  life,  with  very  few 
companions.  The  educational  advantages  of  that 
region  were  not  great,  but  such  as  they  were  young 
Thomas  availed  himself  of  them  to  the  utmost.  He 
went  through  his  preliminary  studies  at  a  private  in 
stitution  called  the  Southampton  Academy,  and  in 
his  nineteenth  year  he  became  a  student  of  the  law. 
His  taste  for  mechanics,  which  increased  in  his  later 
life,  was  constantly  exercised,  and  was  to  be  very 
useful  to  him  in  his  military  career.  His  mother's 
brother,  James  Rochelle,  was  at  this  time  clerk  of 
the  court  of  Southampton  County  ;  he  appointed  his 
nephew,  George  Thomas,  to  be  his  deputy,  and  the 
young  man  performed  the  duties  of  this  office  while 
he  was  continuing  his  legal  studies. 

It  is  thus  probable  that  young  Thomas  would 
have  become  a  country  lawyer  and  have  spent  his 
life  at  his  paternal  home ;  but  an  event  now  occurred 
which  changed  his  destiny.  In  the  spring  of  1836 


EARLY   LIFE   AND   MEXICAN   WAR.  5 

John  Y.  Mason,  a  member  of  Congress  from  Vir 
ginia,  was  empowered  to  appoint  a  cadet  at  West 
Point  for  his  district.  His  attention  was  called  to 
this  well-grown  and  clever  youth,  the  nephew  and  the 
deputy  of  the  County  Clerk  of  Southampton  ;  and 
he  spoke  of  the  appointment  to  his  uncle,  Mr.  Ro- 
chelle.  The  boy  was  sent  for  and  offered  the  war 
rant  ;  it  was  left  to  his  own  judgment ;  he  accepted 
it  at  once  and  began  his  preparations  to  go  to  West 
Point.  On  his  way  to  the  Military  Academy  he 
stopped  at  Washington  to  thank  Mr.  Mason  again. 
That  gentleman  expressed  himself  very  curtly  :  "  No 
cadet  from  my  district,"  he  said,  "has  ever  graduated 
at  the  Military  Academy.  If  you  do  not,  I  never 
want  to  see  your  face  again." 

He  entered  West  Point  on  June  i,  1836.  There 
is  but  little  diversity  in  the  life  of  a  cadet.  He  lives 
an  almost  conventual  life,  shut  out  from  the  world 
and  subjected  to  rigorous  order  and  discipline,  the 
like  of  which  no  young  men  in  this  country  encoun 
ter  elsewhere.  The  days  are  filled  up  with  drills, 
lessons,  and  parades.  With  the  exception  of  two 
months'  furlough  at  the  end  of  the  second  year, 
there  are  absolutely  no  vacations.  Soldiering  there 
is  not  play,  but  business,  and  the  consequence  is, 
great  transformations  take  place  in  the  four  years' 
course.  Untutored  boys  become  military  men  and 
courtly  gentlemen,  and  WTest  Point  vindicates  herself 
with  every  annual  class  that  she  graduates. 


6  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

There  is  little  to  relate  of  his  cadet  life.  He  fell 
easily  and  obediently  into  the  routine  of  duty.  He 
is  remembered  as  a  steady  student,  not  learning  very 
rapidly,  but  never  losing  what  he  learned  ;  develop 
ing  slowly  and  strongly.  On  June  20,  1840,  he  was 
graduated  twelfth  in  a  class  of  forty-five.  Among 
his  classmates  were  Paul  O.  Hebert,  later  Governor 
of  Louisiana,  William  T.  Sherman,  Stewart  Van 
Vliet,  and  others  whose  names  are  well  known  in 
the  military  history  of  the  country.  From  these 
gentlemen  we  learn  that  while  at  the  academy  he 
was  reticent  and  introspective,  dignified  and  seri 
ous,  a  solid  man,  never  hasty  in  judgment  or  ex 
pression,  but  always  just  and  considerate  of  others. 
To  his  special  friends  he  was  "  Old  Thorn,"  easy 
going  and  reliable. 

After  his  graduation  in  June,  1840,  he  received 
the  usual  furlough  until  the  autumn.  His  first  com 
mission  was  that  of  second  lieutenant  in  the  Third 
Artillery.  He  joined  his  regiment  at  Fort  Columbus, 
Governor's  Island,  New  York  Harbor,  but  he  did 
not  remain  there  long.  The  Florida  War,  caused  by 
the  attempted  removal  of  the  Indians  from  that  ter 
ritory,  was  still  dragging  along  its  fitful  existence  ; 
sometimes  it  burst  forth  into  spasmodic  flame,  and 
anon  its  embers  were  smoldering  and  smoking.  In 
October  of  that  same  year  Thomas  was  sent  to  join 
that  portion  of  his  regiment  which  was  already  there 
in  the  Everglades  of  Florida,  a  swampy  land  of  water 


EARLY   LIFE   AND    MEXICAN   WAR.  7 

and  hummocks,  given  over  to  alligators,  miasma, 
moccasins,  ticks,  and  mosquitoes.  It  was  hard  sol 
diering  and  little  glory.  Troops  in  civilized  coun 
tries  march  on  roads  ;  in  this  Indian  warfare  they 
were  obliged  to  fight  in  pathless  swamps,  where 
only  the  Indian  can  make  his  way  from  tree  to 
tree. 

The  following  letter,  now  first  published,  written 
by  Thomas  to  his  friend  and  classmate  Kingsbury, 
gives  a  very  vivid  glimpse  of  the  man  and  his  activi 
ty  during  the  Florida  War.  It  is  curious  to  find  him 
saying,  "  This  will  be  the  only  opportunity  I  shall 
have  of  distinguishing  myself,  and  not  to  be  able  to 
avail  myself  of  it  is  too  bad."  We  who  were  then 
at  West  Point  as  cadets  were  also  very  fearful  that 
the  Florida  War  would  end  without  giving  us  a 

chance . 

[COPY.] 

"  FORT  LAUDERDALE,  E.  ¥.,Jttiy  25,  1841. 

"  DEAR  KINGSBURY  :  Owing  to  the  quantity  of 
business  on  my  hands  at  this  time,  I  have  not  been 
able  to  answer  yours  of  the  226.  May  before. 

"What  do  you  ordnance  officers  do  for  quarter 
masters  and  commissaries  ?  Do  you  do  the  duty 
yourselves,  or  have  you  staff  officers  at  your  ar 
senals  to  perform  those  duties  ? 

"  My  duties  at  this  post  are  so  many  that  my 
whole  time  is  taken  up.  I  have  to  do  the  duty  of 
commissary,  quartermaster,  ordnance  officer,  and 


8  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

adjutant ;    and   if  I    find    time    to   eat  my  meals,   I 
think  myself  most  infernal  fortunate. 

"  So  the  Democrat  was  not  dismissed  after  all ; 
you  have,  however,  got  him  away  from  Watervliet, 
which  must  be  some  consolation  at  least.  Old  Van 
has  become  so  much  pleased  with  line  duty  that  I 
hardly  think  he  could  be  bribed  to  accept  an  ap 
pointment  in  a  staff  corps.  I  saw  him  yesterday ; 
he  came  down  in  the  boat  with  Major  Childs,  who 
has  gone  to  Fort  Dallas,  below  this  place,  with  sixty 
men  from  his  post  and  sixty  from  here,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  making  an  expedition  into  the  Everglades  to 
oust  Sam  Jones  from  his  cornfields.  I  think  it  highly 
probable  that  they  may  do  something  if  they  will  go 
to  work  properly,  for  the  Indians  are  there,  I  know, 
as  we  have  frequently  seen  their  fires  at  night,  and 
they  do  not  expect  to  see  any  of  our  men  there  at 
this  season  of  the  year ;  therefore,  if  the  major  will 
only  manage  the  affair  well,  he  may  add  fresh  laurels 
to  those  he  has  already  won.  I  have  been  left  be 
hind  to  take  care  of  this  infernal  place  in  conse 
quence  of  being  commissary,  etc. 

"  This  will  be  the  only  opportunity  I  shall  have 
of  distinguishing  myself,  and  not  to  be  able  to  avail 
myself  of  it  is  too  bad.  They  say  at  St.  Augustine 
that  the  Third  will  be  ordered  to  Old  Point  this  fall, 
but  there  have  been  so  many  sayings  of  the  kind  this 
summer  that  I  begin  to  have  no  faith  in  them. 

"  Colonel  Worth  has  been  on  a  grand  scout,  but 


EARLY   LIFE   AND   MEXICAN   WAR.  g 

did  not  succeed  in  discovering  any  fields  or  Indians. 
Major  Childs  thinks  that  some  regiment  of  infantry 
will  come  to  these  lower  posts  this  fall,  and  we  will 
be  concentrated  at  Fort  Pierce  preparatory  to  a 
grand  expedition  to  the  Okechobee,  where  they 
think  the  whole  Indian  force  has  retired  as  the  last 
point  of  safety. 

"  I  am  glad  you  exposed  the  doings  of  those 
people  of  the  Academic  Board  ;  they  deserve  some 
thing  worse  than  exposition  to  the  Engineer  De 
partment. 

"  I  have  not  heard  from  Gardiner  or  Martin  yet ; 
what  they  are  doing  I  can  not  learn.  Hebert  has 
written  only  once  since  my,  arrival  in  Florida  ;  he 
had  just  then  returned  from  furlough.  From  his  ac 
counts  I  should  say  that  he  had  been  enjoying  him 
self  in  fine  style. 

"  I  have  just  heard  that  poor  Job  Lancaster  has 
been  killed  by  lightning.  I  have  heard  no  news 
lately  which  has  distressed  me  more,  for  he  was  one 
of  the  very  best  of  men.  Wardwell  is  also  dead  ;  he 
had  the  fever  which  has  been  prevailing  in  the  west 
ern  part  of  the  territory.  You  must  write  again 
soon.  Yours  truly, 

"  (Signed)       GEORGE  H.  THOMAS. 

"Lieutenant  C.  P.  KINGSBURY,    U.   S.  A.,    Watervliet  Arsenal, 
Watervliet,  N.  Y."* 

*  I  am  indebted  to  the  courtesy  of  Major  William  H.  Lam 
bert,  of  Philadelphia,  for  the  use  of  this  letter. 


IO  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Thomas  joined  Major  Richard  D.  A.  Wade's  com 
mand  in  his  campaign  against  the  Seminoles  in  time 
to  take  an  active  part  in  the  capture  of  seventy  In 
dians  on  November  6,  1841.  This  was  his  first  bat 
tle  service,  and  so  well  was  it  performed  that  he 
received  the  warm  thanks  of  Major  Wade,  who  com 
manded  in  the  action,  and  of  Colonel  (afterward 
General)  Worth,  who  was  in  command  of  all  the 
troops  in  Florida  at  that  time. 

The  mention  that  he  received  in  the  dispatches  of 
these  officers  gained  for  him  the  brevet  rank  of  first 
lieutenant  in  the  army  "  for  gallantry  and  good  con 
duct  against  the  Florida  Indians."  Few  persons  real 
ize  the  dangers  and  hardships  of  Indian  warfare.  It 
is  indeed  an  inglorious  service.  Death  by  an  arrow 
is  ignoble  in  comparison  of  that  in  "  the  imminent 
deadly  breach  "  amid  "  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of 
glorious  war."  The  savages  are  treacherous  and 
cruel.  They  lie  in  ambush,  they  tear  off  the  scalp, 
they  torture  the  prisoners  ;  add  to  this  the  character 
of  the  Indian  country  in  Florida,  the  reeking  mias 
mas  of  the  Everglades,  and  we  shall  see  that  few  men 
have  received  adequate  rewards  for  such  service. 
Fortunately  for  Thomas,  he  did  not  remain  long  in 
that  region.  First  he  was  ordered  on  temporary  duty 
to  New  Orleans  Barracks  in  1842,  and  very  soon  after 
to  Fort  Moultrie,  South  Carolina,  opposite  Fort 
Sumter,  a  locality  before  long  to  be  famous. 

So  small  was  our  army  at  that  time,  and  so  wide 


EARLY   LIFE   AND   MEXICAN   WAR.  n 

the  range  of  country,  that  the  young  officer  was  your 
true  peripatetic  philosopher,  traveling  for  the  most 
time  in  high-pressure  steamboats  or  on  bad  roads  in 
broken-down  stage  coaches.  He  was  also  a  social 
personage  wherever  he  went,  invited  everywhere, 
and  considered,  by  virtue  of  his  commission,  a  gen 
tleman  of  the  first  rank.  Thomas  shared  in  the 
gayeties  of  Charleston  for  a  short  time,  performing 
his  routine  duties  at  Fort  Moultrie,  but  in  1843  he 
was  ordered  to  Fort  McHenry,  near  Baltimore,  and 
there  the  handsome  and  accomplished  young  soldier 
was  a  very  acceptable  person  in  the  gay  and  delight 
ful  society  of  Baltimore,  always  renowned  for  its 
charming  hospitality.  He  is  still  remembered  there 
as  a  dignified  and  courteous  gentleman  and  a  very 
handsome  officer.  The  story  of  his  service  and  his 
honors  in  Florida  gave  him  additional  social  dis 
tinction.  But  he  was  not  permitted  to  linger  long  in 
that  pleasant  place ;  after  less  than  two  years'  stay 
he  was  detailed  on  recruiting  service,  in  1845,  to 
New  York  city. 

Such  a  "  detail  "  is  considered  choice  duty,  and  is 
sought  for  by  most  officers;  but  an  event  was  now  to 
occur  in  our  history  which  required  the  more  active 
services  of  the  whole  army  and  a  considerable  force 
of  volunteers — militia  mustered  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States.  The  army  itself  was  increased 
from  nine  regiments  of  infantry  to  sixteen ;  a  third 
regiment  of  dragoons  was  created,  and  also  a  regi- 


12  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ment  of  mounted  riflemen.  The  young  soldier  was 
now  to  have  a  new  and  better  opportunity  to  exer 
cise  his  powers  and  display  his  prowess.  What  was 
this  new  and  portentous  cloud  which  so  suddenly 
arose  ? 

It  had  become  manifest,  for  many  reasons,  some 
of  them  purely  political,  and  some  of  them  the  issue 
of  the  inexorable  logic  of  events,  that  a  conflict  with 
our  Southern  neighbor  Mexico  was  in  the  immedi 
ate  future.  This  is  not  the  place  to  consider  the 
causes  and  the  justice  of  that  war.  A  strong  party 
opposed  it.  The  poet  James  Russell  Lowell  lam 
pooned  it  in  the  "  Biglow  Papers  " ;  but  the  people 
favored  it  because  it  gave  a  new  expansion  to  our 
territory  and  a  new  glory  to  our  annals.  Wild  and 
adventurous  Americans,  aided  by  traitorous  Mexi 
cans,  had  claimed  that  Texas  was  independent ;  the 
United  States  had  favored  their  claims,  had  recog 
nized  the  asserted  independence,  and  had  then  an 
nexed  Texas  to  the  Union.  Mexico  refused  to  ac 
cept  this  action,  and  insisted  upon  retaining  her 
territory  intact.  An  American  army  of  observa 
tion  and  occupation  was  encamped  under  General 
Taylor  at  Corpus  Christi.  This  officer,  well  and 
fortunately  chosen  to  command  our  forces,  was  a 
man  of  revolutionary  lineage  and  a  young  hero 
in  the  War  of  1812.  When  the  troubles  with  Mexi 
co  began  he  was  colonel  of  the  First  Infantry, 
and,  although  sixty-one  years  of  age,  a  man  in  the 


EARLY   LIFE   AND   MEXICAN   WAR.  I3 

full  vigor  of  life.  With  little  early  education,  he 
was  a  soldier  by  instinct  and  practice,  and  was  to 
earn  a  large  fame  by  his  good  generalship  and  splen 
did  valor  in  Mexico.  The  force  under  his  command 
being  transformed  into  an  army  of  invasion,  it  marched 
to  the  Rio  Grande  to  meet  a  Mexican  army  which 
had  been  sent  thither  to  resist  the  movements  of 
General  Taylor.  There  was  a  show  of  justice  on 
either  side;  but  what  did  not  appear  in  any  mani 
festo  was  the  hope  of  the  Southern  leaders  to  extend 
the  territory  in  which  the  system  of  slavery  might  be 
continued,  and  to  maintain  that  supremacy  in  the 
Government  which  the  South  felt  it  was  gradually 
and  surely  losing. 

But  to  the  young  soldier  of  that  time  the  ques 
tions  of  the  justice  and  morality  of  that  war  did  not 
present  itself.  He  was  a  sworn  defender  of  the 
nation,  and  it  was  the  nation's  quarrel.  He  cared 
nothing  for  causes  of  war  and  knew  little  of  political 
schemes  and  sectional  disputes.  Besides,  he  saw  in 
that  war  an  opportunity  which  had  been  rare,  and 
promised  to  be  rarer,  to  display  his  heroism  and  be 
crowned  with  military  honor.  He  seized  it  with 
avidity  and  entered  upon  this  new  career  of  hope 
and  promise. 

There  had  been  no  declaration  of  war;  the  actual 
war  began  with  the  first  bloodshed.  Immediately 
thereafter  General  Taylor,  having  marched  up  the 
river,  left  a  force  consisting  of  eight  companies  of 


14  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

infantry  and  artillery  and  several  guns  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rio  Grande  to  take  post  and  intrench 
itself  opposite  the  city  of  Matamoros.  The  earth 
works  thrown  up  there  were  called  Fort  Brown,  in 
honor  of  the  commanding  officer,  Major  Jacob 
Brown.  Returning  to  Point  Isabel  he  made  his 
preparations  for  advance.  With  his  main  body,  con 
sisting  of  about  thirty-five  hundred  men,  the  general 
marched  from  Point  Isabel  to  meet  the  Mexican  force 
which  was  coming  down  the  left  bank  slowly  from 
Matamoros.  The  armies  encountered  each  other 
midway  between  Fort  Brown  and  Point  Isabel,  at 
Palo  Alto,  on  the  6th  of  May,  1846.  There  a  cau 
tious  and  experimental  battle  was  fought,  with  no 
decided  results,  except  that  the  Mexicans  had  fallen 
back  a  little  to  a  place  called  Resaca  de  la  Palma, 
and  the  troops  of  both  armies  rested  upon  their  arms 
during  the  night.  On  the  yth,  beginning  with  the 
early  dawn,  a  furious  battle  was  fought  which  result 
ed  in  the  entire  defeat  of  the  Mexicans. 

Meantime  the  garrison  at  Fort  Brown,  opposite 
Matamoros,  was  in  great  straits.  Should  the  Mexi 
cans  be  successful,  there  is  little  doubt  that  they 
would  all  be  massacred,  and  they  were  in  this 
critical  condition  from  the  3d  to  the  pth  of  May. 
They  were  furiously  cannonaded  from  Matamoros; 
they  heard  the  cannon  of  Palo  Alto,  and  when  it 
ceased  and  there  was  no  Mexican  retreat  their  hopes 
sank.  The  early  guns  of  Resaca  greeted  their  ears, 


EARLY   LIFE    AND    MEXICAN   WAR.  j  5 

and  as  the  day  passed  fugitives  from  the  Mexican 
force  began  to  appear.  At  last  they  saw  the  com 
plete  rout ;  every  gun  in  Fort  Brown  was  then 
trained  upon  them  and  hastened  their  flight. 

Fort  Brown  was  relieved,  Matamoros  was  evacu 
ated,  and  occupied  at  once  by  our  conquering  army. 
Major  Brown  was  killed  during  the  siege,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Thomas,  who  was  serving  with  that  contin 
gent  under  the  immediate  command  of  Bragg, 
shared  the  extreme  dangers  and  the  great  honor  of 
that  siege.  Fort  Brown  in  time  became  a  large 
town,  and  is  now  known  as  Brownsville,  robbing 
Matamoros  of  its  prestige  and  progress. 

Thomas  moved  with  the  army  of  General  Taylor 
up  the  river,  commanding  a  section  of  light  artillery 
in  the  van.  Diverging  from  the  Rio  Grande  at  Ca- 
margo,  the  force  marched  inland  to  Monterey,  where 
he  found  and  joined  his  company  of  the  Third  Artil 
lery.  He  was  again  distinguished  in  the  attack  on 
that  stronghold.  It  is  related  that  he  was  ordered  to 
withdraw  his  guns  from  a  particularly  exposed  spot. 
With  characteristic  coolness  he  ordered  them  to  be 
loaded,  and  in  the  midst  of  the  heavy  fire  gave  the 
enemy  a  farewell  shot  and  retired  slowly.  He  was 
complimented  in  orders  by  his  immediate  commander, 
General  Henderson,  and  by  the  division  commander, 
General  Twiggs.  For  his  gallantry  and  good  con 
duct  at  Monterey  he  received  a  second  brevet  as 
captain.  The  next  step  in  his  career  is  in  connection 


l6  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

with  the  story  of  Buena  Vista,  a  rare  and  glorious 
event  in  our  military  annals. 

General  Taylor  had  advanced  to  a  spot  near  Sal- 
tillo  in  expectation  of  meeting  a  large  army  under 
Santa  Anna  intended  to  crush  him  and  the  American 
occupancy  from  that  region.  Most  unfortunately, 
Taylor's  army  was  greatly  decreased  just  when  it 
seemed  essential  to  retain  every  man  in  order  to 
stem  the  Mexican  torrent.  It  happened  in  this  wise  : 
General  Scott  was  completing  an  armament  with 
which  to  proceed  on  a  new  line  from  Vera  Cruz  to 
the  city  of  Mexico.  In  order  to  do  this  he  with 
drew,  by  permission  of  the  War  Department,  nearly 
all  the  regular  troops  from  General  Taylor,  thus 
leaving  him  with  a  force  of  only  five  thousand  men, 
mostly  volunteers.  The  situation  was  grave  in  the 
extreme.  Santa  Anna  was  in  array  before  him  with 
an  army  of  twenty  thousand  of  the  best  Mexican 
troops.  He  sent  a  letter  to  Taylor  demanding  sur 
render,  which  the  latter  very  curtly  refused.  Then 
came  shock  upon  shock ;  masses  were  hurled  against 
him;  with  his  flank  imperiled  and  a  part  of  his 
forces  driven  back,  but  with  a  grim  tenacity  Taylor 
refused  to  be  beaten.  Then  Santa  Anna  weakly  sent 
another  flag  to  ask  him  what  he  wanted.  This  was 
simply  amusing,  and  was  the  prelude  to  the  sudden 
withdrawal  of  the  Mexican  army  in  full  march  to 
ward  the  capital.  There  are  few  fields  of  battle 
more  glorious  in  history  than  that  of  Buena  Vista. 


EARLY    LIFE   AND    MEXICAN   WAR.  ij 

It  reminds  one  of  Poitiers  and  Agincourt,  where  a 
few  English  soldiers  confronted  three  times  their 
numbers  of  French.  It  was  there  that  originated 
General  Taylor's  sobriquet  of  "  Rough  and  Ready." 
There  was  also  given,  or  we  like  to  think  was  given, 
the  epigrammatic  order,  "  A  little  more  grape,  Cap 
tain  Bragg."  These  words  became  watch  words, 
and  Buena  Vista  made  General  Taylor  president. 

But  to  come  back  to  Thomas.  There  were  two 
batteries  of  light  artillery  on  that  field,  commanded 
respectively  by  Braxton  Bragg  and  T.  W.  Sherman. 
Thomas  had  been  in  command  of  one  of  them  from 
November  21,  1846,  to  February  14,  1847,  because 
Bragg  had  been  promoted  to  a  captaincy  and  had 
taken  another  battery.  At  the  latter  date  Captain 
T.  W.  Sherman  came  and  relieved  him  in  command. 
During  the  battle  he  was  thus  acting  as  first  lieu 
tenant  of  the  battery,  and  he  received  the  plaudits 
of  his  captain,  T.  W.  Sherman,  who  reported  that  he 
had  more  than  sustained  his  reputation  as  an  ac 
curate  and  scientific  artillerist. 

General  Wool,  second  in  command  under  Taylor, 
said :  "  We  are  mainly  indebted  for  the  great  vic 
tory  to  the  service  of  the  artillery  officers.  Without 
our  artillery,"  he  said,  "  we  could  not  have  main 
tained  our  position."  And  it  may  be  added  that 
General  Taylor's  sententious  and  magnificent  notice 
of  Bragg  in  the  report  of  the  battle  sheds  some  lus 
ter  also  upon  Bragg's  comrades  of  the  artillery.  In 


1 8  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

speaking  of  his  invaluable  services  he  uses  these 
words,  conceived  in  the  enthusiastic  spirit  of  Napier 
in  the  Peninsular  War  :  "  Without  infantry  to  sup 
port  him  and  at  the  imminent  risk  of  losing  his  guns 
[Bragg]  came  rapidly  into  action,  the  Mexican  lines 
being  but  a  few  yards  from  the  muzzles  of  his  pieces. 
The  first  discharge  of  canister  caused  the  enemy  to 
hesitate ;  the  second  and  third  drove  him  back  in  dis 
order  and  saved  the  day."  * 

For  thus  assisting  to  save  the  day  at  Buena  Vista, 
Thomas  was  brevetted  a  major  in  the  army,  and  a 
man  with  three  brevets  for  service  in  front  of  the 
enemy  was  at  that  time  a  marked  man. 

He  honored  the  army,  and  was  honored  in  turn  by 
the  citizens  in  his  own  county  in  Virginia,  who  met 
at  Jerusalem  Court  House,  July  19,  1847,  in  a  pub 
lic  gathering,  and  in  an  enthusiastic  meeting  drew 
up  a  series  of  complimentary  resolutions  speaking 

*  The  reviewer  of  General  Howard's  Life  of  Taylor,  of  this 
series,  in  the  journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution  for 
March,  1893,  makes  a  decided  discount  upon  the  claims  of  the 
United  States  army  on  this  field.  He  says  Santa  Anna's  forces 
were  very  much  worn  out  on  their  arrival ;  that  probably  he  had 
not  more  than  twelve  thousand  men  in  action  ;  and  although  he 
had  a  great  preponderance  of  cavalry,  there  was  a  decided  dis 
parity  between  their  weaker  men  and  horses  and  our  splendid  dra 
goons.  Taylor  had  the  choice  of  ground  ;  but,  considering  the 
known  inequality  between  the  two  armies,  the  questions  are  per 
tinent,  Why  did  he  fight  there  in  the  open  field  ?  and  Why  not  in 
fortifications  in  Saltillo?  Wool,  his  second  in  command,  declared 
that  they  were  whipped  and  must  retreat.  Notwithstanding  all 
this,  however,  Taylor  refused  to  consider  himself  beaten,  and  held 
the  field  while  his  discomfited  enemy  retired  with  great  rapidity. 


EARLY   LIFE    AND    MEXICAN   WAR.  ig 

of  the  military  skill,  bravery,  and  noble  deportment 
of  Major  Thomas,  and  presented  him  with  a  hand 
some  sword,  engrossed  on  the  scabbard  with  the 
names  of  the  victories  in  which  he  had  participated. 
He  had  given  such  large  promise  that  it  was  mani 
fest  he  was  only  in  reserve  for  greater  things  when 
ever  the  Government  should  need  military  skill, 
valor,  and  power  to  command.  Should  the  emer 
gency  come  he  would  be  sought  for. 

It  must  be  said,  however,  that  there  did  not  seem 
to  be  then  the  slightest  prospect  of  a  call  for  such 
services.  From  the  beginning  of  our  history  the 
Government  has  taken  a  very  just  and  proper  view 
of  the  military  situation  in  time  of  peace.  It  has  al 
ways  reduced  our  army  to  a  minimum.  And  so  after 
the  Mexican  War  the  volunteers  were  disbanded  and 
the  extra  regular  regiments  dropped.  An  opening 
for  adventure  was  made  by  the  acquisition  of  Cali 
fornia,  and  all  the  world  was  awakened  by  the  new 
cry,  "  Westward,  ho  !  "  For  the  officers  then  in  serv 
ice  there  seemed  to  be,  however,  no  military  future. 
And  yet  in  the  womb  of  Time  that  very  future  was 
in  embryo.  The  victories  in  Mexico;  the  acquisi 
tion  of  California,  New  Mexico,  and  Arizona  were 
the  potent  factors  in  bringing  about  this  issue. 
The  entrance  of  California  as  a  free  State  in  1850 
further  disturbed  the  political  equilibrium,  and  was 
a  remote  and  faint  usher  of  the  great  war  which 
was  to  break  out  ten  years  later. 
3 


CHAPTER   II. 

THE    CAMPAIGN    WITH    PATTERSON. 

A  loyal  Virginian — His  features  and  appearance — His  men  trust 
him — Florida,  Newport,  Boston,  West  Point — Instructor  of 
artillery  and  cavalry — His  captaincy  a  Christmas  gift — His 
marriage  in  1855 — Second  Cavalry — The  Kiowa  Expedition, 
1860 — Secession — Temptations — Per  contra — Decides  to  re 
main  loyal — Accident  at  Norfolk — Defection  of  his  seniors — 
At  Carlisle — Joins  Patterson — Bull  Run — His  view  of  Patter 
son's  campaign. 

PERHAPS  this  is  the  place,  and  while  waiting  for 
such  an  emergency,  to  describe  the  appearance  of 
this  man.  He  was  cast  in  a  strong  and  large  mould, 
and  had  many  of  the  personal  traits  of  Washington, 
whom,  in  his  intellectual  and  moral  character,  he 
greatly  resembled.  He  was  just  six  feet  high  and 
very  well  proportioned,  without  too  much  flesh;*  he 
was  very  erect.  He  had  a  walk  which  was  at  once 
military  and  easy;  it  was  that  of  a  man  who  marched 
straight  to  his  purpose.  Bright  blue  eyes,  later  in 
life  somewhat  sunken,  changeable  in  expression  from 

*  He  weighed  at  this  time  about  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
pounds,  but  he  had  reached,  in  August,  1867,  the  weight  of  two 
hundred  and  forty-six  pounds. 


THE   CAMPAIGN   WITH   PATTERSON.  2I 

mildness  to  strong  purpose;  a  heavy  overhanging 
brow,  with  a  horizontal  furrow  at  the  base.  His  nose 
was  well  shaped  and  proportioned ;  he  had  firm-set 
lips  falling  a  little  at  the  extremities  ;  a  strong  chin  ; 
light-brown  waving  hair  and  full  but  short  beard. 
His  head  gave  altogether  the  suggestion  of  a  self- 
reliant  man ;  dignified  and  courteous,  asking  lit 
tle  from  others,  but  ready  to  impart  much.  When 
men  first  knew  him  they  respected  and  feared  him  ; 
on  longer  acquaintance,  especially  such  as  exists  be 
tween  a  commander  and  his  soldiers,  they  trusted 
and  loved  him.  They  learned  to  associate  his  ap 
pearance  with  sure  victory  and  constant  care  for 
their  comfort  and  safety. 

The  emergency  spoken  of  was  soon  to  occur. 
Until  then  he  was  leading  the  routine  life  of  an  of 
ficer  in  garrison  and  camp.  To  an  active  and  studi 
ous  mind  such  a  life  becomes  irksome.  How  to  pass 
the  time  is  the  question  of  the  hour.  Many  officers 
seek  amusement.  On  the  frontier  those  who  are 
sportsmen  can  pass  their  days  with  gun  and  rod  and 
long  excursions  on  horseback  ;  others  play  billiards 
and  talk ;  a  few,  like  Thomas,  spend  their  time  in 
study  of  the  profession,  literally  in  time  of  peace 
preparing  for  war.  Much  of  his  time  at  frontier 
posts  was  also  spent  in  the  study  of  botany,  miner 
alogy,  and  other  branches  of  natural  history.  He 
sent  many  valuable  specimens  to  the  Smithsonian 
Institution  at  Washington. 


22  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

After  a  short  stay  in  camp  at  Brazos  Santiago  he 
was  ordered  again  to  Florida,  where  the  embers  of 
the  Indian  War  were  slowly  dying  out.  Nothing  of 
importance  occurred  to  affect  his  record.  Very  soon 
we  find  him  at  Fort  Independence,  in  Boston  Harbor, 
whence  he  was  ordered  to  Fort  Adams,  Newport,  in 
December,  1848.  In  April,  1851,  he  was  detailed  for 
duty  as  Instructor  of  Artillery  and  Cavalry  at  the 
Military  Academy,  a  position  of  great  importance, 
at  the  head  of  a  department,  corresponding  to  a  pro 
fessorship.  This  officer  commands  the  detachments 
of  artillery  and  cavalry  troops,  besides  instructing 
the  cadets.  The  position  is  usually  given  to  a  cap 
tain,  but,  notwithstanding  his  numerous  brevets,  Ma 
jor  Thomas  was  still  a  first  lieutenant,  and  as  the 
army  had  again  settled  down  to  a  peace  establish 
ment,  promotion  was  very  slow.  Thus  it  happened 
that  it  was  thirteen  years  after  his  graduation,  and 
while  he  was  stationed  at  West  Point,  that  he  re 
ceived  his  promotion  to  a  captaincy,  a  welcome 
Christmas  gift  on  December  24,  1853. 

Those  who,  like  the  writer  of  this  sketch,  served 
with  him  during  his  tour  of  duty  at  West  Point,  will 
readily  recall  his  serious,  practical,  almost  stern  face ; 
his  stately  form ;  his  firm,  martial  tread ;  his  cool  and 
equable  temper  ;  his  impartial  justice ;  and  withal 
his  courteous  bearing  and  kindly  spirit  toward  the 
cadets,  which  they  fully  recognized  and  appreciated. 
He  certainly  taught  them  by  example  as  well  as  by 


THE    CAMPAIGN    WITH    PATTERSON.  23 

precept ;  with  entire  recognition  of  military  law  and 
regulations,  he  treated  them  as  gentlemen  of  honor 
as  well  as  soldiers. 

We  come  now  to  another  important  event  in  his 
life.  It  was  during  his  residence  at  West  Point,  on 
November  17,  1852,  that  he  married  a  lady  whom  all 
army  people  had  already  learned  to  hold  in  great 
admiration  and  respect,  Miss  Frances  L.  Kellogg,  of 
Troy,  New  York.  Mrs.  Kellogg,  a  widow  and  some 
thing  of  an  invalid,  had  been  for  some  time  in  the 
habit  of  spending  a  portion  of  every  year  at  the 
West  Point  Hotel  with  her  two  daughters.  The 
fascination  of  the  elder,  in  appearance,  culture,  and 
an  exceeding  charm  of  conversation,  won  the  affec 
tions  of  Major  Thomas.  Seldom  is  such  a  congenial 
union  to  be  recorded.  She  was,  like  him,  large  and 
of  stately  presence ;  she  made  for  him  a  charming 
home,  when  he  could  be  at  home;  she  entered  into 
all  his  interests  and  made  them  her  own  ;  treasured 
every  incident  of  his  famous  career,  and  although 
separated  for  long  periods  by  the  war,  she  kept  pace 
with  his  actions  and  was  in  perfect  accord  with  his 
views  and  purposes. 

After  being  made  a  captain  in  December,  1853, 
he  proceeded  to  join  his  company  on  May  i,  1854, 
and  while  doing  so  to  conduct  a  battalion  cf  the 
Third  Artillery  to  Benicia  Barracks,  California, 
which  he  reached  via  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  on  the 
ist  of  June:  after  a  short  stay  he  marched  them 


24 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


forward  to  Fort  Yuma,  where  he  remained  until  July 
21,  1855.  Dr.  Murray,  afterward  surgeon  general, 
accompanied  him.  Always  studious  and  of  an  in 
quiring  mind,  he  spent  that  year  in  learning  to  speak 
the  Indian  language  of  the  tribes  of  that  region. 
From  Fort  Yuma  we  find  him  transferred  from  duty 
to  duty  with  a  rapidity  that  required  great  activity 
on  his  part,  and  displayed  that  promptness  of  move 
ment  which  is  so  excellent  a  quality  in  a  commander. 
In  the  early  spring  of  1855  he  was  in  garrison  at 
Jefferson  Barracks.  It  was  while  there  that  he  re 
ceived  another  promotion.  In  the  reorganization  of 
the  cavalry  service  on  May  i2th  of  that  year  the  fol 
lowing  field  officers  were  appointed  for  the  Second 
Cavalry,  all  of  them  graduates  of  West  Point,  and 
Southern  men  :  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  of  Texas, 
Colonel ;  Robert  E.  Lee,  of  Virginia,  Lieutenant 
Colonel ;  William  J.  Hardee,  of  Georgia,  and  George 
H.  Thomas,  of  Virginia,  Majors. 

"  General  Thomas,"  says  Mr.  Van  Horn,  "  always 
believed  that  Mr.  Davis  had  regard  to  a  probable 
war  between  the  Northern  and  Southern  States  in 
organizing  that  regiment."  Although  his  commis 
sion  reached  him  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  he  had  in 
fact  been  appointed  while  at  Fort  Yuma  to  fill  an 
original  vacancy  in  the  Second  Cavalry.  He  was 
then  a  junior  captain  of  artillery.  The  reason  of 
this  promotion  was  as  follows :  It  was  Jefferson 
Davis's  regiment  of  the  Mississippi  Rifles  that  had 


THE   CAMPAIGN   WITH   PATTERSON.  2$ 

supported  the  batteries  at  Buena  Vista ;  thus  Davis 
knew  and  admired  Thomas  personally.  It  was  due 
to  this  that  when  he  was  Secretary  of  War  he  gave 
him  this  promotion. 

From  1855  to  1859  he  had  short  tours  of  frontier 
duty  at  Fort  Mason,  Texas,  San  Antonio,  and  Fort 
Belknap.  Being  employed  in  the  latter  year  to  ac 
company  the  Texas  Reserve  Indians  to  the  Indian 
Territory,  he  made  such  studies  of  natural  science 
as  were  possible.  In  1860  he  took  part  in  the  Kiowa 
Expedition  to  the  sources  of  the  Concho  and  Colo 
rado  Rivers.  It  was  during  this  expedition  that  the 
troops  had  a  skirmish  with  the  Indians  on  the 
Brazos  River,  near  the  junction  of  the  Concho  and 
Colorado  Rivers — a  predatory  band  not  engaged  in 
regular  warfare  but  looking  for  plunder.  In  this 
skirmish  on  August  26,  1860,  Major  Thomas  received 
a  singular  wound ;  an  arrow  passed  through  his  chin 
and  into  his  breast.  It  is  more  notable  because,  ex 
posed  as  he  was  in  after  days  and  in  so  many  fights, 
it  was  the  only  wound  he  ever  received.  It  was  not, 
however,  sufficiently  serious  in  itself  to  cause  him  to 
apply  for  a  leave  of  absence.  He  wanted  rest  and 
deserved  it,  and  on  those  grounds  applied  for  leave 
for  a  year.  It  was  granted,  and  he  left  his  com 
mand  on  November  i,  1860.  This  was  just  before 
Lincoln's  election,  and  was  a  time  of  serious  de 
liberation  to  all  thinking  men  in  the  country. 
Thomas  was  not  a  politician,  but  he  might  well 


26  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

employ  his  leave  in  careful  survey  of  the  state  of 
the  nation. 

Rapidly  coming  events  had  cast  their  portentous 
shadows  before  them.  It  was  manifest  that  dissatis 
faction  at  the  South  would  lead  to  secession ;  and 
would  not  secession  lead  to  war  ?  Southern  officers 
of  the  army,  honest  but  perplexed  in  the  extreme, 
were  beginning  to  leave  the  service  ;  some  of  them 
to  take  active  part  for  their  section,  others  limiting 
their  allegiance  to  their  State,  others  still  hoping  to 
remain  neutral  in  the  struggle.  Vain  hope  ! 

The  excitement  increased  in  a  rapid  ratio.  Men's 
consciences  became  deafened ;  men's  reason  was 
carried  away  in  the  whirlwind  of  political  passion. 
The  hatred  of  the  sections  became  bitter  and  intense. 
The  whole  country  was  a  mighty  field  of  war,  with 
two  hostile  encampments.  The  old  cry  was  heard, 

"  Under  which  king,  Bezonian  ?     Speak  or  die." 
No  wonder  that  many  a  good  man  was  shaken. 

Professor  Smyth,  of  Cambridge,  in  speaking  of 
an  analogous  instance,  illustrating  the  cool  and  fear 
less  judgment  of  General  Washington  when  the 
country  was  in  danger  of  being  embroiled  in  a  for 
eign  war  by  assisting  France  against  the  allies,  uses 
these  striking  words  :  "  The  foundations  of  the  moral 
world  were  shaken,  but  not  the  understanding  of 
Washington." 

Surely  it  is  not  going  too  far  to  apply  them  to 
the  conduct  of  those  Southern  officers  who  remained 


THE   CAMPAIGN   WITH   PATTERSON.  2/ 

true  to  the  Union  in  this  struggle  in  spite  of  tempta 
tions  and  strong  inducements  to  the  contrary. 

The  time  has  come  when  we  may  calmly  consider 
and  analyze  this  question.  It  is  easy  for  men  after 
the  act,  and  in  view  of  the  momentous  results,  to 
reason  back  calmly  to  that  day  of  stormy  conditions 
and  doubting  judgments.  It  is  easy  to  condemn,  but 
to  the  Southern  men  of  that  time  it  was  indeed  a 
portentous  question.  Let  us  take  all  things  into 
consideration  :  The  prestige  of  birth,  the  claims  of 
family,  the  long-time  conflict  between  State  and  Na 
tional  supremacy,  the  doubts  and  hopes  that  a  peace 
ful  solution  might  be  reached,  the  fact  that  the  best 
minds  in  Virginia  were  not  in  favor  of  the  precipitate 
secession  inaugurated  by  South  Carolina,  and  that 
the  State  did  not  secede  until  April  xyth.  We  may 
be  sure  that  all  these  things,  and  many  others,  were 
carefully  considered  by  Thomas. 

In  the  reminiscences  of  General  E.  D.  Keyes  he 
expresses  the  conviction  that  the  influence  of  Mrs. 
Thomas  was  potent  to  keep  her  husband  in  the 
Union  ranks.  With  reference  to  this,  Mrs.  Thomas, 
in  a  letter  to  a  friend  dated  November  9,  1884,  says: 
"  General  Keyes's  private  opinion  that  I  was  the 
cause  of  General  Thomas  remaining  in  the  service 
is  decidedly  a  mistake.  I  do  not  think  they  met 
from  the  time  General  Thomas  went  to  Kentucky  to 
join  that  army  until  they  met  in  San  Francisco  years 
after.  There  was  never  a  word  passed  between 


28  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

General  Thomas  and  myself,  or  any  one  of  the 
family,  upon  the  subject  of  his  remaining  loyal  to  the 
United  States  Government.  We  felt  that  whatever 
his  course,  it  would  be  from  a  conscientious  sense  of 
duty;  that  no  one  could  persuade  him  to  do  what 
he  felt  was  not  right." 

General  Lee,  who  had  been  in  favor  of  gradual 
emancipation,  sadly  resigned  and  received  an  ap 
pointment  in  Virginia.  It  is  not  known  that  any 
special  offers  were  made  by  the  Southern  authorities 
to  General  Thomas,  but  Governor  Letcher,  of  Vir 
ginia,  had  issued  a  general  and  urgent  request  to  all 
officers  of  the  army  from  Virginia  to  resign  and  take 
service  for  their  State.  After  a  careful  and  cautious 
review  of  the  situation,  Thomas  determined  to  re 
main  in  the  service  of  his  country,  and  this  conclu 
sion  was  the  more  honorable,  if  possible,  because  it 
would  cost  him  so  much.  He  knew  that  he  would 
receive  bitter  reproaches  from  all  his  Southern  rela 
tions  and  friends  on  the  one  hand,  and  suspicions  of 
his  loyalty  from  the  authorities  at  Washington  on 
the  other. 

After  receiving  his  wound  on  the  Brazos  River, 
and  while  on  his  way  home,  he  met  with  another 
severe  accident  which  seemed  at  first  as  if  it  would 
disable  him  for  all  further  duty  as  a  soldier.  Near 
Lynchburg  he  jumped  from  a  railway  train  and 
twisted  his  spine  He  was  six  weeks  confined  to 
his  bed  in  Norfolk,  nursed  by  his  faithful  wife,  who 


THE   CAMPAIGN   WITH   PATTERSON.  29 

joined  him  there.  He  recovered,  but  always  felt 
the  effects  of  that  accident. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  he  took  a  step  which  has 
been  greatly  misconstrued.  If  for  any  reason  he 
should  resign,  he  felt  that  he  must  do  something  for 
a  livelihood,  as  he  would  be  without  adequate  means 
of  support.  There  had  appeared  in  the  newspapers 
an  advertisement  informing  the  world  that  the  posi 
tion  of  commandant  of  cadets  at  the  Virginia  Mili 
tary  Institute  was  vacant ;  this  was  a  school  pro 
vided  for  by  the  State  and  ranking  next  to  West 
Point  in  the  excellence  of  its  military  instruction. 
Thomas  wrote  for  information  concerning  it.  This 
has  been  construed  by  his  maligners  as  an  evidence 
of  his  intention  to  desert  the  Union  cause.  Nothing 
could  be  more  mistaken  ;  he  considered  himself  as 
an  invalid ;  he  still  believed  that  secession,  which 
had  gone  up  like  a  rocket,  would  come  down  like 
a  stick ;  that  it  would  not  be  espoused  by  a  majority 
of  the  Southern  States,  his  own  being  among  the 
number  that  would  repudiate  it,  and  that  in  his  re 
tirement  he  would  be  able  to  take  care  of  his  health 
and  cultivate  the  art  of  war  by  studious  perusal  of 
the  campaigns  of  great  generals.  It  may  be  said 
that  his  wish  was  father  to  his  thought ;  but  there 
were  many  good  men  who  had  similar  hopes. 

He  found  himself  measurably  recovering  from 
his  wound  and  his  accident.  He  saw  that  the  animus 
of  the  South  was  from  day  to  day  more  warlike. 


30  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Secession  had  made  a  clean  sweep.  Virginia,  who 
had  disapproved  and  discountenanced  the  secession 
of  South  Carolina,  had  now  joined  the  Confederate 
ranks.  His  decision  was  made  and  it  was  final.  The 
bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  clinched  it.  He  was 
thenceforth  a  Union  man,  ready  and  anxious  to  fight 
in  the  Union  quarrel,  to  give  all  that  he  had,  even 
his  life,  to  the  service  of  the  nation.  The  day  before 
Fort  Sumter  fell  Thomas  started  from  New  York  for 
Carlisle  Barracks,  Pennsylvania,  where  he  was  ordered 
to  reorganize  and  equip  his  regiment,  the  second 
cavalry,  for  immediate  service  in  the  field.  His 
leave  of  absence  had  not  more  than  half  expired, 
and  it  was  the  only  leave  he  had  had  for  twelve 
long  years. 

The  great  question  of  allegiance  which  Thomas 
had  settled  for  himself  had  proved  a  stumbling-block 
to  all  the  other  field  officers  of  his  regiment.  Colonel 
A.  S.  Johnston,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee, 
and  the  senior  major,  W.  J.  Hardee,  had  resigned 
their  commissions  to  enter  the  Confederate  service, 
and  by  their  resignation  Major  Thomas  was  placed 
in  command  of  the  regiment  as  colonel  on  May  3, 
1861.*  His  promotion  was  thus  regular  and  rapid. 

*  It  has  been  said  that  he  then  took  the  new  and  strengthened 
oath  of  allegiance  twice  on  the  same  day.  As  it  was  required  that 
an  officer  on  being  promoted  to  a  higher  grade  should  again  take 
the  oath,  it  may  well  be  that  the  commissions  of  lieutenant  colonel 
and  colonel  followed  each  other  so  rapidly  that  he  took  the  oath 
twice  in  quick  succession  and  possibly  on  the  same  day. 


THE    CAMPAIGN    WITH    PATTERSON.  3! 

He  was  a  full  colonel  at  the  age  of  forty-four,  and  so 
he  was  unexpectedly  but  richly  rewarded  for  his  ad 
herence  to  the  Union. 

In  November,  1860,  General  Twiggs,  then  in  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  South,  had  dis 
mounted  this  regiment  and  ordered  it  out  of  Texas; 
it  needed,  therefore,  a  thorough  reorganization — re 
cruits,  rearrangement  of  companies  and  assignment 
to  them ;  the  purchase  of  horses  and  preliminary 
drills,  all  of  which  taxed  the  activity  and  industry  of 
Thomas  to  the  utmost.  It  had  been  on  April  10, 
!86i — two  days  before  the  bombardment  of  Fort 
Sumter — that  all  the  companies  of  his  regiment  ex 
cept  two  had  been  sent  to  Carlisle  Barracks,  and 
the  remaining  two  to  Army  Headquarters  at  Wash 
ington.  The  rapidity  with  which  he  put  his  regi 
ment  into  condition  for  service  is  indicated  by  his 
readiness  to  take  immediate  part  in  the  campaign. 

While  at  Carlisle  he  went  out  with  four  companies 
of  his  regiment  to  protect  the  Northern  Central  Rail 
road,  which  was  threatened  from  Maryland.  Every 
day  the  war  clouds  lowered  more  portentously. 
Thomas  was  ordered,  with  these  four  companies,  to 
join  General  Patterson  in  the  Valley  of  Virginia, 
where  the  City  Troop  of  Philadelphia*  was  added  to 

*  The  first  City  Troop  of  Philadelphia  was  an  organization 
which  had  existed  since  the  Revolution  (and  still  exists).  It  acted 
as  escort  to  General  Washington  from  Philadelphia  to  Cambridge 
in  1775.  Its  history  was  published  in  1875. 


32  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

his  force,  and  very  soon  he  was  placed  in  command 
of  a  brigade. 

It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  review 
the  brief  campaign  of  Patterson  except  in  so  far  as 
Thomas  was  concerned  in  it.  It  bore  a  relation  to 
the  general  plan  only  vaguely  discerned  until  after  it 
was  over. 

Had  the  Federal  troops  been  successful  at  Bull 
Run,  it  would  hardly  have  elicited  a  passing  com 
ment  ;  it  would  have  only  been  considered  a  cover 
of  Harper's  Ferry  barring  the  entrance  into  Pennsyl 
vania.  The  defeat  at  Bull  Run  caused  the  authori 
ties  to  look  for  reasons,  and,  in  search  for  a  scape 
goat,  the  blame  fell  upon  Patterson.  The  story  is 
well  known.  General  McDowell,  an  untried  leader  and 
a  favorite  of  General  Scott,  moved  out  from  Wash 
ington  with  an  undrilled  and  undisciplined  force  of 
thirty  thousand  men  to  meet  Beauregard,  who  was 
marching  northward  from  Richmond  with  an  almost 
equal  force,  but  of  men  more  consolidated,  and  in 
spired  by  the  hopes  which  had  fired  the  Southern 
heart.  They  encountered  each  other  at  and  around 
Bull  Run.  These  were  the  chief  combatants,  and  at 
one  time  during  the  action  the  Federal  advance  had 
placed  the  Confederates  in  great  straits,  and  the 
Union  victory  seemed  certain. 

But  besides  these  two  armies,  General  Joseph  E. 
Johnston,  with  Thomas  J.  Jackson  under  his  com 
mand,  was  on  the  Northern  line,  where  he  was  con- 


THE   CAMPAIGN   WITH    PATTERSON.  33 

fronted  by  General  Patterson,  as  aforesaid,  and  in 
his  emergency  Beauregard  awaited  and  hoped  for 
this  re-enforcement. 

The  orders  to  General  Patterson,  it  must  be 
said,  were  not  very  explicit.  He  was  to  drive  John 
ston  back  to  Virginia,  and  also  by  his  menacing  atti 
tude  to  hold  him  in  his  front,  and  thus  prevent  his 
re-enforcing  Beauregard  at  the  critical  moment  so  as 
to  give  him  additional  advantage  over  McDowell's 
army.  The  Confederate  hopes  were  realized.  The 
Union  army  was  overpowered  and  defeated. 

Many  penny-a-liners  have  tried  their  unskilled 
hands  on  this  problem.  To  the  military  critic  it  ap 
pears  that  the  issue  of  the  campaign  ought  not  to 
have  been  unexpected.  The  movement  on  Bull  Run 
was  premature.  The  Union  army  was  in  no  part 
organized  or  drilled.  There  were  no  generals  worthy 
of  the  name  ;  most  brigades  and  some  divisions  were 
commanded  by  colonels  newly  appointed  and  inex 
perienced  ;  the  men  did  not  know  their  officers.  If 
it  be  said  that  the  Southern  force  was  in  the  same 
plight,  that  they  were  fairly  matched,  that  the  Fed 
eral  troops  had  a  large  advantage  at  first,  it  must  be 
added  that  the  first  indication  of  real  strategy  and 
grand  tactics  came  from  the  Confederate  leaders.  The 
final  overwhelming  blow  was  dealt  by  that  very  force 
of  Johnston  which  it  was  vainly  hoped  that  Patterson 
could  hold  in  check. 

Let  us  look  for  the  moment  at  the  means  which 


34  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Patterson  had  of  doing  so.  His  army  consisted 
principally  in  a  small  contingent  of  three  months' 
volunteers,  who  were  so  entirely  unused  to  military 
service  as  to  be  of  very  little  use  in  the  field ;  but 
more  than  that,  their  time  had  almost  expired  and 
the  men  were  eager  to  go  home.  He  followed  John 
ston,  crossing  the  Potomac  at  Williamsport ;  had  a 
slight  skirmish  with  him  on  July  2d  at  Falling 
Waters,  confronted  him  at  Martinsburg,  and  finally 
drove  him  to  Winchester.  It  is  now  manifest  that 
the  movements  of  Johnston  were  of  a  temporizing 
policy  until  he  could  fall  back  by  a  forced  march 
and  join  Beauregard  at  Bull  Run.  Patterson  could 
not  hold  him;  he  was  between  Beauregard  and 
Patterson,  and  every  advance  of  the  latter  drove 
him  toward  the  former.  Could  he  not  have  followed 
him  and  re-enforced  McDowell  ?  It  may  be  said  that, 
with  a  dashing  leader  and  vigorous  troops  in  splendid 
condition  that  was  possible,  with  or  without  orders. 
But  he  had  no  orders.  He  had  vainly  solicited  them 
from  hour  to  hour.  The  auspicious  moment  past. 
Patterson  fell  back  when  Johnston  disappeared  from 
his  front,  and  after  the  defeat  of  our  army  he  was 
overwhelmed  with  bitter  but  ignorant  criticism. 

Wre  need  not  reopen  the  subject  further.  Thus 
much  it  has  been  necessary  to  say,  because  Thomas, 
the  highest  officer  in  his  command,  took  strong 
ground  in  his  favor  when  the  subject  was  under 
going  a  heated  discussion.  In  a  letter  to  General 


THE   CAMPAIGN   WITH    PATTERSON. 


35 


Patterson,  written  before  Atlanta  on  August  8,  1864, 
three  years  after  the  date  of  these  occurrences,  he 
says :  "  Judging  of  them  (the  volunteer  troops)  as  of 
other  volunteer  troops,  had  I  been  their  commander 
I  should  not  have  been  willing  to  risk  them  in  a 
heavy  battle  coming  off  within  a  few  days  of  the  ex 
piration  of  their  service.  I  have  always  believed, 
and  have  frequently  so  expressed  myself,  that  your 
management  of  the  three  months'  campaign  was  able 
and  judicious,  and  was  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
service,  considering  the  means  at  your  disposal  and 
the  nature  of  the  troops  under  your  command." 
Some  military  writers  may  differ  from  General 
Thomas  on  this  subject ;  few  will  deny  that  he  was 
a  competent  critic  and  honest  in  his  judgment.  The 
opinion  expressed  in  the  letter  just  cited  is  that  of  a 
trained  soldier,  a  hero  in  many  actions,  and  who 
was  already  known  as  the  Rock  of  Chickamauga. 

NOTE. — I  have  received  the  following  communication,  bearing 
upon  a  matter  contained  in  this  chapter,  from  a  lady  closely  con 
nected  with  General  Thomas.  I  prefer  to  give  it  as  written, 
rather  than  simply  to  embody  it  in  my  narrative  : 

"  General  Thomas  came  out  of  Texas  with  a  year's  leave  of 
absence,  in  November,  1860,  to  join  Mrs.  Thomas  in  New  York, 
having  obtained  the  leave  some  months  and  only  waiting  for 
some  one  to  relieve  him  at  his  post,  without  any  thought  of 
political  troubles  in  the  country,  and  with  no  reference  to  the 
arrow  wound,  from  which  he  speedily  recovered  and  never  felt 
any  effects  afterward.  He  met  with  a  serious  accident  on  his 
journey,  not  from  a  railroad  disaster,  as  commonly  asserted,  but 
from  a  misstep  in  getting  out  of  the  car  at  night  while  the  train 
was  taking  in  water  somewhere  near  Lynchburg.  Deceived  by 
the  shadows  of  the  moonlight,  he  stepped  out  on  to  what  he  sup- 
4 


36  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

posed  was  the  road,  but  proved  to  be  down  a  deep  ravine,  sustain 
ing  a  fall  of  twenty  feet  or  more.  He  continued  his  journey  to 
Norfolk,  where  Mrs.  Thomas  joined  him  and  remained  there 
until  he  was  able  to  go  to  his  mother's  home  in  Southampton 
County,  Virginia,  suffering  severely.  After  a  visit  of  several 
weeks  he  went  with  Mrs.  Thomas  to  New  York,  stopping  a  few 
days  at  Washington  en  route.  It  was  while  in  New  York  that  he 
fully  realized  the  extent  of  his  injury,  and,  fearing  he  would  never 
be  able  to  do  duty  again  with  his  regiment,  he  began  to  think 
what  he  could  do  in  the  event  of  being  obliged  to  give  up  his 
military  life.  Mrs.  Thomas  saw  in  the  columns  of  the  National 
Intelligencer  an  advertisement  for  commandant  of  cadets  at  the 
Virginia  Military  Institute,  read  it  aloud  to  him,  and  asked  if  he 
could  do  that  duty.  He  said  he  thought  he  could,  and  accord 
ingly  wrote  to  the  superintendent,  Major  F.  H.  Smith,  asking 
about  the  vacancy,  and  received  word  in  reply  that  the  vacancy 
had  been  filled.  There  the  matter  re-.ted,  and  from  these  facts  the 
story  has  grown  that  General  Thomas  applied  for  an  appointment 
in  the  Confederate  army.  He  was  in  New  York  when  his  regi 
ment  arrived  from  Texas,  and  could  easily  have  obtained  a  surgeon's 
certificate  for  inability  to  do  any  duty,  but  preferred  to  make  the 
effort,  suffering  and  disabled  as  he  was.  He  obeyed  the  order  im 
mediately  to  join  his  regiment  at  Carlisle  and  refit  it  for  service. 
It  was  while  on  the  train  for  Carlisle  that  he  first  heard  of  the  at 
tack  on  Fort  Sumter,  and  wrote  to  Mrs.  Thomas  on  his  arrival : 
'  Whichever  way  he  turned  the  matter  over  in  his  mind,  his  oath 
of  allegiance  to  his  Government  always  came  uppermost.' '' 


CHAPTER   III. 

APPOINTED    A    BRIGADIER    GENERAL. 

Kentucky  and  the  Union — General  Robert  Anderson  at  Louis 
ville —  Sherman,  Buell,  Mitchel — Doubts  concerning  Thomas 
overcome— Appointed  brigadier  August  17,  1861 — Assigned 
to  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland — "  The  dark  and 
bloody  ground  " — Preponderating  sentiment  for  the  Union — 
Governor  Magoffin — Bell  and  Everett — Lincoln — Neutrality 
— Buckner  and  the  "  Home  Guard  " — Cumberland  Gap — 
Thomas  goes  toward  East  Tennessee — Zollicoffer — Nelson's 
camp,  "  Dick  Robinson  " — Brownlow,  Nelson,  and  Andrew 
Johnson — Want  of  troops  and  supplies — Forward  and  back — 
Attempt  to  supersede  Thomas — Incessant  labor. 

A  NEW  promotion  now  awaited  Colonel  Thomas. 
With  the  rapid  rush  of  affairs  it  was  soon  manifest 
that  the  border  State  of  Kentucky  would  be  the 
ground  of  fierce  contention  between  the  opposing 
forces.  Should  it  be  swept  into  the  secession  ranks, 
or  should  it  remain  with  the  Union  ?  The  most 
strenuous  efforts  were  made  on  both  sides.  General 
Robert  Anderson,  who  had  become  widely  known  by 
his  defense  of  Fort  Sumter,  and  who  was  a  native  of 
Kentucky,  had  been  sent  to  take  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Tennessee,  and  had  made  his 
headquarters  at  Louisville.  He  had  accepted  on 


38  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

condition  that  h,e  might  name  his  subordinate  briga 
diers.  With  regard  to  three  of  them  he  had  no 
trouble — viz.,  William  T.  Sherman,  Buell,  and  O.  M. 
Mitchel.  He  was  in  doubt  as  to  the  fourth,  and  was 
just  about  to  nominate  Simon  B.  Buckner,  who  soon 
after  went  into  the  Confederate  ranks,  when  his  atten 
tion  was  called  to  Colonel  Thomas,  whom  he  had 
known  in  the  service  before.  He  nominated  Thomas 
to  the  President,  and  this  nomination  was  fortified 
by  the  recommendation  of  the  Hon.  Samuel  J.  Ran 
dall,  who  had  served  under  him  in  the  first  City 
Troop  of  Philadelphia  during  the  campaign  of  Gen 
eral  Patterson. 

The  Government  still  looked  askance  upon  an 
officer  of  Virginia  birth,  and  who  also  belonged 
to  the  Second  Cavalry,  the  ranks  of  which  had  been 
greatly  depleted  by  the  wholesale  resignation  of 
Southern  officers  with  whom  it  had  been  largely  filled 
by  Jefferson  Davis. 

General  Sherman,  in  his  Memoirs,  declares  as  much 
when  he  says  that  General  Anderson,  who  had  gone 
to  Washington  to  present  his  views  and  receive  in 
structions,  and  had  asked  for  the  appointment  of 
certain  officers  to  serve  under  him  as  brigadiers, 
had  some  difficulty  in  prevailing  on  Mr.  Lincoln  to 
appoint  George  H.  Thomas,  a  native  of  Virginia,  to 
be  brigadier  general,  because  so  many  Southern  offi 
cers  had  already  left  the  army  to  join  the  Confed 
erate  service. 


APPOINTED   A   BRIGADIER   GENERAL. 


39 


Thomas  was  doubly  unfortunate  because,  besides 
being  suspected  by  the  Federal  Government,  he  was 
regarded  by  many  at  the  South  as  a  traitor  whose  sin 
was  unpardonable.  The  scruples  of  the  President 
were,  however,  overcome.  His  appointment  as  briga 
dier  general  dates  from  August  17,  1861,  and  he  was 
assigned  to  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  on 
the  24th  of  the  same  month.  Beyond  the  recognition 
of  his  merits  by  his  comrades  in  the  army,  he  was  as 
yet  an  unknown  man,  and  the  first  steps  of  the  career 
now  opening  to  him  were  full  of  doubt  and  danger, 
which  would  tax  not  only  his  military  judgment  but 
also  his  moral  courage  to  the  utmost.  The  region 
in  which  he  was  called  to  serve  and  try  his  "  'prentice 
hand "  was  the  debatable  land  between  the  North 
and  South — a  veritable  "  Chevy  Chase." 

In  order  to  form  a  just  estimate  of  what  was  be 
ing  done  and  what  was  to  be  done  in  Kentucky,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  take  a  look  backward  upon  the 
political  condition  of  affairs  in  that  State.  Peopled 
mainly  by  emigrants  from  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas, 
it  was  considered  by  the  casual  observer  to  be  as 
Southern  in  its  character  as  any  of  the  States  about  to 
secede  and  enter  the  Southern  Confederacy  ;  and  yet, 
to  the  astonishment  of  the  Southern  people  them 
selves,  it  became  evident,  as  political  matters  were 
converging  to  a  crisis  in  1861,  that  Kentucky  would 
be  loyal  to  the  Union.  "  It  is  unquestionably  though 
painfully  true,"  says  Edward  A.  Pollard,  "that  the 


40  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

great  body  of  the  people  of  Kentucky  were  the  ac 
tive  allies  of  Lincoln." 

Kentucky  had  been  known  in  its  earlier  history 
as  the  "  dark  and  bloody  ground  "  of  fierce  Indian 
tribes;  it  continued  to  deserve  the  name  during  the 
Revolution,  when  Great  Britain  formed  alliances  with 
the  Indians.  The  treaty  of  peace  and  Jay's  later 
treaty  did  not  entirely  stop  the  fighting  there.  It 
came  into  the  Union  as  a  State  in  1792,  and  ranked 
with  the  South  in  character.  But  the  preponderance 
of  loyal  men  in  Kentucky  required  gradual  demon 
stration  ;  indeed,  it  took  some  time  for  men  to  know 
their  own  minds. 

In  1859  it  seemed  that  the  State  was  so  strongly 
proslavery  in  the  approaching  controversy  that 
Governor  Magoffin  was  elected  on  that  issue,  and  it 
might  be  well  feared  that  it  would  join  the  Southern 
States  in  the  coming  contest. 

In  1860,  however,  this  fear  was  dispelled  by  the 
nomination  of  a  Presidential  ticket  with  the  names  of 
Bell  and  Everett,  which  certainly  looked  toward 
gradual  emancipation,  which  then  seemed  possible. 
That  ticket  was  elected  in  Kentucky,  and  this  greatly 
strengthened  the  hands  of  Union  men.  They  began 
at  once  to  fight  the  secession  movement  at  every 
point,  and  to  dwell  upon  the  vast  commercial  ad 
vantages  which  Kentucky  would  enjoy  within  the 
Union.  Just  after  the  election  of  Lincoln  the  State 
Legislature  met,  and  while  they  defended  slavery  as 


APPOINTED   A    BRIGADIER    GENERAL.          4I 

an  existing  institution,  they  were  strong  for  the 
Union,  denounced  secession,  and  deprecated  war. 
Then  began  a  game  of  wits.  A  State  guard  was 
organized  which  was  intended  to  be  neutral ;  but 
when  Buckner  took  command  of  it  and  posted  it  at 
Bowling  Green,  it  was  soon  declared  to  be  in  the 
secession  interests.  Governor  Magoffin  had  refused 
to  enlist  the  troops  called  for  by  Lincoln's  proclama 
tion ;  but  when,  on  July  4,  1861,  the  President  called 
an  extra  session  of  Congress,  the  members  sent  from 
Kentucky  were  all  Union  men.  This  was  the  signal 
for  political  disintegration  ;  the  secessionists  of  Ken 
tucky  scattered  to  the  South  and  took  up  arms  with 
the  South  ;  the  State  was  strong  for  the  Union.  The 
controversy  became  and  remained  indeed  a  purely 
political  one,  but  the  soil  of  Kentucky  was  the  scene 
of  varied  strategy  and  bloody  battles  to  the  end  of 
the  war. 

Buckner,  with  the  Home  Guard,  had  joined  the 
Confederate  ranks  and  taken  post  at  Bowling  Green, 
Kentucky,  on  the  Big  Barren  Branch  of  the  Green 
River,  a  tributary  of  the  Ohio,  to  await  the  progress 
of  events  and  soon  to  join  fiercely  in  the  strife.  -  Thus 
the  State  was  in  a  condition  of  the  greatest  turmoil ; 
loyal  Kentuckians  were  in  danger  of  being  overpow 
ered  and  silenced  by  secession  forces.  Honest  but 
ignorant  men  were  told  that  their  slaves  would  be  at 
once  taken  from  them,  although  the  President  had 
declared  that  he  had  no  such  purpose.  Such  men 


42  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

armed  to  defend  their  property.  In  this  condition  of 
things  it  seemed  good  policy  to  send  to  Kentucky  of 
ficers  of  Southern  birth  who  had  remained  loyal  to  the 
Union  and  who  could  yet  understand  the  difficulties 
of  their  Southern  brethren.  Among  these  were  Thom 
as  J.  Wood,  Rousseau,  Ward,  R.  W.  Johnson,  and  Boyle. 
Such  was  certainly  the  reason  also  of  sending 
Thomas  to  Kentucky,  and  great  hopes  were  enter 
tained  of  the  Union  movements  there.  With  the  ex 
ception  of  the  early  and  tentative  affairs  in  Western 
Virginia  under  McClellan  and  Rosecrans,  there  had 
as  yet  been  no  Federal  victory.  The  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  fought  in  July,  1861,  was  a  great  defeat  for  the 
Union  arms.  The  whole  loyal  North  was  on  the 
tiptoe  of  expectation  and  impatient  hope  for  some 
cheering  event  to  wipe  out  that  disgrace.  New  gen 
erals  were  being  appointed.  Troops  were  in  motion 
and  being  encamped  upon  objective  points  of  the 
irregular  chess  board.  A  gleam  of  victory  would  be 
hailed  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  and  the  general 
who  should  achieve  it  would  be  regarded,  among  the 
host  of  untried  commanders,  as  the  "  coming  man  " 
who  was  so  greatly  needed.  Such  were  some  of  the 
strong  incentives  among  the  data  of  the  problem 
presented  to  Thomas  in  Kentucky.  Just  at  this 
juncture  General  Anderson's  health  failed,  and  he 
asked  to  be  relieved  of  his  command,  in  which  he  was 
succeeded  by  General  William  T.  Sherman  early  in 
September,  1861. 


APPOINTED   A   BRIGADIER   GENERAL. 


43 


We  may  now  stop  for  a  moment  to  consider  the 
strategy  of  the  proposed  campaign.  An  examination 
of  the  ground  will  display  its  main  features  at  a 
glance.  Thomas  had  studied  the  situation,  both  of 
fensive  and  defensive.  His  purpose  was  to  go  at 
once  into  East  Tennessee,  in  which  there  were  many 
loyal  Union  men  cruelly  oppressed  by  the  Confeder 
ate  forces  raised  in  that  region  and  by  public  South 
ern  opinion.  These  he  would  rescue  and  relieve 
from  their  sufferings,  and  thus  at  the  same  time  re 
cruit  the  Union  ranks.  He  would  also  seize  the  rail 
road,  the  main  artery  of  the  Confederacy,  running 
from  Richmond  into  Georgia,  Alabama,  and  Missis 
sippi.  Thus  he  would  cut  their  communications 
with  the  North,  and  provide  a  good  starting  point 
for  the  Southern  movements.  Chattanooga  would 
fall  into  Union  hands. 

Many  of  these  loyal  East  Tennesseeans  who  had 
fled  into  Kentucky  were  clamorous  for  an  immediate 
movement  of  Union  troops  to  relieve  their  oppressed 
brethren.  Thomas  reported  to  Sherman  at  Louis 
ville  on  September  6,  1861,  and  saw  at  once  the  dif 
ficult  nature  of  the  problem  as  I  have  endeavored  to 
show  it;  it  was  not  only  a  military  but  a  political 
situation.  There  were  many  impatient  people  mak 
ing  a  din  about  his  ears  from  the  very  start.  The 
authorities  at  Washington  were  urging  the  move 
ment  upon  Sherman,  and  Sherman  was  astounding 
them  with  the  magnitude  of  his  demands  for  the 


44  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

success  of  such  a  movement.  The  army  was  ex 
pecting  it,  and  the  loyal  East  Tennesseeans,  backed 
rather  impatiently  by  ex-Governor  Andrew  Johnson 
and  others,  were  clamorous  to  be  taken  back  home 
protected  by  Union  troops.  But  where  were  the 
troops  with  which  to  accomplish  this  ?  They  were 
not  yet  collected,  and  when  collected  they  could 
hardly  be  called  troops. 

Lieutenant  William  Nelson,  of  the  navy,  a  loyal 
Kentuckian,  who  happened  to  be  at  home  on  furlough, 
was  given,  without  its  interfering  with  his  naval 
rank,  an  appointment  as  brigadier  general  of  volun 
teers.  He  was  a  man  cast  in  a  gigantic  mould,  of 
stern  character,  dogmatic  will,  great  energy,  and 
strong  prejudice.  He  was  selected  to  form  the 
nucleus  of  an  army  for  this  campaign.  With  this 
purpose  he  established  his  headquarters  in  middle 
Kentucky  very  near  the  Kentucky  River,  about  fifty 
miles  south  of  Frankfort,  which  he  named  "  Camp 
Dick  Robinson." 

There  were  congregated  the  most  motley  crowd 
that  ever  bore  the  name  of  soldiers.  There  were 
loyal  men  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  especially 
East  Tennessee,  called  "Andrew  Johnson's  men"; 
adventurers  from  Ohio  to  whom  such  an  opportunity 
was  a  Godsend;  but  the  prevailing  spirit  was  that 
of  loyalty  to  the  Union.  They  were  not  deceived  by 
the  proffer  that  if  they  would  disband  so  would 
Buckner — every  day  showed  the  absolute  impracti- 


APPOINTED   A   BRIGADIER   GENERAL. 


45 


cability  of  such  a  course;  nor  by  the  specious  proc 
lamation  of  Zollicoffer,  that  he  was  coming  "  to  de 
fend  the  soil  of  a  sister  Southern  State  against  an  in 
vading  foe,  and  that  no  citizen  of  Kentucky  was  to 
be  molested  in  person  or  property,  whatever  his 
political  opinions,  unless  found  in  arms  against  the 
Confederate  Government,  or  giving  aid  and  comfort 
to  the  enemy  by  his  counsels." 

The  moving  spirits  on  the  Union  side  in  East 
Tennessee  besides  Andrew  Johnson,  later  to  be 
President  of  the  United  States,  were  "  Parson  Brown- 
low,"  who  stirred  the  people  by  his  rugged  ha 
rangues,  and  T.  A.  R.  Nelson,  a  patriot  of  a  poetic 
temperament  and  golden-mouthed  oratory.  "It  is 
not  difficult,"  says  General  Howard,  "to  imagine  all 
the  chaos  of  this  big  camp.  The  ever-changing 
commanders  of  the  department  or  district,  and  the 
ambition  of  great  men,  who,  as  yet  unused  to  war,  had 
come  hither  to  assert  their  prerogatives,  were  among 
the  prime  causes.  Above  and  below  Thomas  there 
was  commotion  and  perpetual  unrest.  Steady,  strong, 
firm,  deliberate,  he  brought  order  out  of  confusion." 

Recruits  were  taken  thither  without  equipment 
and  without  proper  supplies  of  any  sort ;  every  day 
accessions  were  made  of  men,  but  not  of  supplies; 
and  yet  out  of  these  chaotic  elements  it  was  hoped 
that  a  skillful  commander  could  at  once  create  an 
army.  Thomas  was  the  devoted  man  to  whom  this 
duty  was  intrusted.  He  was  assigned  to  the  com- 


46  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

mand  of  "  Camp  Dick  Robinson  "  on  September  i2th. 
The  disloyal  Kentuckians  laid  plans  to  capture  him 
on  his  journey  thither,  but  he  avoided  their  snares 
and  arrived  safely  on  the  i5th,  where  he  found  about 
six  thousand  men,  and  where  his  eyes  were  at  once 
opened  to  the  difficulty  of  the  situation.  The  pros 
pect  was  indeed  a  gloomy  one.  There  was  great 
want  of  arms,  ammunition,  food,  clothing,  and 
shelter.  His  first  act  was  to  appoint  a  quarter 
master  and  a  commissary  of  subsistence.  The  men 
were  soon  comfortably  sheltered  and  fed.  Then  he 
wrote  with  great  insistency  for  a  full  supply  of  ra 
tions,  cartridges,  and  muskets.  Men,  he  said,  were 
of  no  use  without  these  ;  and  yet  men  were  coming 
in  numbers.  The  very  fact  of  his  taking  command 
caused  many  loyal  men  to  flock  to  the  standard, 
while  disloyalty  found  its  place  in  the  rapidly  in 
creasing  armies  of  the  Confederacy  or  in  the  form  of 
the  guerrilla  warfare. 

He  set  himself  busily  to  work  to  give  form  and 
consistence  to  this  heterogeneous  mass.  It  was 
soon  organized  into  six  regiments ;  others  were 
added  later.  Other  regiments  in  better  condition 
were  also  forwarded  to  him ;  these  were  all  arranged 
in  four  brigades,  constituting  the  First  Division  of 
"  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  with  a  proportional 
force  of  unattached  cavalry  and  artillery.* 

*  "  Such  was  the  promising  nucleus  of  that  great  army  which 
later  on  swept  through  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Georgia,  the  two 


APPOINTED   A   BRIGADIER   GENERAL.          47 

The  department  was  now  commanded  by  General 
Sherman,  and  the  troops  thus  far  organized  had  been 
designated  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  on  account 
of  the  great  strategic  value  of  that  river.  Thomas 
was  obliged  also  to  create  a  staff  out  of  his  undis 
ciplined  material.  By  constant  drills  and  a  rigorous 
system  of  camp  police  he  had  effected  a  great  trans 
formation,  and  his  troops  were  every  day  becoming 
more  and  more  fitted,  as  they  were  more  and  more 
anxious,  to  be  led  against  the  enemy.  After  this 
preparation  they  now  only  waited  for  orders,  and 
these  were  earnestly  solicited. 

In  what  direction  should  he  move  ?  His  first 
suggestion  was  to  advance  rapidly  through  Cumber 
land  Gap  upon  Knoxville,  an  important  strategic 
point  as  we  have  seen,  and  after  destroying  the  East 
Tennessee  and  Virginia  Railroad  he  would  follow 
the  enemy  in  the  mountains  and  capture  or  disperse 
his  army.  But  the  enemy  had  not  been  idle  either.  A 
force  under  General  Zollicoff er,  acting,  it  is  said,  with 
out  orders,  had  made  a  rapid  advance  upon  Loudon 
through  the  Cumberland  Gap,  that  narrow  and  vital 
mountain  pass,  very  near  the  point  where  the  States 
of  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee  meet.  It  was 
a  fair  trial  of  conclusions  between  the  two  forces, 
Thomas  intending  to  pass  through  Cumberland  Gap 

Carolinas,  and  Virginia,  and  was  finally  reviewed  at  Washington, 
before  it  melted  away  into  the  peaceable  elements  from  which  it 
had  thus  early  been  organized." 


48  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

into  East  Tennessee,  while  Zollicoffer  really  passed 
through  it  into  Kentucky.  According  to  the  Con 
federate  account,  Zollicoffer  had  already,  on  Septem 
ber  29th,  dispersed  a  small  Union  camp  at  Barbours- 
ville  on  the  Cumberland,  about  seventy  miles  north 
of  Knoxville.  Then  General  Schoepf,  who  had  been 
sent  out  by  General  Thomas  to  contest  his  ad 
vance,  in  the  fear  of  being  flanked  by  the  enemy 
from  Bowling  Green,  had  rapidly  retired.  Thus 
the  plans  of  the  Union  general  were  changed ;  he 
pushed  forward  a  large  party  to  obstruct  the  roads 
by  which  the  enemy  would  advance,  and  at  the  same 
time  called  urgently  for  re-enforcements.  His  ac 
tion  seemed  to  throw  Zollicoffer  into  a  state  of  in 
decision  ;  instead  of  marching  in  advance  from  Lou- 
don  to  Rock  Castle  Hills,  he  fell  back  to  Cumber 
land  ford. 

While  Thomas  was  exhibiting  incessant  activity 
in  bringing  order  out  of  this  chaos  and  catching 
glimpses  of  success  at  the  end,  he  was  almost 
stunned  by  a  letter  received  from  General  O.  M. 
Mitchel  at  Cincinnati,  who  had,  like  himself,  been 
recently  appointed  a  brigadier  general  and  was 
only  a  few  days  his  senior,  inclosing  an  order  from 
the  Secretary  of  War  directing  him  to  take  com 
mand  of  the  department,  and  to  supersede  Thomas 
in  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  upon  which  he  had 
just  entered.  Thomas  might  well  object,  for  thus 
he  would  be  robbed  of  the  glory  which  should  follow 


APPOINTED   A   BRIGADIER   GENERAL.          49 

from  its  success.  He  was  not  the  man  to  permit 
this.  The  Government  might  supersede  him,  it  was 
true,  but  he  would  not  fight  under  Mitchel  in  that 
campaign.  He  wrote  to  him  courteously  but  firmly, 
expressing  his  dissatisfaction,  and  declaring  that  he 
would  refuse  to  serve  under  him.  Should  the  order 
be  enforced  he  would  retire. 

In  the  chaotic  condition  of  affairs  in  that  region 
it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the  publication  of 
this  order  was  dictated  by  any  suspicion  as  to  the 
loyalty  and  ability  of  Thomas.  In  its  state  of  doubt 
and  uncertainty  the  Government  was  glad  to  listen 
to  any  suggestions  which  might  lead  to  success,  and 
thus  it  was  that  Mitchel  was  advanced,  with  little 
consideration  of  the  man  whom  he  should  supersede. 
But  yet  it  is  probable  that  he  thought  it  implied 
suspicion,  and  he  felt  that  he  must  vindicate  both 
his  patriotism  and  his  powers.  He  also  wrote  to 
Sherman,  who  was  still  in  command  in  that  region  of 
the  forces  now  called  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
The  prompt  reply  was  very  gratifying.  "You  are 
authorized,"  Sherman  said,  "  to  go  on  and  prepare 
your  command  for  active  service.  General  Mitchel 
is  subject  to  my  orders,  and  I  will,  if  possible,  give 
you  the  opportunity  to  complete  what  you  have  be 
gun."  Thus  his  first  great  peril  was  overcome. 
The  unbiassed  reader  will  at  once  concede  that 
Thomas  was  right.  To  be  superseded  was  tanta 
mount,  in  his  judgment,  to  a  charge  against  him  that 


$0  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

he  had  not  shown  himself  the  man  for  the  occasion. 
That  demanded  a  reason,  and  a  strong  one.  Did  it 
imply  incapacity  or  disloyalty  ?  He  had  a  right  to 
know  ;  indeed,  he  felt  that,  instead  of  being  neglected 
or  set  aside,  he  deserved  special  consideration. 
However,  the  order  was  suspended,  and  Thomas 
pushed  preparations  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

The  larger  strategy  of  the  enemy  was  now  mani 
fest.  His  long  and  weak  line,  greatly  exaggerated  in 
numbers,  in  order  to  deceive  the  Union  generals,  ex 
tended  from  Fort  Henry  through  Bowling  Green 
and  up  the  Cumberland  as  far  as  Cumberland  Gap. 
Thomas,  who  was  now  in  firm  command  of  the  First 
Division,  consisting  of  four  brigades,  was  operating 
against  its  right,  but  with  obstacles  not  only  in  his 
front  but  in  his  rear  and  in  his  midst.  The  troops 
were  still  undrilled  and  undisciplined,  they  were  ill- 
armed  and  ill-clad,  but  as  an  offset  to  these  evils 
they  were  very  earnest  and  ardent,  and  anxious  to 
be  led  against  the  enemy. 


CHAPTER   IV. 

MILL    SPRINGS. 

Opposing  counsels — Festina  lente — Clamor  from  Washington — 
Schoepf  toward  Somerset — At  Crab  Orchard — Army  of  the 
Cumberland  becomes  Army  of  the  Ohio — Sherman  relieved 
by  Buell — Schoepf  left  at  Somerset — Back  to  Columbia — 
Zollicoffer  and  Crittenden  advance — Mill  Springs — Logan's 
Cross  Roads — Fierce  attack — Repulse — Rapid  retreat — Re- 
cross  the  Cumberland — Pursuit  soon  abandoned — Great  joy 
in  the  land — Thomas  not  mentioned  in  General  Order — Re 
sults  of  victory. 

WHILE  Andrew  Johnson  had  been,  indecorously 
and  without  a  show  of  authority,  urging  Thomas  to 
move  into  East  Tennessee,  Sherman  had  warned  him 
not  to  push  too  far  and  endanger  his  line  of  communi 
cations.  The  Government  at  Washington  became 
also  clamorous  for  a  movement  and  a  battle.  He 
kept  his  own  counsel,  got  such  supplies  and  re-en 
forcements  as  he  could,  and  watched  the  apparently 
irresolute  enemy.  The  result  was  cheering.  Indeed, 
it  was  a  military  dance  of  forward  and  back.  General 
Garrard  with  the  Third  Kentucky  Regiment  was  at 
Rock  Castle  Hills,  and  as  the  enemy  advanced 
Thomas  sent  a  part  of  the  First  Brigade  under 
its  chief,  General  Schoepf,  consisting  of  the  Four- 
5 


52  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

teenth  Ohio,  Fourth  Kentucky,  and  two  batteries,  to 
reconnoitre  as  far  as  Somerset.  The  latter  had  not 
moved  far,  however,  before  he  came  upon  the  pickets 
of  Zollicoffer,  who  had  come  from  Cumberland  Gap 
through  Monticello,  and  who  after  a  smart  skirmish 
fell  back.  A  week  after,  Thomas  moved  his  head 
quarters  forward  to  Crab  Orchard  with  full  intent  to 
beat  up  the  enemy's  quarters  wherever  he  should 
be;  but  an  order  form  Sherman  again  checked  him, 
and  required  him  to  withdraw  his  command  across 
the  Kentucky  River.  The  scouting  was  not  well 
done  and  the  air  was  full  of  rumors. 

The  Confederate  General  A.  S.  Johnston  had  oc 
cupied  Bowling  Green,  and  was  said  to  have  a  com 
mand  of  forty-five  thousand  men.  It  was  afterward 
found  that  this  had  been  magnified  nearly  threefold. 
It  was  asserted  that  he  was  about  to  cut  the  Union 
line  between  Thomas  at  Crab  Orchard  and  McCook 
at  Nolensville.  Thus  drawn  back  and  held  in  leash, 
Thomas  was  obliged  to  abandon  his  scheme  tem 
porarily  ;  and  he  was  not  even  permitted  to  re-en 
force  Schoepf  at  Somerset.  All  this  was  due  to  an 
important  change  which  was  about  to  be  made.  By 
an  order  bearing  date  of  November  i5th,  the  coming 
event  having  cast  its  shadow  before,  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  became  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
General  W.  T.  Sherman  was  relieved  from  the  com 
mand,  and  was  succeeded  by  General  Don  Carlos 
Buell.  The  former  had  been  considered  visionary 


MILL   SPRINGS.  53 

even  to  the  verge  of  insanity  on  account  of  his  esti 
mate  given  to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  'the  number 
of  troops  necessary  for  the  successful  conduct  of 
the  campaign  in  that  region.  When  men  of  good 
common  sense  were  declaring  that,  with  seventy-five 
thousand  three  months'  men  for  an  entire  army,  sixty 
days  would  end  the  war,  Sherman's  estimate  that 
two  hundred  thousand  would  be  necessary  in  Ken 
tucky  and  Tennessee  alone  seemed  like  the  dream 
of  a  madman.  His  reputed  ravings  proved  after 
ward  to  be  the  utterance  of  sober  truth,  and  the 
splendid  method  in  his  madness  throughout  the  war 
was  a  strong  factor  in  achieving  the  final  Union 
success.  General  Buell  was  a  noble  soldier — one  of 
the  very  best  of  his  time.  He  was  stern,  determined, 
and  dignified,  somewhat  cautious,  but  an  excellent 
administrator.  He  too  was  later  to  suffer  from  the 
unmilitary  impatience  of  his  superiors.  Both  these 
generals  knew  Thomas  well ;  Sherman  was  his  class 
mate  at  West  Point,  and  Buell,  in  the  class  after  him, 
was  three  years  his  companion  there.  Caution,  how 
ever,  was  the  order  of  the  day  at  those  headquarters. 
Schoepf  was  left  at  Somerset,  while  Thomas,  in  or 
der  to  shorten  the  Union  line,  was  ordered  to  fall 
back  upon  Lebanon  and  Danville.  The  enemy  bom 
barded  Schoepf,  and  he  was  then  re-enforced. 

It  was  considered  that  Thomas  could  march 
more  safely  southward  by  way  of  Columbia,  to 
make  connection  with  Schoepf,  and  that  thus  united 


54  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

they  could  march  upon  the  new  camp  of  the  enemy 
at  Beech  Grove.  Crittenden  had  proceeded  first  to 
Mill  Springs  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Cumberland, 
and  then,  having  surprised  or  outwitted  the  Union 
Ferry  Guards,  had  encamped  at  Beech  Grove  on  the 
north  bank. 

The  line  of  Thomas,  who  on  the  2pth  was  placed 
in  command  of  all  the  troops  east  of  New  Haven, 
was  thus  posted :  The  First  and  Second  Tennessee 
and  the  Seventh  Kentucky  were  at  Loudon  ;  the 
Fourteenth  Ohio,  Tenth  Indiana,  and  Fourth  and 
Tenth  Kentucky,  with  a  battery,  were  at  Lebanon  ; 
the  Third  Kentucky  and  First  Kentucky  Cavalry 
were  at  Columbia ;  the  Thirty-third  Indiana  was 
at  Crab  Orchard ;  the  Thirty-first  Ohio,  the  Thirty- 
first  Ohio  Battery,  and  a  contingent  of  Cavalry  were 
at  Camp  "  Dick  Robinson  " ;  the  Seventeenth  and 
Thirty-third  Ohio,  with  a  battery,  were  near  Som 
erset.  This  line  did  not  long  remain  ;  the  forces 
were  moved  by  every  whim  or  fancy  from  head 
quarters. 

We  may  pause  for  a  moment  to  take  a  glance  at 
the  force  which  Thomas  was  now  about  to  encoun 
ter.  It  numbered  between  ten  thousand  and  fifteen 
thousand  men.  The  advance,  consisting  of  two 
thousand  men,  was  commanded  by  General  Zolli- 
coffer,  a  native  Tennesseean,  a  man  of  great  worth, 
an  editor,  and  a  member  of  Congress,  who  in  1861 
had  become  a  brigadier  general  in  the  Confederate 


MILL  SPRINGS.  55 

service.  He  had  led  the  advance,  but  this  and  the 
whole  remaining  force  were  under  the  command  of 
General  George  B.  Crittenden,  a  graduate  of  West 
Point  and  a  soldier  of  experience,  who  had  served 
in  the  Black  Hawk  War,  the  Texan  Revolution  of 
1835,  and  the  Mexican  War.  His  encampment  at 
Beech  Grove  betokened  his  purpose  to  fight,  and 
now  instructions  had  been  given  to  Thomas  to  meet 
him.  It  was  claimed  afterward,  in  extenuation  of  his 
defeats,  that  Crittenden  had  no  alternative  but  to 
fight.  He  was  almost  without  supplies,  and  the 
country  could  not  provide  them.  General  Critten 
den  joined  the  advance  and  assumed  the  command 
on  January  i,  1862. 

On  December  2pth  Buell  ordered  Thomas  to 
march  southward  and  to  join  Schoepf.  This  was  the 
permission  so  long  waited  for.  He  started  on  the 
3ist  from  Lebanon  through  Columbia  ;  but  so  serious 
were  the  troubles  and  the  obstacles  that  confronted 
him  that  it  took  him  eighteen  days  to  march  to 
Logan's  Cross  Roads,  so  near  Mill  Springs,  on  the 
southern  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  that  it  is  the 
alternative  name  of  the  battle  field.  It  was  an  un 
commonly  rainy  season.  The  roads  were  very  diffi 
cult  for  the  transportation  of  supplies  and  ammuni 
tion  and  for  the  movement  of  artillery. 

Again,  as  his  progress  was  retarded,  new  clamors 
arose  at  his  delay.  At  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  when 
he  reached  it,  he  communicated  with  Schoepf,  who 


56  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

sent  him  re-enforcements;  and  he  was  obliged  to 
pause  until  he  could  in  a  manner  reorganize  and 
prepare  for  the  work  before  him.  Thus,  moving 
himself  with  a  small  division  from  Columbia,  he  was 
to  join  Schoepf,  who  was  marching  with  his  brigade 
from  Somerset,  thirty  miles  south.  They  were  to 
join  forces  before  the  enemy  could  attack  either  in 
detail.  Crittenden's  force  had  crossed  the  Cumber 
land  at  a  point  between  the  two  and  ten  miles  south 
of  Thomas.  It  must  be  observed  that  at  the  last 
moment  this  union  of  the  forces  of  Thomas  and 
Schoepf  was  a  delicate  matter  in  front  of  the  enemy. 
It  was  a  question  of  exactitude  in  point  of  time.  The 
place  where  Schoepf  was  to  join  him  was  at  or  near 
Beach  Grove,  and  thus  he  would  defeat  the  purpose 
of  the  enemy  to  strike  the  Union  army  in  detail. 

The  description  of  the  field  of  battle  may  be 
epitomized.  Thomas  lay  along  the  Somerset  road 
and  across  the  Mill  Springs  road.  His  purpose  of 
advance  and  attack  was  fortunately  forestalled  by 
Crittenden,  who  left  his  camp  at  Beach  Grove  ori 
the  Cumberland  and  marched  at  a  quick  step  the 
ten  miles  to  Logan's  Cross  Roads  on  the  evening  of 
January  i8th.  Early  the  next  morning,  hoping  to 
overpower  Thomas  before  he  had  concentrated  his 
troops  and  disposed  them  for  battle,  Crittenden, 
driving  in  Woolford's  cavalry,  attacked  vigorously 
and  was  promptly  repulsed.  Zollicoffer  had  moved 
at  midnight,  and  at  the  dawn  of  Sunday — a  dark  and 


Sketch. 

OF 
THE  BATTLEFIELD  OF 

LOGAN'S  CROSS  ROADS, 

OR 

MILL  SPRINGS. 

January  lOth,  1SG2. 


MILL   SPRINGS.  57 

rainy  Sunday — the  attack  was  made.  The  enemy 
advanced  to  the  crest  of  the  last  intervening  hill. 
There  halting,  he  sent  for  re-enforcements.  Critten- 
den's  advance  was  disclosed  by  Woolford's  cavalry. 

The  attack  was  expected  and  received  by  Colonel 
Hanson's  Second  Brigade,  supported  by  Colonel  S. 
S.  Fry,  of  the  Fourth  Kentucky.  These  troops  held 
the  enemy  in  check.  With  all  speed  General  Thomas 
ordered  forward  the  Tenth  Indiana.  Thus  met  in 
front,  the  enemy,  advancing  through  a  cornfield,  en 
deavored  to  flank  the  left  of  Colonel  Fry's  regiment ; 
but  the  prompt  advance  of  the  Tennessee  Brigade 
against  the  enemy's  right,  and  the  rapid  firing  of  a 
section  of  Captain  Kinney's  battery,  posted  to  the 
left  of  that  regiment,  put  a  stop  to  his  advance.  The 
Fourth  Kentucky  and  the  Tenth  Indiana,  being  now 
out  of  ammunition,  were  replaced  by  the  Second  Min 
nesota  and  the  Ninth  Ohio,  who  charged  the  enemy 
on  his  left  with  fixed  bayonets.  But  there  was  no 
longer  need  of  force.  Crittenden  had  had  enough  of 
the  fight ;  he  fell  back  in  haste.  The  Union  line  was 
reformed,  an  advance,  conducted  with  due  caution, 
forced  the  enemy  still  farther  back  to  his  distant  in- 
trenchments,  and  on  reaching  them  Thomas  ordered 
a  vigorous  cannonade  upon  them.  It  is  said  that  in 
the  confusion  Zollicoffer  mistook  Fry's  command  for 
some  of  his  own  troops,  and,  advancing  to  join  them, 
was  killed  by  a  pistol  shot  fired  by  Fry  himself.  At 
the  same  time  Fry's  horse  was  shot.  Thomas  had 


58  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

followed  the  enemy  closely,  and  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  ipth  he  reformed  his  line  of  battle  very 
near  to  their  intrenchments  and  opened  upon  them 
with  his  artillery.  But  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs 
had  been  already  won. 

Through  the  night  Thomas  made  all  his  arrange 
ments  in  preparation  for  an  attack  at  dawn,  not 
doubting  that  he  would  meet  with  a  stern  resistance. 
We  may  judge  of  his  astonishment  when  he  found  at 
the  earliest  streaks  of  day  that  Crittenden  had  left 
his  intrenchments  with  such  precipitancy  that  he  had 
abandoned  everything  behind  them — one  hundred 
and  sixty  wagons  filled  with  supplies,  and  all  his  ar 
tillery  and  ammunition  trains.  It  was  very  difficult 
to  understand  this  lame  and  impotent  conclusion  of 
his  boastful  advance.  The  disorder  in  his  ranks, 
however,  whatever  the  reason,  merged  into  panic. 
He  made  haste  to  cross  the  Cumberland  and  place  it 
as  a  barrier  between  himself  and  his  triumphant  foe. 
This  was  done  by  a  steamer  and  three  ferryboats, 
which  were  then  burned  to  obstruct  the  pursuit. 
Thomas,  crossing  a  portion  of  his  force  in  skiffs,  pur 
sued  him  as  far  as  Monticello,  where  the  enemy  had 
arrived  in  a  starving  condition,  and  then  slowly  re 
turned  to  Somerset.  The  Union  losses  had  not  been 
great ;  they  were  but  one  officer  and  thirty-eight 
men  killed,  fourteen  officers  and  one  hundred  and 
ninety-four  men  wounded.  Those  of  the  enemy 
were  greater — viz.,  one  hundred  and  twenty  killed, 


MILL   SPRINGS.  59 

three  hundred  and  forty-nine  wounded  and  prisoners. 
Computing  the  numbers  actually  engaged,  there  was 
a  great  disparity  between  the  forces.  The  army  of 
Crittenden  numbered  in  action  twelve  thousand  men, 
while  that  of  Thomas  consisted  of  eight  regiments, 
or  scant  seven  thousand  men. 

The  battle  is  known  by  three  titles — Logan's 
Cross  Roads,  Fishing  Creek,  and  Mill  Springs;  the 
last  named  is  the  most  commonly  used.  It  was  hailed 
with  shouts  of  joy  throughout  the  country.  Buell's 
order  of  the  day — January  23,  1862 — conveys  the 
thanks  of  the  commander  in  chief  to  Thomas  and 
his  army  for  what  he  calls  their  brilliant  victory.  It 
is  certainly  unaccountable,  except  on  the  conviction 
that  the  Government  did  not  look  with  great  confi 
dence  upon  Thomas,  that  the  Secretary  of  War  makes 
no  mention  of  him  by  name  or  title  in  the  order  from 
Washington  concerning  the  victory.  He  is  lavish  of 
praise  for  the  prompt  and  spirited  movements  and 
daring  battle  of  Mill  Springs  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  forces,  but  he  does  not  mention  Thomas 
either  by  name  or  implication.  The  omission  is 
marked,  and  Thomas  felt  it.  Nor  was  he  promoted 
for  this  victory.  Others  who  had  done  nothing  as 
yet  were  being  promoted,  but  it  was  required  of  him 
to  do  something  more  before  he  should  be.  The 
Legislature  of  Ohio,  then  in  session,  was  more  gen 
erous.  The  battle,  as  we  have  seen,  was  fought  on 
January  igth.  Under  date  of  January  28th  a  resolu- 


60  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

tion  was  passed  thanking  Thomas  and  his  men  in 
good  set  terms  for  their  important  victory. 

If  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs  was  barren  of  imme 
diate  results  it  was  not  the  fault  of  Thomas.  As  at 
the  present  time  we  look  back  upon  it,  we  wonder 
that  he  was  not  permitted  to  carry  out  the  plans  for 
the  conquest  and  occupancy  of  East  Tennessee  which 
he  alone  had  clearly  excogitated  and  had  thus  actually 
begun ;  but  at  least  the  rebel  line  was  broken  and 
must  be  readjusted.  The  victories  of  Grant  at  Fort 
Henry  and  Fort  Donelson,  and  the  concentration  of 
troops  on  the  Tennessee  to  meet  the  enemy  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  diverted  the  attention  of  the  authori 
ties  from  Thomas's  scheme,  and  even  for  a  time  ob 
scured  its  importance. 

We  may  pause  for  a  moment,  however,  to  see 
what  had  been  really  demonstrated  by  this  battle  of 
Mill  Springs  to  the  anxious  and  expectant  country  : 

I.  It  was  the  first  victory  achieved  by  the  Union 
arms.  Everything  before  had  been  tentative;  the 
country  was  waiting  to  see  whether  its  armies  were 
to  manoeuvre,  advance,  and  fall  back,  according  to 
the  precepts  of  the  "  circumlocution  office,"  or 
whether  the  generals  meant  business  and  fight.  Here, 
then,  was  a  downright  honest  blow,  a  knock-down 
blow  which  struck  the  keynote  of  actual  fighting 
and  success;  a  victory  so  complete  and  disastrous  to 
the  enemy  that  the  moral  results  were  large — entirely 
out  of  proportion  to  the  material  gains. 


MILL   SPRINGS.  5X 

II.  It  was  not  merely  a  piece  of  battle  tactics 
which  routed  the  enemy  for  the  moment ;  it  was  a  fine 
exhibition  of  strategy,  which  destroyed  the  right  of 
an  extremely  long  strategic  line,  which  made  it  pos 
sible  to  invade  East  Tennessee,  destroy  the  trunk 
line  of  railroad,    occupy  Chattanooga,  and   greatly 
shorten  the  war.     All  that  was   in  the  purpose  of 
General  Thomas,  but   circumstances  had  conspired 
against  him. 

III.  It  created  a  general  and  presented  a  type  and 
an  example  for  others  to  imitate.     Up  to  this  time 
we  had  no   generals ;  the  Government  was  making 
experiments.     Many  men  who  had  never  commanded 
a  brigade,  and   many  others   who    had  never  com 
manded  anything,  but  were  clever  politicians,  were 
sent  into  the  field  to  demonstrate  their  incapacity. 
The  failures  were  more  numerous  than  Beau  Brum- 
mell's  cravats;  but   here,  on  the  contrary,  was  dis 
closed  to  the  view  of  the  country  a  real  general,  who 
had  commanded  and  held  well  in  hand  ten  thousand 
men,  and  with  a  portion  of  them  had  defeated  in  fair 
battle  a  force  of  the  enemy  nearly  double  his  own. 
Thomas  was  literally  the  first  general  in  point  of  time 
developed  by  the  war,  and  equal,  as  will  be  seen  in 
the  course  of  the  war,  to  any  which  it  developed. 
The  battle  of   Mill   Springs  established  his  reputa 
tion  as  a  soldier  and  an  accomplished  general. 

IV.  It  defeated  the  schemes  of  the  secessionists 
and   secured   Kentucky   to   the  Union.     It  made  a 


62  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

grand  gathering  center  for  Union  men  and  diffused  a 
Union  spirit.  It  constituted  the  State  a  strong  base 
of  supplies,  containing  many  points  of  departure  for 
the  Union  army  moving  southward.  To  the  loyal 
men  of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  it  was  great  happi 
ness  to  see  such  a  feat  accomplished  in  their  own  ter 
ritory  by  a  Virginian  who  was  likewise  an  American 
patriot. 

Thus  it  is  that,  while  in  point  of  numbers  of  killed 
and  wounded  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs  does  not 
figure  among  the  great  actions  of  the  war,  it  must  be 
conceded  that  when  we  consider  its  early  delivery,  its 
inauguration  of  successful  fighting  in  the  Southern 
campaign,  the  difficult  and  hazardous  character  of 
this  bold,  initial  experiment,  it  rises  to  an  importance 
disproportioned  to  the  numbers  engaged.  It  proved 
Thomas  to  be  independent,  earnest,  determined,  and 
valiant,  with  a  sense  of  superiority  to  his  adversary, 
with  a  prestige  which  accompanied  him  through  his 
entire  career.  It  showed  him  to  be  a  man  whose  self- 
respect  was  great,  who  would  not  be  overslaughed  or 
set  aside  with  impunity,  and  it  swept  away  among  all 
right-minded  men  the  false  suspicions  which  had  been 
entertained  as  to  his  loyalty  to  the  Government. 

It  should  also  be  observed  that,  had  Thomas  been 
permitted  to  carry  out  his  plans  and  been  rapidly 
re-enforced,  he  might  have  moved  at  once ;  he  might 
have  taken  Knoxville  and  Chattanooga  almost  by  a 
coup-de-main  and  greatly  hastened  the  end  of  the 


MILL   SPRINGS.  63 

war.  It  was  perhaps  too  much,  however,  to  expect 
at  that  time,  and  the  Union  troops  were  neither 
numerous  nor  veteran  enough  for  such  a  campaign, 
however  excellent  their  general  might  be. 

Extract  from  General  Thomas's  Report  of  the  Battle^ 

of  Mill  Springs. 

(  vty 

"  HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  DIVISION,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO,  P^fy 
"  SOMERSET,  K\.,  January  j>/,  /tf^Q 


"  CAPTAIN  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that,  in:  ' 
carrying  out  the  instructions  of  the  general  com 
manding  the  department,  contained  in  his  commu 
nication  of  December  29th,  I  reached  Logan's  Cross 
Roads,  about  ten  miles  north  of  the  intrenched  camp 
of  the  enemy  on  the  Cumberland  River,  on  the  iyth 
instant,  with  a  portion  of  the  Second  and  Third 
Brigades,  Kinney's  battery  of  artillery,  and  a  bat 
talion  of  Woolford's  cavalry.  The  Fourth  and 
Tenth  Kentucky,  Fourteenth  Ohio,  and  Eighteenth 
United  States  Infantry  being  still  in  rear,  detained 
by  the  almost  impassable  condition  of  the  roads,  I 
determined  to  halt  at  this  point,  await  their  arrival, 
and  to  communicate  with  General  Schoepf. 

"  The  Tenth  Indiana,  Woolford's  cavalry,  and 
Kinney's  battery  took  position  on  the  main  road 
leading  to  the  enemy's  camp.  The  Ninth  Ohio 
and  Second  Minnesota  (part  of  Colonel  McCook's 
brigade)  encamped  three  fourths  of  a  mile  to  the 
right  on  the  Roberts  post-road.  Strong  pickets 
were  thrown  out  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  be 
yond  where  the  Somerset  and  Mill  Springs  road 
comes  into  the  main  road  from  my  camp  to  Mill 
Springs,  and  a  picket  of  cavalry  some  distance  in  ad- 


64  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

vance  of  the  infantry.  General  Schoepf  visited  me 
on  the  day  of  my  arrival,  and,  after  consultation,  I 
directed  him  to  send  to  my  camp  Standards  battery, 
the  Twelfth  Kentucky,  and  the  First  and  Second 
Tennessee  Regiments,  to  remain  until  the  arrival  of 
the  regiments  in  the  rear. 

"  Having  received  information,  on  the  evening  of 
the  i ;th,  that  a  large  train  of  wagons  with  its  escort 
was  encamped  on  the  Robertsport  and  Danville 
road,  about  six  miles  from  Colonel  Steedman's  camp, 
I  sent  an  order  to  him  to  send  his  wagons  forward 
under  a  strong  guard,  and  to  march  with  his  regi 
ment  (the  Fourteenth  Ohio)  and  the  Tenth  Ken 
tucky,  Colonel  Harlan,  with  one  day's  rations  in 
their  haversacks,  to  the  point  where  the  enemy  were 
said  to  be  encamped,  and  either  capture  or  disperse 
them. 

"  Nothing  of  importance  occurred  from  the  time 
of  our  arrival  until  the  morning  of  the  ipth  except 
a  picket  skirmish  on  the  night  of  the  iyth.  The 
Fourth,  the  battalion  Michigan  Engineers,  and  Wet- 
more's  battery  joined  on  the  i8th.  About  half  past 
six  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  i9th  the  pickets 
from  Woolford's  cavalry  encountered  the  enemy  ad 
vancing  on  our  camp,  retired  slowly,  and  reported 
their  advance  to  Colonel  M.  D.  Manson,  command 
ing  the  Second  Brigade.  He  immediately  formed 
his  regiment  (the  Tenth  Indiana)  and  took  a  position 
on  the  road  to  await  the  attack,  ordering  the  Fourth 
Kentucky,  Colonel  S.  S.  Fry,  to  support  him,  and 
then  informed  me  in  person  that  the  enemy  were 
advancing  in  force  and  what  disposition  he  had 
made  to  resist  them.  I  directed  him  to  join  his 
brigade  immediately,  and  hold  the  enemy  in  check 


MILL   SPRINGS.  65 

until  I  could  order  up  the  other  troops,  which  were 
ordered  to  form  immediately,  and  were  marching  to 
the  field  in  ten  minutes  afterward.  The  battalion 
of  Michigan  Engineers,  and  Company  A,,  Thirty- 
eighth  Ohio,  were  ordered  to  remain  as  guard  to 
the  camp.  Upon  my  arrival  on  the  field  soon  after 
ward  I  found  the  Tenth  Indiana  formed  in  front  of 
their  encampment  apparently  awaiting  orders,  and 
ordered  them  forward  to  the  support  of  the  Fourth 
Kentucky,  which  was  the  only  entire  regiment  then 
engaged.  I  then  rode  forward  myself  to  see  the 
enemy's  position,  so  that  I  could  determine  what 
disposition  to  make  of  my  troops  as  they  arrived. 
On  reaching  the  position  held  by  the  Fourth  Ken 
tucky,  Tenth  Indiana,  and  Woolford's  cavalry,  at  a 
point  where  the  roads  fork  to  go  to  Somerset,  I 
found  the  enemy  advancing  through  a  cornfield  and 
evidently  endeavoring  to  gain  the  left  of  the  Fourth 
Kentucky  Regiment,  which  was  maintaining  its  po 
sition  in  a  most  determined  manner.  I  directed  one 
of  my  aids  to  ride  back  and  order  up  a  section  of 
artillery  and  the  Tennessee  Brigade  to  advance  on 
the  enemy's  right,  and  sent  orders  to  Colonel  McCook 
to  advance  with  his  two  regiments  (the  Ninth  Ohio 
and  Second  Minnesota)  to  the  support  of  the  Fourth 
Kentucky  and  Eighteenth  Indiana. 

"A  section  of  Captain  Kinney's  battery  took  a 
position  on  the  edge  of  the  field,  to  the  left  of  the 
Fourth  Kentucky,  and  opened  an  effective  fire  on  a 
regiment  of  Alabamians  which  was  advancing  on 
the  Fourth  Kentucky.  Soon  afterward  the  Second 
Minnesota,  Colonel  H.  P.  Van  Cleve,  arrived,  report 
ing  to  me  for  instructions.  I  directed  him  to  take 
the  position  of  the  Fourth  Kentucky  and  Tenth  In- 


66  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

diana,  which  regiments  were  nearly  out  of  ammu 
nition.  The  Ninth  Ohio,  under  the  immediate  com 
mand  of  Major  Kaimmerling,  came  into  position  on 
the  right  of  the  road  at  the  same  time.  Immediately 
after  these  regiments  had  gained  their  positions  the 
enemy  opened  a  most  determined  and  galling  fire, 
which  was  returned  by  our  troops  in  the  same  spirit, 
and  for  nearly  half  an  hour  the  contest  was  main 
tained  on  both  sides  in  the  most  obstinate  manner. 

"At  this  time  the  Twelfth  Kentucky,  Colonel  W. 
A.  Hoskins,  and  the  Tennessee  Brigade,  reached  the 
field  on  the  left  of  the  Minnesota  regiment,  and 
opened  fire  on  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy,  who 
then  began  to  fall  back. 

"  The  Second  Minnesota  kept  up  a  most  galling 
fire  in  front,  and  the  Ninth  Ohio  charged  the  enemy 
on  the  left  with  bayonets  fixed,  turned  their  flank, 
and  drove  them  from  the  field,  the  whole  line  giving 
way  and  retreating  in  the  utmost  disorder  and  con 
fusion. 

"  As  soon  as  the  regiments  could  be  formed  and 
refill  their  cartridge  boxes  I  ordered  the  whole  force 
to  advance.  A  few  miles  in  rear  of  the  battlefield  a 
small  force  of  cavalry  was  drawn  up  near  the  road, 
but  a  few  shots  from  our  artillery — a  section  of 
Standart's  battery — dispersed  it,  and  none  of  the 
enemy  were  seen  again  until  we  arrived  in  front  of 
their  intrenchment. 

"  As  we  approached  their  intrenchments  the  di 
vision  was  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  and  steadily 
advanced  along  the  summit  of  the  hill  of  Mouldens. 
From  this  point  I  directed  their  intrenchments  to 
be  cannonaded,  which  was  done  until  dark  by  Stand- 
art  and  Wetmore's  batteries.  Kinney's  battery  was 


MILL  SPRINGS. 


67 


placed  in  position  on  the  extreme  left  of  Russell's 
house,  from  which  point  he  was  directed  to  fire 
on  their  ferry  to  deter  them  from  attempting  to 
cross. 

"  On  the  following  morning  Captain  Wetmore's 
battery  was  ordered  to  Russell's  house,  and  assist 
ed  with  his  Parrott  guns  in  firing  upon  the  ferry. 
Colonel  Hanson's  brigade  took  position  on  the  left, 
near  Kinney's  battery,  and  every  preparation  was 
made  to  assault  their  intrenchments  on  the  following 
morning.  The  Fourteenth  Ohio,  Colonel  Steedman, 
and  the  Tenth  Kentucky,  Colonel  Harlan,  having 
joined  from  detached  service  soon  after  the  repulse 
of  the  enemy,  continued  with  their  brigade  in  pur 
suit,  although  they  could  not  get  up  in  time  to  join 
in  the  fight.  These  two  regiments  were  placed  in 
front,  in  my  advance  on  the  intrenchments  the  next 
morning,  and  entered  first,  General  Schoepf  having 
also  joined  me  the  evening  of  the  igth  with  the 
Seventeenth,  Thirty-first,  Thirty-fifth,  and  Thirty- 
eighth  Ohio,  his  entire  brigade,  and  entered  with 
the  other  troops.  On  reaching  the  intrenchments 
we  found  that  the  enemy  had  abandoned  everything 
and  retired  during  the  night.  Twelve  pieces  of  ar 
tillery,  with  their  caissons  packed  with  ammunition ; 
one  battery  wagon  and  two  forges  ;  a  large  amount 
of  small  arms,  mostly  the  old  flint-lock  muskets,  and 
ammunition  for  the  same;  one  hundred  and  fifty  or 
sixty  wagons  and  upward  of  one  thousand  horses 
and  mules  ;  a  large  amount  of  commissary  stores, 
intrenching  tools,  and  camp  and  garrison  equipage, 
fell  into  our  hands.  A  correct  list  of  all  the  cap 
tured  property  will  be  forwarded  as  soon  as  it  can 
be  made  up  and  the  property  secured. 
6 


68  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

"  The  steam  and  ferry  boats  having  been  burned 
by  the  enemy  on  their  retreat,  it  was  found  impos 
sible  to  cross  the  river  and  pursue  them ;  besides, 
their  command  was  completely  demoralized,  and  re 
treated  with  great  haste  and  in  all  directions,  mak 
ing  their  capture  in  any  numbers  quite  doubtful  if 
pursued.  There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  moral 
effect  produced  by  their  complete  dispersion  will 
have  a  more  decided  effect  in  re-establishing  Union 
sentiments  than  though  they  had  been  captured." 

In  order  to  present  a  picture  which  is  at  once  a 
companion  and  a  counterpart  and  which  magnifies 
the  feat  of  arms  of  Thomas  by  exhibiting  the  utter 
discomfiture  of  his  enemy,  we  give  the  following : 

Extracts  from  General  G.  B.  Crittenden's  report  of  the 
Battle  of  Mill  Springs. 

"  The  enemy  sought  evidently  to  combine  their 
forces  stationed  at  Somerset  and  Columbia,  and 
when  such  junction  was  made  to  invest  my  intrench- 
ments.  I  deemed  it  proper,  therefore,  to  make  an 
attack  before  the  junction  could  be  effected,  feeling 
confident,  from  the  reports  of  the  cavalry  pickets 
made  at  a  late  hour,  that  the  waters  of  Fishing 
Creek  were  so  high  as  to  prevent  them  from  uniting. 
My  information  in  that  respect  was  correct. 

"  Soon  after  daylight  on  the  morning  of  January 
ipth  the  cavalry  advance  came  in  contact  with  the 
pickets  of  the  enemy  after  a  march  of  nearly  nine 
miles  over  a  deep  and  muddy  road.  With  a  few  shots 
the  enemy's  pickets  were  driven  in,  retiring  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  to  a  house  on  the  left  of  the  road. 


MILL   SPRINGS. 


69 


From  this  house  and  woods  in  the  rear  of  it  quite 
a  brisk  fire  was  opened  upon  the  head  of  the  column. 
Skirmishers  having  been  thrown  forward,  General 
Zollicoffer's  brigade  was  formed  in  line  of  battle 
and  ordered  to  advance  upon  the  enemy,  whom  I 
supposed  would  come  out  from  their  camp,  which 
we  were  now  approaching  to  take  position.  The 
road  here  extended  straight  in  front  for  near  a  mile 
toward  the  north. 

"  A  company  of  skirmishers  from  the  Mississippi 
regiment  advancing  on  the  left  of  the  road,  after 
sharp  firing,  drove  a  body  of  the  enemy  from  the 
house  and  the  woods  next  to  it,  and  then,  under  or 
ders,  crossing  the  road,  fell  in  with  their  regiment. 
Following  this  company  of  skirmishers  on  the  left  of 
the  road  to  the  point  where  it  crossed  to  the  right, 
the  regiment  of  Colonel  Cummings  (Nineteenth  Ten 
nessee)  kept  straight  on,  and  crossing  a  field  about 
two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  wide  at  double-quick, 
charged  into  the  woods  where  the  enemy  was  shel 
tered,  driving  back  the  Tenth  Indiana  Regiment 
until  it  was  re-enforced. 

"  At  this  time  General  Zollicoff er  rode  up  to  the 
Nineteenth  Tennessee  and  ordered  Colonel  Cum 
mings  to  cease  firing,  under  the  impression  that  the 
firing  was  upon  another  regiment  of  his  own  brigade. 
Then  the  general  advanced,  as  if  to  give  an  order  to 
the  lines  of  the  enemy,  within  bayonet  reach,  and 
was  killed  just  as  he  discovered  his  fatal  mistake. 
Thereupon  a  conflict  ensued,  when  the  Nineteenth 
Tennessee  broke  its  line  and  gave  back.  Rather  in 
the  rear  and  near  to  this  regiment  was  the  Twenty- 
fifth  Tennessee,  commanded  by  Colonel  Stanton, 
which  engaged  the  enemy,  when  the  colonel  was 


70  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

wounded  at  the  head  of  his  men  ;  but  this  regiment, 
impressed  with  the  same  idea  which  had  proved  fatal 
to  General  Zollicoffer — that  it  was  engaged  with 
friends — soon  broke  its  line  and  fell  into  some  dis 
order. 

uAt  this  time — the  fall  of  General  Zollicoffer 
having  been  announced  to  me — 1  went  forward  in 
the  road  to  the  regiments  of  Colonels  Cummings 
and  Stanton,  and  announced  to  Colonel  Cummings 
the  death  of  General  Zollicoffer,  and  that  the  com 
mand  of  the  brigade  devolved  upon  him. 

"  There  was  a  cessation  of  firing  for  a  few  mo 
ments,  and  I  ascertained  that  the  regiment  of  Colo 
nel  Battle  was  on  the  right  and  the  Mississippi  regi 
ment  in  the  center,  neither  as  yet  having  been  ac 
tively  engaged,  and  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  entire 
line.  I  had  ordered  General  Carroll  to  bring  up  his 
brigade,  and  it  was  now  in  supporting  distance,  dis 
played  in  line  of  battle.  I  now  repeated  my  orders 
for  a  general  advance,  and  soon  the  battle  raged 
from  right  to  left.  When  I  sent  my  aid  to  order 
the  Fifteenth  Mississippi  to  charge,  I  sent  by  him  an 
order  to  General  Carroll  to  advance  a  regiment  to 
sustain  it.  He  ordered  up  for  the  purpose  Colonel 
Murray's  (Twenty-eighth  Tennessee)  regiment,  which 
engaged  the  enemy  on  the  left  of  the  Mississippi 
regiment  and  on  the  right  of  Stanton's  (Tennessee) 
regiment.  I  ordered  Captain  Rutledge,  with  two  of 
his  guns,  forward  in  the  road  to  an  advanced  and 
hazardous  position,  ordering  Colonel  Stanton  to  sup 
port  him,  where  I  hoped  he  might  bring  them  to  play 
effectively  upon  the  enemy ;  but  the  position  did  not 
permit  this,  and  he  soon  retired  under  my  order.  At 
this  point  the  horse  of  Captain  Rutledge  was  killed 


MILL   SPRINGS.  71 

under  him.  Very  soon  the  enemy  began  to  gain 
ground  on  our  left,  and  to  use  their  superior  force 
for  flanking  in  that  quarter. 

"  I  was  in  person  at  the  right  of  the  line  of 
Stanton's  regiment,  the  battle  raging,  and  did  not 
observe  this  so  soon  as  it  was  seen  by  Colonel 
Carroll,  who  moved  the  regiment  of  Colonel  Cum- 
mings,  then  commanded  by  Lieutenant- Colonel 
Walker,  to  the  left,  to  meet  this  movement  of  the 
enemy,  and  formed  the  Seventeenth  Tennessee,  com 
manded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Miller,  to  support  the 
regiments  on  the  left.  The  regiments  of  Murray, 
Stanton,  and  Cummings  were  driven  back  by  the 
enemy,  and  while  reforming  in  the  rear  of  the  Sev 
enteenth  Tennessee,  that  well -disciplined  regiment 
met  and  held  in  check  for  some  time  the  entire  right 
wing  of  the  Northern  army.  These  regiments  on 
my  left  and  on  the  left  of  the  road  retired  across 
the  field  a  distance  of  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
yards,  and  there  for  a  time  repulsed  the  advancing 
enemy.  Especially  the  regiment  of  Colonel  Stan- 
ton,  partially  rallied  by  its  gallant  field  officers, 
formed  behind  a  fence,  and,  pouring  volleys  into  the 
ranks  of  the  enemy  coming  across  the  field,  repulsed 
and  drove  them  back  for  a  time  with  heavy  loss. 

"  For  an  hour  now  the  Fifteenth  Mississippi,  un 
der  Lieutenant-Colonel  Walthall,  and  the  Twentieth 
Tennessee,  under  Colonel  Joel  A.  Battle,  of  my  cen 
ter  and  right,  had  been  struggling  with  the  superior 
force  of  the  enemy. 

"  I  can  not  omit  to  mention  the  heroic  valor  of 
these  two  regiments,  officers  and  men.  When  the 
left  retired  they  were  flanked  and  compelled  to  leave 
their  position.  In  their  rear,  on  the  right  of  the 


72  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

road,  was  the  regiment  of  Colonel  Powell  (Twenty- 
ninth  Tennessee),  which  had  been  formed  in  the 
rear  and  ordered  forward  by  me  some  time  before. 
General  Carroll  ordered  this  regiment  to  face  the 
flanking  force  of  the  enemy  which  was  crossing  the 
road  from  the  left  side,  which  it  did,  checking  it  with 
a  raking  fire  at  thirty  paces.  In  this  conflict  Colo 
nel  Powell,  commanding,  was  badly  wounded.  The 
Sixteenth  Alabama,  which  was  the  reserve  corps  of 
my  division,  commanded  by  Colonel  Wood,  did  at 
this  critical  juncture  most  eminent  service.  Having 
rushed  behind  the  right  and  center,  it  came  to  a 
close  engagement  with  the  pursuing  enemy,  to  pro 
tect  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  Fifteenth  Mississippi 
and  Twentieth  Tennessee,  when  they  were  the  last, 
after  long  fighting,  to  leave  the  front  line  of  the  bat 
tle ;  and,  well  led  by  its  commanding  officer,  in  con 
junction  with  portions  of  other  regiments,  it  effec 
tually  prevented  pursuit  and  protected  my  return  to 
camp. 

"  Owing  to  the  formation  and  character  of  the 
field  of  battle  I  was  unable  to  use  my  artillery  and 
cavalry  to  advantage  in  the  action.  During  much 
of  the  time  the  engagement  lasted  rain  was  falling. 
Many  of  the  men  were  armed  with  flint-lock  muskets, 
and  they  soon  became  unserviceable. 

"  On  the  field  and  during  the  retreat  to  camp 
some  of  the  regiments  became  confused  and  broken, 
and  great  disorder  prevailed.  This  was  owing  in 
some  measure  to  a  want  of  proper  drill  and  dis 
cipline,  of  which  the  army  had  been  much  deprived 
by  reason  of  the  nature  of  its  constant  service  and 
of  the  country  in  which  it  had  encamped. 

"  During  the  engagement,  or  just  prior  to  it,  the 


MILL   SPRINGS. 


73 


force  under  General  Thomas  was  increased  by  the 
arrival,  on  a  forced  march,  of  a  brigade  from  his 
rear,  which  I  had  hoped  would  not  arrive  until  the 
engagement  was  over.  This  made  the  force  of  the 
enemy  about  twelve  thousand  men.  My  effective 
force  was  four  thousand.  The  engagement  lasted 
three  hours." 


CHAPTER   V. 

CORINTH    AND    PERRYVILLE. 

Forts  Henry  and  Donelson — Buell  at  Nashville — Battle  of  Pitts- 
burg  Landing — Defeat  and  flight  of  Beauregard — Thomas  in 
command  of  the  right  wing — Siege  of  Corinth — Major  general 
of  volunteers — Resumes  command  of  his  division — Joins  Buell 
at  Louisville — Declines  to  supersede  him — Battle  of  Perry- 
ville — McCook — Crittenden  and  Gilbert — Thomas  no  special 
command — Bragg  retires — Buell  relieved  by  Rosecrans — 
Thomas  dissatisfied — In  command  of  center — On  to  Mur- 
freesboro — Bragg  strongly  posted. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  rapid  retreat  of  the  enemy 
after  Mill  Springs  baffled  further  pursuit ;  and  the 
hurly-burly  of  events  in  a  different  direction  so 
occupied  the  military  authorities  that  the  scheme 
of  marching  to  Knoxville,  and  thence  to  Chatta 
nooga,  was  at  once  abandoned,  or  rather  indefinite 
ly  postponed.  It  was  impossible  so  to  augment 
Thomas's  force  as  to  permit  him  to  carry  out  such  a 
plan. 

The  Confederate  generals  Floyd  and  Pillow,  who 
had  ignominiously  escaped  from  Fort  Donelson  in 
a  panic,  had  passed  rapidly  through  Nashville  and 
were  closely  followed  by  Buell's  force.  In  order  to 
retard  the  pursuit  they  had  destroyed  the  suspen- 


CORINTH    AND    PERRYVILLE.  75 

sion  bridge,  but  Buell  improvised  crossings  in  boats, 
and  was  soon  in  possession  of  the  capital  of  Ten 
nessee,  where  he  was  joined  by  Thomas  with  his 
division. 

In  the  meantime  General  Grant  had  marched 
down  the  Tennessee  to  a  point  called  Pittsburg 
Landing.  It  had  been  selected  by  General  Charles 
F.  Smith,  and  there  he  was  soon  to  be  confronted 
by  A.  S.  Johnston  with  a  large  Confederate  army. 

There  are  several  moot  questions  connected  with 
this  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  or  Shiloh,  which 
may  or  may  not  be  settled  after  this  generation  has 
passed  away'.  Was  Grant's  army  surprised  there  ? 
Was  it  so  driven  back  and  disabled  that  the  battle 
would  have  been  lost  without  the  strong  re-enforce 
ments  and  assistance  of  Buell  ?  We  need  not  dis 
cuss  these  questions  here.  One  fact  is  patent,  how 
ever  :  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  indeed  very 
sorely  pressed  when  Buell  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
on  April  yth,  moved  at  the  most  fortunate  moment 
to  its  succor.  Together  they  defeated  the  enemy. 
Whatever  doubts  there  were  of  Grant's  ability  to 
maintain  himself,  they  were  dispelled  by  Buell's  ar 
rival,  which  was  accelerated  by  the  ever-increasing 
roar  of  artillery,  telling  him  of  the  fierce  contest 
going  on  around  the  little  church  of  Shiloh  and 
along  the  retiring  left  flank  of  Grant's  army  toward 
the  landing  itself. 

General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  the  Confederate 


76  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

commander,  had  been  killed  early  in  the  action,  and 
General  P.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  a  thorough  and  valiant 
soldier,  had  succeeded  to  the  command  and  driven 
back  the  left  flank  of  Grant's  army  as  upon  a  pivot. 
It  was  not  an  enviable  task  which  Beauregard  had 
thrust  upon  him,  to  assume  command  in  the  very 
heat  of  an  action,  planned  by  another ;  and  now, 
pressed  and  outnumbered  by  this  new  force  of 
Buell,  he  had  no  alternative  but  a  precipitate  re 
treat  toward  Corinth,  an  important  strategic  point 
twenty-nine  miles  from  the  battlefield  of  Pittsburg. 
The  principal  value  of  Corinth  is  that  it  lies  at  the 
junction  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  'and  the  Mo 
bile  and  Ohio  Railroads,  which  are  the  lines  of  com 
munication  from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Atlantic  and 
from  the  Ohio  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Beauregard 
fortified  this  position,  and  there — to  speak  not  quite 
technically — he  was  besieged  by  General  Halleck, 
who  had  assumed  the  command  of  both  Federal 
armies,  now  comprising  a  well-appointed  force  of 
about  one  hundred  thousand  men. 

Beauregard's  orders  and  proclamations  indicate 
not  only  his  view  of  the  importance  of  the  position, 
but  of  his  power  to  maintain  himself  there,  and 
induced  in  the  Federal  commander  an  excess  of 
caution  in  his  approach.  Thomas,  who  had  not 
come  up  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh, 
being  in  the  rear  of  Buell's  column,  was  now  placed 
by  Halleck  in  command  of  the  right  wing,  consist- 


CORINTH    AND   PERRYVILLE. 


77 


ing  of  several  divisions — a  recognition  of  his  gen 
eralship  which  was  very  gratifying  to  him.  In  view 
of  succeeding  events,  it  is  curious  to  note  that  at 
this  time  Sherman  was  temporarily  under  his  com 
mand.  In  the  opinion  of  the  best  military  critics, 
Corinth  might  then  have  been  taken  by  a  vigorous 
assault ;  instead  of  that,  it  was  formally  besieged, 
and  the  siege  lasted  for  more  than  a  month.  It 
should  be  mentioned,  however,  in  partial  extenua 
tion  of  this  delay,  that  the  movements  of  the 
army  were  rendered  difficult  by  numerous  obstacles. 
From  the  time  of  starting,  on  April  pth,  from  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  the  weather  was  continuously  bad, 
the  roads  execrable,  and  much  of  the  way  needed  to 
be  corduroyed  ;  add  to  these  difficulties  the  fact 
that  the  exact  condition  of  things  within  the  lines 
of  Corinth  was  unknown  to  the  Federal  commander; 
more  so,  perhaps,  than  it  should  have  been. 

Halleck,  who  had  been  an  engineer  officer,  was 
thus  prompted  to  invest  a  weakly  intrenched  place 
and  approach  it  with  all  the  technique  of  a  move 
ment  upon  a  permanent  work.  The  least  that  can 
be  said  is  that  he  was  overmastered  by  his  excessive 
caution.  He  delayed  attacking,  he  made  manoeuvres 
of  approach,  but  he  never  did  deliver  a  formal  as 
sault.  At  the  last  he  was  surprised  that  Beauregard 
had  silently  left  the  place,  after  having  put  some 
Quaker  guns  in  position,  still  further  to  intimidate 
his  halting  enemy. 


78  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

It  was  during  this  siege  of  Corinth,  and  on  April 
25,  1862,  that  Thomas  received  his  promotion  as 
major  general  of  volunteers  in  somewhat  tardy 
recognition  of  his  excellent  service  at  Mill  Springs. 
He  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  strategy  or  grand 
tactics  of  this  movement,  but  was  ready  at  any  mo 
ment  to  launch  his  troops  like  a  thunderbolt  upon 
the  intrenchments  of  Beauregard,  and  would  doubt 
less  have  won  further  honor  if  the  assault  had  been 
ordered.  After  the  occupation  of  Corinth  he  was 
placed  in  temporary  command,  angl  remained  there 
until  June  22d.  At  that  time,  and  at  his  own  re 
quest,  Thomas  was  returned  to  the  command  of  his 
old  division,  and  proceeded  to  join  Buell  in  his  fur 
ther  movements.  This  was  a  busy  time  for  him.  In 
beating  up  the  enemy's  quarters  and  looking  out  for 
his  communications,  he  was  ordered  in  succession  to 
Huntsville,  to  Decherd,  to  Pelham,  and  to  McMinn- 
ville,  where,  on  the  flank  and  front,  discretion  and 
forecast  were  needed.  It  was  evident  that  he  pos 
sessed  both. 

The  plans  of  the  Confederate  commander  Bragg 
were  soon  manifest.  He  was  about  to  make  a  des 
perate  experiment.  He  would  combine  his  forces 
and  invade  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  At  first  it 
seemed  that  he  would  make  Nashville  his  objective 
point,  but  before  reaching  it  he  appeared  to  deflect 
his  army  and  to  march  upon  Louisville.  At  this 
time  General  Halleck  was  created  general  in  chief 


CORINTH   AND    PERRYVILLE.  jg 

of  the  army  and  called  to  Washington,  and  the  task 
of  confronting  Bragg  was  confided  to  General  Don 
Carlos  Buell,  who  had  divined  the  purposes  ot 
Bragg,  and  appears  to  have  been  master  of  the 
situation.  He  ordered  Thomas  to  join  him  with 
four  divisions  without  delay,  and  then  proceeded 
with  his  advance  column  to  Louisville,  which  he 
reached  by  a  forced  march  on  June  25th.  This  was 
greatly  to  the  joy  of  the  large  loyal  element  in  that 
capital,  and  to  the  amazement  and  bitter  disgust  of 

the  secessionists.     Thus  Bragg's  purpose  to  march 

/ 

on  Louisville  was  thwarted. 

Would  his  advance  on  Nashville  be  more  suc 
cessful  ?  Ground  had  been  lost,  the  Confederates 
were  assuming  the  offensive  ;  a  great  struggle  was 
still  in  the  near  future.  The  Government  at  Wash 
ington,  wanting  great  results,  was  dissatisfied  even 
with  this  brilliant  strategy  of  Buell,  and  was  dis 
posed  to  hold  him  responsible  for  this  new  and  con 
sequential  invasion  of  Kentucky  by  the  Confederate 
army.  Without  seeking  for  explanations,  they  re 
lieved  him  summarily  from  his  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  ordered  General  Thomas  to 
assume  it.  Thomas,  however,  was  not  the  man  to 
become  the  instrument  of  such  injustice,  and  de 
clared  himself  at  once  against  it.  Buell,  who  had 
deserved  well  of  the  republic,  was  humiliated  by  an 
unexpected  blow.  Besides,  he  was  on  the  eve  of  a 
serious  conflict  for  which  he  had  made  due  and 


8o  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

careful  preparation.  He  bore  the  blow  with  stoical 
philosophy,  but  Thomas  telegraphed  at  once  to  ask 
that  the  order  be  withdrawn  or  suspended — an  act 
which  vindicated  publicly  his  noble  character.  Most 
subordinate  commanders  would  have  jumped  at  the 
tempting  opportunity.  This  was  on  September  29, 
1862.  The  order  was  suspended,  and  on  October 
ist  Buell  marched  out  to  give  battle  to  Bragg,  with 
Thomas  as  second  in  command. 

This  brings  us  to  the  battle  of  Perryville,  which, 
in  addition  to  being  a  fair  stand-up  fight  in  open 
field,  was  apparently  intended  by  the  Government  to 
give  Buell  an  opportunity  to  revindicate  himself  and 
satisfy  their  exacting  impatience.  Generals  were  to 
be  tried  and  flung  away  with  little  regard  to  justice. 
Brilliant,  not  partial  success,  was  what  was  required. 
Before  considering  this  battle  we  may  certify  our 
selves  of  the  motives  of  Thomas's  action.  Many 
persons  have  attributed  his  protest  against  the  re 
moval  of  Buell  entirely  to  diffidence  of  his  own 
powers.  This  might  indeed  have  been  so.  It  is 
true  that  any  general  might  hesitate  to  take  com 
mand  of  an  army  on  the  eve  of  battle  with  the  de 
tails  of  whose  organization  and  administration  he 
was  not  familiar,  but  in  a  great  emergency  such  re 
luctance  might  have  been  overcome.  Indeed,  the 
order  relieving  Buell  contained  already  these  three 
provisos :  he  was  not  to  be  relieved  "  if  he  was  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy  preparing  to  fight,  if  he 


CORINTH   AND   PERRYVILLE.  gl 

had  gained  a  victory,  or  if  Thomas  was  absent." 
General  Thomas  has,  however,  told  us  himself  his 
reasons  in  simple  and  unmistakable  language  : 

"  I  am  not,"  he  said,  "  as  modest  as  I  have  been 
represented  to  be  ;  I  did  not  request  the  retention 
of  General  Buell  in  command  through  modesty,  but 
because  his  removal  and  my  assignment  were  alike 
unjust  to  him  and  to  me.  It  was  unjust  to  him  to 
relieve  him  on  the  eve  of  battle,  and  unjust  to  my 
self  to  impose  upon  me  the  command  of  the  army  at 
such  a  time." 

But  it  should  here  be  observed,  that  while  he  was 
more  than  willing  under  such  circumstances  to  re 
main  Buell's  subordinate,  it  is  not  to  be  inferred  that 
he  would  have  been  willing  to  let  any  other  officer 
take  the  place  he  had  declined,  without  remon 
strance.  He  only  refused  it  that  Buell  might  re 
tain  it.  We  may  say  here,  in  passing,  that  the 
delay  occasioned  by  the  order  and  its  suspension 
caused  Buell  the  loss  of  twenty -four  hours  and 
a  golden  opportunity  for  which  he  was  not  respon 
sible. 

We  need  not  dwell  upon  the  battle  of  Perryville 
except  so  far  as  it  relates  to  General  Thomas,  and 
that  part  is  neither  large  nor  important.  In  such  a 
work  as  this  details  are  unnecessary,  and  indeed  im 
possible.  We  can  give  only  the  general  movement 
of  the  battle  and  the  part  played  by  Thomas,  which 
indeed  was  not  a  very  prominent  one.  Subjected  to 


82  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

military  criticism,  the  battle  was  faulty  in  many  re 
spects.  Thomas,  as  second  in  command,  was  greatly 
trammeled,  or  rather  his  value  was  neutralized  ;  he 
commanded  no  troops  specifically ;  was  supposed 
to  have  a  general  supervision  of  the  field,  but  was 
really  confined  to  such  a  position  as  his  chief  direct 
ed.  His  duties  were  therefore  of  a  nondescript  and 
ambiguous  character.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  had 
been  divided  into  three  corps,  each  consisting  of 
three  divisions.  The  First  Corps  was  commanded 
by  Major-General  A.  McD.  McCook,  the  Second 
by  Major-General  Thomas  L.  Crittenden,  and  the 
Third  by  Colonel  C.  C.  Gilbert,  who  had  been 
nominated  brigadier  general  of  volunteers  by  the 
President,  but  not  yet,  nor  ever,  confirmed,  by  the 
Senate.  Thomas  was  directed  to  make  his  head 
quarters  with  Crittenden's  corps. 

The  situation  in  which  the  Union  army  now  found 
itself  was  grave.  The  expeditions  of  Forrest  and 
Morgan  in  July,  1862,  had  greatly  restored  the  con 
fidence  of  the  secessionists  in  Kentucky  and  Tennes 
see.  Murfreesboro  had  been  captured  by  a  coup  de 
main  on  the  i3th  of  July,  and  Buell's  communications 
with  Nashville  were  threatened.  His  dispatches 
were  intercepted  and  false  ones  sent,  and  it  was  of 
the  greatest  importance  to  advance  at  once  to  check 
the  enemy's  temerity  in  attempting  to  turn  his  left 
flank. 

Leaving  Louisville  on  the  ist  of  October,  Buell's 


CORINTH   AND    PERRYVILLE.  83 

army  was  concentrated  at  Bardstown,  about  fifty 
miles  south,  on  the  7th.  A  battle  was  imminent.  It 
might  have  been  postponed  by  Buell,  but  Bragg  took 
the  initiative.  The  intended  order  of  the  troops  was: 
McCook  on  the  left,  Gilbert  in  the  center,  and  Crit- 
tenden  on  the  right.  The  Confederates  were  di 
vided  into  two  corps :  the  right  under  Polk,  consist 
ing  of  the  divisions  of  Cheatham  and  Withers  ;  the 
left  under  Hardee,  with  the  divisions  of  Anderson 
and  Buckner. 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  Federal  order  had 
not  been  completed.  Crittenden  had  not  yet  ar 
rived.  Only  two  divisions  of  McCook's  corps  were 
in  position,  and  against  this  incompleteness  Bragg 
ordered  three  divisions  in  mass  to  be  thrown.*  This 
attack  fell  principally  upon  McCook's  left  division, 
commanded  by  General  Jackson,  who  was  there  and 
then  killed.  It  was  in  great  straits,  and  clamored 
for  aid  from  the  center,  but  succor  did  not  come ; 
and  after  a  desperate  conflict,  McCook's  left  was 
driven  back,  and  only  rallied  under  cover  of  the 
center.  Thus  it  did  not  entirely  leave  the  field. 
The  other  division  of  McCook,  which  had  come  in 
advance  under  General  Rousseau,  was  intended  to 
maintain  connection  with  the  left  division  of  Gil 
bert's  corps ;  but,  by  a  mischance,  the  left  of  Gilbert 
had  been  incautiously  moved  away,  and  there  was  a 

*  It  was  fighting  for  fully  two  hours  before  Buell  received  in 
telligence  of  the  fact. 
7 


84  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

considerable  gap  just  across  Doctor's  Creek,  between 
himself  and  Rousseau's  right.  Into  that  opening, 
with  a  quick  perception  and  by  a  flying  march, 
Bragg  had  thrust  Buckner's  division.  It  had  at 
once  formed  line  on  Rousseau's  flank,  facing  it  at 
right  angles,  and,  unfortunately,  neither  the  com 
manding  general  nor  his  second  in  command  was  on 
the  field  at  that  point  to  direct  the  prompt  move 
ment  required  by  this  emergency. 

The  situation  was  indeed  most  unexpected  and 
anomalous — one  Confederate  division  thrust  between 
two  Union  divisions,  and,  as  it  were,  flanking  both, 
while  six  other  Federal  divisions  were  in  its  rear  and 
could  at  a  word  have  annihilated  it.  Buell  was  still 
at  some  distance  in  the  rear.  Thomas,  occupying 
the  nominal  position  of  second  in  command,  had 
been  directed  to  take  post  with  Crittenden's  corps 
on  the  right.  He  therefore  could  have  no  just 
knowledge  of  what  was  transpiring  on  the  left 
center. 

It  is  easy  enough  now  to  see  that  if  McCook's 
two  divisions  had  changed  front  against  Buckner, 
and  if  Gilbert  also  had  made  a  wheel  to  the  left 
with  part  of  his  force,  Buckner's  division  would 
have  been  crushed  or  captured.  A  forward  move 
ment  by  Crittenden  and  a  subsequent  wheel  to  the 
left  would  have  taken  in  flank  and  rear  the  entire 
attacking  force  of  Bragg.  But  such  movements 
required  prompt  intelligence  of  the  situation  and 


CORINTH   AND   PERRYVILLE.  85 

concert  of  action,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  were  im 
possible  at  that  time.* 

These  are  criticisms  after  the  battle.  Later  in 
the  war,  and  with  officers  and  troops  more  experi 
enced  in  military  problems,  such  mistakes  were  less 
liable  to  be  made,  and  yet  they  sometimes  were 
made.  They  form  a  severe  part  of  military  educa 
tion,  and  the  successful  general  is  he  who  profits  by 
such  experience.  The  enemy  did  not  follow  up  his 
advantage,  although  he  had  rudely  broken  the 
Union  line.  At  nightfall  General  Buell,  as  soon 
as  he  comprehended  the  situation,  sent  orders  to 
Thomas  to  move  one  division  of  Crittenden's  to  the 
center  at  the  needed  point,  and  two  brigades  to  as 
sist  General  Rousseau,  who,  although  thrust  back, 
was  still  contesting  his  ground  against  Buckner. 

But,  in  spite  of  his  partial  success  and  the  dis 
comfiture  of  the  Union  army,  strange  to  say,  Bragg 
had  no  thought  of  continuing  the  contest.  He  had 
indeed  telegraphed  that  a  great  Confederate  victory 
was  gained  at  Perryville,  but  it  was  a  barren  victory. 
He  did  not  begin  his  retreat  until  the  i2th  of  Oc 
tober.  The  Comte  de  Paris  calls  it  very  properly 
"  a  reverse  for  both  parties,"  but  in  point  of  fact  the 
advantage  was  with  the  federal  troops. 

*  In  point  of  fact,  not  more  than  half  of  Buell's  army  had  really 
been  engaged.  The  brunt  of  the  action  was  borne  by  eleven 
brigades,  and  their  terrible  fighting  is  indicated  by  their  loss  in 
less  than  four  hours  of  four  thousand  men.  Crittenden  was  not 
on  the  field  at  all  until  dark,  when  the  action  was  entirely  over. 


86  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

The  Union  array  remained  on  the  field,  and 
Buell,  before  his  retirement,  had  ordered  Thomas  to 
proceed  to  Glasgow  and  Bowling  Green,  while 
Bragg,  his  plans  defeated  and  a  new  combination 
being  rendered  necessary,  fell  back  into  Tennessee. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  Confederate  forces  to  the 
South  and  the  occupation  of  the  field  of  battle  by 
the  Federals  were  at  first  regarded  at  Washington  as 
indications  of  good  success,  but  as  fuller  tidings  were 
received  this  opinion  was  changed,  and  the  Govern 
ment,  being  dissatisfied  with  Buell,  again  determined 
to  relieve  him  from  the  command.  He  had,  whether 
anticipating  this  action  or  not,  retired  to  Louisville, 
leaving  Thomas  in  his  place. 

It  would  be  naturally  concluded  that  now 
Thomas  would  receive  and  accept  the  command. 
Most  persons  were  therefore  very  much  surprised, 
and  Thomas  himself  most  painfully  so,  when  it  was 
found  that  another  general  was  to  be  appointed — 
General  Rosecrans,  whose  success  against  General 
Price  at  luka  had  already  commended  him  to  the 
favorable  notice  of  the  Government.  He  was  indeed 
by  a  few  days  the  junior  of  General  Thomas  as  a 
major  general,  and  the  date  of  commission,  while  it 
was  not  absolutely  an  assurance  of  promotion,  was 
at  that  time,  cceteris  paribus,  a  recognized  factor  in 
preferment  to  command ;  and  certainly  Thomas  had 
already  exhibited  such  a  genius  for  war  as  gave  him 
every  reason  to  expect  the  promotion.  He  felt  ex- 


CORINTH    AND    PERRYVILLE.  37 

tremely  humiliated,  and  made  dignified  expostula 
tions.  The  Government  thought,  or  affected  to 
think,  that  when  before  the  battle  of  Perryville  he 
had  declined  to  supersede  Buell,  he  meant  to  ex 
press  a  permanent  disinclination  to  assume  com 
mand,  a  diffidence  of  his  own  powers,  and  a  desire 
to  evade  responsibility.  Nothing  could  be  more 
absurd  or  farther  from  the  truth.  The  reasons  for 
his  former  action  have  already  been  fully  given. 
That  action  showed  him  to  be  a  man  at  once  gener 
ous  and  just.  That  conjuncture  belonged  to  the 
past.  No  such  reasons  now  existed,  and  in  consider 
ing  this  new  condition  of  affairs  we  can  not  do 
better  than  to  let  him  speak  for  himself,  as  he  has 
done  in  his  letter  to  General  Halleck.  With  com 
mendable  dignity  he  passes  in  rapid  review  the  prin 
cipal  events  of  his  short  but  brilliant  career  and  his 
just  claims  to  the  consideration  of  the  Government. 
Speaking  of  the  former  occasion,  when  the  order 
relieving  General  Buell  was  suspended  at  his  request, 
he  says  : 

**  The  order  relieving  him  and  placing  me  in 
command  was  suspended  at  my  request,  but  to-day 
I  find  him  relieved  by  General  Rosecrans,  my  junior, 
although  I  do  not  feel  conscious  that  any  just  cause 
exists  for  overslaughing  me  by  placing  me  under  my 
junior,  and  I  am  therefore  deeply  mortified  and 
grieved  at  the  course  taken  in  this  matter." 

In  his  answer  General  Halleck  repeats  the  mis- 


88  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

apprehension  in  these  words :  "  You  having  virtually 
declined  the  command  at  that  time,  it  was  necessary 
to  appoint  another,  and  General  Rosecrans  was  se 
lected.  It  was  not  possible  to  give  you  command 
after  you  had  declined  it." 

It  is  not  the  part  of  a  just  historian  to  impute 
motives  without  just  grounds,  but  the  biographer 
must  express  his  astonishment  that  the  opportunity 
was  not  offered  to  Thomas  and  thus  the  chance  of 
misconception  avoided.  At  any  rate,  it  would  seem 
that  they  wanted  Rosecrans  more  than  they  did 
Thomas.  The  whole  question  was  thoroughly  dis 
cussed  at  Washington,  and  when  they  determined  to 
put  Rosecrans  at  the  head  of  that  army  he  was  the 
junior  not  only  of  Thomas  but  of  McCook  and  Crit- 
tenden.  Where  there  is  a  will  there  is  a  way  ;  so,  in 
order  to  remedy  that  obstacle,  his  commission  as  a 
major  general,  which  had  been  dated  August  i6th, 
while  Thomas's  was  April  25th,  was  now  arbitrarily 
changed  to  March  2ist.  After  all,  we  are  forced  to 
the  conclusion  that,  passing  over  all  who  had  been 
involved  in  the  check  at  Perryville,  they  wanted  a 
new  man  ;  they  should  only  have  been  honest  enough 
to  say  so. 

It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  another  factor 
of  the  greatest  importance  in  this  struggle  had  now 
appeared  in  the  preliminary  proclamation  of  Presi 
dent  Lincoln,  issued  on  the  22d  of  September,  just 
before  the  battle  of  Perryville,  giving  notice  that  on 


CORINTH   AND    PERRYVILLE.  go 

the  ist  of  January,  1863,  all  persons  held  as  slaves 
within  any  State  or  any  part  of  a  State  the  people 
whereof  should  then  be  in  rebellion  against  the 
United  States  should  be  thenceforward  and  forever 
free.  This  was  the  prompt,  irresistible,  inexorable 
logic  of  events,  which  moves  rapidly  to  its  conclu 
sions.  Just  one  month  before,  on  the  226.  of  Au 
gust,  he  had  said  to  Mr.  Greeley :  "  My  paramount 
object  is  to  save  the  Union,  and  not  either  to  save 
or  destroy  slavery.  If  I  could -save  the  Union  with 
out  freeing  any  slave,  I  would  do  it;  if  I  could  save 
it  by  freeing  all  the  slaves,  I  would  do  it;  and  if  I 
could  do  it  by  freeing  some  and  leaving  others 
alone,  I  would  do  that."  One  month  later  he  had 
freed  the  slaves  of  all  that  were  in  rebellion,  and  a 
little  more  than  three  months  after  that,  on  the 
ist  of  January,  1863,  the  decree  went  forth  that 
negro  slavery  was  abolished  throughout  the  land. 
This,  soon  sanctioned  by  Congress,  became  a  su 
preme  law,  and  affected  the  use  of  negroes  in  both 
armies.  But  it  was  so  thoroughly  a  foregone  con 
clusion,  that  it  had  already  entered  into  the  plans  of 
many  of  the  loyal  generals.* 

Immediately    upon    his    appointment    Rosecrans 
lost  no  time  in  preparations  for  the  new  campaign 


*  Just  how  it  would  affect  certain  generals  was  still  a  matter 
of  doubt,  and  it  may  be  that,  with  some  lingering  of  his  first 
suspicion  as  to  Thomas,  Lincoln  may  have  preferred  not  to  give 
him  so  important  a  command. 


90  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

in  Tennessee.  Under  date  of  October  24th  the  De 
partment  of  the  Cumberland  had  been  reformed,  to 
include  that  part  of  Tennessee  lying  east  of  the 
Tennessee  River,  and  the  army  now  commanded  by 
Rosecrans  was  again  called  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland.  This  was  divided  into  three  corps — the 
right,  center,  and  left — commanded  respectively  by 
Generals  McCook,  Thomas,  and  Crittenden. 

The  two  contending  forces  made  busy  prepara 
tion  for  a  new  conflict.  From  the  7th  of  November 
to  the  26th  of  December  the  main  army  of  Rosecrans 
was  encamped  around  Nashville,  while  numerous  ex 
peditionary  movements  were  made  to  feel  the  enemy 
and  to  guard  the  approaches.  The  railroads  were 
secured,  magazines  established,  and  the  men  thor 
oughly  equipped  for  the  impending  movement. 
Bragg's  army  was  intrenched  around  Murfreesboro, 
about  forty  miles  south,  where  Rosecrans  was  or 
dered  to  attack  him,  unless  he  should  assume  the 
initiative  and  advance  upon  Rosecrans. 

Thomas  had  wisely  declined  to  be  retained  as 
second  in  command,  having  observed  in  the  case  of 
Grant  at  Corinth,  and  having  experienced  in  his  own 
case  in  the  last  battle,  that  it  meant  rank  without 
authority  or  power.  There  would,  in  my  judgment, 
have  been  a  different  story  to  tell  of  Perryville  if  he 
had  commanded  a  corps  there.  He  now  accepted 
the  command  of  the  center  corps,  because,  as  was 
happily  proved  afterward,  he  could  exercise  im- 


CORINTH   AND    PERRYVILLE.  gi 

plicit  authority,  maintain  perfect  relations  with  the 
other  corps,  and  have  credit  for  what  he  accom 
plished.  His  corps  was  now  larger  than  the  others. 
It  consisted  of  four  divisions,  while  the  rest  had 
only  three.  His  division  commanders  were  Gen 
erals  Rousseau,  Negley,  Dumont,  and  Fry. 

Whatever  criticisms  may  hereafter  be  made  upon 
the  career  of  General  Rosecrans,  he  was  then  known 
as  a  fighting  man  and  a  good  general.  In  the  earliest 
days  of  the  war  he  had  beaten  the  enemy  at  Rich 
Mountain  and  Carnifex  Ferry.  Later  he  had  won  a 
victory  over  Price  at  luka,  and  had  driven  that  gen 
eral  and  Van  Dorn  away  from  Corinth.  He  had 
graduated  in  the  engineers  at  West  Point,  and  had 
well-formed  notions  of  the  science  of  war.  He  en 
tered  upon  his  new  duties  with  alacrity  and  vigor, 
and  to  have  a  man  like  Thomas  at  his  right  hand 
was  a  tower  of  strength.  He  meant  business.  His 
first  care  was  to  restore  the  communications  by  rail 
road  from  Louisville  to  Nashville,  and  thus  to  estab 
lish  two  strong  bases  of  supplies;  or  rather,  we  might 
say,  the  whole  railroad  line  formed,  so  to  speak,  a 
long  connecting  base  between  the  two,  upon  which 
the  army  could  depend.  This  precaution  being  well 
taken,  and  the  work  thoroughly  accomplished  prin 
cipally  by  Thomas's  troops,  the  great  object  in  view 
was  to  beat  up  Bragg's  quarters  at  Murfreesboro  or 
wherever  he  could  find  him,  drive  him  from  Ten 
nessee,  capture  Chattanooga,  and  bring  the  whole 


92 


GENERAL  THOMAS. 


State  finally  and  permanently  into  the  Union  ranks. 
They  had  been  long  enough  trying  to  do  this.  It 
was  high  time  to  accomplish  it.*  Thomas's  troops 
were  constantly  in  motion.  With  his  headquarters 
at  Gallatin,  he  had  superintended  the  repairs  and 
fortification  of  the  railroad  between  the  two  capi 
tals.  Large  magazines  of  supplies  and  munitions 
had  been  formed  at  Nashville  and  at  the  secondary 
base,  Louisville.  Toward  the  end  of  December 
everything  was  in  readiness.  The  army  was  put 
in  motion,  the  corps  marched  by  different  roads 
but  within  supporting  distance  upon  Murfreesboro. 
Thomas  was  in  advance  with  two  divisions  and  two 
brigades  on  the  Franklin  road ;  the  rest  of  his  corps 
were  still  detached  but  would  soon  join  him.f  On 
the  3oth  of  December  the  whole  Union  army  was  in 
front  of  Murfreesboro.  Such  was  the  impetuosity 
of  Rosecrans  that  he  thought  Bragg  had  evacuated 
the  town.  Instead  of  making  a  careful  reconnois- 
sance  he  ordered  Crittenden  to  occupy  it,  but  soon 
he  found  out  that  he  was  mistaken  ;  Bragg  was  in 
trenched  in  an  exceedingly  strong  line,  and  was  as 
full  of  fight  as  his  Union  enemy. 

*  Bragg's  army  from  the  iQth  to  the  26th  of  October  was  pass 
ing  through  Cumberland  Gap,  and  thence  he  moved  to  Chatta 
nooga,  the  objective  point,  whence,  after  due  reorganization  and 
preparation,  he  might  set  out  to  intercept  and  fight  Rosecrans. 

\  McCook  marched  by  the  Nolensville  road,  and  Crittenden 
by  the  direct  road  to  Murfreesboro.  All  moved  cautiously  upon 
that  town,  expecting,  indeed,  to  meet  the  enemy  at  Triune. 


CORINTH    AND    PERRYVILLE.  93 

Indeed,  he  was  waiting  for  him  this  time,  as  be 
fore,  on  his  chosen  field  of  battle,  not  in  ambush  or 
in  the  employment  of  stratagem,  but  in  open  and 
defiant  array.  He  had  the  retreat  from  Perryville, 
which  was  equal  to  a  defeat,  to  atone,  for,  and 
the  Confederate  authorities  were  as  urgent  that  he 
should  overthrow  Rosecrans  as  the  headquarters  at 
Washington  were  that  Rosecrans  should  destroy  him. 
His  was  already  the  losing  cause,  and  the  most  des 
perate  efforts  were  needed  to  restore  it  to  hopeful 
vigor.  These  efforts  General  Bragg  made  to  the 
utmost  of  his  ability. 


CHAPTER   VI. 


The  field — Bragg's  line — Defensive-offensive — First  Union  move 
— The  right  wing  routed — The  left  pushed  back — The  center 
retired — Possible  withdrawal — "  This  army  can't  retreat  " — 
New  position — Semicircle  of  fire — Thomas  repulses  attack 
with  promptness  and  skill — Crittenden  crosses  the  river — 
Driven  back — Union  artillery  scatters  enemy — Bragg  aban 
dons  his  wounded — First  telegram  to  Richmond — The  bloody 
crossing — Federal  victory — New  arrangement  of  corps — Cam 
paign  of  Tullahoma — Long  rest  and  delay. 

WE  must  pause  for  a  moment  to  take  a  glance  at 
the  battlefield  soon  to  be  resonant  with  the  thunders 
of  warfare  and  bloody  from  the  holocaust  of  vic 
tims.  Before  doing  so  we  present  a  brief  outline  of 
the  numerical  strength  and  composition  of  the  con 
tending  armies.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  or 
ganized  as  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  consisted  of 
two  wings  and  a  center.  The  right  wing,  com 
manded  by  General  A.  McD.  McCook,  was  com- 

*  I  have  adopted  the  geographical  name  of  this  river,  although 
it  would  be  more  commonly  called  Stone  River,  as  it  has  been  in 
the  past.  It  is  spelled  Stone's  River  in  the  reports,  etc.,  con 
tained  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  Record.  In  Lippincott's 
Gazetteer,  however,  it  is  given  as  Stone  River. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER.  95 

posed  of  three  divisions,  commanded  respectively  by 
General  Jefferson  C.  Davis,  General  Richard  W. 
Johnson,  and  General  P.  H.  Sheridan.  The  left 
wing  was  commanded  by  General  T.  L.  Crittenden. 
The  three  divisions  of  which  it  was  composed  were 
commanded  respectively  by  Generals  T.  J.  Wood, 
John  M.  Palmer,  and  H.  P.  Van  Cleve.  The  center, 
under  Thomas,  had  for  its  division  commanders 
Generals  Rousseau,  Negley,  S.  S.  Fry,  who  seems  to 
have  replaced  Generals  Dumont  and  R.  B.  Mitchell. 
A  fifth  division,  not  engaged  at  Stone's  River,  was 
commanded  by  General  J.  J.  Reynolds.  Each  of 
these  large  commands  had  an  adequate  contingent 
of  artillery,  and  Thomas  had  portions  of  three  regi 
ments  of  cavalry,  but  the  body  of  the  cavalry  was 
formed  into  a  division  under  the  command  of  Gen 
eral  D.  S.  Stanley.  Such  was  the  Union  army.  By 
the  night  of  December  3oth  they  were  in  position. 

To  meet  it  and  arrest  its  progress,  the  Confeder 
ate  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  commanded  by  General 
Bragg,  consisted  of  two  corps  under  Generals  Polk 
and  Hardee.  The  divisions  of  Folk's  corps  were 
commanded  by  Cheatham  and  Withers,  and  each  con 
tained  four  very  heavy  brigades.  Hardee's  corps 
was  composed  of  two  divisions  under  Breckinridge 
and  Cleburne.  McCown's  divisions  of  Kirby  Smith's 
army  were  temporarily  serving  with  Hardee  in  this 
action.  General  Joseph  Wheeler  was  in  command 
of  all  the  cavalry,  formed  into  four  brigades,  one  of 


96  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

which  was  commanded  by  himself  and  the  other 
three  by  Buford,  Pegram,  and  Wharton. 

To  a  cursory  glance  before  the  action  the  chances 
of  the  combatants  seemed  to  be  about  even  ;  there 
was  little  disparity  in  force,  for,  while  Rosecrans  had 
forty-three  thousand  men,  Bragg  had  about  forty- 
six  thousand.  The  latter  had  the  advantage  of  posi 
tion  carefully  selected  and  thoroughly  intrenched ; 
his  slight  excess  of  numbers  was  made  up  by  excel 
lent  re-enforcements  from  the  corps  of  Kirby  Smith, 
and  he  was  burning  with  desire  to  retrieve  what, 
after  all,  was  the  disaster  at  Perryville.  Appar 
ently  acting  on  the  defensive,  he  was  like  the  lion 
crouched  for  a  spring. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Union  army  had  the  pres 
tige  of  advance,  which  is  much  in  itself.  It  had  a 
new  confidence  in  a  fresh  general  who  had  won 
laurels  in  other  fields.  It  had  a  thorough  and  far 
better  reorganization  since  Perryville.  Crittenden 
would  have  a  chance  to  fight,  McCook  an  oppor 
tunity  to  retrieve  himself,  and  Thomas,  no  longer 
second  in  command,  would  be  permitted  to  show  his 
superb  staying  and  supporting  power ;  for  the  battle 
was  to  be  fought  on  different  lines  from  those  origi 
nally  projected. 

And  now  let  us  look  at  the  field  upon  whieh  was 
to  be  achieved  a  signal  victory,  in  winning  which 
Thomas  played  a  most  brilliant  part.  Murfreesboro 
is  situated  on  the  west  fork  of  Stone's  River,  or 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER.  gj 

rather  about  a  mile  east  of  it.  The  flow  of  the 
stream  is  a  little  west  of  north,  and  it  empties  into 
the  Cumberland  about  five  miles  from  Nashville. 
Less  than  ten  miles  below  Murfreesboro  it  is  joined 
by  Overall  Creek.  The  battle  was  fought  in  part 
between  these  two  streams  and  on  both  sides  of 
Stone's  River.  The  Nashville  and  Chattanooga 
Railroad  follows  the  general  northwestern  direction 
of  the  river. 

General  Bragg,  who  thus  far  seemed  to  be  en 
tirely  on  the  defensive,  had  intrenched  himself  in  a 
strong  line  in  front  of  Murfreesboro  and  on  the  left 
bank,  with  his  right  crossing  the  stream  about  two 
miles  in  front  of  the  town.  Most  of  his  line  was 
drawn  up  in  a  strong  triple  formation.  The  divi 
sion  on  his  left  was  that  of  McCown,  temporarily 
detached  from  Kirby  Smith.  That  flank  was  covered 
by  Wharton's  brigade  of  cavalry.  In  first  formation, 
at  least,  the  order  from  left  to  right  was — Cleburne, 
Cheatham,  Withers — and  across  the  river,  forming 
the  extreme  right,  was  the  division  of  Breckinridge, 
supported  on  the  flank  by  Wheeler  with  the  remain 
ing  three  brigades  of  cavalry.  Bragg's  headquarters 
were  in  the  rear  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  and  on 
the  Nashville  turnpike.  I  have  said  that  Bragg  was 
on  the  defensive-offensive.  He  would  await  the  at 
tack  of  the  advancing  Union  army  with  the  hope  of 
defeating  it  so  thoroughly  that  he  might  pursue  it 
back  into  the  coveted  border  States  to  resuscitate  the 


98  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

secession  spirit  and  to  take  all  the  chances  which  for 
tune  should  throw  into  his  hands;  or,  if  that  were 
delayed,  he  would  himself  attack.  His  hopes  were 
high  and  his  troops  confident.  He  had  not  long  to 
wait.  Upon  this  strong  Confederate  line  the  Union 
army  was  about  to  advance.  On  the  right,  on  high 
ground  near  the  Franklin  pike,  opposite  the  strong 
Confederate  left,  was  McCook's  corps. 

As  the  Confederate  line  extended  beyond  Mc 
Cook's  right,  making  his  line  a  very  faulty  one,  which 
Rosecrans  had  recognized,  but  not  corrected,  he  re 
sorted  to  a  stratagem.  The  night  before  the  action 
he  extended  his  line  by  false  camp  fires  for  some 
distance,  the  result  of  which  was  the  strong  exten 
sion  of  the  enemy's  line,  which  was  to  take  McCook 
in  flank  and  rear  at  the  very  first  onset.  On  the 
left,  in  a  bend  of  the  river,  was  Crittenden's  wing. 
Thomas,  with  the  center  on  a  rolling  slope,  was 
either  to  act  independently  or  as  a  reserve  in  sup 
port  of  the  right  or  left,  as  circumstances  might 
require.  It  was  now  daybreak  of  December  3ist. 
The  enemy's  left  unfortunately  extended  beyond 
McCook's  right  as  he  was  coming  into  position, 
and  this  gave  them  a  great  advantage  over  him. 
They  advanced  to  the  attack,  and  their  assault 
was  delivered  with  such  vigor  that  the  Union  right 
wing  was  at  once  turned,  was  driven  back  and 
to  the  left  a  long  distance,  and  in  their  retreat 
fell  upon  Thomas's  two  divisions,  which  were  fortu- 


THE  BATTLEFIELD 

STONE'S 

NEAR  MURFREESBORO 


THE    BATTLE    OF    STONE'S    RIVER.  99 

nately  enabled  to  stem  the  current  setting  like  a 
mill  race  to  the  rear.  The  Confederates  claimed, 
although  no  doubt  their  account  is  exaggerated,  that 
in  this  attack  the  right  of  the  Union  army  was 
entirely  surprised.  The  artillery  horses  were  not 
harnessed,  and  so  several  Federal  batteries  were  cap 
tured.  In  any  case  the  situation  was  bad  enough. 
The  Union  right  was  pushed  back  during  five  hours 
of  incessant  fighting,  brigade  after  brigade  being  led 
in  by  the  enemy  with  great  impetuosity  to  complete 
the  work.  It  was  here  that  Sheridan  signalized  him 
self  by  the  splendid  fighting  of  his  division  against 
attacks  in  front  and  flank,  and  even  in  rear  :  when  he 
did  fall  back  it  was  in  part  for  lack  of  ammunition. 
Negley  also  did  much  with  his  division  partially 
to  stem  the  tide.  Rousseau  was  ordered  to  the 
right  and  rear  of  Sheridan.  Thomas  was  also 
there,  and  was  to  prove  a  tower  of  defense  in  this 
emergency.  His  policy  had  been  to  make  two  par 
tial  changes  of  front,  falling  back  in  good  order 
and  refusing  his  right.  Prisoners  were  taken  and 
guns  were  lost  during  these  movements,  in  John 
son's  and  Sheridan's  divisions.  Having  thus  thrust 
back  as  upon  a  pivot  the  Union  right,  Bragg  then 
determined  to  crush  the  left  flank,  which  was  held 
by  Palmer's  division,  and  two  brigades  of  Wood's 
division,  constituting  the  principal  portion  of  Crit- 
tenden's  troops,  and  supported  by  one  brigade  of 
Sheridan's  division  of  McCook's  corps.  In  the  mean- 


100  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

time  Rosecrans,  instead  of  re-enforcing  McCook, 
formed,  by  the  aid  of  Thomas,  a  new  line  of  battle 
on  several  oval-shaped  hills  and  also  on  a  crest  in 
rear  of  the  left,  from  which,  by  a  concentrated 
semicircular  fire  of  artillery  in  all  directions,  he  might 
resist  the  attacks  of  the  enemy  from  any  direction. 
He  wisely  masked  his  artillery,  and  the  troops  lay 
behind  the  eminences,  guns  and  men  awaiting  the 
attack.  Fifty  of  these  guns  were  placed  on  the  left 
of  this  new  line,  and  would  give  a  good  account  of 
those  rash  enough  to  assail  them.  The  general  and 
the  troops  were  fully  awake  to  the  situation,  and 
Thomas  was  the  hero  of  the  occasion.  Thus  much 
of  the  battle  had  taken  place  on  the  3ist  of  Decem 
ber  and  had  seemed  decidedly  to  go  against  the 
Union  army.  Encouraged  by  his  great  success, 
Bragg  ordered  his  left  center,  which  had  also  swung 
around  to  the  right,  to  make  a  final  assault  at  sun 
set — intended  to  be  a  coup  de  grace.  It  did  indeed 
shake  the  Union  troops  just  taking  position  on  their 
new  line,  but  it  was  at  last  thoroughly  repelled  or 
held  in  check,  while  Thomas  was  slowly  retiring. 
To  form  this  new  line,  General  Thomas  with  five 
brigades  had  stopped  the  advance  on  the  Federal 
right  and  had  thus  saved  the  army.  In  the  words 
of  Van  Home,  "  General  Thomas  gained  greater 
distinction  in  other  battles,  but  never  did  he  meet  a 
crisis  with  more  promptness  and  skill."  There  is  a 
story  that  late  that  night,  at  a  meeting  of  the  prin- 


THE    BATTLE   OF    STONE'S    RIVER.  IOI 

cipal  officers,  something  was  said  about  a  possible 
retreat,  and  Rosecrans  awakened  Thomas,  who  had 
fallen  asleep,  and  put  to  him  the  question,  "Will 
you  protect  the  rear  on  retreat  ? "  Starting  out  of 
his  slumber,  Thomas  ejaculated,  "  This  army  can't 
retreat!  "  and  at  once  fell  asleep  again.  In  justice 
to  Rosecrans  it  should  be  said  that  nothing  could 
have  been  more  gallant  than  his  conduct  in  the  suc 
ceeding  conflict,  especially  as  he  rode  down  to  the 
Round  forest  under  the  concentrated  fire  of  the 
enemy.  It  was  then  that  Colonel  Garesche,  his  aid, 
had  his  head  taken  off  by  a  cannon  shot  at  his  side, 
and  three  orderlies  were  killed  in  quick  succession. 

Rosecrans  adopted  the  opinion  that  the  army 
could  not  retreat.  On  the  morning  of  the  ist  of 
January  he  had  concluded  in  his  own  words  "to 
fight  or  die."  Provisions  and  ammunition  were  rap 
idly  brought  up  from  the  rear.  The  men  were  in 
good  spirits  and  condition  ;  they  were  now  almost 
impregnably  posted.  If  the  enemy  was  not  ready  to 
attack  they  would  resume  the  offensive;  they  would 
anticipate  Bragg's  purpose  to  assault  the  Union 
left.  With  this  purpose  General  Crittenden  sent  sev 
eral  brigades  across  the  river  to  threaten  the  ene 
my's  right.  These  brigades  were  fiercely  attacked 
by  the  Confederates  under  Breckinridge,  who  pur 
sued  them  to  and  across  the  river  to  a  considerable 
distance,  but  the  pursuers  rushed  into  a  terrible  trap. 
It  was  then  that  the  fifty  guns  masked  on  the  left  of 


102  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Crittenden's  corps  opened  upon  their  advance  with 
a  murderous  fire,  before  which  they  recoiled  in  dis 
may.  And  at  that  juncture  Colonel  John  F.  Miller 
with  a  brigade  of  Negley's  division,  which  had  been 
sent  from  Thomas  to  re-enforce  Crittenden,  fell  upon 
them,  drove  them  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet 
through  and  beyond  their  own  line  of  works  toward 
Murfreesboro.  The  entire  situation  was  changed. 
Bragg  had  expended  his  fury  in  these  attacks.  The 
discomfiture  of  his  right  settled  the  question.  His 
hopes  were  destroyed.  He  made  some  desultory 
and  faint  attacks  upon  Thomas's  center,  which  were 
promptly  met  and  repulsed  ;  and  so,  on  the  night  of 
January  3d  and  on  the  morning  of  the  4th,  leaving 
his  dead  and  wounded  behind,  he  retired  rapidly  to 
the  South.  The  Union  army  had  lost  eight  thousand 
five  hundred,  and  the  Confederates,  according  to 
General  Bragg's  report,  over  ten  thousand.  There 
is  such  a  discrepancy  in  the  accounts  of  the  capture 
of  prisoners  on  both  sides,  that  it  is  very  difficult  to 
get  at  the  truth,  even  by  a  collation  and  comparison 
of  the  official  reports. 

The  partial  success  of  Bragg  at  Perryville  has 
led  the  Southern  historian  to  claim  a  victory  there, 
but  he  acknowledges  his  defeat  at  Stone's  River.  A 
great  defeat  it  was  in  its  consequences,  injurious 
as  they  proved  to  be  to  the  Confederate  arms.  The 
moral  disaster  was  also  immense.  He  had  lost  middle 
Tennessee,  and  with  it  the  confidence  of  the  Con- 


THE   BATTLE    OF   STONE'S   RIVER.  Ic>3 

federate  authorities.  For  some  time  before  the  ac 
tion  Bragg  had  abandoned  the  idea  that  Rosecrans 
would  attack  him.  His  well-appointed  army  of  be 
tween  forty  and  fifty  thousand  men  had  been  passing 
a  delightful  time  at  Murfreesboro.  It  was  the  scene 
of  joy  and  festivity.  Gay  parties  in  the  town  and  in 
the  camp  were  the  order  of  the  day.  There  seemed 
to  be  no  apprehension  for  the  immediate  future,  and 
especially  did  the  grand  Christmas  ball  give  a  new 
and  famous  illustration  of  Byron's  Waterloo.  Just 
one  week  after,  the  fields  around  Murfreesboro  were 
thickly  strown  with  the  dead  of  both  armies — 

"  Rider  and  horse,  friend,  foe,  in  one  red  burial  blent." 

The  day  after  Christmas,  in  the  midst  of  a  steady 
rain,  the  news  had  come  in  that  the  Union  army  was 
on  its  march,  and  this  had  been  to  Bragg  in  the  nature 
of  a  surprise.  To  summarize  further,  we  have  seen 
that  the  action  of  the  3ist  had  given  to  the  Confed 
erate  forces  a  decided  success.  The  Union  troops 
had  been  driven  back  for  a  long  distance,  and  had 
lost  many  prisoners  and  guns.  It  was  then  that 
Bragg  had  prematurely  telegraphed  to  Richmond, 
proclaiming  the  news  of  a  great  victory  before  it 
had  been  half  achieved.  His  words  were,  u  God  has 
granted  us  a  happy  New  Year." 

When  night  came  down  upon  the  ist  of  January 
the  loss  and  the  carnage  were  evidenced  by  the  fact 
that  two  thousand  men  had  fallen  in  the  single  at- 


104 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


tack  of  Breckinridge  on  the  Union  left.  The  Con 
federates  appropriately  call  it  the  bloody  crossing 
of  Stone's  River. 

On  Sunday  morning,  January  4th,  a  reconnois- 
sance  disclosed  the  departure  of  Bragg's  army,  and 
Murfreesboro  was  occupied  by  the  Federal  troops. 
Thomas  entered  the  town  on  Monday,  January  5th, 
preceded  by  Stanley's  cavalry.  Rose'crans  did  not 
proceed  farther,  but  remained  there  to  reorganize 
and  recruit,  and  wait  for  more  favorable  weather. 
The  authorities  at  Washington  and  the  whole  coun 
try  were  overjoyed  at  the  success.  Congratulatory 
orders  were  issued,  and  eulogistic  resolutions  were 
passed  by  Congress  and  the  Legislatures  of  several 
Northern  States. 

It  would,  of  course,  have  been  well  if  Rosecrans 
could  have  followed  Bragg  immediately,  and  to  the 
public  mind  this  seemed  possible  ;  but  the  military 
critic  knows  that  after  such  a  hard-fought  battle 
an  orderly  pursuit  can  not  be  made.  Whether  six 
months  were  necessary  for  reorganization  and  a  par 
tial  state  of  inaction  was  warranted,  are  more  ques 
tionable  considerations.  Long  stays  in  permanent 
camps  are  not  beneficial  to  troops.  But  more  of 
this  hereafter. 

Measured  by  the  actual  conditions  of  the  battle 
field,  it  was  a  Union  victory.  The  enemy  had  been 
repulsed  at  all  points,  the  disaster  to  the  right  wing 
on  the  first  day  had  been  splendidly  retrieved  on  the 


THE    BATTLE   OF    STONE'S    RIVER.  IO5 

following  days,  and  then  Bragg  had  retired  from  the 
field,  leaving  his  wounded  behind. 

Major  William  Lambert,  in  his  admirable  oration 
at  Rochester  before  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  happily  epitomizes  the  value  of  Thom 
as's  services  in  this  action  :  "At  Stone's  River,  when, 
in  spite  of  Sheridan's  superb  stand,  the  troops  upon 
Thomas's  right,  flanked  and  overborne,  were  forced 
back ;  when  his  left  was  alike  exposed  by  the  retire 
ment  of  its  immediate  supports,  and  he  was  com 
pelled  to  fight  on  front  and  flanks  :  the  rapidity  with 
which  he  changed  front  while  thus  heavily  engaged, 
and,  forming  line  at  right  angles  to  his  first  position, 
gave  direction  and  stability  to  the  army's  new  for 
mation,  not  less  than  the  sturdiness  with  which  he 
fought  his  division  throughout  the  entire  action  ; 
and  the  vigor  with  which  he  asserted  in  the  night 
conference  '  This  army  can't  retreat,'  made  his  service 
in  this  battle  second  only  to  that  he  rendered  at 
Chickamauga." 

It  has  been  thought  by  some  critics  that  Rose- 
crans  was  in  as  good  a  condition  for  an  immediate 
advance  as  Bragg  was  for  an  orderly  retreat.  This 
is  hardly  just.  After  so  bloody  a  battle  there  must 
be  time  to  rest  and  recover,  and,  to  say  the  least  of 
it,  the  new  campaign  of  Rosecrans  required  the  col 
lection  of  supplies  for  at  least  twenty-five  days'  sub 
sistence,  the  carrying  of  ammunition  for  at  least  two 
great  battles,  the  securing  of  the  railroad  commu- 


106  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

nications,  and  a  great  increase  to  the  cavalry  ;  for  the 
enemy's  cavalry  were  ten  or  twelve  thousand  strong, 
and  we  had  a  very  inadequate  force  to  cope  with  it. 

Rosecrans  made  a  change  of  designation  in  the 
commands.  Instead  of  right  and  left  wings  and 
center,  the  army  was  divided  into  corps,  McCook 
having  command  of  the  Twentieth,  Thomas  of  the 
Fourteenth,  and  Crittenden  of  the  Twenty-first. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  farther  upon  the 
splendid  services  of  Thomas  and  his  corps  in  this 
battle.  In  the  great  rush  of  McCook's  corps  to  the 
rear  on  the  first  day  he  stood  firm  at  the  right  cen 
ter,  stemming  the  apparently  resistless  tide,  while  he 
established  the  new  line  and  made  the  later  arrange 
ments  practicable.  He  massed  the  artillery  on  the 
heights,  brought  the  pursuit  to  a  standstill, "and  then 
converted  it  into  a  disastrous  retreat.  Now  that  the 
confusion  of  reports  and  dispatches  has  been  brought 
into  something  like  order,  Thomas  emerges  from 
the  record  as  the  most  important  and  prominent 
man  of  that  field — a  man  destined,  if  he  should  be 
spared,  for  greater  achievements.  His  newly  desig 
nated  Fourteenth  Corps  consisted  of  four  divisions, 
commanded  respectively  by  Generals  Rousseau,  Neg- 
ley,  Brannan,  and  J.  J.  Reynolds,  all  good  men  and 
true,  and  to  be  thoroughly  tested  in  the  next  great 
action  between  the  two  armies. 

It  seemed  that  the  time  of  that  action  was  at 
hand,  for  during  the  early  months  of  the  year,  while 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER. 


107 


Rosecrans  was  resting  and  reorganizing  at  Murfrees- 
boro,  Bragg  had  established  his  headquarters  at  Tul- 
lahoma,  a  small  town  on  Rock  Creek,  thirty-two 
miles  from  Murfreesboro,  and  at  the  junction  of  two 
trunk  lines  of  railroad,  the  Nashville  and  Chatta 
nooga  and  the  McMinnville  and  Manchester.  It 
was  a  good  defensive  position,  if  Bragg  really  meant 
it  to  be  a  base  of  operations;  it  would  enable  him  to 
move  rapidly  on  an  interior  line  from  that  part  of 
the  Tennessee  River  where  it  forms  the  boundary 
between  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  to  that  other  part 
where  it  covers  Chattanooga. 

It  seems  more  than  probable,  however,  that  this 
conduct  of  Bragg  was  of  the  nature  of  a  feint  to 
deceive  Rosecrans,  and  to  draw  him  off  from  a  direct 
movement,  while  he  perfected  his  plans  with  regard 
to  Chattanooga. 

Thus  began  what  has  been  dignified  by  the  name 
of  the  Tullahoma  campaign ;  it  was  of  only  ten 
days'  duration — from  the  23d  day  of  June  to  the  4th 
of  July.  Rosecrans  was  not  deceived.  If  Bragg 
meant  it  in  earnest,  he  would  drive  him  from  his  dje- 
fenses  on  Duck  River,  with  his  headquarters  at  Tul 
lahoma,  or  fall  upon  his  line  of  communication  and 
cut  him  off  from  Chattanooga.  Bragg  did  not  wait 
for  Rosecrans's  coming.  Thomas,  with  the  Four 
teenth  Corps,  moved  toward  Manchester  and  threat 
ened  his  right,  whereupon  the  Twentieth  Corps  was 
moved  upon  Liberty  Gap,  and  this  gave  McCook  an 


108  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

opportunity  to  retrieve  his  ill  fortune  at  Stone's 
River.  Thomas  moved  to  Hooven's  Gap.  Thus, 
with  his  flank  threatened  at  Tullahoma,  after  a  show 
of  resistance,  Bragg  retreated  to  Chattanooga. 

The  movements  of  Thomas  from  Manchester  and 
of  McCook  from  Tullahoma  were  unable  to  bring 
him  to  a  stand  ;  he  burned  the  bridges  and  crossed 
the  Cumberland  range,  and  Rosecrans  was  now  free 
to  make  his  plans  for  a  more  direct  advance  upon 
Chattanooga.  The  possession  of  the  gaps  in  that 
line  had  been  feebly  contested  by  the  enemy  sim 
ply  to  gain  time;  they  were  now  held  by  Thomas 
and  McCook,  while  Crittenden,  with  the  left  wing, 
would  find  no  opposition  in  a  direct  march  upon  this 
mountain  range. 

It  was  thought  that  the  spirit  of  action  infused 
in  the  Union  army  by  this  movement  to  Tullahoma 
would  increase  in  strength,  and  lead  Rosecrans  to 
move  at  once  upon  Bragg's  new  position;  but  there 
was  to  be  another  long  and  unfortunate  delay,  and 
the  reader  chafes,  as  the  authorities  at  Washington 
did,  as  he  foresees  the  results  which  were  to  follow. 
We  may  here  anticipate  a  little.  Bragg  was  at 
Chattanooga,  but  it  was  manifest  that  he  could 
not  continue  to  hold  the  town  ;  Rosecrans  could  cut 
him  off  from  his  Southern  communications.  He 
must  come  outside  and  fight  him.  Should  Bragg 
defeat  him,  he  could  hold  Chattanooga  ;  should  he 
be  defeated,  he  could  retreat  to  the  South. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER.  iOg 

Halting  on  the  northwestern  side  of  the  Cumber 
land  Mountains,  Rosecrans  continued  his  plans  and 
preparations  for  crossing  the  Tennessee.  The  pre 
cious  months  of  summer  were  passing,  the  enemy 
was  consolidating  and  strengthening  his  schemes  of 
resistance,  and  explicit  orders  were  being  sent  from 
Washington  urging  Rosecrans  to  move ;  so  that, 
when  he  did,  it  was  under  pressure. 

General  Halleck  said  he  was  blamed  at  Washing 
ton  for  not  urging  Rosecrans  to  move  forward  more 
rapidly,  while  Rosecrans  was  blaming  him  for  that 
very  urgency.  It  is  impossible  to  decide  in  such  a 
case.  It  is  worthy  of  observation,  however,  that  in 
the  case  of  several  generals  of  the  highest  order  the 
impatience  of  the  Government  at  Washington  has 
been  proved  unjust  and  injurious,  and  so  the  benefit 
of  the  doubt  may  be  given  to  Rosecrans. 

During  the  long  inaction  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  from  January  to  June,  while  thousands 
of  officers  and  men  were  procuring  leave  of  absence, 
Thomas  did  not  ask  for  a  furlough,  which  he  might 
have  had,  to  visit  his  wife  and  friends  at  the  North. 

Extracts  from  General  Thomas's  Report  of  Stone's  River. 

"  HEADQUARTERS  (CENTRE)  FOURTEENTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
"DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

"  MURFREESBORO,  January  75,  1863. 

"  MAJOR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  to  the 
major  general  commanding  the  Department  of  the 
Cumberland  the  following  report  of  the  operations 


1 10  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

of  that  part  of  my  command  which  was  engaged  in 
the  battle  of  Stone's  River,  in  front  of  Murfreesboro. 
It  is  proper  to  state  here  that  two  brigades  of  Fry's 
division  and  Reynolds's  entire  division  were  detained 
near  Gallatin  and  along  the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railroad  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  rebel  leader 
Morgan,  who  had  been  for  a  long  time  on  the  watch 
for  an  opportunity  to  destroy  the  railroad. 

"  Rousseau's,  Negley's,  and  Mitchell's  divisions 
and  Walker's  brigade  of  Fry's  division  were  concen 
trated  at  Nashville ;  but  Mitchell's  division  being 
required  to  garrison  Nashville,  my  only  available 
force  was  Rousseau's  and  Negley's  divisions  and 
Walker's  brigade  of  Fry's  division — about  13,395  ef 
fective  men. 

"  December  26th. — Negley's  division,  followed  by 
Rousseau's  division  and  Walker's  brigade,  marched 
by  the  Franklin  pike  to  Brentwood,  at  that  point 
taking  the  Wilson  pike.  Negley  and  Rousseau  were 
to  have  encamped  for  the  night  at  Owens's  Store. 
On  reaching  the  latter  place,  Negley,  hearing  heavy 
firing  in  the  direction  of  Nolensville,  left  his  train 
with  a  guard  to  follow,  and  pushed  forward  with  his 
troops  to  the  support  of  Brigadier-General  J.  C. 
Davis's  command,  the  advance  division  of  McCook's 
corps,  Davis  having  become  hotly  engaged  with  the 
enemy  posted  in  Nolensville  and  in  the  pass  through 
the  hills  south  of  that  village.  Rousseau  encamped 
with  his  division  at  Owens's  Store;  Walker  with  his 
brigade  at  Brentwood.  During  the  night  a  very 
heavy  rain  fell,  making  the  crossroads  almost  im 
passable,  and  it  was  not  until  the  night  of  the  27th 
that  Rousseau  reached  Nolensville  with  his  troops 
and  train.  Negley  remained  at  Nolensville  until  10 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER. 


Ill 


A.  M.  on  the  27th,  when,  having  brought  his  train 
across  from  Wilson  pike,  he  moved  to  the  east  over 
an  exceedingly  rough  byroad  to  the  right  of  Crit- 
tenden,  at  Stewartsboro,  on  the  Murfreesboro  pike. 
Walker,  by  my  orders,  retraced  his  steps  from  Brent- 
wood  and  crossed  over  to  the  Nolensville  pike. 

"December  28th. — Negley  remained  in  camp  at 
Stewartsboro,  bringing  his  train  from  the  rear. 
Rousseau  reached  Stewartsboro  on  the  night  of  the 
28th ;  his  train  arrived  early  next  day. 

"  December  2yth. — Negley's  division  crossed  Stew 
art's  Creek,  two  miles  southwest  and  above  the 
turnpike  bridge,  and  marched  in  support  of  the  head 
and  right  flank  of  Crittenden's  corps,  which  moved 
by  the  Murfreesboro  pike  to  a  point  within  two  miles 
of  Murfreesboro.  The  enemy  fell  back  before  our 
advance,  contesting  the  ground  obstinately  with 
their  cavalry  rear  guard.  Rousseau  remained  in 
camp  at  Stewartsboro,  detaching  Starkweather's 
brigade  with  a  section  of  artillery  to  the  Jefferson 
pike,  crossing  Stone's  River,  to  observe  the  move 
ments  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction.  Walker 
reached  Stewartsboro  from  the  Nolensville  pike 
about  dark. 

" December  joth. — A  cavalry  force  of  the  enemy, 
something  over  four  hundred  strong,  with  two  pieces 
of  artillery,  attacked  Starkweather  about  9  A.  M., 
but  were  soon  driven  off.  The  enemy  opened  a 
brisk  fire  on  Crittenden's  advance,  doing  but  little 
execution,  however.  About  7  A.  M.  during  the  morn 
ing  Negley's  division  was  obliqued  to  the  right, 
and  took  up  a  position  on  the  right  of  Palmer's  divi 
sion  of  Crittenden's  corps,  and  was  then  advanced 
through  a  dense  cedar  thicket,  several  hundred 


112  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

yards  in  width,  to  the  Wilkinson  crossroads,  driving 
the  enemy's  skirmishers  steadily  and  with  considera 
ble  loss — our  loss  comparatively  small.  About  noon 
Sheridan's  division  of  McCook's  corps  approached 
by  the  Wilkinson  crossroads,  joined  Negley's  right, 
McCook's  two  other  divisions  coming  up  on  Sheri 
dan's  right,  thus  forming  a  continuous  line,  the  left 
resting  on  Stone's  River,  the  right  stretching  in  a 
westerly  direction  and  resting  on  high  wooded 
ground  a  short  distance  to  the  south  of  the  Wilkin 
son  crossroads,  and,  as  has  since  been  ascertained, 
nearly  parallel  with  the  enemy's  intrenchments, 
thrown  up  on  the  sloping  land  bordering  the  north 
west  bank  of  Stone's  River,  Rousseau's  division,  with 
the  exception  of  Starkweather's  brigade,  being  or 
dered  up  on  the  Murfreesboro  pike  in  the  rear  of  the 
center.  During  the  night  of  the  3oth  I  sent  orders 
to  Walker  to  take  up  a  strong  position  near  the 
turnpike  bridge  over  Stewart's  Creek  and  defend 
the  position  against  any  attempts  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry  to  destroy  it.  Rousseau  was  ordered  to 
move  by  6  A.  M.  on  the  3ist  to  a  position  in  rear  of 
Negley.  This  position  placed  his  division  with  its 
left  on  the  Murfreesboro  pike  and  its  right  extending 
into  the  cedar  thicket  through  which  Negley  had 
marched  on  the  3oth.  In  front  of  Negley's  position, 
bordering  a  large  open  field  reaching  to  the  Mur 
freesboro  pike,  a  heavy  growth  of  timber  extended 
in  a  southerly  direction  toward  the  river.  Across 
the  field,  running  in  an  easterly  direction,  the  enemy 
had  thrown  up  rifle-pits  at  intervals  from  the  timber 
to  the  river  bank,  to  the  east  side  of  the  turnpike. 
Along  this  line  of  intrenchments,  on  an  eminence 
about  eight  hundred  yards  from  Negley's  position, 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER.  II3 

and  nearly  in  front  of  his  left,  some  cannon  had 
been  placed,  affording  the  enemy  great  advantage  in 
covering  an  attack  on  our  center.  However,  Palm 
er,  Negley,  and  Sheridan  held  the  position  their  troops 
had  so  manfully  won  on  the  morning  of  the  3oth 
against  every  attempt  to  drive  them  back,  and  re 
mained  in  line  of  battle  during  the  night. 

"  December  3  ist. — Between  6  and  7  A.M.,  the  ene 
my,  having  massed  a  heavy  force  on  McCook's  right 
during  the  night  of  the  3oth,  attacked  and  drove  it 
back,  pushing  his  division  in  pursuit  in  echelon  and 
supporting  distance  until  he  had  gained  sufficient 
ground  to  our  rear  to  wheel  his  masses  to  the  right 
and  throw  them  upon  the  right  flank  of  the  center, 
at  the  same  moment  attacking  Negley  and  Palmer 
in  front  with  a  greatly  superior  force.  To  counter 
act  this  movement  I  had  ordered  Rousseau  to  place 
two  brigades  with  a  battery  to  the  right  and  rear 
of  Sheridan's  division,  facing  toward  the  west,  so 
as  to  support  Sheridan  should  he  be  able  to  hold 
his  ground,  or  to  cover  him  should  he  be  compelled 
to  fall  back.  About  eleven  o'clock  General  Sheri 
dan  reported  to  me  that  his  ammunition  was  en 
tirely  out,  and  he  would  be  compelled  to  fall  back 
to  get  more.  As  it  became  necessary  for  General 
Sheridan  to  fall  back,  the  enemy  pressed  on  still 
farther  to  our  rear,  and  soon  took  up  a  position 
which  gave  them  a  concentrated  cross-fire  of 
musketry  and  cannon  on  Negley's  and  Rousseau's 
troops  at  short  range.  This  compelled  me  to  fall 
back  out  of  the  cedar  woods  and  take  up  a  line 
along  a  depression  in  the  open  ground  within  good 
musket  range  of  the  edge  of  the  woods,  while  the 
artillery  was  retired  to  the  high  ground  to  the  right 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

of  the  turnpike.  From  this  last  position  we  were 
enabled  to  drive  back  the  enemy,  cover  the  forma 
tion  of  our  troops,  and  secure  the  center  on  the  high 
ground.  In  the  execution  of  this  last  movement, 
the  regular  brigade,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Shep- 
erd,  Eighteenth  United  States  Infantry,  came  under 
a  most  murderous  fire,  losing  twenty-two  officers 
and  five  hundred  and  eight  men  in  killed  and 
wounded,  but,  with  the  co-operation  of  Scribner's 
and  Beatty's  brigades  and  Guenther's  and  Loomis's 
batteries,  gallantly  held  its  ground  against  over 
whelming  odds.  The  center  having  succeeded  in 
driving  back  the  enemy  from  its  front,  and  our  ar 
tillery  concentrating  its  fire  on  the  cedar  thicket 
on  our  right,  drove  him  back  far  under  cover,  from 
which,  though  attempting  it,  he  could  not  make  any 
advance. 

"January  i,  1863.  —  Repeated  attempts  were 
made  by  the  enemy  to  advance  on  my  position 
during  the  morning,  but  they  were  driven  back  be 
fore  emerging  from  the  woods.  Colonel  Stark 
weather's  brigade  of  Rousseau's  division,  and  Walk 
er's  brigade  of  Fry's  division,  having  re-enforced  us 
during  the  night,  took  post  on  the  right  of  Rousseau 
and  left  of  Sheridan,  and  bore  their  share  in  repel 
ling  the  attempts  of  the  enemy  on  the  morning  of  the 
ist  instant.  For  the  details  of  the  most  valuable 
service  rendered  by  these  two  brigades  on  the  3oth 
and  3ist  of  December,  1862,  and  the  ist,  2d,  and  3d 
of  January,  1863,  I  refer  you  to  their  reports.  In 
this  connection  I  also  refer  you  to  the  report  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Parkhurst,  commanding  the  Ninth 
Michigan  Infantry  (on  provost  duty  at  my  head 
quarters),  for  the  details  of  most  valuable  service 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER.  ^5 

rendered  by  his  command  on  the  3ist  of  December 
and  ist  and  2d  of  January.  Negley's  division  was 
ordered  early  in  the  day  to  the  support  of  McCook's 
right,  in  which  position  it  remained  during  the  night. 

^January  2d. — About  7  A.  M.  the  enemy  opened  a 
direct  and  cross-fire  from  his  batteries  in  our  front, 
and  along  our  position  on  the  east  bank  of  Stone's 
River  to  our  left  and  front,  at  the  same  time  making 
a  strong  demonstration  with  infantry,  resulting,  how 
ever,  in  no  serious  attack.  Our  artillery — Loomis's, 
Guenther's,  Stokes's,  and  another  battery  (the  com 
mander's  name  I  can  not  now  recall) — soon  drove  back 
their  infantry.  Negley  was  withdrawn  from  the  ex 
treme  right  and  placed  in  reserve  behind  Crittenden's 
right.  About  4  p.  M.  a  division  of  Crittenden's  corps, 
which  had  crossed  Stone's  River  to  reconnoiter,  was 
attacked  by  an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy, 
and,  after  a  gallant  resistance,  compelled  to  fall 
back.  The  movements  of  the  enemy  having  been 
observed  and  reported  by  some  of  my  troops  in  the 
center,  I  sent  orders  to  Negley  to  advance  to  the 
support  of  Crittenden's  troops  should  they  want 
help.  This  order  was  obeyed  in  most  gallant  style, 
and  resulted  in  the  complete  annihilation  of  the 
Twenty-sixth  Tennessee  rebel  regiment  and  the  cap 
ture  of  their  flags;  also  in  the  capture  of  a  battery, 
which  the  enemy  had  been  forced  to  abandon,  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet.  (See  Negley's  report.) 

"January  jd. — Soon  after  daylight  the  Forty- 
second  Indiana,  on  picket  in  a  clump  of  woods  about 
eight  hundred  yards  in  front  of  our  lines,  was  at 
tacked  by  a  brigade  of  the  enemy,  evidently  by  su 
perior  numbers,  and  driven  in  writh  considerable  loss. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Shankling,  commanding  the  regi- 
9 


n6  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ment,  was  surrounded  and  taken  prisoner  while  gal 
lantly  endeavoring  to  draw  off  his  men  from  under  the 
fire  of  such  superior  numbers.  From  these  woods  the 
enemy's  sharpshooters  continued  to  fire  occasionally 
during  the  day  on  our  pickets.  About  6  p.  M.  two 
regiments  from  Colonel  John  Beatty's  brigade  of 
Rousseau's  division,  co-operating  with  two  regiments 
of  Spear's  brigade  of  Negley's  division,  covered  by 
the  skillful  and  well-directed  fire  of  Guenther's  Fifth 
United  States  Artillery  and  Loomis's  First  Michigan 
batteries,  advanced  on  the  woods  and  drove  the 
enemy  not  only  from  its  cover,  but  from  their  in- 
trenchments  a  short  distance  beyond.  For  the  de 
tails  of  this  gallant  night  attack  I  refer  you  to  the 
reports  of  Brigadier-General  Spear,  commanding 
Third  Brigade  of  Negley's  division,  and  Colonel 
John  Beatty,  commanding  Second  Brigade  of  Rous 
seau's  division. 

"  The  enemy  having  retreated  during  the  night 
of  the  3d,  our  troops  were  occupied  during  the  morn 
ing  of  the  4th  in  burying  the  dead  left  on  the  field. 
In  the  afternoon  one  brigade  of  Negley's  division 
was  advanced  to  the  crossing  of  Stone's  River,  with 
a  brigade  of  Rousseau's  division  in  supporting  dis 
tance  in  reserve. 

"January  jth. — My  entire  command,  preceded  by 
Stanley's  cavalry,  marched  into  Murfreesboro  and 
took  up  the  position  we  now  hold.  The  enemy's 
rear  guard  of  cavalry  was  overtaken  on  the  Shelby- 
ville  and  Manchester  roads,  about  five  miles  from 
Murfreesboro,  and,  after  sharp  skirmishing  for  two 
or  three  hours,  was  driven  from  our  immediate  front. 
The  conduct  of  my  command  from  the  time  the 
army  left  Nashville  to  its  entry  into  Murfreesboro 


THE   BATTLE   OF   STONE'S   RIVER. 


117 


is  deserving  of  the  highest  praise,  both  for  their 
patient  endurance  of  the  fatigues  and  discomforts  of 
a  five  days'  battle,  and  for  the  manly  spirit  exhibited 
by  them  in  the  various  phases  of  this  memorable 
contest.  I  refer  you  to  the  detailed  reports  of  the 
division  and  brigade  commanders,  forwarded  here 
with,  for  special  mention  of  those  officers  and  men  of 
their  commands  whose  conduct  they  thought  worthy 
of  particular  notice." 


CHAPTER   VII. 

FORWARD    TO    CHATTANOOGA. 

The  Titanic  terrain — Terra  incognita — Dissolving  views — Chatta 
nooga  the  prize — Evacuated  by  Bragg,  with  intention  to  re 
turn — Rosecrans  urged  to  move — The  field — Ridges,  rivers, 
and  gaps — Topography  of  Chattanooga — "  Hawk's  Nest " — 
Chickamauga  Creek — "  River  of  death  " — Missionary  Ridge — 
Rosecrans's  misjudgment — Occupies  Chattanooga  and  orders 
pursuit — Bragg  waits  for  him — Thomas  ordered  to  Lafayette 
— Bragg  concentrated  there — Attacks  Union  left — Then  right 
— Table  of  both  armies — Crittenden  driven  back — McCook 
scattered. 

ALTHOUGH  it  is  only  the  purpose  of  this  narrative 
to  describe  the  part  taken  in  the  campaigns  and  bat 
tles  of  the  war  by  the  subject  of  this  biography,  we 
are  here  met  by  the  unmathematical  paradox  that 
the  part  taken  by  Thomas  was  not  equal  to,  but  in 
a  peculiar  sense  greater  than,  the  whole.  In  order 
to  prove  this  it  becomes  necessary  to  present  at 
somewhat  greater  length  an  outline  sketch  of  the 
entire  campaign  in  which  it  is  claimed  that  he 
played  so  important  a  part. 

This  is  no  easy  task.  Amid  the  jargon  of  re 
criminations,  the  immense  amount  of  statistics,  the 
rapid  transformations  and  dissolving  views  of  the 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA.  1 19 

march  to  the  battlefield,  and  of  the  field  itself,  the 
impartial  critic  finds  himself  surrounded  by  difficul 
ties.  Eager  claimants  for  eulogistic  recognition  are 
on  either  hand,  and  before  him  at  every  step  are 
well-conceived  excuses  for  failure.  In  one  of  his 
essays  on  history  Carlyle  says  :  "  The  most  gifted 
man  can  observe,  still  more  can  record,  only  the 
series  of  his  own  impressions.  His  observation, 
therefore,  to  say  nothing  of  his  other  imperfections, 
must  be  successive,  while  the  things  done  were  often 
simultaneous.  The  things  done  were  not  a  series 
but  a  group."  This  is  worthy  of  notice  by  military 
critics.  It  is  true  of  the  movement  of  large  armies, 
and  eminently  so  of  the  battle  now  to  be  considered. 
Chickamauga  presents  such  a  labyrinth  both  as  to 
time  and  space,  as  to  series  and  groups,  that  the 
historian  would  be  irrecoverably  lost  were  it  not  for 
the  threefold  clue  of  magic  thread  presented  by  the 
skill,  valor,  and  endurance  of  Thomas,  which  alone 
gives  system  and  symmetry  to  the  story.  From  first 
to  last  Thomas  was  the  guiding  spirit  and  splendid 
hero  of  the  battle. 

The  campaign  of  Chattanooga  was  in  all  respects 
the  most  colossal  and  difficult  of  the  war.  It  was  the 
conflict  of  Titans  upon  gigantic  camping  grounds. 
That  there  should  have  been  blunders  and  partial 
failures  is  not  at  all  to  be  wondered  at  when  we  con 
sider  the  immense  difficulties  of  the  problem — the 
vastness  of  the  great  theater,  its  extremely  broken 


120  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

and  diversified  nature,  mountain  ranges,  narrow 
gaps,  deep  valleys,  thick  forests,  rivers  and  streams 
in  snakelike  and  bewildering  convolutions.  All  these 
features  were  of  the  nature  of  obstacles  to  the  Fed 
eral  advance,  and  at  the  same  time  a  defense  and 
protective  covering  to  the  Confederate  positions. 
Thus  from  the  outset  it  was  an  unequal  conflict. 

The  great  objective  point  for  both  armies  was 
Chattanooga.  It  was  the  purpose  of  Rosecrans  to 
occupy  it  permanently,  and  that  of  Bragg  to  return 
to  it  after  he  should  have  defeated  the  Union  army. 
We  have  seen  that,  as  early  as  the  battle  of  Mill 
Springs,  Thomas  had  hoped  to  capture  it. 

One  year  later  Buell  was  marching  upon  it  when 
he  was  stopped  by  Bragg  at  Perryville.  The  move 
ment  upon  Chattanooga  was  again  begun  when 
Rosecrans  succeeded  Buell,  and  it  had  been  again 
delayed  by  reason  of  the  battle  of  Stone's  River. 
Bragg,  as  we  have  seen,  had  occupied  it,  and  at  first 
sight  it  seems  strange  that  he  should  have  evacu 
ated  the  town  at  the  approach  of  the  Union  army. 
It  will  soon  appear,  however,  that  the  alternative 
was  forced  upon  him.  He  was  not  well  provided 
with  materials  and  provisions  with  which  to  stand  a 
siege.  His  communications  both  north  and  south 
were  endangered  by  the  advance  of  Rosecrans  ;  and 
so  he  left  the  town  temporarily,  to  give  battle  to 
Rosecrans,  to  defeat  him,  and  to  drive  him  back 
upon  the  route  of  his  advance.  That  being  accom- 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA.  121 

plished,  Bragg  would  return  at  once  to  Chattanooga, 
lose  no  time  in  fortifying  and  fully  supplying  the 
place,  secure  his  communications,  especially  those 
with  the  South,  and  constitute  it  an  impregnable 
base  of  future  operations.  He  came  very  near  ac 
complishing  all  this. 

It  has  been  already  seen  that  the  long  stay  of 
Rosecrans  at  Murfreesboro,  only  temporarily  broken 
by  the  campaign  of  Tullahoma,  was  so  irritating  to 
the  authorities  at  Washington  that  they  sent  urgent 
requests,  and  at  last  imperative  orders,  to  Rosecrans 
to  move  upon  Bragg  without  any  further  delay.  As 
we  proceed  in  our  inquiries  we  are  the  more  inclined 
to  consider  the  Union  general  wise  in  his  caution  and 
delay.  He  was  pained  and  perplexed  by  the  ignorant 
impatience  of  the  authorities  at  Washington.  His 
correspondence  with  the  War  Department,  from  Jan 
uary  to  July,  discloses  the  great  needs  of  his  army 
in  all  kinds  of  equipments  ;  the  necessity  of  abun 
dant  material  to  be  supplied  as  he  advanced  along 
lines  of  communication  which  would  be  taxed  to 
their  utmost ;  and,  in  addition  to  this,  the  deliberate 
care  to  put  his  troops  in  the  best  marching  and 
fighting  order.  Such  things  can  not  be  properly 
done  in  a  day.  Even  genius  is  powerless  to  ac 
complish  them. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  the  diametrically  opposite 
views  taken  of  the  military  situation  at  this  junc 
ture.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Grant  was  besieg- 


122  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ing  Vicksburg,  and  there  certainly  was  an  intimate 
relation  between  that  siege  and  the  proposed  move 
ment  from  Murfreesboro.  To  the  authorities  at 
Washington  it  seemed  that  great  promptitude  in 
both  cases  would  be  reciprocally  important.  To 
Rosecrans  it  appeared  not  well  "  to  fight  two  great 
battles  at  the  same  time."  In  point  of  fact,  the  critic 
is  not  disposed  to  lay  great  stress  upon  this  contro 
versy.  Grant,  with  his  preponderance  of  numbers, 
needed  nothing  from  Rosecrans  except  to  keep 
Bragg  in  his  front ;  while,  without  perceiving  the 
significance  of  Rosecrans's  view,  he  could  certainly 
well  afford  to  wait  until  he  was  ready  to  fight  his 
own  battle.  The  moral  effect  of  the  capture  of. 
Vicksburg  was  indeed  very  great,  but  materially  it 
had  little  to  do  with  Rosecrans  and  his  fortunes. 

On  this  question  of  the  long  delay  at  Murfrees 
boro  it  should  further  be  said,  that  while  it  was 
natural  that  the  Washington  authorities  should  be 
anxious  for  speedy  and  successful  results,  the  six 
months  consumed  by  Rosecrans  form  a  very  small 
period  in  the  annals  of  a  great  war  ;  and  not  only 
the  general  in  command  but  his  immediate  subor 
dinates  were,  prejudice  apart,  the  best  judges  of  the 
time  to  move  as  well  as  the  manner  of  movement. 

"  To  show,"  says  Rosecrans  in  a  letter  to  Halleck 
of  June  u,  1863,  "how  differently  things  are  viewed 
here,  I  called  on  my  corps  and  division  commanders 
and  generals  of  cavalry  for  answers  in  writing  to 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA. 


133 


these  questions  :  i.  From  your  best  information,  do 
you  think  the  enemy  materially  weakened  in  our 
front  ?  2.  Do  you  think  this  army  can  advance  at 
this  time  with  reasonable  prospect  of  fighting  a 
great  and  successful  battle  ?  3.  Do  you  think  an 
advance  advisable  at  this  time  ?  To  the  first,  eleven 
answered  No,  six  Yes,  to  the  extent  of  ten  thousand. 
To  the  second,  four  Yes,  with  doubts  ;  thirteen  No. 
To  the  third,  not  one  Yes  ;  seventeen  No.  Not  one 
thinks  an  advance  advisable  until  Vicksburg's  fate 
is  determined.  Admitting  these  officers  to  have  a 
reasonable  share  of  military  sagacity,  courage,  and 
patriotism,  you  perceive  that  there  are  graver  and 
stronger  reasons  than  probably  appear  at  Washing 
ton  for  the  attitude  of  this  army.  I  therefore  coun 
sel  caution  and  patience  at  headquarters.  Better 
wait  a  little  to  get  all  we  can  ready  to  insure  the 
best  results,  if  by  so  doing  we,  perforce  of  Provi 
dence,  observe  a  great  military  maxim,  not  to  risk 
two  great  and  decisive  battles  at  the  same  time.  We 
might  have  cause  to  be  thankful  for  it ;  at  all  events, 
you  see  that,  to  expect  success,  I  must  have  thorough 
grounds,  that  when  I  say  '  Forward  ! '  my  word  will 
inspire  conviction  and  confidence  where  both  are 
now  wanting." 

It  is  due  both  to  General  Rosecrans  and  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas  to  say  that  the  latter  is  understood  to 
have  heartily  supported  what  he  considered  the  nec 
essary  delay  of  that  army  at  Murfreesb 

^ 


124  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

he  was  not  actuated  in  his  opinion  by  any  desire  for 
personal  rest  or  absence  during  this  period. 

Preliminary  reconnoissances,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  been  already  made.  Palmer's  and  Wood's  di 
visions  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps  began  the  crossing 
of  the  Cumberland  Mountains  on  August  i6th.  By 
the  ist  of  September  all  had  crossed;  on  the  8th  of 
that  month  his  whole  army  had  passed  over  the 
Tennessee,  and  the  main  body  was  encamped  in 
Lookout  Valley,  near  the  western  slope  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  and  it  was  his  apparent  intention  to  move 
in  force  upon  Bragg's  southern  communications. 
As  we  approach  the  bloody  field  of  Chickamauga 
we  must  cast  a  comprehensive  glance  at  the  ground 
over  which  Rosecrans  was  moving  and  the  field 
upon  which  the  hostile  armies  were  to  meet. 

Chattanooga  is  situated  in  one  of  the  numerous 
coil-like  bends  of  the  Tennessee  River.  South  and 
west  of  it  the  ground  is  broken  into  long  ridges, 
with  narrow  intervening  valleys,  running  down  and 
abutting  against  the  river.  Through  these  valleys 
are  streams  flowing  into  the  river,  and  through  the 
ridges  at  long  distances  apart  are  precipitous  gaps, 
through  which  the  Union  army  must  pass.  The  first 
ridge  reckoning  from  the  west  is  the  plateau  of 
Sand  Mountain,  attaining  an  elevation  of  twenty- 
two  hundred  feet.  Next  to  that  is  Will's  Val 
ley,  merging  at  the  north  into  Lookout  Valley, 
through  which  flows  Lookout  Creek,  along  the  east- 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA.  I25 

ern  side  of  which  is  the  extended  range  of  Lookout 
Mountain,  running  up  to  the  Tennessee  River  just 
below  Chattanooga.  Its  top  is  twenty-four  hundred 
feet  high.  East  of  this  is  a  small  valley  called  Mc- 
Lemore's  Cove,  in  which  the  West  Chickamauga 
takes  its  rise  and  flows  northward,  emptying  into 
the  Tennessee  about  three  miles  above  Chatta 
nooga.  A  short  distance  west  of  Chattanooga  is 
Missionary  Ridge,  a  long  narrow  elevation,  between 
which  and  Lookout  Mountain  the  Chattanooga 
River  flows  and  empties  into  the  Tennessee  just 
below  the  city. 

Northeast  of  Missionary  Ridge  is  the  famous 
Chickamauga  Creek,  now  about  to  be  the  scene  of 
one  of  the  bloodiest  battles  of  the  war.  On  the  east 
side  of  Pigeon  Mountain  and  at  the  extremity  of 
Pea  Vine  Ridge  is  the  town  of  Lafayette,  about  fif 
teen  miles  south  of  Chattanooga,  on  the  Southern 
Railroad.  It  was  occupied  by  the  Confederates  in 
force.  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills,  on  the  Chickamauga 
Creek,  about  ten  miles  north  of  Lafayette,  was  to 
play  an  important  part  in  the  battle.  Rossville  and 
Rossville  Gap  are  just  at  the  southern  end  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge.  Among  the  principal  towns  on  or 
near  the  Tennessee  which  also  figure  in  the  cam 
paign  are  Bridgeport  and  Stevenson.  Through  the 
former  a  portion  of  Bragg's  army  crossed  in  his 
retiring  movement,  as  also  did  a  portion  of  the 
Union  army  in  its  advance.  Through  the  latter 


126  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Rosecrans  received,  at  a  lengthening  distance,  his 
principal  supplies  from  Nashville. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  that,  by  a  curious  co 
incidence,  the  Cherokee  Indian  names  of  Chatta 
nooga  and  Chickamauga  have  an  involuntary  but 
romantic  connection  with  the  purposes  of  the  con 
tending  armies  and  the  bloody  history  of  the  cam 
paign.  Chattanooga,  the  great  objective  point,  to 
hold  which  both  were  exerting  their  utmost  powers, 
means  "  hawk's  nest,"  and  is  analogous  to  the  eyrie 
which  gave  its  name  in  history  to  the  House  of 
Hapsburg ;  while  Chickamauga  means  "  the  river 
of  death."  Mission  or  Missionary  Ridge  is  so 
called  because  upon  it  was  a  Roman  Catholic  Mis 
sion,  with  chapel  and  school,  for  the  Cherokee  In 
dians.  As  we  have  already  seen,  Rosecrans,  when  he 
began  his  movement  in  the  latter  days  of  June, 
pressing  Bragg  back  to  Tullahoma  and  cutting  the 
railroad  at  Decherd,  had  a  force  of  about  sixty 
thousand  men,  which,  however,  by  constant  re-en 
forcements,  had  increased  by  September  to  ninety- 
two  thousand. 

The  following  is  a  tabulated  statement  of  the 
composition  of  his  army :  I.  The  Fourteenth  Corps, 
General  Thomas,  contained  four  divisions — viz., 
Baird,  Negley,  Brannan,  J.  J.  Reynolds.  II.  The 
Twentieth  Corps,  General  McCook,  three  divisions 
— viz.,  J.  C.  Davis,  R.  W.  Johnson,  and  Sheridan. 
III.  The  Twenty -first  Corps,  General  Crittenden, 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA.  I2^ 

three  divisions — viz.,  T.  J.  Wood,  Palmer,  and  Van 
Cleve.  IV.  The  Reserve  Corps,  General  Gordon 
Granger,  one  division — viz.,  J.  B.  Steedman.  V.  The 
Cavalry  Corps,  General  R.  Mitchell  and  Colonel  E. 
M.  McCook. 

In  the  early  days  of  August,  Bragg  having  con 
tinued  to  retreat,  Rosecrans  slowly  followed.  The 
conviction  was  growing  stronger  upon  him  that  all 
he  would  have  to  do  was  to  pursue  the  enemy.  It 
still  increased  in  strength  when  Bragg,  having  made 
feeble  resistance  at  the  gaps  of  Cumberland  Moun 
tain,  passed  through  them  and  crossed  the  river 
mainly  at  Bridgeport.  He  burned  the  bridge  at  that 
crossing  and  went  into  Chattanooga,  but  he  did  not 
remain  there  long.  When  he  evacuated  the  town 
the  conviction  of  Rosecrans  became  a  certainty  that 
Bragg  was  in  full  retreat.  Then,  fearing  lest  he 
should  escape  him,  the  Union  general  pushed  his 
troops  rapidly  forward,  and  in  his  attempt  to  find 
out  Bragg's  lines  of  retreat  he  extended  his  army 
loosely  in  a  long  line  from  left  to  right,  in  order 
that  he  might  not  fail  to  intercept  the  enemy,  what 
ever  might  be  his  line  of  flight.  This  was  hazardous 
in  the  extreme.  McCook  was  separated  from  Thomas 
by  a  distance  of  forty  miles  or  more  on  the  right, 
while  Crittenden  was  on  the  other  side  twenty  miles 
from  the  center.*  In  order  further  to  deceive  Rose- 

*  In  point  of  fact,    McCook  was  completely  insulated  at  Al 
pine,  where  he  remained  until  the  nth. 


I28  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

crans  into  the  opinion  that  he  was  retreating,  Bragg 
also  resorted  to  various  stratagems,  not  unusual  on 
such  occasions.  Men  were  sent  into  the  Union  lines 
with  the  news  that  Bragg  had  left  Chattanooga  and 
was  beginning  a  rapid  retreat  southward,  and  he 
also  made  a  few  movements  in  order  to  strengthen 
that  belief. 

Thomas  was  not  for  an  instant  deceived  by 
these.  He  alone,  among  the  generals  of  that  army, 
seemed  really  to  divine  the  nature  of  the  situation, 
and  he  pointed  out  the  extreme  danger  of  allowing 
such  intervals  between  the  corps.  He  even  took  the 
responsibility  of  ordering  McCook  to  close  in  upon 
him,  and  it  was  not  a  moment  too  soon.  Bragg,  he 
repeated,  was  not  retreating  at  all.  He  was  only 
luring  the  Union  army  on  to  his  own  chosen 
ground.  He  would  see  their  dispersed  condition, 
and  attack  the  separated  corps  in  detail.  By  taking 
strong  ground  south  of  Chattanooga,  he  would  se 
cure  his  own  communications,  put  himself  in  the 
most  advantageous  position,  cut  Rosecrans  off  from 
Chattanooga,  and  there  await  the  re-enforcements, 
which  would  give  him  preponderating  strength  to 
strike  the  Union  corps  as  they  were  passing  through 
the  mountain  gaps.  It  was  a  well-conceived  and 
well-digested  plan,  and  certainly  for  a  short  time 
General  Rosecrans  was  thoroughly  deceived.  This 
delusion  of  Rosecrans  was,  however,  soon  dissipated. 

Even  then,  had  he  simply  occupied  Chattanooga 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA.  129 

and  intrenched  his  army  strongly  around  it,  his 
campaign,  thus  far  so  well  conducted,  would  have 
been  a  great  success,  with  no  drawbacks.  He 
would  have  avoided  the  bloody  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga  and  been  in  far  better  condition  than  he  was 
after  that  action.  As  he  awoke  from  his  delusion 
he  drew  together  with  great  precipitation  the  sepa 
rate  corps  before  Bragg  could  strike  them  in  detail. 
With  one  division  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps,  which 
had  crossed  the  river  at  Battle  Creek,  he  occupied 
Chattanooga  on  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  Decem 
ber.  But  they  did  not  fortify  the  town.  Leaving 
only  one  brigade  there  to  hold  it,  Crittenden  pushed 
on  with  the  rest  of  his  corps  in  the  furtherance  of 
Rosecrans's  plan  of  pursuit  to  Ringgold.  Here 
again  his  eyes  began  to  be  opened.  The  way 
was  strongly  barred  by  the  enemy,  so  Crittenden 
turned  aside  toward  Lafayette.  There  also  was  a 
lion  in  the  path ;  so  he  fell  rapidly  back  to  Lee  and 
Gordon's  Mill.  The  military  critic  may  adopt  the 
judgment  of  Van  Horn.  Of  the  condition  of  things 
at  this  time  he  says:  "In  view  of  the  manifest 
practicability  of  the  concentration  of  the  army  at 
Chattanooga,  Thomas  urged  Rosecrans  to  abandon 
his  scheme  of  pursuit,  to  establish  his  army  at  that 
point  and  perfect  communications  with  Bridgeport 
and  Nashville.  Had  this  been  done,  the  offensive 
could  have  been  taken  from  Chattanooga  as  a  base. 
Thomas  was  opposed  to  a  movement  which  would 


130  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

bring  on  a  battle  when  the  army,  having  nearly  ex 
hausted  its  supplies  transported  from  Bridgeport, 
could  not  follow  up  a  victory  in  the  event  of  win 
ning  one,  and  where,  if  defeat  should  be  the  issue, 
the  problem  of  supplies  would  be  difficult  of  solu 
tion."  But  the  counsel  of  Thomas  was  set  aside.  It 
still  appeared  to  the  commanding  general  that  Bragg 
was  moving  as  rapidly  as  possible  upon  Rome,  where 
indeed  a  few  advanced  troops  were  throwing  up 
extensive  intrenchments.  So,  on  the  9th  of  Sep 
tember,  Rosecrans  ordered  a  general  pursuit  by 
the  whole  army.  To  Thomas  that  day  he  wrote 
in  the  following  decided  language :  "  The  general 
commanding  has  ordered  a  general  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  by  the  whole  army.  ...  He  directs  you  to 
move  your  command  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  La 
fayette."  To  the  same  purpose,  General  Critten- 
den,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  had  occupied  Chatta 
nooga  with  one  brigade,  while  with  the  remainder 
of  the  Twenty-first  Corps  he  was  to  follow  the 
enemy  rapidly,  was  embarked  in  this  general  pur 
suit.  General  McCook  with  the  detachments  of 
the  Twentieth  Corps  was  to  move  toward  Rome 
through  Alpine  and  Summerville,  to  turn  the  enemy's 
flank  and  cut  off  his  retreat.  Thus  at  the  outset  the 
campaign  was  let  and  hindered  by  a  first  most  griev 
ous  error. 

In  endeavoring  to  carry  out  his  orders,  General 
Thomas  moved  through  Stevens's  and  Cooper's  Gaps, 


FORWARD   TO   CHATTANOOGA.  j^i 

Negley's  division  leading  through  the  former  into 
McLemore's  Cove,  twenty  miles  south  of  Chatta 
nooga. 

While  the  Union  troops  were  acting  under  these 
mistaken  orders,  a  glance  at  Bragg's  movements 
will  show  that,  so  far  from  any  thought  of  retreat,  he 
had  been  quietly  taking  position  on  the  yth  and  8th 
of  September  on  a  strong  line  from  Lee  and  Gor 
don's  Mill  to  Lafayette  along  the  main  road  lead 
ing  south  from  Chattanooga,  and  fronting  the  slope 
of  Lookout  Mountain.  Everything  now  tended  to 
Bragg's  advantage. 

The  following  is  a  concise  table  of  the  Confed 
erate  army  under  General  Bragg  :  I.  Folk's  corps, 
two  divisions,  Cheatham  and  Hindmari.  II.  D.  H. 
Hill's  corps,  two  divisions,  Cleburne  and  Breckin- 
ridge.  III.  Buckner's  corps,  two  divisions,  A.  P. 
Stewart  and  Preston.  IV.  Walker's  corps,  two  di 
visions,  Liddell  and  Gist.  V.  Longstreet's  corps, 
which  arrived  later,  and  just  before  the  battle  of 
the  2oth,  three  divisions,  Hood,  McLaws,  and  Bush- 
rod  R.  Johnson.  VI.  Wheeler's  cavalry  corps,  two 
divisions,  Wharton  and  Martin.  VII.  Forrest's  cav 
alry  corps,  two  divisions,  Armstrong  and  Pegram. 
In  order  to  give  Bragg  every  available  fighting 
man,  the  Georgia  militia  were  guarding  the  depots 
and  bridges. 

Bragg  was  concentrated  along  this  line,  was  in 
readiness  to  strike  in  any  direction,  and  enthusiastic 

10 


132  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

at  the  evident  misapprehension  of  the  situation  by 
Rosecrans.  It  seemed  a  new  illustration  of  the  old 
fable  of  "  the  spider  and  the  fly."  His  army  had  at 
first  consisted  of  the  corps  of  Polk  and  Hill,  which, 
with  the  contingents  of  all  kinds,  had  amounted  to 
fifty-nine  thousand  men.  Re-enforcements,  as  the 
above  table  shows,  had  been  coming  in  daily  under 
Buckner,  Breckinridge,  and  Johnston.  Some  of 
these  re-enforcements,  it  has  been  asserted,  were  in 
violation  of  military  law.  They  were  said  to  be 
drawn  from  Grant's  front  in  large  numbers,  and 
many  of  them  had  been  paroled  by  him  under  a 
promise  not  to  fight  until  duly  exchanged ;  it  is 
alleged  that  they  were  never  exchanged,  but  were 
sent  at  once  to  confront  Rosecrans.  Thus  it  seems 
that  the  Confederate  armies  had  already  begun  to 
feel  that  want  of  men  which  was  to  lead  before  long 
to  their  final  defeat.  At  last,  in  the  nick  of  time, 
just  before  the  battle  of  the  2oth  was  joined,  tw6 
divisions  under  Longstreet  arrived  from  the  Army 
of  Virginia.  These,  added  to  his  main  force,  gave 
Bragg  on  the  morning  report  of  the  i8th  more  than 
ninety  thousand  men. 

The  force  of  Rosecrans  which  was  to  try  con 
clusions  with  this  army  amounted,  as  we  have  seen, 
to  ninety-five  thousand  men.  When  Rosecrans  or 
dered  the  pursuit,  Thomas,  whose  corps  then  formed 
the  center  of  the  Union  army,  marched  toward  La 
fayette,  and  was,  as  we  shall  see,  the  first  to  engage 


FORWARD    TO   CHATTANOOGA. 


133 


the  enemy.  From  that  moment  the  conviction  must 
have  grown  upon  the  clear  mind  of  Thomas,  as  it  is 
certainly  apparent  to  the  military  reader,  that  the 
fortunes  of  the  Union  army  were  in  his  keeping. 
In  obedience  to  his  orders,  he  had  moved  cau 
tiously  over  Lookout  Mountain,  through  Stevens's 
and  Cooper's  Gaps,  toward  Dug  Gap  in  Pigeon 
Mountain,  about  nine  miles  beyond. 

On  the  night  of  the  gth  of  September  Bragg  or 
dered  a  large  force  to  attack  Negley  in  the  gap  the 
next  morning,  and  he  afterward  declared  that  had 
the  generals  carried  out  his  instructions  Negley 
would  have  been  overpowered  by  numbers.  He  was 
probably  mistaken,  for  with  his  usual  sagacity  and 
prudence  Thomas  had  foreseen  this  possibility,  and 
ordered  the  divisions  of  Baird,  Reynolds,  and  Bran- 
nan  forward  to  support  Negley  in  order  to  repel 
Bragg's  projected  attack.  Strange  to  say,  this  ex 
cellent  caution  of  Thomas  was  regarded  with  impa 
tience  by  Rosecrans,  who  had  not  yet  divested  him 
self  of  the  idea  that  Bragg  was  in  full  retreat.  Nor 
did  he  seem  to  see  that  this  caution  of  Thomas  was 
greatly  to  the  advantage  of  McCook  and  Crittenden, 
whose  corps  were  yet  at  wide  distances  apart  and 
needed  concentration,  and  were  anxiously  awaiting 
orders  to  that  effect.  Thus  it  happened  that  when 
Bragg  advanced  later  through  Catlett's  Gap  and 
Dug  Gap  to  overpower  Negley  and  his  supports, 
Thomas  withdrew  his  force  by  Bailey's  Cross  Road 


134 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


toward  Lookout  Mountain,  where  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  was  concentrated.  We  repeat  that  from  that 
time  General  Thomas  seems  to  the  disinterested 
spectator  like  a  man  already  anticipating,  in  dim 
outline  indeed,  the  great  responsibility  which  was  to 
fall  upon  him. 

He  was  loyally  devoted  to  the  administration  of 
Rosecrans,  and  could  not  fail  to  see  in  what  a  mas 
terly  manner  the  campaign  had  been  thus  far  con 
ducted.  He  was  ready  to  obey  orders,  but  he  already 
began  to  notice  how  mistaken  some  of  those  orders 
were.  He  saw  with  anxiety  the  separation  of  the 
corps  out  of  supporting  distance.  He  did  not  agree 
with  Rosecrans  in  his  opinion  that  Bragg  was  about 
to  retreat ;  and  that  this  was  what  his  temporary 
evacuation  of  Chattanooga  meant.  He  saw  that  the 
Confederate  general  was  obliged  thus  to  cover  his 
Southern  communications  and  fight  a  desperate -bat 
tle  ;  and,  holding  these  opinions  while  others  did 
not,  he  felt  that  the  brunt  of  the  attack  was  to  fall 
upon  him,  and  that  if  he  could  not  bear  it  the  day 
was  lost.  In  such  a  light  at  least  does  the  entire 
conduct  of  Thomas  appear  to  the  military  critic. 
Nor  does  this  opinion  come  after  the  facts;  it  was 
clearly  that  of  Thomas  before  the  battle. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  CHICKAM AUG A. 

Bragg  leaves  Thomas  to  attack  Crittenden — Position  of  troops  on 
the  iyth  and  i8th — Thomas  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chicka- 
mauga  from  Owen's  Ford  to  Gowan — McCook  withdraws  to 
the  rear — Crittenden  on  the  left  center  in  the  rear — Thomas 
holds  the  left — Furious  attacks  on  the  left,  on  the  right,  and 
on  the  center — Order  of  Rosecrans  to  T.  J.  Wood  makes  a 
gap  in  the  line — Penetrated  by  Longstreet — The  forlorn  hope 
and  the  Gordian  knot — Rosecrans  goes  to  Chattanooga — Final 
attack — Steedman's  division  of  Granger's  corps — Thomas  re 
tires  in  good  order — "  The  Rock  of  Chickamauga." 

WHILE  thus  the  enemy  was  strongly  concentrated 
opposite  our  center,  the  projected  pursuit  by  the 
right  and  left  wings  had  not  simply  come  to  a 
standstill,  but  the  conditions  were  entirely  reversed 
to  close  up  upon  Thomas.  McCook  had  thrown  his 
trains  backward,  and  there  had  been  some  confusion 
and  countermarching  among  his  troops  pending  his 
reception  of  further  orders. 

When  he  found,  on  receiving  the  order  to  join 
Thomas,  that  he  could  not  do  so  by  the  nearest  line, 
he  had  sent  back  his  trains  to  the  summit  of  the 
mountain  ;  and  when  he  received  the  repeated  order 
he  could  only  obey-  it  by  moving  through  Valley 


136  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

Head  and  ascending  the  mountain  through  Hender 
son's  Gap.  This  detour  caused  great  delay,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  iyth  that  the  three  corps  were  in 
supporting  distance.  It  will  always  cause  the  mili 
tary  reader  to  wonder  that  Bragg  in  the  meantime 
had  not  attacked  them  in  detail  with  superior  num 
bers.  That  he  did  not  accomplish  this  was  no  doubt 
in  part  due  to  the  fact  that 'he  did  not  know  the 
military  position  with  great  exactness.  He  was  war 
ranted  in  doubting  that  such  a  military  blunder  had 
been  committed;  and  when  the  Union  army  was 
most  extended  the  distances  were  too  great  for  him 
to  strike  promptly.  On  the  left,  Crittenden  had 
taken  position  on  the  Chickamauga  on  August  i2th, 
at  and  around  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill.  As  it  was 
evident  the  enemy  would  not  retreat,  he  was  or 
dered  to  attack  and  drive  them  away  ;  this  made  a 
temporary  change  in  Bragg's  plan.  He  seems  to 
have  determined  to  postpone  his  movement  against 
Thomas  until  he  could  crush  Crittenden.  That  ef 
fectually  accomplished,  he  would  again  mass  his 
forces  against  Thomas,  drive  him  back  in  confu 
sion,  and,  coming  upon  the  flank  of  McCook,  would 
send  him  flying  through  the  air.  This  programme 
would  perhaps  have  been  carried  out  successfully 
had  it  not  been  for  the  want  of  activity  on  the  part 
of  his  subordinates.  Bragg  was  handicapped  by 
some  men  who  were  counselors  rather  than  lieuten 
ants.  The  attack  upon  Crittenden  was  confided  to 


THE    BATTLE    OF   CIIICKAMAUGA.  \^j 

Polk,  and  was  to  have  been  made  at  dawn  on  Sep 
tember  i3th.  The  Confederate  divisions  that  were 
to  make  it  were  those  of  Hindman  and  Cheatham, 
supported  by  the  divisions  of  Walker,  with  Buck- 
ner's  divisions  in  reserve.  Cleburne,  of  Hill's  corps, 
occupied  Dug  Gap  and  was  watching  Thomas. 
General  Bragg's  plan  was  not  carried  out  according 
to  his  orders. 

We  may  now  pass  over  the  intervening  days  of 
preparation  and  experiment  until  the  evening  of  Sep 
tember  lyth,  when  the  adverse  forces  were  thus 
posted  :  Thomas's  corps  was  still  on  arid  near  the  left 
bank  of  the  Chickamauga  River,  from  Owen's  Ford 
to  Gowan,  Brannan's  division  being  on  the  right; 
then  Baird,  Negley,  and  Reynolds.  Crittenden's 
corps  was  still  in  front  of  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill, 
comprising  the  divisions  of  Palmer,  T.  J.  Wood,  and 
Barnes's  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's.  McCook's  corps, 
which  had  retraced  its  steps  from  Alpine,  had  finally 
taken  ground  and  shape  to  the  right  and  rear  on  the 
slope  of  Missionary  Ridge,  covering  the  roads  to 
Stevens's  and  Cooper's  Gaps. 

This  campaign,  which  in  its  doubtful  and  tactive 
movements  had  consumed  more  than  twenty  days 
from  the  time  when  Rosecrans  made  his  first  move 
ment  to  cross  the  Cumberland  Mountain,  becomes,  as 
we  are  on  the  eve  of  the  great  conflict  of  Chicka 
mauga,  so  full  of  detail  that  space  is  entirely  wanting 
to  describe  it  fully  in  these  pages.  By  September 


138 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


i7th  the  corps  of  the  Union  army  were  fortunately 
within  supporting  distance,  and  then  and  the  next 
day  they  were  in  readiness  for  the  conflict :  although 
up  to  this  time  there  had  been  partial  conflicts  for 
many  days,  the  real  action  of  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga  is  comprised  in  two  days  of  hard  fighting — 
September  ipth  and  2oth.  The  eyes  of  Rosecrans 
had  now  at  last  been  entirely  opened  to  the  real 
purpose  of  the  enemy,  and  terrible  attacks  on  the 
Union  left  and  center  were  further  to  convince  him 
of  his  unfortunate  mistake. 

Another  glance  at  the  topography  must  be  taken 
before  the  great  battle  begins.  Chickamauga  Creek 
rises  near  the  base  of  Missionary  Ridge,  runs  in  a 
northeast  direction,  and  enters  the  Tennessee  River 
about  six  miles  above  Chattanooga.  The  following 
rapid  changes  had  been  made  in  the  Union  line: 
Crittenden  was  moved  to  the  rear  and  right,  and 
Thomas  was  obliqued  to  the  left.  Thus  the  Union 
army  had  its  right  near  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  and 
its  left  near  the  Rossville  road.  Besides  the  fierce 
fighting,  a  new  danger  impended.  It  now  became 
evident  that  Bragg's  purpose  was  to  cut  Rosecrans 
off  from  Chattanooga,  and,  to  give  him  greater  force 
with  which  to  do  this,  Longstreet  had,  as  we  have 
related,  just  arrived  with  his  troops  from  Virginia 
on  the  night  of  the  i8th,  and  had  taken  position  at 
once  for  the  battle  of  the  next  day. 

That  night  was  a  very  busy  one.     There  was  no 


THE    BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA. 


139 


sleep  for  the  Federal  army ;  they  worked  all  night, 
completing  the  alignment  and  throwing  up  slight  in- 
trenchments.  This  incessant  labor  was  not  com 
pleted  until  two  hours  before  day  on  the  ipth.  The 
dreadful  note  of  preparation  was  heard  on  every 
hand.  A  full  moon  and  a  cloudless  sky  made  the 
entire  scene  visible.  The  night  was  very  cold,  and 
the  men,  instead  of  gathering  wood,  warmed  them 
selves  by  setting  the  fences  on  fire  where  they  stood. 
Thus  the  entire  position  was  clearly  delineated  by 
the  blazing  fences. 

Had  General  Rosecrans  chosen  even  at  that  mo 
ment  to  withdraw  without  a  battle,  it  does  seem  that 
he  might  have  entered  Chattanooga  by  the  Dry  Val 
ley  and  the  Lafayette  road  and  rapidly  fortified  him 
self  there  to  stand  a  siege.  He  preferred,  however, 
to  fight;  and,  on  the  whole,  we  applaud  his  decision ; 
to  have  shunned  the  battle  then  would  have  caused 
the  loss  of  prestige  and  reputation.  Strategy  and 
grand  tactics  were  at  an  end.  Battle  tactics  and 
hard  pounding  were  in  order.  The  chances  of  suc 
cess  were  even,  the  forces  about  equal.  The  bat 
tlefield  presented  no  advantages  of  sun  and  air  to 
either  combatant ;  but  the  stake  was  very  unequal. 
If  Bragg  were  defeated,  he  would  retreat  to  the 
South,  as  he  eventually  did  after  the  battle  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge.  If  Rosecrans  were  cut  off  from  Chat 
tanooga  and  pursued,  it  would  have  been  very  hard 
to  save  the  Union  army  from  utter  ruin ;  indeed,  in 


140 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


the  judgment  of  the  best  military  critics,  it  would 
have  been  impossible. 

First  Day,  September  ip. — With  the  dawn  of  the 
ipth  both  armies  were  ready  for  action.  The  ene 
my  were  posted  on  the  right  bank  of  the  creek  in 
two  wings,  commanded  respectively  by  Polk  and 
Longstreet.*  In  the  front  of  the  right  wing  were 
the  three  divisions  of  Cleburne,  Breckinridge,  and 
Cheatham ;  and  in  the  left  wing  Stewart's  and 
Hood's  divisions.  The  furious  attack  with  over 
whelming  numbers  upon  Thomas  was  designed  to 
be  made  at  the  break  of  day,  and  explicit  orders 
had  been  sent  to  Polk  to  that  effect. 

Thomas  was  in  ignorance  indeed  that  an  over 
whelming  force  was  very  near  him,  and  might  have 
been  surprised  had  not  a  strong  reconnoissance  under 
Brannan  disclosed  the  enemy  and  brought  on  the 
battle  in  a  more  patent  way.  The  attack  of  the  ene 
my  was,  however,  furious,  and  at  first  seemed  over 
powering  ;  but,  although  driven  back,  the  Union  force 
soon  rallied  and  by  a  counter-charge  disputed  the 
field  ;  timely  re-enforcements  were  sent  by  Rosecrans. 
The  purpose  of  the  enemy  was  for  Hood  to  swing 
round  his  right  and  envelop  Crittenden,  while  Wal 
ker  should  attack  in  front  and  join  Hood,  and  then 
united  they  would  force  their  way  into  the  gap  be- 

*  Some  of  his  troops — three  small  brigades — participated  in 
the  battle  of  the  igth.  Longstreet  himself  did  not  arrive  until 
that  night ;  he  reported  in  person  to  Bragg  at  n  o'clock. 


THE   BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  1^1 

tween  the  latter  and  Thomas.  At  the  same  time 
D.  W.  Hill  was  posted  so  as  to  defeat  any  Union 
attempt  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Confederates  ;  for 
while  Bragg  was  intent  upon  turning  the  Union  left, 
he  was  not  without  concern  as  to  his  own  left. 

When  the  attack  came  it  was  with  tremendous 
force.  It  was  directed  against  the  left  of  Thomas, 
who  now  held  the  left  of  the  line,  for  Crittenden  had 
been  already  moved  to  the  right  and  rear.  Had  it 
been  thoroughly  successful  it  would  have  cut  off  the 
last  chance  of  retreat,  should  that  become  neces 
sary,  into  the  defenses  of  Chattanooga.  McCook 
had  been  withdrawn  by  order  of  Rosecrans  to  form 
a  new  line  on  the  right ;  and  thus  disintegrated  as 
corps,  brigades  of  both  these  corps  were  sent  to  the 
left  from  time  to  time  to  Thomas  as  he  needed  them. 
The  furious  assault  of  the  enemy  had  been  received 
by  Baird  and  Brannan  on  the  extreme  left.  It  was 
also  aided  by  Forrest's  cavalry.  The  Union  troops 
were  driven  back  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  with  the 
loss  of  several  guns.  There  they  rallied,  and,  form 
ing  a  new  line,  awaited  a  new  attack  ;  but  it  did  not 
come  at  that  point.  This  time  there  was  a  desperate 
attempt  made  upon  Thomas's  right  flank,  which  had 
been  rapidly  re-enforced  by  divisions  from  McCook's 
corps.  This,  however,  was  only  partially  successful, 
for  General  Hazen,  with  admirable  forecast,  had 
posted  twenty  guns  on  a  commanding  eminence, 
which  forced  the  enemy  back,  with  great  loss.  Af- 


142  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ter  a  slight  lull  a  heavy  column  of  the  enemy  then 
advanced  upon  Thomas's  center.  There  he  was  less 
vulnerable,  and  repulsed  the  assaulting  force  with 
out  difficulty. 

Such,  in  brief,  was  the  record  of  the  fight  on  Sep 
tember  ipth.  The  Union  troops  were  slightly  re 
tired,  and  the  Confederates  still  retained  the  ardor 
and  prestige  of  attack.*  The  next  day  would  decide 
the  difficult  question,  and  it  looked  doubtful  indeed. 
Thus  battered  on  both  flanks  and  in  the  center,  on 
the  evening  of  the  i9th  Thomas  fell  back  slightly 
and  readjusted  his  line,  especially  strengthening  his 
left  flank,  the  point  of  vital  importance,  which  the 
enemy  was  determined  to  overpower,  and  the  defeat 
of  which  would  cut  the  army  off  from  Chattanooga. 
All  other  assaults  were  subordinated  to  this  impor 
tant  purpose. 

During  the  night  of  the  i9th  there  was  great  ac 
tivity  in  both  camps.  Bragg  had  readjusted  the 
two  wings  of  his  army ;  \  the  right,  still  commanded 
by  Polk,  contained  the  four  divisions  of  Cleburne, 

*  The  whole  army  of  Rosecrans,  by  reason  of  the  nature  of 
the  attacks,  had  been  constantly  obliquing  to  the  left ;  and  during 
the  night  of  the  igth  the  same  order  of  divisions  was  observed 
from  left  to  right — viz.,  Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  Reynolds,  and 
Brannan,  Baird  refusing  his  left,  and  Brannan  in  echelon.  Neg- 
ley,  who  had  been  posted  on  the  right  of  Brannan,  was  moved  to 
the  left  of  Baird. 

\  At  the  last  and  opportune  moment — viz.,  at  midnight  on  the 
igth — Longstreet  arrived  from  Virginia  with  a  strong  re-enforce 
ment,  and  these  troops  were  at  once  placed  in  line  of  battle. 


THE    BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  ^3 

Breckinridge,  Cheatham,  and  Walker.  The  left, 
under  Longstreet,  comprised  the  six  divisions  of 
Stewart,  Preston,  Johnson,  Anderson,  Hood,  and 
McLaws.  These  were  disposed  in  double  lines,  with 
a  strong  cavalry  force  on  the  right  flank.  The  new 
line  of  Thomas  occupied  a  similarly  extended  front. 
From  left  to  right  were  the  divisions  of  Baird,  Palm 
er,  Reynolds,  Brannan,  Wood,  Davis,  Sheridan,  and 
Wilder.  Gordon  Granger  had  one  division  of  his 
corps  near  Rossville.  The  Union  troops  worked 
most  industriously  all  night ;  ammunition  was  dis 
tributed,  intrenchments  were  made,  and  trees  were 
cut  down  to  form  abatis  in  front.  The  manifest  de 
termination  of  Bragg  to  roll  up  Thomas's  left  flank 
made  all  this  activity  more  than  necessary.  The 
furious  assaults  of  yesterday  were  to  be  repeated 
on  the  morrow. 

Second  Day,  September  20. — At  early  dawn  Thom 
as  sent  to  Rosecrans  to  request  that  Negley's  di 
vision,  which  had  been  detached,  should  be  placed 
in  position  on  his  threatened  left.  It  was  slow  in 
coming,  and  by  eight  o'clock  only  one  brigade — 
that  of  Beatty — had  arrived.  And  at  early  morning, 
according  to  Bragg's  explicit  orders,  the  divisions  of 
Folk's  corps  were  to  make  their  attack.  When  before 
daylight  Bragg,  who  was  in  the  saddle,  took  a  posi 
tion  from  which  he  expected  to  see  the  prompt  fulfill 
ment  of  his  orders,  he  was  greatly  astonished  to  find 
no  sign  of  movement.  He  dispatched  a  staff  officer 


144  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

to  General  Folk's  headquarters,  who  had  been  ab 
sent  from  his  advance  during  the  night  and  who 
was  taking  a  late  breakfast.  The  adjutant  received 
from  him  the  excuse  that  the  divisions  designated  to 
make  the  attack  were  partly  overlapped  by  Long- 
street's  troops  and  could  not  move  ;  so  the  attack 
was  not  made  until  nearly  ten  o'clock.*  About  that 
time  Breckinridge  and  Cleburne  made  a  fierce  assault 
upon  the  Union  left,  Cleburne  directly  in  front,  and 
Breckinridge  swinging  round  to  the  left,  again  trying 
to  inclose  it.  Then  began  a  movement  forward  and 
back  ;  the  enemy  were  repulsed  ;  the  attacking  party 
was  re-enforced;  the  ground  was  again  lost,  but  was 
partially  recovered  by  Stanley's  brigade  of  Negley's 
division,  and  Vanderveer's  of  Brannan's.  Breckin- 
ridge's  left  wheel  was  reversed,  and  the  Union  left 
was  temporarily  relieved  and  strongly  held  by  Baird's 
division.  The  movements  on  the  field  were  now 
rapid  and  numerous.  Baird's  division  was  re-enforced 
by  a  brigade  of  Wood's,  and  Thomas  directed  a  large 
number  of  guns  to  be  placed  on  Missionary  Ridge, 
to  sweep  by  their  fire  the  intervening  ground  and 
prevent  the  advance  of  the  enemy. 

No  sooner  had  these  precautions  been  taken  than 


*  Bragg,  dissatisfied  with  this  excuse,  suspended  Polk  from  his 
command  and  preferred  charges  against  him.  Upon  a  point  of 
legal  informality  Jefferson  Davis  quashed  the  charges  and  restored 
Polk  to  his  command.  This  very  act  invalidated  Bragg's  author 
ity  and  robbed  him  of  power. 


THE  BATTLEFIELD  OF 

CHICK  AM  AUGA 


THE   BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  145 

a  new  trouble  sprang  up  on  the  right.  McCook's 
troops,  who  had  been  retired,  not  anticipating  an 
attack  in  that  direction,  and  were  being  moved  to 
the  left  and  center  in  order  to  strengthen  Thomas. 
Sheridan's  division  had  been  pushed  forward  from 
Missionary  Ridge.  Davis's  division,  after  orders  and 
counter-orders,  had  marched  to  take  post  between 
the  right  of  Wood  and  the  left  of  Sheridan.-^  TOcJ^ 
right  of  the  Union  line  being  thus  exposed  by  de 
taching  these  divisions,  the  enemy  took  prompt 
advantage,  and  sent  a  force  to  flank  the  right  and 
gain  Thomas's  rear.  Thus  a  new  moment  of  ex 
treme  peril  was  reached.  Rosecrans  was  so  im 
pressed  with  the  danger  that  he  sent  word  to  Thomas 
to  refuse  his  right.  This  would  have  changed  his 
order  of  battle  which  the  situation  of  the  left  and 
center  rendered  impracticable.  He  laconically  re 
plied  that  the  enemy  was  pushing  him  so  hard  he 
could  make  no  changes.  He  was,  indeed,  fight 
ing  a  Homeric  battle  single-handed  against  great 
odds.  He  called  for  re-enforcements,  but  the  great 
confusion  of  the  troops  in  his  rear  prevented  their 
coming. 

Bragg,  disregarding  all  other  issues,  then  threw 
his  whole  force  against  Thomas,  feeling  almost  cer 
tain  of  success.  Thus  staggering  under  burdens  too 
heavy  to  bear,  and  by  no  means  disposed  to  relax 
his  heroic  efforts,  a  new  misfortune  occurred;  the 
gravest  of  all  perils  yet  encountered  came  upon  him 


146  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

at  this  unfortunate  moment.     It  was  a  mistake  for 
which,  as  usual,  "nobody  was  to  blame."* 

Contrary  to  the  common  practice,  Rosecrans  had 

*  With  regard  to  this  very  serious  misapprehension  the  follow 
ing  is  the  statement  of  General  Rosecrans  : 

"  Orders  were  dispatched  to  General  Wood  to  close  up  on  Rey 
nolds,  and  word  was  sent  to  General  Thomas  that  he  should  be 
supported  even  if  it  took  away  the  whole  corps  of  Crittenden  and 
McCook. 

"General  Davis  was  ordered  to  close  on  General  Wood,  and 
General  McCook  was  advised  of  the  state  of  affairs  and  ordered 
to  close  his  whole  command  to  the  left  with  all  dispatch. 

"  General  Wood,  overlooking  the  direction  to  close  up  on 
Reynolds,  supposed  he  was  to  support  him  by  withdrawing  from 
the  line  and  passing  to  the  rear  of  General  Brannan,  who,  it  ap 
pears,  was  not  out  of  line,  but  was  in  echelon  and  slightly  in  rear 
of  Reynolds's  right.  By  this  unfortunate  mistake  a  gap  was 
opened  in  the  line  of  battle,  of  which  the  enemy  took  instant  ad 
vantage,  and,  striking  Davis  in  flank  and  rear  as  well  as  in  front, 
threw  his  whole  division  in  confusion. 

"  The  same  attack  shattered  the  right  brigade  of  Wood  before 
it  cleared  the  space.  The  right  of  Brannan  was  thrown  back, 
and  two  of  his  batteries,  then  in  movement  to  a  new  position, 
were  taken  in  flank  and  thrown  back  through  two  brigades  of  Van 
Cleve,  then  on  the  march  to  the  left,  throwing  his  division  into  con 
fusion,  from  which  it  never  recovered  until  it  reached  Rossville." 

This  general  statement  should  be  accompanied  with  General 
Wood's  vindication. 

After  describing  his  position  on  the  field  he  says  : 

"  About  eleven  o'clock  A.  M.  I  received  the  following  order : 

'"HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND,  10.45  A.M. 
' '  General  WOOD,  Commanding  Division  :  Close  up  on  Gen 
eral  Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible  and  support  him. 
"  '  By  order  of  General  ROSECRANS. 

"  '  (Signed)     F.  S.  BOND,  A.  D.  C.'  " 

"  It  was  delivered  by  an  orderly.  The  order  was  not  only  man 
datory,  but  peremptorily  mandatory.  It  directed  me  to  close 


THE    BATTLE    OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  \^ 

sent  by  an  orderly  an  order  to  General  T.  J.  Wood 
direct,  instead  of  through  the  corps  commander.  It 
was,  that  Wood's  division  should  close  up  on  Rey 
nolds  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Let  it  be  observed  that 
the  relative  positions  of  these  divisions  on  the  line 
were  Reynolds,  Brannan,  Wood,  and  Sheridan,  Bran- 
nan  being  a  little  in  rear.  Wood,  construing  the 
order  literally,  faced  his  division  to  the  rear  and 
marched  past  the  rear  of  Brannan  to  the  position  of 
Reynolds,  where  he  was  not  really  wanted  and 
where  there  was  no  place  for  him.  The  vacant  space 
which  he  had  left  formed  a  gap  in  the  center  of 
Thomas's  line.  The  enemy  were  not  slow  in  per 
ceiving  this.  Longstreet's  men,  Stewart's,  Hood's, 
Kershaw's,  and  Hindman's  divisions  poured  like  a 
flood  into  it,  and  the  Union  line  was  cut  in  two. 
The  situation  was  now  unfortunate  in  the  extreme. 
The  long  Confederate  line  already  overlapped  the 
Union  line  on  the  right.  The  left  was  by  no  means 
too  secure;  the  right  and  rear  were  endangered, 

upon  General  Reynolds,  a  movement  of  one  body  from  the  rear 
to  another  body  in  front  of  it.  But  it  gave  the  reason  for  the 
movement — viz.,  to  support  the  body  of  troops  in  front — the  most 
important  reason  that  can  exist  on  the  field  of  battle. 

"  With  this  order  in  my  hand,  with  Brannan  on  my  left,  with  no 
knowledge  of  Reynolds's  position,  but  with  a  peremptory  order 
to  close  up  on  him  and  support  him,  it  was  physically  impossible 
to  obey  in  any  other  way  than  I  did — viz.,  by  withdrawing  from 
the  line,  passing  to  the  left,  finding  Reynolds's  position,  closing 
up  on  him,  and  supporting  him." — From  General  Wood's  letter  to 
the  author. 

II 


I48  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

and  now  the  center  of  the  line  was  pierced.  What 
was  intended  was  that,  simultaneously  with  Wood's 
movement,  Davis  and  Sheridan  should  close  to  the 
left  and  fill  the  gap.  A  fatal  delay  occurred.  Hind- 
man  struck  Davis  in  flank  and  rear  and  routed  him 
while  he  was  moving  to  fill  the  gap.  Longstreet's 
troops  followed  up  this  movement.  Thomas's  right 
was  driven  to  the  rear;  his  center  swung  round  as 
upon  a  pivot.  Could  his  left  hold  on  ?  That  was 
the  vital  question.  Here  was  the  Gordian  knot. 

Small  congeries  of  troops  gathered,  and,  led  by 
the  bravest  men,  instead  of  rushing  with  the  rest  to 
the  rear,  had  come  to  join  Thomas.  Among  these 
toward  evening  was  the  gallant  Sheridan,  who  ap 
peared  at  a  vital  moment  with  his  own  division  and 
other  scattering  troops  whom  he  had  rallied  around 
him.  Thus,  with  about  twenty  thousand  men  against 
the  entire  army  of  Bragg,  General  Thomas  held  the 
key  of  the  position  ;  everything  depended  upon  him. 
The  rest  of  the  Union  army  was  a  disorganized  mob 
flying  to  Chattanooga.  Rosecrans  had  abandoned 
the  field,  and  at  four  on  that  afternoon  had  tele 
graphed  to  Washington,  "  My  army  has  been  whipped 
and  routed."  He  should  have  excepted  Thomas, 
who  had  not  been  whipped  or  routed.  Forced  into 
a  line  of  crescent  form,  his  artillery  advantageously 
posted,  he  repulsed  the  fierce  attacks  of  Polk  on  his 
left  and  center,  and  of  Longstreet  on  his  right  and 
rear.  But  unless  succor  should  come  speedily  it  was 


THE   BATTLE    OF   CHICKAMAUGA. 


149 


indeed  a  lost  field ;  but  the  re-enforcements  came, 
not  only  timely  but  unexpected. 

When  the  action  began,  Granger  with  his  troops 
was  not  upon  the  field  at  all,  but  was  out  on  the 
Ringgold  road.  This  makes  his  action  the  more 
meritorious,  as  in  the  great  confusion  of  the  battle 
and  with  the  sounds  of  conflict  in  several  directions, 
and  especially  not  knowing  that  Rosecrans  had  left 
the  field,  a  man  of  less  decision  would  have  waited 
for  orders,  and  thus  imperiled  the  fortunes  of  Thom 
as  as  much  as  his  timely  appearance  succored  and 
supported  them.  Granger's  troops  won  very  de 
served  distinction  on  that  occasion,  and  much  of  it 
was  due  to  the  splendid  fighting  of  Steedman  at  the 
Horseshoe  Ridge. 

The  troops  of  Thomas  were  disposed  in  an  ir 
regular  semicircle,  Polk  pounding  upon  his  left, 
Longstreet  on  his  right  and  rear,  holding  a  strong 
and  commanding  ridge  on  their  flank,  and  appar 
ently  there  was  nothing  behind  him  but  disorder  and 
confusion.  It  was  then  that  General  Gordon  Gran 
ger,  like  Dessaix  at  Marengo,  after  ordering  Steed 
man  with  two  brigades  of  the  reserve  division  to 
move  at  a  double  quick  toward  the  right,  where  the 
firing  became  louder  and  louder,  galloped  to  find 
Thomas  in  person.  Granger  was  in  command,  and 
therefore  deserves  the  credit  of  the  movement ;  but, 
before  he  ordered  it,  it  is  due  to  Steedman  to  state 
that  he  was  very  anxious  to  make  it  himself,  and 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

earnestly  begged  permission  to  do  so.  Earlier  in 
the  day  Rosecrans  had  posted  him  on  the  Ringgold 
road,  to  remain  there  until  further  directions.  As 
the  firing  increased  in  volume,  he  had  written  two 
notes  to  Rosecrans  asking  permission  to  move.  As 
no  answers  were  received,  it  was  supposed  that  they 
had  miscarried.  He  then  appealed  to  Granger,  who 
gladly  gave  the  order  and  preceded  him  to  the  field. 
Thus  a  fresh  force  of  seven  thousand  five  hundred 
men  moved  rapidly  down  to  the  relief  of  Thomas. 
As  he  descried  their  approach,  there  was  a  painful 
moment  of  uncertainty,  like  that  of  Napoleon  at 
Waterloo,  whether  he  or  the  enemy  was  being  re- 
enforced.  His  line,  at  that  time  and  just  prior  to 
the  coming  of  Granger,  was  in  the  following  order 
from  left  to  right :  Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  Rey 
nolds,  Wood,  and  Brannan.  But  soon  through  the 
clouds  of  smoke  and  dust  he  caught  one  glimpse  of 
the  waving  Stars  and  Stripes. 

When  Steedman  approached,  Thomas  was  stand 
ing  alone  in  a  clump  of  trees  on  Horseshoe  Ridge, 
with  the  enemy  trying  to  turn  both  flanks.  For  a 
moment  he  questioned  whether  he  should  send  him 
to  re-enforce  his  left,  or  make  head  against  the 
masses  of  Longstreet  that  were  overpowering  his 
right  and  were  already  passing  to  his  rear.  He  did 
not  hesitate  long.  Pointing  to  the  right,  to  the 
commanding  ridge  held  by  the  enemy,  he  ejaculated, 
"  Take  that  ridge !  "  Steedman  moved  at  once  to 


THE    BATTLE   OF    CHICKAMAUGA.  15! 

the  attack,  and,  in  spite  of  the  fierce  resistance  of 
the  enemy,  took  the  ridge  and  the  gorge,  with  the 
loss  of  twenty-nine  hundred  men  !  There  was  no 
more  desperate  fighting  during  the  war.  The  pene 
trating  wedge  was  thrown  back  upon  their  main 
line.  The  gap  was  filled  and  the  Union  rear  se 
cured.  Thomas  completed  his  contracted  line;  am 
munition,  which  was  running  low,  was  issued  to  the 
troops,  and  this  little  army,  with  its  heroic  leader, 
constituted  that  "  Rock  of  Chickamauga,"  against 
which  both  wings  of  the  Confederates  had  been 
hurled  in  unison  and  thrown  back  in  evaporating 
spray.  When  directing  the  distribution  of  the  re 
maining  ammunition,  Thomas  issued  orders  that 
when  that  was  exhausted  they  must  depend  upon 
the  bayonet !  All  told,  the  force  with  which  Thomas 
accomplished  this  achievement  was  about  twenty- 
five  thousand  men.  The  Confederate  columns  which 
attempted  to  dislodge  this  force  numbered  between 
fifty  and  sixty  thousand. 

Obstructed  by  the  mass  of  troops  moving  to  the 
rear,  Rosecrans  did  not  reach  this  portion  of  the 
field,  and  was  ignorant  of  the  heroic  resistance 
Thomas  was  making.  Securing  a  safe  retreat  for  his 
army  in  Chattanooga,  he  sent  word  to  Thomas  to 
use  his  discretion  in  withdrawing  the  army.  The 
laconic  answer  was,  "  It  will  ruin  the  army  to  with 
draw  it  now;  this  position  must  be  held  till  night." 
He  was  yet,  however,  to  receive  and  repel  an  attack 


152  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

of  the  whole  Confederate  line  intended  for  a  coup  de 
grace.  Receiving  a  portion  of  this  attack,  Thomas 
found  that  the  time  had  come  to  retire.  The  mode 
of  attack  was  well  chosen,  had  Thomas  remained  to 
receive  it  fully.  Their  right  was  swung  round  again 
to  envelop  his  left  and  to  cut  off  his  retreat,  while 
their  left  was  massed  against  the  vulnerable  points 
of  the  morning.  It  was  now  his  policy  to  elude 
them.  Orders  were  issued  at  nightfall  to  withdraw 
by  divisions,  Reynolds  in  front;  and  yet  in  front  of 
Reynolds  there  was  danger.  A  body  of  the  enemy 
had  succeeded  in  passing  through  the  woods  and 
were  now  in  rear  of  Reynolds — or  rather,  in  his 
change  of  front,  they  were  before  him.  Aided  by 
Turchin's  brigade,  which  made  a  splendid  charge 
upon  Liddell's  division  on  the  extreme  right,  he 
scattered  this  force  and  made  some  prisoners. 

Then  Thomas  formed  a  new  temporary  line  at 
Rossville  to  cover  his  retiring  movement,  where  he 
was  joined  by  several  of  the  generals  who  had  been 
driven  away  or  had  retreated.  By  the. dim  light 
of  a  clouded  moon  he  conducted  the  retreat  with 
great  caution  and  in  good  order.  A  strong  rear 
guard  alone  confronted  the  enemy,  and  the  attack 
so  furiously  begun  was  abandoned.  Longstreet  and 
Forrest  were  impetuously  urgent  that  Bragg  should 
at  once  advance  the  whole  army  in  full  pursuit.  The 
former  had  directed  General  Wheeler  with  his  caval 
ry  to  cut  off  the  retreating  force  from  Chattanooga, 


THE    BATTLE    OF   CHICKAMAUGA. 


153 


but  Bragg  ordered  a  halt  and  recall.  The  darkness 
of  the  night,  he  said,  and  the  density  of  the  forest, 
rendered  further  movements  uncertain  and  exceed 
ingly  dangerous. 

What  would  have  been  the  issue  had  he  moved  is 
indeed  a  matter  of  speculation ;  for,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  asserted  that,  had  the  Union  troops 
been  rallied  even  partially  and  concentrated  with 
Thomas  at  the  vital  point,  such  was  the  shattered 
condition  of  Bragg's  army  that  it  is  more  than  prob 
able  a  battle  on  the  2ist  would  have  resulted  in  a 
Union  victory.  Among  the  withdrawals  due  in  part 
to  the  terrible  onsets  of  the  enemy,  to  the  piercing 
of  the  Union  line,  and  other  causes  incident  to  the 
vicissitudes  of  the  battlefield,  was  that,  as  we  have 
already  seen,  of  the  divisions  of  Sheridan,  Jefferson 
C.  Davis,  and  Van  Cleve.  While  Thomas  held  the 
field  and  retained  his  coolness  in  the  midst  of  all 
this  confusion,  he  could  not  understand  why,  as  soon 
as  they  were  rallied,  they  did  not  return  to  his  aid. 
He  sent  explicit  orders  by  his  aid-de-camp,  Colonel 
Thurston,  that  they  should  return  across  the  coun 
try  from  McFarland's  Gap,  which  was  only  two  or 
two  and  a  half  miles,  and  on  which  route  there  was 
no  interposition  of  rebel  force  to  prevent  it.  But 
these  troops  were  in  full  march  toward  Rossville, 
and  the  order  was  not  obeyed.  Circumstances  which 
do  not  appear  on  the  record  may  explain  what  is 
otherwise  inexplicable.  We  only  know  that  it  was 


154  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

after  their  arrival  at  Rossville  that  an  attempt  was 
made  to  obey  the  order.  They  moved  by  the  direct 
road,  and  did  not  reach  Thomas  until  the  evening, 
so  that  it  took  all  day  to  march  seven  or  eight  miles 
around  two  sides  of  a  triangle,  when  they  might  have 
marched  two  and  a  half  miles  in  an  hour. 

I  am  not  disposed  to  criticise  General  Sheridan 
and  his  associates,  who  did  splendid  service  on  that 
field,  but  the  fact  remains  that,  could  this  have  been 
done  with  the  eight  or  ten  thousand  men  which 
Sheridan  might  have  gathered  and  brought  up  in 
the  nick  of  time,  there  would  probably  have  been 
no  occasion  for  Thomas  to  have  left  that  battlefield 
at  all,  for  he  would  have  been  able  to  withstand 
the  final  attack  and  drive  the  Confederate  army 
away  in  dire  confusion.  Such  was  the  clear  con 
viction  of  General  Garfield,  Rosecrans's  chief  of 
staff,  who,  instead  of  going  with  his  leader  into 
Chattanooga,  had  joined  Thomas  on  the  field.  Epito 
mizing  the  situation  at  a  quarter  to  nine  on  Sep 
tember  2oth :  "  On  the  whole,"  he  says,  "  General 
Thomas  and  General  Granger  have  done  the  enemy 
fully  as  much  injury  to-day  as  they  have  suffered 
from  him,  and  they  have  successfully  repelled  the 
repeated  combined  attacks  most  fiercely  made  of  the 
whole  rebel  army,  frequently  pressing  the  front  and 
both  our  flanks  at  the  same  time.  The  rebels  have 
done  their  best  to-day,  and  I  believe  we  can  whip 
them  to-morrow;  I  believe  we  can  now  crown  the 


THE   BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  jjjj 

whole  battle  with  victory.  Granger  regards  them 
as  thoroughly  whipped  to-night,  and  thinks  they 
would  not  renew  the  fight  were  we  to  remain  on  the 
field."  Whatever  the  views  of  Thomas  were,  al 
though  Rosecrans  had  virtually  turned  over  the 
command  into  his  hands,  leaving  it  to  his  discretion 
when  to  withdraw,  it  would  have  been  manifestly 
unwise  in  him  to  assume  the  responsibility  of  a  new 
battle.  His  first  movement  was  to  post  what  there 
was  of  Crittenden's  corps  intact  on  Missionary 
Ridge,  near  Rossville;  McCook's  men  across  the 
valley,  with  his  cavalry  covering  the  right  flank ; 
while  his  own  Fourteenth  Corps  was  placed  between 
the  two,  from  Ringgold  Gap  to  Dry  Valley  road. 

It  is  worthy  of  further  note,  perhaps,  that  among 
those  who  in  the  disorder  of  the  field  had  joined 
Thomas  was,  as  has  been  already  said,  General  Gar- 
field,  whose  opinion  has  just  been  quoted.  He  dis 
played  a  military  spirit  and  great  energy  during  the 
whole  campaign,  and  especially  in  the  fighting  of 
the  2oth,  which  formed  one  of  the  elements  of  that 
popularity  which  made  him  President  of  the  United 
States!  As  the  alternative  of  fighting  the  enemy 
again  had  been  given  up,  nothing  remained  but  to 
withdraw  the  army  into  the  defenses  of  Chattanooga. 
While  retiring  to  Rossville,  so  curiously  mingled  was 
the  field  with  Union  and  Confederate  troops  that 
Thomas  captured  five  hundred  of  their  men  who  had 
penetrated  to  the  Union  rear. 


156  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

On  the  night  of  the  2oth  and  morning  of  the  2ist 
his  guns  were  posted  in  large  numbers  on  the  low 
range  of  hills  in  his  rear.  To  guard  against  the  ad 
vance  of  the  enemy,  the  Dry  Valley  pass  on  the  right 
and  the  Rossville  pass  on  the  left  were  strongly 
picketed.  The  Union  army  remained  thus  posted 
during  the  2ist,  and  then  by  a  night  march  they 
traversed  the  four  miles  to  Chattanooga,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  22d  they  were  in  at  least  temporary 
safety.  The  men  set  to  work  with  a  will  as  the  ris 
ing  sun  of  that  day  dissipated  the  ghastly  vision  of 
the  previous  days.  Ghastly  indeed  it  was!  The  Union 
losses  had  been  more  than  sixteen  thousand,  while 
by  his  furious  onslaughts  Bragg  had  sacrificed  eight 
een  thousand  men.  Humanity  shudders  as  the  im 
agination  conjures  up  that  Aceldama;  the  contorted 
forms  of  dead  men  and  still  writhing  bodies  of  the 
wounded,  presenting  such  an  infernal  holocaust  as 
few  even  of  Napoleon's  battlefields  had  witnessed ! 
The  intrenchments  were  soon  secure  against  any  at 
tacks  of  the  Confederates ;  the  guns  were  rapidly  put 
into  position  and  opened  upon  any  rash  bands  of  the 
enemy  that  appeared  in  sight.  Soldiers  soon  forget 
their  dangers  and  sufferings.  Their  spirits  rose  as 
the  bands  played  national  airs,  and  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  flaunted  defiance  to  the  enemy  from  many 
flagstaffs. 

Bragg's  resources  were,  however,  not  yet  exhaust 
ed.  He  posted  his  army  around  Chattanooga,  encom- 


THE   BATTLE   OF   CHICKAMAUGA.  ^7 

passing  and  covering  the  entire  Union  position. 
Holding  the  Southern  railroads,  he  commanded  the 
northern  route  to  Dalton,  and  occupied  the  long  line  of 
Missionary  Ridge.  The  tables  were  turned.  Instead 
of  the  Union  force  besieging  Bragg  in  Chattanooga, 
they  were  besieged  by  him,  and,  as  we  shall  soon  see, 
with  a  strong  chance  of  compelling  them  to  come  out 
or  die  of  starvation. 

We  may  now  pause  to  take  a  more  philosophic 
view  of  this  great  battle,  and  thus  to  place  in  a  clear 
light  the  real  claims  of  Thomas  to  the  chief  glory 
and  distinction  of  that  field.  Technically  speaking, 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga  was  a  Confederate  victo 
ry,  and,  as  far  as  the  field  was  concerned,  a  Union 
defeat.  General  Bragg  deserves  praise  for  his  well- 
conceived  plans  and  timely  orders,  although  he 
failed  in  what  would  have  been  a  stroke  of  Napo 
leonic  genius — the  destruction  of  the  Union  corps 
in  detail  while  they  were  separated  from  each 
other.  That  was  a  golden  opportunity  lost.  The 
Southern  commander  was  not,  however,  properly 
supported  by  his  subordinates.  In  a  military  point 
of  view,  he  deserved  to  win. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  common  language,  every 
thing  went  against  Thomas,  and  yet  we  have  the  para 
dox  that  every  adverse  circumstance  gave  him  an 
opportunity.  His  counsel  was  disregarded  at  the 
first.  His  corps  was  thrust  single-handed  into  the 
jaws  of  disaster ;  the  other  corps  were  at  first  insulated 


158  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

and  afterward  disintegrated,  and  could  give  him  little 
assistance.  By  reason  of  an  unfortunate  order  com 
municated,  not  through  him,  to  a  subordinate  di 
rectly,  his  line  was  pierced.  If  at  the  beginning  the 
armies  had  been  of  about  equal  strength,  later,  owing 
to  untoward  circumstances,  he  had  maintained  him 
self  with  twenty-five  thousand  men  against  the  rap 
idly  repeated  attacks  of  more  than  twice  that  num 
ber.  His  sublime  valor  and  unequaled  endurance 
received  the  plaudits  of  the  enemy.  "  Never,"  said 
one  of  their  historians,  u  did  the  Yankees  fight  better 
than  just  here."  His  own  men  called  him  thence 
forth  "  The  Rock  of  Chickamauga."  He  saved  the 
army  from  flight  and  utter  ruin,  for  flight  would  have 
meant  the  scattering  of  the  troops,  the  unrelenting 
pursuit  by  Bragg,  his  occupation  of  Tennessee  and 
Kentucky,  and  his  seriously  threatening  the  line  of 
the  Ohio. 

Thus  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  displays  to  us 
this  heroic  man,  towering  above  his  colleagues  by  his 
cool  and  sensible  judgment,  his  tenacity  of  purpose, 
and  his  splendid  valor.  His  skill  as  a  general  was 
tested  and  proved  by  his  making,  as  Lannes  said  to 
Napoleon,  "his  plans  in  the  face  of  the  enemy"; 
changing  and  modifying  them  with  the  numerous 
and  rapid  changes  of  the  field ;  assuming  the  com 
mand  and  the  responsibility  with  a  clear  grasp  and 
a  forecasting  intelligence  not  surpassed  by  any 
general  in  the  history  of  modern  war.  And  his  sol- 


THE   BATTLE    OF   CHICKAMAUGA. 


J59 


diers  were  worthy  of  such  a  general,  and  were  thor 
oughly  infused  with  his  spirit.  It  must  be  a  glorious 
and  invaluable  retrospect  to  those  brave  officers  and 
men  who  are  able  to  say,  "  I  fought  with  Thomas 
at  Chickamauga." 

NOTE. — For  an  admirable  summary  of  the  part  played  by  the 
artillery  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  the  reader  is  referred  to  a 
series  of  articles  contributed  by  General  John  C.  Tidball  to  the 
Journal  of  the  Military  Service  Institution,  particularly  in  Novem 
ber,  1892,  and  January,  1893.  He  considers  the  experience  of  that 
action  of  great  value  in  changing  the  system  from  details  of  bat 
teries  with  regiments  and  brigades  to  the  establishment  of  an 
artillery  corps,  under  the  command  of  a  chief  of  artillery,  so  that 
batteries  might  be  sent  in  logical  connection  to  points  where  they 
were  absolutely  needed.  He  says:  "Soon  after, the  action  the 
batteries  were  taken  from  infantry  brigades  ;  two  were  allowed  to 
each  division,  while  the  other  seven  of  each  corps  were  organized 
into  a  brigade  and  placed  under  the  direct  command  of  a  field 
officer  of  artillery.  The  whole  artillery  of  the  army  was  under  the 
direction  of  a  higher  chief.  From  this  on  there  was  an  efficient 
service  of  artillery  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland." 


CHAPTER    IX. 

THOMAS    AT    CHATTANOOGA. 

Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi — Grant  in  command — Rose- 
crans  relieved  by  Thomas — Army  of  the  Cumberland — Hook 
er's  grand  division — "  I'll  hold  the  town  till  we  starve  " — 
Seventy  miles  of  wagoning — Brown's  Ferry — Great  achievement 
of  Baldy  Smith — Bragg's  astonishment — Longstreet  detached 
to  Knoxville — Sherman  to  attack  Bragg's  left — Hooker's  ad 
vance  by  Lookout — Thomas  attacks  and  captures  Missionary 
Ridge — "Without  orders" — Confederates  routed  and  pur 
sued. 

AFTER  the  first  news  at  Washington  "that  Rose- 
crans's  army  had  been  "  whipped  and  routed  "  there 
arrived  the  pleasing  intelligence  that  Chattanooga 
had  been  occupied  and  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
was  safe  in  its  intrenchments.  The  relief  was  so 
great  that  congratulatory  orders  were  issued.  But 
still  later  news  announced  the  partial  defeat  of  Rose- 
crans,  and  the  skill  and  heroism  of  Thomas,  and  so 
it  was  decided  to  make  a  change  in  the  command. 
"  The  Rock  of  Chickamauga  "  was  a  taking  title  not 
only  at  headquarters  but  throughout  the  country, 
and  it  remains  in  history  as  his  important  and  hon 
orable  cognomen. 

The  gravity  of  the  situation,  however,  was  by  no 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  ifa 

means  misunderstood.  It  was  considered  so  great 
that  immediate  re-enforcements  were  sent  down  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  under  General  Hooker ; 
and  General  Grant,  our  most  distinguished  com 
mander,  the  hero  of  so  many  fields,  was  ordered  to 
concentrate  a  portion  of  his  Western  troops,  under 
Sherman,  at  Chattanooga,  and  to  assume  the  com 
mand  there  in  person. 

Hooker's  column  was  extended  at  first  from 
Nashville  to  Bridgeport,  to  secure  the  communica 
tions  by  that  line.  He  had  under  him  the  Eleventh 
and  Twelfth  Corps,  and  they  arrived  at  Bridgeport  in 
detachments  from  the  2d  to  the  5th  of  October. 
They  were  joined  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
and  placed  under  General  Thomas.  Sherman  was  on 
his  way  by  a  rapid  movement  to  Chattanooga. 

On  the  i6th  of  October  an  order  was  issued  at 
Washington  making  the  following  changes  in  com 
mand  :  The  departments  and  armies  of  the  Ohio,  Cum 
berland,  and  Tennessee  were  all  united  in  "  the  Mili 
tary  Division  of  Mississippi."  General  Grant  was 
placed  at  its  head,  with  his  temporary  headquarters 
at  Chattanooga.  General  Burnside,  stationed  at 
Knoxville,  commanded  the  Department  and  Army  of 
the  Ohio,  General  Sherman  that  of  the  Tennessee, 
while  General  Thomas  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  from  which  Rosecrans  had 
been  relieved.  Again  Thomas  protested  against  the 
proposed  change,  but  in  vain.  He  was  the  necessary 


162  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

man  in  spite  of  his  reluctance.  Chickamauga  had 
made  him  so. 

Rosecrans,  in  his  order  announcing  his  retirement, 
commends  to  his  troops  the  known  prudence,  daunt 
less  courage,  and  true  patriotism  of  Thomas.  While 
his  promotion  was  an  honor  most  richly  deserved, 
it  was  a  most  dangerous  one,  full  of  trouble  and 
great  responsibility.  As  early  as  September  3oth 
the  Secretary  of  War  had  telegraphed :  "  The  merits 
of  General  Thomas  and  the  debt  of  gratitude  the 
nation  owes  to  his  valor  and  skill  are  fully  appreci 
ated  here,  and  I  wish  you  to  tell  him  so.  It  is  not  my 
fault  that  he  was  not  in  chief  command  months  ago." 

A  summary  of  the  situation  is  as  follows :  It 
seems  now  to  have  been  a  mistake  on  the  part  of  the 
authorities  to  let  Burnside  occupy  Knoxville.  It 
could  not  aid,  but  was  destined  to  embarrass,  the 
more  vital  operations  at  Chattanooga.  Sherman  was 
coming  up  as  rapidly  as  possible  with  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee;  and  Hooker's  grand  division  had 
arrived  at  Bridgeport,  and  was  waiting  for  its  assign 
ment  to  a  part  in  the  coming  drama.  It  was  mani 
fest  that  there  would  be  no  lack  of  numbers.  The 
great  danger  was  want  of  food ;  every  additional 
man  would  increase  that  danger. 

On  his  way  to  Chattanooga,  Grant  had  stopped 
at  Louisville,  and  had  held  a  long  conference  with 
the  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  gone  there  to  meet 
him.  They  discussed  the  situation  ;  they  were  more 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  ^3 

than  satisfied  with  the  strong  position  of  the  Union 
army,  with  both  flanks  touching  the  Tennessee  River 
— or  rather,  to  be  more  exact,  the  left  resting  on 
Citico  Creek  and  the  right  on  Lookout  Mountain, 
and  then  on  Chattanooga  Creek.  Although  it  was 
encircled  by  the  enemy  all  the  way  round  from  Mis 
sionary  Ridge  to  Lookout  Mountain,  there  was  little 
to  fear  in  this  regard.  It  could  resist  all  attacks  ;  it 
could  attack  in  turn ;  but  the  overwhelming  difficul 
ty  was  whence  and  how  to  procure  supplies,  without 
which  both  resistance  and  attack  would  soon  be  im 
possible.  The  situation  was  grave  in  the  extreme, 
and  it  seemed  almost  without  remedy.  They  needed 
provisions  and  forage,  shoes  and  clothing,  ammuni 
tion  and  medical  stores,  horses  and  mules.  The  men 
were  reduced  to  half  rations.  The  animals  were  with 
out  forage,  their  very  bones  seeming  to  rattle  within 
their  drawn  hides.  The  precarious  supplies  which 
were  received  came  in  by  the  Anderson  road,  a  very 
bad  one  at  all  seasons,  but  rendered  almost  impassa 
ble  by  the  autumnal  rains.  They  came  across  Wai- 
den's  Ridge,  between  the  Tennessee  River  and  the 
Sequatchie  Valley,  from  Bridgeport,  Ala.,  the  whole 
distance  being  seventy  miles.  The  wagon  trains 
were  shelled  as  they  passed  by  detached  forces  of 
the  enemy,  and  many  of  them  were  captured  and  de 
stroyed  by  cavalry  raids — Wheeler  and  Forrest  seem 
ing  to  be  ubiquitous  in  all  that  region. 

More  than  ten  thousand  horses  and  mules  had 
12 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

perished  in  the  long  line  of  wagoning,  and  Grant 
spoke  with  grim  humor  of  the  soldiers'  daily  fare 
when  he  called  it  "  half  a  ration  of  bread,  and  beef 
dried  on  the  hoof."  It  was  with  the  knowledge  of 
this  condition  of  things  that  Grant  had  telegraphed 
to  Thomas  from  Louisville,  on  the  ipth  of  October, 
"  to  hold  Chattanooga  at  all  hazards."  The  reply  of 
the  latter  was  one  of  those  laconic  and  epigrammatic 
sentences  which  become  embalmed  in  history :  "  I 
will  hold  the  town  till  we  starve."  At  that  moment 
the  chances  were  certainly  two  to  one  that  they  would 
starve  or  surrender.  There  seemed,  indeed,  to  be  no 
other  alternative.  Without  provisions  men  could  not 
offer  battle  to  the  enemy ;  starving  men  can  not  fight. 
Without  provisions  they  could  not  retreat ;  they  would 
faint  by  the  way.  Without  animals  they  could  not 
carry  away  wagons  or  guns;  so,  had  a  retreat  been 
attempted,  they  would  have  lost  all  their  guns  and 
munitions,  and  their  cavalry  would  have  failed  them. 
The  troops  would  have  been  dispersed  in  every  direc 
tion,  and  the  enemy,  hardly  deigning  to  pursue  them, 
would  have  attempted  a  Northern  invasion.  Indeed, 
General  Grant  wrote  to  Washington  that  "  a  retreat 
would  have  been  almost  certain  annihilation." 

There  was  great  joy  in  the  Confederate  councils. 
Bragg  with  his  strong  forge  saw  just  such  a  vision 
of  Federal  disaster.  He  could  afford  to  wait.  His 
cavalry  swarmed  upon  the  Federal  communications ; 
he  had  plenty  of  supplies  himself;  Thomas  could  not 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  165 

get  them,  and  must  soon  surrender;  surely  Bragg's 
star,  which  had  seemed  to  be  sinking  below  the  hori 
zon,  was  again  rising  to  the  ascendant. 

The  chief  movements  during  the  siege  and  in 
the  battles  which  put  an  end  to  it  are  quite  boldly 
defined,  and  were  made  in  such  a  logical  order  that 
there  was  a  clear  consecution  from  first  to  last ;  but 
the  details  were  so  numerous  and  shifting  that  they 
must  be  greatly  condensed  to  come  within  the  scope 
of  this  work,  and  many  gallant  men  and  heroic  bodies 
of  troops  must  pass  with  not  even  a  mere  mention. 
Under  Grant  and  Thomas,  regiments  and  brigades 
were  moved  in  many  directions  without  regard  to 
their  arrangement  in  corps  or  even  divisions.  It  must 
therefore  serve  our  purpose  to  specify  the  corps  and 
their  commanders,  calling  attention  in  the  narrative 
principally  to  such  divisions  and  brigades  as  played 
the  most  prominent  part  in  the  struggle  about  to 
begin. 

The  Browns  Ferry  Affair. — Of  one  operation  we 
must,  however,  pause  to  take  special  notice.  The 
question  of  supplies  was  of  course  paramount  in  the 
mind  of  Thomas,  even  before  the  arrival  of  Grant,  and 
he  was  very  fortunate  in  having  as  his  chief  engineer 
an  officer  fertile  in  resources,  of  large  experience,  and 
prompt  and  skillful  in  execution.  What  is  known  as 
the  Brown's  Ferry  affair,  which  is  now  to  be  briefly 
described,  was  suggested  to  Thomas  and  discussed 
with  him  by  General  William  F.  Smith,  of  the  United 


1 66  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

States  Engineers.  As  soon  as  General  Grant  arrived 
the  plan  was  proposed  to  him,  and  he  gave  his  assent 
to  it.  The  peculiar  topographical  features  of  the  situ 
ation  were  the  chief  factors  in  the  problem.  Where 
the  Tennessee  River  makes  a  loop  just  opposite 
Chattanooga,  running  southward  and  then  turning 
northward  again,  the  intervening  ground  being  known 
as  Moccasin  Point,  Brown's  Ferry  is  situated — six 
miles  distant  by  the  circuitous  water  route,  but  less 
than  a  mile  across  Moccasin  Point.  The  object  in 
view,  or  rather  the  plan  proposed,  was  that  General 
Smith  should  embark  with  a  small  force  in  advance 
of  eighteen  hundred  men  on  the  pontoon  boats,  which 
he  did  on  the  night  of  October  27th.  This  force  was 
under  General  William  B.  Hazen.  They  floated  down 
the  river  in  complete  silence,  and  were  landed  at  two 
points  near  Brown's  Ferry.  About  twenty-two  hun 
dred  additional  men  were  marched  across  the  bend 
of  the  river  to  re-enforce  this  first  party,  and  were 
ferried  over  in  the  pontoons  at  daylight.  In  the 
meantime  the  first  expeditionary  force  had  seized  the 
hills  to  the  west,  at  the  mouth  of  Lookout  Valley,  to 
the  great  surprise  of  the  enemy,  who  had  only  placed 
there  a  small  force,  little  suspecting  an  attack  at  that 
point.  Their  pickets  were  easily  overpowered,  and 
the  spurs  of  the  hills  were  occupied  by  our  troops. 
The  four  thousand  men  who  accomplished  this  work 
were  Hazen's  brigade  of  Sheridan's  division,  Fourth 
Corps,  and  Turchin's  brigade  of  Baird's  division  of 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  ^7 

the  Fourth  Corps.     The  entire  force  and  the  expedi 
tion  were  commanded  by  General  Smith. 

The  effect  was  instantaneous.  The  enemy's  de 
tachment,  finding  itself  in  danger  of  being  cut  off,  re 
treated  precipitately,  leaving  the  Ferry  in  the  hands 
of  the  Union  troops.  This  was  a  great  point  gained. 
The  way  was  now  thrown  open  to  the  advance  of 
Hooker  and  Palmer,  but  what  was  of  far  greater  im 
portance  was  the  immense  shortening  of  the  line  by 
which  the  Union  army  received  its  supplies.  The 
river  was  opened  between  Bridgeport  and  Brown's 
Ferry,  and  there  were  two  fine  roads — one  from 
Bridgeport  to  Brown's  Ferry,  and  the  other  from 
Brown's  Ferry  to  Kelly's.  By  means  of  the  former 
road  the  distance  was  shortened  to  twenty-eight 
miles,  and  when  supplies  were  taken  up  the  river  on 
boats  from  Bridgeport  to  Brown's  Ferry  there  were 
but  eight  miles  of  wagoning  as  against  the  seventy 
miles  of  the  day  before.  And  this  grand  feat  was 
the  sudden  and  splendid  harbinger  of  Union  success 
soon  to  follow.  Two  steamers — one  captured  from 
the  enemy  and  one  recently  built — were  put  into 
immediate  requisition;  others  also  were  very  soon 
employed,  and  all  necessary  provisions  were  brought 
to  the  troops  around  Chattanooga.  Thomas  recog 
nized  the  value  of  this  achievement  in  a  subsequent 
report,  in  which  he  says:  "To  Brigadier-General 
William  F.  Smith  should  be  accorded  great  praise,  for 
the  ingenuity  which  conceived  and  the  ability  which 


1 68  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

executed  the  movement  at  Brown's  Ferry."  General 
Grant's  recognition  of  its  value  is  found  in  the  fact 
that  he  at  once  recommended  General  Smith  to  be 
made  a  major  general.  Charles  A.  Dana,  the  Assist 
ant  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  there  at  the  time, 
says,  in  a  dispatch  of  October  28th,  "  The  great  suc 
cess  is  General  Smith's  operation  at  the  mouth  of 
Lookout  Valley." 

The  astonishment  and  chagrin  of  Bragg  are  inde 
scribable.  Up  to  that  very  moment  he  had  seen  for 
the  Union  army  only  the  alternatives  of  starvation 
or  retreat ;  his  certain  hope  was  destroyed  at  a  sin 
gle  blow.  There  never  was  a  finer  transformation 
scence  in  a  war  drama.  The  following  order  will 
show  the  change  in  the  situation  at  a  glance: 

"  CHATTANOOGA,  November  /,  1863. 
"COLONEL  MACKAY  :  The  Paint  Rock  will  leave 
Bridgeport  this  day  at  12  M.,  laden  with  rations  and 
forage.  Send  down  an  order  for  her  to  land  at  Kelly's 
Ferry,  else  she  will  come  up  to  Brown's  Ferry,  where 
there  are  no  conveniences  for  unloading.  Give  or 
ders  also  that  the  boats  will  continue  to  stop  at 
Kelly's  Ferry  until  further  orders.  Thirty-nine  thou 
sand  rations  of  forage  are  at  Kelly's  Ferry  now.  Get 
up  a  due  proportion  of  subsistence  and  forage  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  also  clothing  for  the  men. 

"Respectfully, 

"(Signed)  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

"Major  General,  U.  S.  Volunteers,  Commanding" 


THOMAS   AT    CHATTANOOGA.  ^9 

And  now  the  siege  was  soon  to  give  way  to  the 
battle. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  under  General 
Thomas  comprised  the  Fourth  and  Fourteenth 
Corps,  commanded  respectively  by  Generals  Gordon 
Granger,  and  Palmer.  The  Eleventh  and  Twelfth, 
constituting  the  force  brought  by  Hooker,  were  for 
the  time  united  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and 
entirely  under  the  control  of  General  Thomas.  The 
Eleventh  was  commanded  by  General  Slocum,  and 
the  Twelfth  by  General  Howard. 

General  Sherman  did  not  arrive  until  November 
i4th,  and  his  troops  were  just  behind  him.  As  soon 
as  he  took  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  situation 
from  Fort  Wood,  and  saw  the  tents  of  the  belea 
guering  force,  he  said,  "  General  Grant,  you  are  be 
sieged";  and  the  answer  was,  "  It  is  too  true."  But 
we  are  anticipating. 

Grant  had  arrived  at  Chattanooga  on  October 
23d.  His  first  plan,  before  the  arrival  of  Sherman, 
was  disclosed  in  an  order  issued  on  November  yth. 
By  it  Thomas  was  directed  to  attack  the  enemy  on 
the  north  end  of  Missionary  Ridge.  It  was  hoped 
that  he  might  roll  back  their  line  on  the  right,  and 
that  also  Bragg  would  be  compelled  to  recall  Long- 
street's  force,  which,  it  was  reported,  had  gone  to 
besiege  Burnside  at  Knoxville.  At  Thomas's  in 
stance  the  order  was,  however,  countermanded  until 
the  arrival  of  Sherman.  As  soon  as  he  came  the 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

three  generals  rode  to  the  nearest  point  of  observa 
tion,  and  Grant  asked  Sherman  whether  he  thought 
he  could  make  the  proposed  attack  with  success. 
This  required  the  laying  of  the  new  pontoon  bridge, 
and  the  attack  on  Bragg's  right  flank  where  Mission 
ary  Ridge  abuts  on  Chickamauga  Creek  near  the 
tunnel.  He  answered  in  the  affirmative,  and  thus 
one  part  of  the  battle  plan  was  settled  in  advance. 
It  was  hoped  by  this  movement  not  only  to  thrust 
Bragg's  right  flank  back  by  direct  attack,  but  also, 
by  seriously  threatening  his  communications,  to 
oblige  him  to  fall  back  in  order  to  secure  them.  It 
was  also  arranged  in  a  general  way  that  Thomas 
should  support  him  not  only  by  attacking  in  front, 
but  also  obliquely  to  the  left,  touching  Sherman's 
right.  This  movement,  howTever,  was  to  take  more 
decided  shape  a  little  later.  We  may  anticipate  by 
saying  that  Hooker  was  to  come  upon  Bragg's  left 
flank,  and  so  to  threaten  it  as  to  keep  it  in  place, 
and  not  allow  re-enforcements  to  be  sent  to  the 
enemy's  right.  The  way  being  now  open,  Thomas 
had  ordered  Hooker  to  cross  the  Tennessee  at 
Bridgeport,  which  he  had  done,  and  Palmer,  who 
was  posted  opposite  Whitesides,  had  followed 
Hooker. 

When  Grant  assumed  the  command,  on  October 
23d,  as  for  a  time  Thomas  becomes  a  subordinate 
officer  under  Grant's  orders,  only  enough  need  be 
said  of  the  remainder  of  the  campaign  to  assign  to 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  iji 

Thomas  his  proper  share  of  the  duty  and  the  glory, 
and  to  show  that  his  troops  were  admirably  handled, 
and  were  eminently  successful.  Doubtless  in  the  life 
of  Grant,  of  this  series,  and  in  those  of  Hooker  and 
Sherman,  Chattanooga  will  receive  careful  attention. 
While  Bragg  was  thoroughly  disconcerted  by  the 
ingenious  skill  of  the  Union  commanders,  and  was 
in  doubt  what  new  step  to  take,  he  found  he  had 
committed  a  great  error  in  complying  with  Long- 
street's  suggestion  to  detach  his  corps  and  direct  it 
upon  Knoxville,  there  to  attack  Burnside.  It  may 
be  here  premised  that  this  did  not  so  weaken  Bragg's 
center  as  to  warrant  his  feeble  resistance  against 
the  coming  attack.  It  was,  however,  with  a  knowl 
edge  of  this  detachment  that  Grant  conceived  his 
plan  of  a  triple  movement — Sherman  on  the>le¥£/  c< 
Hooker  to  come  up  on  the  right,  and  Thomas  in 

the  center,  to  make  a  direct  attack  upon  Missionary 

• 
Ridge,  thus   simultaneously   assaulting   both   flanks 

and  the  center  of  Bragg.  With  regard  to  Burnside, 
who  had  been  clamoring  for  succor  at  Knoxville, 
Grant  was  not  foolish  enough  to  imitate  Bragg  and 
weaken  his  force,  but  Burnside  was  ordered  to  hold 
out  at  all  hazards,  partly  on  account  of  the  impor 
tance  of  the  place,  but  also  to  keep  Longstreet  there 
and  away  from  Bragg's  army.  Whatever  the  physical 
effect  may  have  been,  the  moral  effect  of  detaching 
Longstreet  was  obvious. 

To  carry  out  the  plan  thus  prepared,   Sherman, 


172  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

who  after  varied  adventures  had  marched  from 
Bridgeport  by  way  of  Whitesides  and  crossed  the 
river  at  Brown's  Ferry,  had  by  daylight  of  the  24th 
eight  thousand  men  on  the  south  side  of  the  river. 
The  rest  of  his  command,  crossing  upon  the  pontoon 
bridge,  was  in  position  that  day  near  the  northern 
end  of  Missionary  Ridge,  on  a  detached  hill.  It  ap 
pears  that  at  first  this  was  to  be  the  main  attack, 
and  Thomas  had  sent  all  of  Howard's  force  to  join 
Sherman  in  the  operations  of  the  next  day,  Novem 
ber  25th.  They  were  not,  however,  needed.  It  will 
be  readily  understood  that  in  making  this  triple  move 
ment,  the  parts  of  which  were  in  such  close  relation 
to  each  other,  troops  were  frequently  and  rapidly 
moved  from  one  position  to  another  as  they  seemed 
to  be  needed,  each  attack  depending  for  its  raison 
aetre  upon  the  other  two.  Thus  it  was  that  troops 
were  shifted  from  center  to  flank  and  back  again,  as 
the  exigencies  of  the  conflict  seemed  to  require. 

The  historians  have  divided  the  operations  at 
Chattanooga  into  two  parts  ;  the  first  they  call 
"The  Siege,"  and  the  second  "The  Battle."  At 
this  point  all  was  in  readiness  to  end  the  siege  with 
a  battle. 

On  the  same  day  (November  24th)  Thomas  or 
dered  Hooker  to  put  his  corps  in  motion,  to  carry 
the  Confederate  intrenchments  on  the  nose  of  Look 
out  Mountain,  to  cross  the  Chattanooga  Creek,  and, 
passing  through  Rossville,  to  attack  the  left  of  the 


THOMAS   AT    CHATTANOOGA.  ^3 

enemy's  line  on  the  southern  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge.  The  troops  thus  forming  the  right  wing  in 
the  combined  attack  consisted  of  Geary's  division  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  a  part  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and 
Osterhaus's  division  of  the  Fifteenth,  which  had  been 
detached  from  Sherman. 

The  attacks  on  the  flanks  being  thus  provided 
for,  Thomas  was  to  make  the  central  movement  with 
his  own  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  At  a  given  signal 
they  were  to  move  forward  upon  the  enemy's  rifle 
pits  at  the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge.  They  were 
thus  arranged  from  left  to  right  by  divisions — Baird, 
T.  J.  Wood,  Sheridan,  and  R.  W.  Johnson.  The  line 
was  not  quite  regular,  Wood's  division  being  at  first 
a  little  in  front. 

A  preliminary  reconnoissance  had  been  made  by 
General  Thomas  on  Monday,  November  23d.  Just 
outside  of  Chattanooga  and  less  than  midway  be 
tween  it  and  the  Confederate  rifle  pits,  being  a  part 
of  the  main  fortifications  of  the  city,  was  an  earth 
work  called  Fort  Wood.  Midway  between  that  and 
Missionary  Ridge,  less  than  a  mile  from  Fort  WTood, 
was  a  prominent  double  hill  called  Orchard  Knob. 

Grant,  with  Thomas  and  other  generals,  'stood 
upon  the  ramparts  of  Fort  Wood  superintending  the 
first  act  in  the  bloody,  but  splendid,  drama  about  to 
be  enacted.  Wood's  division  was  moved  rapidly  for 
ward  to  occupy  Orchard  Knob,  and  was  followed  in 
support  by  Sheridan's  division  and  those  of  Baird 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

and  Johnson,  constituting  Palmer's  corps.  This  point 
was  handsomely  carried,  a  prominent  advanced  posi 
tion  was  thus  gained,  and  an  excellent  diversion  was 
made  in  favor  of  Sherman's  coming  attack  on  the 
enemy's  right.  During  the  night  a  heavy  battery 
was  posted  on  Orchard  Knob. 

General  Bragg,  who  had  remained  in  a  condition 
of  great  incertitude,  was  resolved  now  to  put  on  a 
mask  of  boldness  to  conceal  his  misgivings.  Even 
while  the  preparations  to  attack  him  were  nearly 
complete,  he  sent  a  letter  to  General  Grant  stating 
that,  as  there  might  be  some  noncombatants  in  Chat 
tanooga,  he  deemed  it  proper  to  notify  Grant  that 
prudence  would  dictate  their  early  withdrawal.  Grant 
had  thanked  him  grimly  for  his  consideration,  but 
had  declined  to  profit  by  it.  If  this  was  not  part  of 
the  game  of  bluff  and  brag,  the  immediately  follow 
ing  days  must  have  opened  his  eyes  to  the  fact  that 
the  prey  of  which  he  had  felt  so  certain  was  not 
simply  slipping  away  from  his  grasp,  but  would  have 
the  temerity  to  attack  him  in  his  intrenchments, 
while  the  noncombatants  would  abet  and  applaud. 

He  was  not  long  left  in  doubt ;  all  was  now  ready 
at  every  point.  The  position  of  the  Confederate 
troops  along  the  ridge  was  as  follows  :  Hardee  held 
their  right  opposite  to  Sherman  with  five  divisions, 
and  Breckinridge  was  on  their  left  with  four.  Al 
though  Sherman's  attack  had  been  originally  in 
tended  as  the  main  one,  it  evidently  was  not  deliv- 


THOMAS   AT    CHATTANOOGA.  ^5 

ered  in  such  a  manner  as  to  carry  out  this  idea,  and 
it  now  became  manifest  that  it  would  be  subordinate 
to  Thomas's  movement  from  the  center.  Most  of 
the  troops  which  had  been  sent  him  by  Thomas  were 
not  employed  at  all.  Portions  of  two  brigades  only 
were  seriously  engaged.  Few  if  any  troops  were  de 
tached  from  the  Confederate  center  to  resist  him.  It 
was  not  known  until  afterward  that  the  great  bulk 
of  the  enemy  was  in  Thomas's  front.  Thus  matters 
were  merging  to  a  crisis. 

All  that  was  waited  for  was  the  appearance  of 
Hooker  on  the  right.  His  troops  were  shut  out  from 
the  view  of  the  army  on  the  plain  by  a  dense  mist, 
which  had  settled  low  upon  the  crest  and  sides  of 
Lookout  Mountain.  Thomas  could  only  guess  how 
the  fight  was  going,  and  was  in  suspense  as  to  the 
result,  until  a  stiff  breeze  springing  up  tore  asunder 
the  cloudy  curtain  and  disclosed,  as  if  in  a  colossal 
amphitheater,  looking  upward,  his  triumphant  march 
against  and  over  the  Confederate  intrenchments. 
This  was  the  famous  "battle  above  the  clouds," 
which  really  presented  one  of  the  most  picturesque 
features  of  that  famous  field.  It  should  be  added 
that  some  impulsive  and  enthusiastic  volunteers, 
with  a  happy  instinct  but  without  orders,  climbed 
to  the  top  of  the  mountain  and  there  unfurled  the 
American  flag.  This  was  at  daylight  on  the  25th. 
Thus  the  announcement  was  made  that  Lookout 
Mountain  was  in  Union  hands.  On  the  morning  of 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

the  same  day  Hooker  moved  to  carry  out  the  pro 
gramme.  Leaving  a  small  force  on  the  nose  of 
Lookout  Mountain,  he  marched  into  the  valley  of  the 
Chattanooga  River.  He  was  momentarily  appalled 
to  find  that  the  bridge  across  the  river  had  been 
broken  ;  but  his  men  worked  like  bees  to  repair  it, 
and  the  Twenty-seventh  Missouri  ran  across  on  the 
stringers,  as  soon  as  they  were  laid,  without  waiting 
for  the  flooring.  Hooker  then  moved  by  Rossville 
Gap  Up  to  the  crest  of  Missionary  Ridge.  We  may 
anticipate  by  saying  that  his  attack  upon  his  enemy's 
left  flank  chimed  in  successfully  with  the  other  parts 
of  the  great  programme. 

To  return  to  Thomas.  His  immediate  command 
was  realizing  Shakespeare's  description  of  the  Eng 
lish  troops  :  They  stood 

"  Like  greyhounds  in  the  slips,  straining  upon  the  start." 

It  was  manifest  that  when  the  word  should  be  given 
their  impetuosity  would  know  no  bounds.  At  last 
the  signal  came  ;  at  twenty  minutes  to  four  o'clock 
six  guns  were  fired  as  if  in  a  complimentary  salute. 
The  brazen  note  of  number  six  had  scarcely  sounded 
when  the  whole  field  was  alive  with  motion.  There 
was  no  more  fiery  charge  in  the  annals  of  the  war. 
The  Union  guns  from  Orchard  Knob  were  trained 
over  the  heads  of  the  attacking  party  upon  the  crest 
of  Missionary  Ridge.  The  assaulting  column  on  the 
front  line,  when  the  signal  for  the  assault  was  given 


THOMAS   AT    CHATTANOOGA.  iyj 

and  all  moving  simultaneously  at  the  firing  of  the 
sixth  gun,  was  arranged  with  Wood  and  Sheridan  in 
the  center  and  Baird  and  Johnson  on  the  flanks. 
The  enemy's  rifle  pits  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge  were 
handsomely  charged  and  easily  captured. 

That  was  as  far  as  Grant  intended  they  should 
go,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  why.  They  could  not 
stay  there ;  the  simplest  instinct  prompted  them 
either  to  retreat  or  advance.  They  had  no  orders  to 
go  beyond,  but  they  were  in  no  condition  to  wait  for 
orders.  They  only  halted  long  enough  to  readjust 
their  lines,  and  were  about  to  breast  the  terrible 
storm  when  there  was  a  conflict  of  judgment.  Some 
one,  it  is  said,  shouted  at  the  top  of  his  voice, 
"  Take  the  ridge  if  you  can  "  ;  but  whether  there  was 
such  a  voice  or  not  is  very  little  matter.  It  certainly 
was  not  an  official  voice.  To  the  astonishment  of 
the  commander  in  chief,  they  rushed  up  the  slope  at 
a  double  quick.  Singularly  enough,  the  divisions 
were  formed  in  wedge-like  shapes,  with  the  colors  in 
the  angle  of  each.  The  guns  from  Orchard  Knob 
swept  the  crest  almost  until  the  attacking  column 
was  upon  it.  Fortunately  much  of  the  enemy's  fire 
was  too  high  to  do  great  damage.  The  Union  color- 
bearers  appeared  to  be  running  a  race  each  in  order 
to  be  the  first  to  plant  the  Stars  and  Stripes  upon  the 
enemy's  works.  The  palm  in  this  contest  has  never 
been  awarded.  In  point  of  fact,  the  enemy's  line  was 
struck  at  six  points  and  very  nearly  at  the  same  time. 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

General  Grant's  anxiety  at  this  movement  with 
out  orders  was  quickly  set  at  rest  by  the  magnificent 
result,  and  he  thus  summarily  disposes  of  the  con 
troversy  in  his  official  report : 

"These  troops  moved  forward  and  drove  the 
enemy  from  the  rifle  pits  at  the  base  of  the  ridge 
like  bees  from  a  hive  ;  stopped  for  a  moment  until 
the  whole  were  in  line,  and  commenced  the  ascent 
of  the  mountain  from  right  to  left,  almost  simultane 
ously  following  closely  the  retreating  enemy  with 
out  further  orders."  This  does  not  state  the  case 
with  sufficient  clearness  or  with  justice  to  the  men. 
Van  Home  describes  it  very  pithily  and  more  cor 
rectly  :  "  The  situation,"  he  says,  "  offered  them  the 
opportunity  to  stand  still  and  die,  to  go  forward 
without  orders,  to  stop  the  destructive  fire  to  which 
they  were  exposed,  or  to  retreat  on  the  same  condi 
tion  to  avoid  it.  The  men  in  the  ranks  and  their 
immediate  commanders  chose  to  go  forward,  and  they 
speedily  executed  one  of  the  most  brilliant  assaults 
known  to  martial  history"  (Life  of  Thomas,  p.  192). 

The  scene  must  have  formed  one  of  the  most 
remarkable  pictures  in  battle  history — the  grand 
natural  features,  the  splendid  confusion  of  the  battle 
in  sights  and  sounds,  the  panorama  gilded  by  the 
slanting  rays  of  the  autumnal  sun  as  he  sank  below 
the  western  horizon  and  carried  the  tidings  into 
other  lands !  The  enemy's  guns  were  turned  upon 
them  as  they  fled  down  the  mountain-side.  Many  of 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA. 


179 


their  regiments  threw  down  their  arms.  Night  put 
an  end  to  the  fighting,  but  the  victory  was  complete. 
By  twelve  o'clock  all  the  Confederate  positions 
around  Chattanooga  were  abandoned,  and  their  dis 
heartened  army  was  in  rapid  motion  to  Ringgold 
and  thence  to  Dalton.  It  was,  up  to  that  time,  the 
greatest  and  most  complete  victory  of  the  war. 

The  most  advanced  Union  troops  were  scarcely 
on  the  crest  of  the  ridge  before  Grant  and  Thomas 
were  there  in  person.  The  latter  did  not  chide  them 
for  their  splendid  disobedience  of  orders.  He  rode 
along  their  lines  amid  tumultuous  cheering,  and  his 
biographer  discloses  a  bit  of  grim  humor  in  his  ad 
dress  to  one  of  the  regiments.  He  told  them  they 
had  made  a  fine  race  up  the  hill.  One  of  the  soldiers, 
who  was  as  gaunt  as  a  trained  runner  by  reason  of 
want  of  food  for  weeks  before,  cried  out,  "  Yes,  gen 
eral,  you  have  been  training  us  for  this  race." 

Just  then  a  steamer  could  be  plainly  seen  upon 
the  river,  in  the  distance,  under  full  head  of  steam, 
and  Thomas,  pointing  to  it,  answered  :  "  That  is  so  ; 
but  there  come  full  rations,  and  in  future  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  shall  have  plenty  to  eat." 

In  the  meantime  Burnside  was  sorely  beleaguer 
ed  at  Knoxville,  and,  fearing  he  could  not  hold  out, 
was  clamoring  for  support.  The  great  success  at 
Chattanooga  enabled  Grant  to  send  Sherman  to 
his  relief,  and  thus  to  complete  the  bisection  of  the 
Confederate  line  between  the  North  and  the  South. 
13 


l8o  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

The  immediate  pursuit  of  the  enemy  by  Thomas 
was  chiefly  with  Hooker's  corps,  as  far  as  Ringgold ; 
but  it  was  determined  then  to  withdraw  the  troops 
to  Chattanooga  and  set  about  careful  preparation 
for  the  future  campaign.  Military  men  will  know 
how  much  there  was  to  be  done  before  the  army 
which  had  been  engaged  at  Chattanooga  could  be 
supplied,  recruited,  and  rested,  to  be  ready  to  move 
down  upon  the  enemy. 

In  order  fairly  to  estimate  the  high  character  of 
the  services  of  Thomas  in  this  eventful  campaign, 
the  siege  and  battle  of  Chattanooga  are  not  to  be 
considered  as  separated  from  the  actions  out  of 
which  they  sprang.  His  work  must  be  regarded  as 
a  whole,  however,  made  up  of  brilliant  parts,  from 
the  beginning  of  Rosecrans's  movement  to  the  field 
of  Chickamauga  down  to  the  rout  of  the  enemy  on 
Missionary  Ridge.  Without  for  a  moment  intending 
to  depreciate  the  merit  of  Grant  at  Chattanooga, 
without  underestimating  the  value  of  the  additional 
force  which  he  ordered  there,  and  certainly  without 
undervaluing  the  brilliant  services  of  subordinate 
commanders,  it  must  be  asserted  that  the  fame  of 
Thomas,  already  established  at  Chickamauga,  shines 
out  with  added  luster  as  the  hero  of  the  entire  cam 
paign.  It  has  been  seen  that  the  army  would  have 
been  lost  but  for  him  at  Chickamauga.  A  less  heroic 
commander  than  he  would  have  abandoned  Chatta 
nooga  as  the  alternative  of  starvation ;  one  with  less 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  igl 

clearness  of  head  and  forecast  would  have  lost  that 
confidence  in  himself  which  made  him  sure  in  ad 
vance  that  he  would  win. 

On  March  12,  1864,  Sherman  was  promoted  to 
the  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  Grant  having  been  created  lieutenant  general 
and  called  to  Washington.  Thomas  retained  his 
position  as  chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
and  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  was 
given  to  General  James  B.  McPherson,  a  rising 
young  officer  of  the  greatest  promise. 

The  strained  relations  of  Bragg  with  many  of 
his  generals,  his  barren  victory  at  Chickamauga, 
and  his  entire  defeat  at  Chattanooga,  had  caused 
him  to  be  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  Con 
federate  army.  It  was  conferred  upon  General 
Joseph  E.  Johnston,  one  of  the  finest  soldiers  the 
United  States  army  had  produced,  and  already 
greatly  distinguished  in  the  Confederate  ranks.  It 
must  be  allowed  that  he  had  a  Herculean  task  before 
him  in  the  regeneration  of  an  army  so  thoroughly 
beaten,  if  not  demoralized,  as  that  of  Bragg's,  and  in 
the  potent  fact  that  he  was  to  fight  with  large  odds 
against  him. 

In  the  Southern  movements  which  were  soon  to 
follow,  Thomas  was  to  play  a  subordinate  part  as 
long  as  he  was  under  Sherman's  command.  We 
shall  see  that  his  conduct  was  marked  always  by 
exact  obedience  of  orders,  frequently  by  more  than 


1 82  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

a  subordinate's  aid  to  the  commanding  general,  and 
often  also  by  flashes  of  striking  skill  in  movement 
and  in  battle. 

Officers  of  distinction  who  served  with  Sherman 
and  Thomas  at  this  time  described  the  great  differ 
ence  and  entire  contrast  between  these  two  distin 
guished  men.  The  former  was  impetuous  in  action 
and  excited  in  manner,  while  the  latter  was  always 
dignified,  quiet,  and  equable,  regarding  even  sud 
den  and  great  emergencies  with  a  coolness  that  was 
apparently  apathetic,  and  yet  rising  slowly  but  fully 
to  the  "  height  of  the  great  argument."  Sherman 
called  him  his  wheel  horse,  by  which  he  meant  his 
strong  reliance  in  case  of  emergency.  When  the 
great  car  of  battle  was  either  in  danger  of  being 
stalled  on  the  uphill  road,  or,  as  was  oftener  the  case, 
when  it  required  the  strong  hold-back  on  the  down 
hill,  it  was  Thomas  who  did  both. 

There  was  a  nickname  by  which  he  was  known 
at  that  time,  which,  however,  had  an  earlier  origin 
and  had  followed  him  in  his  army  career.  When  he 
was  instructor  of  cavalry  and  artillery  at  West 
Point,  the  cadets,  who  were  hard  riders,  and  the 
horses,  which  understood  the  drill  just  as  well  as  the 
cadets,  wanted  to  gallop  and  charge ;  so  when  the 
command  to  trot  was  given  they  expected  it  to  be 
followed  by  that  to  gallop.  Then  the  deep  and 
sonorous  voice  of  Thomas  would  check  their  ardor 
with  the  order  "  Slow  trot !  "  So  he  was  called,  at 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  ^3 

West  Point,  "  Old  Slow  Trot,"  and  the  name  followed 
him  through  the  civil  war. 

Still  another  endearing  name  was  given  to  him. 
His  pride  in  his  command,  his  paternal  care  of  his 
soldiers,  and  a  somewhat  grave  and  fatherly  air, 
caused  them  to  call  him  "  Pap  Thomas  " — a  name 
which,  connected  with  the  command  of  men,  speaks 
volumes.  It  is  echoed  to-day  by  the  survivors  of 
his  army  whenever  they  meet  on  festal  occasion, 
and  recall  with  pride  and  sadness  their  beloved  old 
commander. 

General  Sherman,  after  the  victory  of  Chatta 
nooga,  advanced,  as  has  been  said,  without  a  mo 
ment's  delay  with  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  to  the 
relief  of  Burnside  at  Knoxville.  He  drove  Long- 
street's  corps  away  from  its  front,  and  then  pro 
ceeded  to  Memphis  and  Vicksburg.  With  a  large 
force  of  twenty  thousand  men  he  was  engaged  at 
and  around  Meridian  in  breaking  up  the  railroads 
which  supplied  the  enemy.  Thence,  without  rest, 
he  repaired  to  Nashville  to  organize  a  force  of  a 
hundred  thousand  men  with  which  to  return  and 
make  the  famous  Atlanta  campaign.  His  conduct 
deserves  unqualified  praise. 

Thomas,  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  was 
to  accompany  him  as  far  as  Atlanta,  and  to  take  a 
prominent  part  in  the  curious  strategy  and  numerous 
and  bloody  battles  of  the  campaign.  As  the  details 
of  this  movement  upon  Atlanta  will  be  found  in  a 


1 84  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

corresponding  life  of  General  Sherman,  only  so  much 
of  it  need  be  repeated  here  as  refers  to  the  actions  of 
Thomas  and  the  movements  of  his  army.  And  yet, 
as  will  be  seen  from  our  short  sketch,  the  skill,  valor, 
and  constancy  of  Thomas  were  never  more  severely 
taxed  than  in  that  memorable  campaign. 

For  the  benefit  of  those  readers  who  desire  a  more 
detailed  account,  in  Thomas's  own  words,  we  append 
the  following : 

Extracts  from  General  Thomas's  Report  of  Chickamauga. 

"  September  i8th. — At  4  p.  M.  the  whole  corps 
moved  to  the  left  along  Chickamauga  Creek  to 
Crawfish  Springs.  On  arriving  at  that  place,  received 
orders  to  move  on  the  crossroad  leading  by  Widow 
Glenn's  house  to  the  Chattanooga  and  Lafayette 
road,  connecting  with  Crittenden  on  my  right  at 
Gordon's  Mill.  The  head  of  the  column  reached 
Kelley's  farm  about  daylight  on  the  igth,  Baird's 
division  in  front,  and  took  up  a  position  at  the  forks 
of  the  road  facing  toward  Reid's  and  Alexander's 
bridges  over  the  Chickamauga.  Colonel  Wilder, 
commanding  the  mounted  brigade  of  Reynolds's  di 
vision,  informed  me  that  the  enemy  had  crossed  the 
Chickamauga  in  force  at  those  two  bridges  the  evening 
before  and  driven  his  brigade  across  the  State  road, 
at  Chattanooga  and  Lafayette  road,  to  the  heights 
east  of  the  Widow  Glenn's  house.  Kelley's  house  is 
situated  in  an  opening  about  three  fourths  of  a  mile 
long  and  one  fourth  of  a  mile  wide,  on  the  east  side 
of  the  State  road,  and  stretches  along  that  road  in  a 
northerly  direction,  with  a  small  field  of  perhaps 


THOMAS   AT    CHATTANOOGA.  185 

twenty  acres  on  the  west  side  of  the  road,  directly 
opposite  the  house.  From  thence  to  the  Chicka- 
mauga  the  surface  of  the  country  is  undulating,  and 
covered  with  original  forest  timber  interspersed  with 
undergrowth,  in  many  places  so  dense  that  it  is  dif 
ficult  to  see  fifty  paces  ahead.  There  is  a  cleared 
field  near  Jay's  Mill,  and  cleared  land  in  the  vicinity 
of  Reid's  and  Alexander's  bridges.  A  narrow  field 
commences  at  a  point  about  a  fourth  of  a  mile  south 
of  Kelley's  house,  on  the  east  side  of  the  State  road, 
and  extends  perhaps  for  a  mile  along  the  road  to 
ward  Gordon's  Mill.  Between  the  State  road  and 
the  foot  of  Missionary  Ridge  there  is  a  skirt  of  timber 
stretching  from  the  vicinity  of  Widow  Glenn's  house, 
south  of  the  forks  of  the  road,  to  McDaniel's  house, 
three  fourths  of  a  mile  north  of  Kelley's.  The  eastern 
slope  of  Missionary  Ridge  between  Glenn's  and  Mc 
Daniel's  is  cleared  and  mostly  under  cultivation.  The 
position  of  Baird's  threw  my  right  in  close  proximity 
to  Wilder's  brigade;  the  interval  I  intended  to  fill 
up  with  the  two  remaining  brigades  of  Reynolds's 
division  on  their  arrival.  General  Brannan,  closely 
following  Baird's  division,  was  placed  in  position  on 
his  left,  on  the  two  roads  leading  from  the  State 
road  to  Reid's  and  Alexander's  bridges.  Colonel 
Dan  McCook,  commanding  a  brigade  of  the  reserve 
corps,  met  me  at  General  Baird's  headquarters  and 
reported  to  me  that  he  had  been  stationed  the  pre 
vious  night  on  the  road  leading  to  Reid's  bridge,  and 
that  he  could  discover  no  force  of  the  enemy  except 
one  brigade  which  had  crossed  to  the  west  side  of 
Chickamauga  at  Reid's  bridge  the  day  before;  and 
he  believed  it  could  be  cut  off,  because  after  he  had 
crossed  he  had  destroyed  the  bridge,  the  enemy  hav- 


1 86  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ing  retired  toward  Alexander's  bridge.  Upon  this 
information  I  directed  General  Brannan  to  post  a 
brigade  within  supporting  distance  of  Baird  on  the 
road  to  Alexander's  bridge,  and  with  his  other  two 
brigades  to  reconnoiter  the  road  leading  to  Reid's 
bridge  to  see  if  he  could  locate  the  brigade  reported 
by  Colonel  McCook,  and,  if  a  favorable  opportunity 
occurred,  to  capture  it.  His  dispositions  were  made 
according  to  instructions  by  9  A.  M.  General  Baird 
was  nearly  in  line  with  Brannan,  but  to  watch  well 
on  his  right  flank.  Soon  after  this  disposition  of 
these  two  divisions  a  portion  of  Palmer's  division, 
of  Crittenden's  corps,  took  position  to  the  right  of 
General  Baird's  division.  About  ten  o'clock  Crox- 
ton's  brigade,  of  Brannan's  division,  posted  on  the 
road  leading  to  Alexander's  bridge,  became  engaged 
with  the  enemy,  and  I  rode  forward  to  his  position 
to  ascertain  the  character  of  the  attack.  Colonel 
Croxton  reported  to  me  that  he  had  driven  the  enemy 
nearly  half  a  mile,  but  that  he  was  then  meeting  with 
obstinate  resistance.  I  then  rode  back  to  Baird's 
position  and  directed  him  to  advance  to  Croxton's 
support,  which  he  did  with  his  whole  division,  Stark 
weather's  brigade  in  reserve,  and  drove  the  enemy 
steadily  before  him  for  some  distance,  taking  many 
prisoners.  Croxton's  brigade,  which  had  been  heavi 
ly  engaged  for  over  an  hour  with  greatly  superior 
numbers  of  the  enemy  and  being  nearly  exhausted 
of  ammunition,  was  then  moved  to  the  rear  to  en 
able  the  men  to  fill  up  their  boxes;  and  Baird  and 
Brannan,  having  united  their  forces,  drove  the  enemy 
from  their  immediate  front.  General  Baird  then 
halted  for  the  purpose  of  readjusting  his  line,  and 
learning  from  prisoners  that  the  enemy  were  in  heavy 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  jg? 

force  on  his  immediate  right,  he  threw  back  his 
right  wing  in  order  to  be  ready  for  an  attack  from 
that  quarter.  Before  his  dispositions  could  be  com 
pleted  the  enemy  in  overwhelming  numbers  furiously 
assaulted  Scribner's  and  King's  brigades  and  drove 
them  in  disorder.  Fortunately,  at  this  time  John 
son's  division,  of  McCook's  corps,  and  Reynolds's 
division,  of  my  corps,  arrived  and  were  immediately 
placed  in  position ;  Johnson  preceding  Reynolds, 
his  left  connecting  with  Baird's  right,  and  Palmer 
being  immediately  on  Johnson's  right,  Reynolds  was 
placed  on  the  right  of  Palmer,  with  one  brigade  of 
his  division  in  reserve.  As  soon  as  formed,  they  ad 
vanced  upon  the  enemy,  attacking  him  in  flank  and 
driving  him  in  great  confusion  for  a  mile  and  a  half, 
while  Brannan's  troops  met  them  in  front  as  they 
were  pursuing  Baird's  retiring  brigades,  driving  the 
head  of  his  column  back  and  retaking  the  artillery 
which  had  been  temporarily  lost  by  Baird's  brigades, 
the  Ninth  Ohio  recovering  Battery  H,  Fifth  United 
States  Artillery,  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The 
enemy,  at  this  time  being  hardly  pressed  by  Johnson, 
Palmer,  and  Reynolds  in  flank,  fell  back  in  confusion 
upon  his  reserves,  posted  in  a  strong  position  on  the 
west  side  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  between  Reid's 
and  Alexander's  bridges.  Brannan  and  Baird  were 
then  ordered  to  reorganize  their  commands  and 
take  position  on  commanding  ground  on  the  road 
from  McDaniel's  to  Reid's  bridge,  and  hold  it  to 
the  last  extremity,  as  I  expected  the  next  effort 
of  the  enemy  would  be  to  gain  that  road  and  our 
rear.  This  was  about  2  p.  M.  After  a  lull  of  about 
one  hour  a  furious  attack  was  made  upon  Reynolds's 
right,  and  he  having  called  upon  me  for  re-enforce- 


1 88  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ments,  I  directed  Brannan's  division  to  move  to  his 
support,  leaving  King's  brigade,  of  Baird's  division, 
to  hold  the  position  at  which  Baird  and  Brannan  had 
been  posted,  the  balance  of  Baird's  division  closing 
up  to  the  right  of  Johnson's  division.  It  will  be 
seen  by  General  Reynolds's  report  that  Croxton's  bri 
gade,  of  Brannan's  division,  reached  his  right  just  in 
time  to  defeat  the  enemy's  effort  to  turn  Reynolds's 
right  and  rear.  About  5  p.  M.,  my  lines  being  at  that 
time  very  much  extended  pursuing  the  enemy,  I  de 
termined  to  concentrate  them  on  more  commanding 
ground,  as  I  felt  confident  that  we  should  have  a 
renewal  of  the  battle  the  next  morning.  I  rode  for 
ward  to  General  Johnson's  position  and  designated 
to  him  where  to  place  his  division ;  also  to  General 
Baird,  who  was  present  with  Johnson.  I  then  rode 
back  to  the  crossroads  to  locate  Palmer  and  Rey 
nolds  on  Johnson's  right,  and  on  the  crest  of  the 
ridge,  about  five  hundred  yards  east  of  the  State 
road.  Soon  after,  Palmer  and  Reynolds  got  their 
positions;  and  while  Brannan  was  getting  his,  on 
the  ridge  to  the  west  of  the  State  road,  near  Dyer's 
house,  to  the  rear  and  right  of  Reynolds,  where  I  had 
ordered  him  as  a  reserve,  the  enemy  assaulted  first 
Johnson  and  then  Baird  in  a  most  furious  manner, 
producing  some  confusion ;  but  order  was  soon  re 
stored  and  the  enemy  repulsed  in  fine  style,  after 
which  these  two  divisions  took  up  the  positions  as 
signed  to  them  for  the  night.  Before  adjusting  the 
line  satisfactorily  I  received  an  order  to  report  to 
department  headquarters  immediately,  and  was  ab 
sent  from  my  command  until  near  midnight.  After 
my  return  from  department  headquarters,  and  about 
2  A.  M.  on  the  2oth,  I  received  a  report  from  Gen- 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA. 

eral  Baird  that  the  left  of  his  division  did  not  rest 
on  the  Reid's  bridge  road,  as  I  had  intended,  and 
that  he  could  not  reach  it  without  weakening  his 
line  too  much.  I  immediately  addressed  a  note  to 
the  general  commanding,  requesting  that  General 
Negley  be  sent  me  to  take  position  on  General 
Baird's  left  and  rear,  and  thus  secure  our  left  from 
assault.  During  the  night  the  troops  threw  up  tem 
porary  breastworks  of  logs  and  prepared  for  the  en 
counter  which  all  anticipated  would  come  off  the 
next  day.  Although  informed  by  note  from  General 
Rosecrans's  headquarters  that  Negley's  division 
would  be  sent  immediately  to  take  post  on  my  left, 
it  had  not  arrived  at  7  A.  M.  on  the  2oth,  and  I  sent 
Captain  Willard,  of  my  staff,  to  General  Negley  to 
urge  him  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  to  point 
out  his  position  to  him.  General  Negley,  in  his 
official  report,  mentions  that  he  received  this  order 
through  Captain  Willard  at  8  A.  M.  on  the  2oth,  and 
that  he  immediately  commenced  withdrawing  his 
division  for  that  purpose,  when  the  enemy  was  re 
ported  to  be  massing  a  heavy  force  in  his  front, 
sharply  engaging  his  skirmishers,  and  that  he  was 
directed  by  General  Rosecrans  to  hold  his  position 
until  relieved  by  some  other  command.  General 
Beatty's  brigade,  however,  was  sent  under  guidance 
of  Captain  Willard,  who  took  it  to  its  position,  and 
it  went  into  action  immediately.  The  enemy  at  that 
time  commenced  a  furious  assault  on  Baird's  left, 
and  partially  succeeded  in  gaining  his  rear.  Beatty, 
meeting  with  superior  numbers,  was  compelled  to 
fall  back  until  relieved  by  the  fire  of  several  regi 
ments  of  Palmer's  reserve,  which  I  had  ordered  to 
the  support  of  the  left,  being  placed  in  position  by 


IQO  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

General  Baird,  and  which  regiments,  with  the  co-op 
eration  of  Van  Deveer's  brigade,  of  Brannan's  divi 
sion,  and  a  portion  of  Stanley's  brigade,  of  Negley's 
division,  drove  the  enemy  entirely  from  Baird's  left 
and  rear.  General  Baird  being  still  hardly  pressed 
in  front,  I  ordered  General  Wood,  who  had  just  re 
ported  to  me  in  person,  to  send  one  of  the  brigades 
of  his  division  to  General  Baird.  He  replied  that 
his  division  had  been  ordered  by  General  Rosecrans 
to  support  Reynolds's  right,  but  that  if  I  would  take 
the  responsibility  of  changing  his  orders  he  would 
cheerfully  obey  them,  and  sent  Barnes's  brigades, 
the  head  of  which  had  just  reached  my  position. 
General  Wood  then  left  me  to  rejoin  the  remainder 
of  his  division,  which  was  still  coming  up.  To  pre 
vent  a  repetition  of  this  attack  on  the  part  of  the 
enemy,  I  directed  Captain  Gaw,  chief  topographical 
officer  of  my  staff,  to  go  to  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  troops  on  the  left  and  rear  of  Baird's  and  di 
rect  him  to  mass  as  much  artillery  on  the  slopes 
of  Missionary  Ridge  west  of  the  State  road  as  he 
could  conveniently  spare  from  his  lines,  supported 
strongly  by  infantry,  so  as  to  sweep  the  ground  to 
the  left  and  rear  of  Baird's  position.  This  order 
General  Negley  in  his  official  report  mentions  having 
received  through  Captain  Gaw,  but,  from  his  descrip 
tion  of  the  position  he  assumed,  he  must  have  mis 
understood  my  order,  and,  instead  of  massing  the  ar 
tillery  near  Baird's  left,  it  was  posted  on  the  right  of 
Brannan's  division,  nearly  in  rear  of  Reynolds's  right. 
At  the  time  the  assault  just  described  was  made  on 
Baird  the  enemy  attacked  Johnson,  Palmer,  and  Rey 
nolds  with  equal  fierceness,  which  was  continued  at 
least  two  hours,  making  assault  after  assault  with  fresh 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA.  igi 

troops,  which  were  met  by  our  troops  with  a  most 
determined  coolness  and  deliberation.  The  enemy 
having  exhausted  his  utmost  energies  to  dislodge  us, 
he  apparently  fell  back  entirely  from  our  front,  and 
we  were  not  disturbed  again  until  near  night,  after 
the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  to  Rossville  had  com 
menced.  Just  before  the  repulse  of  the  enemy  on 
our  left  General  Beatty  came  to  me  for  fresh  troops 
in  person,  stating  that  most  of  those  I  had  sent  to 
him  had  gone  back  to  the  rear  and  right,  and  he  was 
anxious  to  get  at  least  another  brigade  before  they 
attacked  him  again.  I  immediately  sent  Captain 
Kellogg  to  hurry  up  General  Sheridan,  whose  division, 

1  had  been  informed,  would  be  sent  to  me.     About 

2  P.  M.,  hearing  heavy   firing  to  my  right  and  rear 
through  the  woods,  very  soon  after  Captain  Kellogg 
left  me,  I  turned  in  that  direction  and  was  riding  to 
the  slope  of  the  hill  in  my  rear  to  ascertain  the  cause. 
Just  as  I   passed   out  of  the  woods  bordering  the 
State  road  I  met  Captain    Kellogg   returning,  who 
reported  to  me  that  in  attempting  to  reach  General 
Sheridan  he  had  met  a  large  force  in  an  open  corn 
field  to  the  rear  of  Reynolds's  position,  advancing 
cautiously,  with  a  strong  line  of  skirmishers  thrown 
out  to  their  front,  and  that  they  had  fired  on  him  and 
forced   him    to    return.     He   had    reported   this    to 
Colonel  Harker,  commanding  a  brigade  of  Wood's 
division,  posted  on  a  ridge  a  short  distance  to  the 
rear  of  Reynolds's  position,  who  also  saw  this  force 
advancing,   but,   with  Captain   Kellogg,  was  of  the 
opinion  that  they  might  be  Sheridan's  troops  coming 
to    our    assistance.      I    rode    forward    to    Colonel 
Marker's  position  and  told  him  that,  although  I  was 
expecting    Sheridan    from   that    direction,    if    these 


I92  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

troops  fired  on  him,  seeing  his  flags,  he  must  return 
their  fire  and  resist  their  further  advance.  He  im 
mediately  ordered  his  skirmishers  to  commence 
firing,  and  took  up  a  position  with  his  brigade  on 
the  crest  of  a  hill  a  short  distance  to  his  right  and 
rear,  placing  his  right  in  connection  with  Brannan's 
division  and  portions  of  Beatty's  and  Stanley's  bri 
gades,  of  Negley's  division,  which  had  been  retired  to 
that  point  from  the  left,  as  circumstantially  narrated 
in  the  report  of  General  John  Beatty  and  Colonel 
Stanley.  I  then  rode  to  the  east  of  the  hill  referred 
to  above.  On  my  way  I  met  General  Wood,  who 
confirmed  me  in  the  opinion  that  the  troops  ad 
vancing  upon  us  were  the  enemy,  although  we  were 
not  then  aware  of  the  disaster  to  the  right  and 
center  of  our  army.  I  then  directed  them  to  place 
his  division  on  the  prolongation  of  Brannan's,  who, 
I  had  ascertained  from  Hood,  was  on  the  top  of  the 
hill  above  referred  to,  and  to  resist  the  further  ad 
vance  of  the  enemy  as  long  as  possible.  I  sent  my 
aid,  Captain  Kellogg,  to  notify  General  Reynolds 
that  our  right  had  been  turned  and  that  the  enemy 
was  in  his  rear  and  in  force.  General  Wood  barely 
had  time  to  dispose  his  troops  on  the  left  of  Bran- 
nan  before  another  of  those  fierce  assaults,  similar 
to  those  made  in  the  morning  on  my  lines,  was  made 
on  him  and  Brannan  combined,  and  kept  up  by  the 
enemy  throwing  in  fresh  troops  as  fast  as  those  in 
their  front  were  driven  back  until  nightfall.  About 
the  time  that  Wood  took  up  his  position  Gen 
eral  Gordon  Granger  appeared  on  my  left  flank 
at  the  head  of  Steedman's  division  of  his  corps. 
I  immediately  dispatched  a  staff  officer — Captain 
Johnson,  Second  Indiana  Cavalry,  of  Negley's 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA. 


193 


division — to  him  with  orders  to  push  forward  and 
take  position  on  Brannan's  right,  which  order  was 
complied  with  with  the  greatest  promptness  and 
alacrity,  Steedman  moving  his  division  into  posi 
tion  with  almost  as  much  precision  as  if  on  drill, 
and  fighting  his  way  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  on 
Brannan's  right,  moved  forward  his  artillery  and 
drove  the  enemy  down  the  southern  slope,  inflicting 
on  him  a  most  terrible  loss  in  killed  and  wounded. 
This  opportune  arrival  of  fresh  troops  revived  the 
flagging  spirits  of  our  men  on  the  right  and  inspired 
them  with  new  ardor  for  the  contest.  Every  assault 
of  the  enemy  from  that  time  until  nightfall  was  re 
pulsed  in  the  most  gallant  style  by  the  whole  line. 
By  this  time  the  ammunition  in  the  boxes  of  the  men 
was  reduced  on  an  average  to  two  or  three  rounds 
per  man,  and  my  ammunition  trains  having  been 
unfortunately  ordered  to  the  rear  by  some  unauthor 
ized  person,  we  should  have  been  entirely  without 
ammunition  in  a  very  short  time  had  not  a  small 
supply  come  up  with  General  Steedman's  command. 
This  being  distributed  among  the  troops  gave  them 
about  ten  rounds  per  man.  General  Garfield,  chief 
of  staff  of  General  Rosecrans,  reached  this  position 
about  4  P.  M.,  in  company  with  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Thruston,  of  McCook's  staff,  and  Captains  Gaw  and 
Barker,  of  my  staff,  who  had  been  sent  to  the  rear  to 
bring  back  the  ammunition  if  possible.  General 
Garfield  gave  me  the  first  reliable  information  that 
the  right  and  center  of  our  own  army  had  been 
driven,  and  of  its  condition  at  that  time.  I  soon 
after  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Rosecrans 
directing  me  to  assume  command  of  all  forces,  and 
with  Crittenden  and  McCook  take  a  strong  position 


GENERAL    THOMAS. 

and  assume  a  threatening  attitude  at  Rossville,  send 
ing  the  unorganized  forces  to  Chattanooga  for  reor 
ganization,  stating  that  he  would  examine  the  ground 
at  Chattanooga  and  then  join  me;  also  that  he  had 
sent  out  rations  and  ammunition  to  meet  me  at 
Rossville.  I  determined  to  hold  the  position  until 
nightfall  if  possible,  in  the  meantime  sending  Cap 
tains  Barker  and  Kellogg  to  distribute  the  ammuni 
tion,  Major  Lawrence,  my  chief  of  artillery,  having 
been  previously  sent  to  notify  the  different  com 
manders  that  ammunition  would  be  supplied  them 
shortly.  As  soon  as  they  reported  the  distribution 
of  the  ammunition  I  directed  Captain  Willard  to  in 
form  the  division  commanders  to  prepare  to  with 
draw  their  commands  as  soon  as  they  received  or 
ders.  At  5.30  p.  M.  Captain  Barker,  commanding 
my  escort,  was  sent  to  notify  General  Reynolds  to 
commence  the  movement,  and  I  left  the  position  be 
hind  General  Wood's  command  to  meet  Reynolds 
and  point  out  to  him  the  position  where  I  wished 
him  to  form  line  to  cover  the  retirement  of  the  other 
troops  on  the  left.  In  passing  through  an  open 
woods  bordering  on  the  State  road,  and  between  my 
last  and  Reynolds's  position,  I  was  cautioned  by  a 
couple  of  soldiers,  who  had  been  to  hunt  water, 
that  there  was  a  large  rebel  force  in  these  woods 
drawn  up  in  line  and  advancing  toward  me.  Just  at 
this  time  I  saw  the  head  of  Reynolds's  column  ap 
proaching,  and  calling  to  the  general  himself,  di 
rected  him  to  form  line  perpendicular  to  the  State 
road,  changing  the  head  of  his  column  to  the  left 
with  his  right  resting  on  that  road,  and  to  charge 
the  enemy  who  were  then  in  his  immediate  front. 
This  movement  was  made  with  the  utmost  prompti- 


THOMAS   AT   CHATTANOOGA. 


'95 


tude,  and,  facing  to  the  right  while  on  the  march, 
Turchin  threw  his  brigade  upon  the  rebel  force, 
routing  them  and  driving  them  in  utter  confusion, 
entirely  beyond  Baird's  left.  In  this  splendid  ad 
vance  more  than  two  hundred  prisoners  were  cap 
tured  and  sent  to  the  rear.  Colonel  Robinson,  com 
manding  the  Twentieth  Brigade,  Reynolds's  division, 
followed  closely  upon  Turchin,  and  I  posted  him  on 
the  road  leading  through  the  ridge,  to  hold  the 
ground  while  the  troops  on  our  right  and  left  passed 
by.  In  a  few  moments  General  Willich,  command 
ing  a  brigade  of  Johnson's  division,  reported  to  me 
that  his  brigade  was  in  position  on  a  commanding 
piece  of  ground  to  the  right  of  the  ridge  road.  I 
directed  him  to  report  to  General  Reynolds  and  as 
sist  in  covering  the  retirement  of  the  troops.  Tur- 
chin's  brigade,  after  driving  the  enemy  a  mile  and  a 
half,  was  reassembled,  and  took  its  position  on  the 
ridge  road  with  Robinson  and  Willich.  These  dis 
positions  being  made,  I  sent  orders  to  Generals  Wood, 
Brannan,  and  Granger  to  withdraw  from  their  posi 
tions.  Johnson's  and  Baird's  divisions  were  at 
tacked  at  the  moment  of  retiring,  but,  by  being  pre 
pared,  retired  without  confusion  or  any  serious 
losses.  General  Palmer  was  also  attacked  while  re 
tiring.  Gross's  brigade  was  thrown  into  some  con 
fusion,  but  Cruft's  brigade  came  off  in  good  style, 
both,  however,  with  little  loss.  I  then  proceeded  to 
Rossville,  accompanied  by  General  Garfield  and 
Gordon  Granger,  and  immediately  prepared  to  place 
the  troops  in  position  at  that  point.  One  brigade 
of  Negley's  division  was  posted  in  the  gap  on  the 
Ringgold  road,  and  two  brigades  on  the  top  of  the 
ridge,  to  the  right  of  the  road,  adjoining  the  bri- 
14 


196  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

gade  in  the  road ;  Reynolds's  division  on  the  right  of 
Negley's  and  reaching  to  the  Dry  Valley  road ; 
Brannan's  division  in  the  rear  of  Reynolds's  right  as 
a  reserve;  McCook's  corps  on  the  right  of  the  Dry 
Valley  road  and  stretching  toward  the  west,  his 
right  reaching  nearly  to  Chattanooga  Creek.  Crit- 
tenden's  entire  corps  was  posted  on  the  heights  to 
the  left  of  the  Ringgold  road,  with  Steedman's  divi 
sion,  of  Granger's  corps,  in  reserve  behind  his  left, 
Baird's  division  in  reserve  and  in  supporting  dis 
tance  of  the  brigade  in  the  gap.  McCook's  brigade, 
of  Granger's  corps,  was  also  posted  as  a  reserve  to 
the  brigade  of  Negley's  on  the  top  of  the  ridge,  to  the 
right  of  the  road.  Minty's  brigade  of  cavalry  was 
on  the  Ringgold  road  about  one  mile  and  a  half  in 
advance  of  the  gap.  About  10  A.  M.  on  the  2ist  re 
ceived  a  message  from  Minty  that  the  enemy  were 
advancing  on  him  with  a  strong  force  of  cavalry 
and  infantry.  I  directed  him  to  retire  through  the 
gap  and  post  his  command  on  our  left  flank,  and 
throw  out  strong  reconnoitering  parties  across  the 
ridge  to  observe  and  report  any  movements  of  the 
enemy  on  our  left  front.  From  information  received 
from  citizens,  I  was  convinced  that  the  position  was 
untenable  in  the  face  of  the  odds  we  had  opposed  to 
us,  as  the  enemy  could  easily  concentrate  upon  our 
right  flank,  which,  if  driven,  would  expose  our  center 
and  left  to  be  cut  entirely  off  from  our  communica 
tions.  I  therefore  advised  the  commanding  general 
to  concentrate  the  troops  at  Chattanooga.  About 
the  time  I  made  the  suggestion  to  withdraw,  the 
enemy  made  a  demonstration  in  the  direct  road,  but 
were  soon  repulsed.  In  anticipation  of  this  order  to 
concentrate  at  Chattanooga,  I  sent  for  the  corps 


THOMAS   AT    CHATTANOOGA.  197 

commanders  and  gave  such  general  instructions  as 
would  enable  them  to  prepare  their  commands  for 
making  the  movement  without  confusion.  All  wag 
ons,  ambulances,  and  surplus  artillery  carriages  were 
sent  to  the  rear  before  night.  The  order  for  the 
withdrawal  being  received  about  6  p.  M.,  the  move 
ment  commenced  at  9  p.  M.  in  the  following  order : 
Strong  skirmish  lines,  under  the  direction  of  judi 
cious  officers,  were  thrown  out  to  the  front  of  each 
division  to  cover  this  movement,  with  directions  to 
retire  at  daylight,  deployed  and  in  supporting  dis 
tance,  the  whole  to  be  supported  by  the  First  Divi 
sion,  Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  under  the  superintend 
ence  of  Major-General  Rousseau,  assisted  by  Minty's 
brigade  of  cavalry,  which  was  to  follow  after  the 
skirmishers.  Crittenden's  corps  was  to  move  from 
the  mills  to  the  left  of  the  road  at  9  A.  M.,  followed 
by  Steedman's  division.  Next,  Negley's  division  was 
to  withdraw  at  10  p.  M.,  then  Reynolds's,  McCook's 
corps,  by  divisions  from  left  to  right,  moving  within 
supporting  distance  one  after  the  other.  Brannan's 
was  posted  at  6  p.  M.  on  the  road  about  half  way 
between  Rossville  and  Chattanooga  to  cover  the 
movement.  The  troops  were  withdrawn  in  a  quiet, 
orderly  manner,  without  the  loss  of  a  single  man, 
and  by  7  A.  M.  on  the  226.  were  in  their  positions  in 
front  of  Chattanooga,  which  had  been  assigned  to 
them  previous  to  their  arrival  and  which  they  now 
occupied,  covered  by  strong  intrenchments  thrown 
up  on  the  day  of  our  arrival  and  strengthened  from 
day  to  day  until  they  were  considered  sufficiently 
strong  for  all  defensive  purposes.  I  respectfully  re 
fer  you  to  the  reports  of  division,  brigade,  and  regi 
mental  commanders  for  the  names  of  those  of  their 


198  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

respective  commands  who  distinguished  themselves. 
Among  them  I  am  much  gratified  to  find  the  names 
of  Colonel  F.  Van  Deveer,  Thirty-fifth  Ohio,  com 
manding  Third  Brigade,  and  Colonel  John  T.  Crox- 
ton,  Fourth  Kentucky,  commanding  Second  Bri 
gade,  Brannan's  division,  both  of  whom  I  saw  on  Sat 
urday,  and  can  confirm  the  reports  given  of  them  by 
their  division  commander.  Colonel  B.  F.  Scribner, 
Thirty-eighth  Indiana,  commanding  First  Brigade, 
Baird's  division,  was  on  the  right  of  that  division  on 
Saturday  morning,  when  it  was  attacked  in  flank  by 
an  overwhelming  force  of  the  enemy  and  driven 
back ;  yet  Colonel  Scribner  was  enabled  to  rally  and 
reorganize  it  without  the  least  difficulty  as  soon  as 
supported  by  Johnson's  division." 


CHAPTER   X. 

THE    ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN. 

Sherman  moves  troops  from  Vicksburg  and  Memphis — The  Merid 
ian  campaign — Destruction  of  railroads — Forward  to  Atlanta 
— The  turning  of  Dalton — Advance  upon  Resaca — The  Eto- 
wah— The  Allatoona  Pass— Dallas— New  Hope  Church— 
Kenesaw  Mountain — Turning  and  capture  of  Marietta — Peach 
Tree  Creek — Line  of  the  Chattahoochee  abandoned — Siege 
and  battles  of  Atlanta — Johnston  superseded  by  Hood — Mc- 
Pherson  killed — Howard  takes  his  place — Battle  of  Jonesboro 
— Atlanta  abandoned  and  occupied — Sherman  destroys  it  and 
drives  out  its  inhabitants — The  general  order  of  Thomas. 

AFTER  a  partial  pursuit  of  the  enemy  as  far  as 
Ringgold,  Thomas  had  returned  to  Chattanooga 
and  had  set  about  the  task  of  preparing  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  and  getting  it  into  perfect  con 
dition  to  take  the  field,  molding  it  into  what  it  in 
deed  became — one  of  the  thunderbolts  of  the  war. 
It  comprised  fifty-four  thousand  infantry,  six  thou 
sand  cavalry,  and  a  hundred  and  thirty  guns. 
These,  with  the  other  contingents  of  Sherman's 
command,  formed  a  force  of  ninety-nine  thousand 
men  with  which  to  open  the  new  campaign.  To 
put  these  into  perfect  condition  and  to  strengthen 
the  communications  had  required  six  months;  they 


200  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

were  in  readiness  on  the  ist  of  May,  1864.  During 
this  time  portions  of  Thomas's  army  were  employed 
on  divers  duties  in  East  Tennessee.  From  the  date 
of  the  battle  of  Chattanooga  until  the  month  of 
May  there  was  thus  constant  activity  throughout 
the  division  of  the  Mississippi  in  preparation  for  the 
great  spring  movement,  the  plan  of  which  was  being 
excogitated  by  the  authorities  under  the  advice  of 
Grant,  who  was  now  in  Virginia,  and  made  his  head 
quarters  with  the  Army  of-  the  Potomac.  Prelimi 
nary  to  that  plan  it  was  essential  to  keep  open  and 
unobstructed  the  course  of  the  Mississippi  River, 
and  by  destroying  the  enemy's  communications  to 
interfere  with  his  Eastern  movements.  The  main 
forces  with  which  these  objects  would  be  accom 
plished  were  McPherson's  Seventeenth  Corps,  then 
at  Vicksburg,  and  Hurlburt's  Sixteenth,  which  was 
at  Memphis.  Very  little  more  need  be  said  of  the 
famous  "  Meridian  Raid  " — the  details  of  which  will 
be  elsewhere  given — than  is  necessary  to  understand 
its  bearings  upon  the  Atlanta  campaign  soon  to  be 
entered  upon. 

Leaving  things  in  and  around  Chattanooga 
under  the  control  of  General  Thomas,  Sherman, 
having  had  a  conference  with  Grant,  went  to  Mem 
phis  and  Vicksburg,  and  after  careful  preparation 
started  on  the  3d  of  February  from  the  latter  place, 
with  about  ten  thousand  men  from  the  two  corps 
just  mentioned  and  a  large  contingent  of  cavalry 


THE    ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  2OI 

under  General  William  Sooy  Smith.  The  objective 
point  was  Meridian,  a  railroad  center  of  vital  im 
portance  to  the  Confederates.  The  Mobile  and 
Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Southern  Mississippi  Rail 
road  intersect  each  other  there.  Overcoming  all 
obstructions  which  had  been  put  in  his  path,  he 
captured  the  town  and  destroyed  it  entirely,  with  all 
the  engines,  running  stock,  mills,  and  workshops. 
For  a  considerable  distance  in  every  direction  the 
railroad  tracks  and  bridges  were  destroyed.  It  was 
rapid  and  complete  desolation.  In  seventeen  days 
he  had  broken  up  a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  of  track, 
and  ten  days  later  he  was  back  at  Vicksburg. 

It  should  be  observed,  in  passing,  that  one  object 
at  least  of  Banks's  disastrous  Red  River  expedition 
was  to  make  a  diversion  in  Sherman's  favor,  while 
Farragut's  threatening  aspect  toward  Mobile,  which 
issued  in  its  capture  during  the  following  summer, 
satisfied  both  Grant  and  Sherman  that  the  new  and 
far-reaching  movement  he  was  about  to  enter  upon 
would  not  be  imperiled  from  those  directions.  He 
would  have  but  one  army  to  fight,  and  that  in  his 
immediate  front.  In  the  meantime  large  quantities 
of  provisions,  munitions,  and  other  stores  had  been 
collected  at  Chattanooga,  and  all  the  troops  des 
tined  for  the  new  campaign  were  ordered  to  con 
centrate  there  on  April  2yth.  By  May  6th  they 
were  all  in  position  and  ready  to  march  southward, 
Atlanta  being  the  objective  point.  The  work  being 


202  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

thus  in  complete  readiness,  Sherman  went  to  Nash 
ville  to  meet  and  confer  with  General  Grant?  and 
thence  he  proceeded  to  Chattanooga.  His  army 
was  thus  disposed,  and  the  following  was  its  exact 
composition  :  The  Fourth  Corps,  General  Howard ; 
the  Fourteenth,  General  John  M.  Palmer ;  the  Twen 
tieth,  General  Hooker.  The  division  commanders 
of  the  Fourth  were  Stanley,  Newton,  and  T.  J. 
Wood;  of  the  Fourteenth,  R.  W.  Johnson,  J.  C. 
Davis,  and  A.  Baird ;  of  the  Twentieth,  Alpheus 
Williams,  J.  W.  Geary,  and  Daniel  Butterfield.  The 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  General  McPher- 
son,  was  near  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mills.  It  con 
tained  twenty-four  thousand  men  and  ninety-six 
guns.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio,  under  General 
Schofield,  was  near  Red  Clay ;  it  numbered  thirteen 
thousand  men  and  twenty-eight  guns.  The  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  under  General  Thomas,  was  sta 
tioned  near  Ringgold ;  it  was,  as  has  been  said, 
sixty  thousand  strong,  with  a  hundred  and  thirty 
guns  and  a  large  cavalry  force.  Thus  it  will  be 
seen  that  General  Sherman  was  about  to  move  south 
with  a  force  of  ninety-nine  thousand  men  and  two 
hundred  and  fifty  guns.* 

*  The  enemy's  force  upon  which  Sherman  was  to  move, 
which  would  block  his  pathway  at  every  point  and  resist  his 
advance,  consisted  of  forty  thousand  men,  divided  into  three  corps, 
under  Hardee,  Hood,  and  Polk,  with  about  four  thousand  cavalry 
under  Wheeler.  General  Johnston  had  been  urgent  for  re-en 
forcements  with  which  to  take  the  initiative,  but  they  did  not 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  203 

The  first  strong  point  which  threatened  their  ad 
vance  was  Dalton.  It  was  now  to  be  seen  whether 
the  new  rebel  commander,  General  Joseph  E.  John 
ston,  would  content  himself  with  the  defensive,  or 
would  have  the  temerity  of  attempting  to  retake 
Chattanooga.  In  order  to  unveil  the  enemy's  pur 
pose,  Thomas,  acting  under  instructions  from  Sher 
man,  had  made  a  demonstration  in  force  upon 
Rocky  Face,  which  is  split  in  two  by  Buzzard's 
Roost  Gap.  As  the  railroad  line  passed  through  the 
gap  it  seemed  to  open  a  gateway  to  Dalton,  but  it 
was  found  so  strongly  fortified  that  a  direct  assault 
would  be  very  injudicious,  and  the  troops  were  with 
drawn.  Then  began  that  system  of  turnings  which 
forms  the  principal  feature  of  the  Atlanta  campaign. 

McPherson  was  ordered  to  move  by  Ship's  Gap 
and  Villanow  and  thence  through  Snake  Creek  Gap, 

and   to   threaten    Resaca.     Thus   Dalton  would-be 

V    ^"^       "  /  • 

taken  in  rear,  and  its  garrison  must  either  retreat  or 
be  cut  off.  With  regard  to  the  movement  by  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  it  should  be  clearly  observed  that  Gen 
eral  Thomas  saw  the  situation  better  .than  General 
Sherman.  When  the  feint  was  made  upon  Buzzard's 
Roost  and  it  was  determined  to  move  through  Snake 

come.  His  sole  recourse  during  the  entire  campaign  seems  to 
have  been  a  masterly  and  skillful  retreat — a  sad  necessity,  for  an 
army  that  is  always  fighting  in  retreat  forgets  how  to  advance. 
Let  it  be  said,  however,  just  here,  that,  in  the  opinion  of  military 
men,  Johnston  displayed  in  that  protracted  retreat  the  finest 
qualities  of  a  soldier  and  a  general. 


204  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

Creek  Gap,  the  propositions  of  Thomas  were,  first, 
to  be  permitted  to  move  with  his  larger  corps  which 
would  have  assured  success,  or,  secondly,  to  re- 
enforce  McPherson  by  Hooker's  corps.  Neither  of 
these  suggestions  was  accepted  by  Sherman,  and 
consequently  the  movement  made  by  McPherson's 
weaker  force  was  not  successful ;  but  Sherman,  who 
repaired  his  errors  quite  as  rapidly  as  he  made  them, 
then  sent  his  whole  army  through  Snake  Creek  Gap 
and  accomplished  the  turning  movement  which  might 
have  been  made  by  a  single  corps,  leaving  the  rest 
to  march  directly  down  upon  the  enemy. 

To  be  a  little  more  precise,  the  turning  of  Dalton 
was  on  this  wise  :  On  the  loth  of  May  General  Scho- 
field  marched  directly  from  the  North  upon  the  de 
fenses  of  the  town.  Thomas  again  made  a  strong 
demonstration  upon  Buzzard's  Roost  Gap,  while 
McPherson  was  threatening  the  Southern  gaps.  The 
result  was  immediate.  Johnston  abandoned  Dalton 
and  fell  back  upon  Resaca,  and  so  the  keynote  was 
struck  for  the  rest  of  the  campaign.  We  anticipate 
in  saying  that  all  the  Confederate  positions  were 
turned,  one  after  another,  not  without  severe  fight 
ing,  however,  until  Atlanta  was  captured. 

On  the  i4th  of  May  Johnston  was  strongly 
fortified  at  Resaca.  Here  the  process  was  repeated. 
A  pontoon  bridge  was  laid  at  Lay's  Ferry  to  the 
west  and  in  rear  of  Resaca,  by  which  the  Oostenaula 
River  could  be  crossed  and  the  railroad  cut  in  rear 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 


205 


of  Resaca,  at  Calhoun,  only  five  miles  distant.  An 
attack  was  made  in  front  on  the  same  day  by 
McPherson,  which  was  unsuccessful,  and  Johnston 
now  made  a  counter  attack  with  great  vigor  against 
Thomas  and  Schofield,  who  formed  the  left  of 
Sherman's  army.  The  battle  was  fierce  from  three 
o'clock  until  ten  that  night.  The  losses  in  the 
Union  army  during  these  two  days  were  nearly  five 
thousand  men,  while  those  of  the  enemy,  fighting 
for  the  most  part  under  cover,  were  twenty-five 
hundred.  After  a  final  and  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
turn  Sherman's  left,  Johnston  was  obliged  to  retreat 
again  on  the  i5th,  and,  crossing  the  Oostenaula,  he 
moved  rapidly  to  the  passage  of  the  Etowah  River, 
over  which  the  railroad  passes,  at  a  town  of  the 
same  name — Etowah.  This  was  a  practical  aban 
donment  also  of  Rome  and  Kingston. 

The  Union  army  marched  relentlessly  down  at 
his  very  heels,  giving  him  no  rest — Thomas  by  the 
direct  road,  McPherson  by  Lay's  Ferry,  and  Scho 
field  by  roads  to  the  left.  But  he  frequently  turned 
upon  his  pursuers.  There  was  incessant  fighting  in 
retreat  through  Cassville  and  Kingston,  at  the  latter 
of  which  was  the  main  body  of  Johnston's  force, 
posted  to  the  west  to  oppose  these  turning  move 
ments.  Kingston  was  selected  as  ground  where  he 
could  advantageously  give  battle  and  defend  the 
line  of  the  Etowah.  Every  step  farther  south  ren 
dered  the  fate  of  Atlanta  more  doubtful. 


206  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

What  Johnston  might  have  accomplished  had 
there  been  concord  and  harmony  in  his  ranks  it  is 
difficult  to  say ;  but,  handicapped  as  he  already  was, 
there  now  appeared  an  enemy  in  his  camp  as  dan 
gerous  and  more  insidious  than  the  Union  army  ; 
the  dissensions  among  his  generals  approached  in 
subordination.  Plood  and  Polk  received  his  instruc 
tions  so  coldly,  and  executed  them  so  reluctantly, 
that  his  best  schemes  fell  to  the  ground. 

If  he  selected  a  field  for  battle,  he  was  met  with 
the  words,  "This  is  no  place  to  make  a  stand."  If 
he  ordered  a  concerted  movement,  he  saw  that  it 
would  fail  for  want  of  concert,  and  so,  reluctantly, 
he  abandoned  his  own  purposes,  because  he  saw  that 
without  concord  and  harmony  they  could  not  suc 
ceed.  When  he  found  that  he  must  give  up  the 
scheme  of  fighting  at  Kingston,  a  ground  which 
certainly  presented  great  advantages  to  his  con 
centrated  force,  he  sadly  issued  orders  for  the  cross 
ing  of  the  Etowah  River,  burned  his  stores  at  Car- 
tersville,  on  the  railroad  just  north  of  Etowah,  and 
again  concentrated  his  forces  at  Allatoona  Pass,  five 
miles  to  the  south.  It  will  be  kept  in  mind  that  his 
line  of  march  had  been  along  the  railroad  which 
runs  through  Kingston,  Cartersville,  and  Allatoona 
Pass  to  Marietta.  There  had  been  conflicts,  some 
of  them  quite  severe,  in  different  parts  of  this  thea 
ter  by  detached  forces,  but  Johnston's  main  body 
awaited  Sherman  at  Allatoona  Pass,  while  a  consid- 


THE   ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN.  2O/ 

erable  detachment  proceeded  to  fortify  New  Hope 
Church  and  Dallas,  which  lie  among  hilly  knobs 
about  ten  miles  west  of  Marietta.*  Sherman's  strat 
egy  continued  the  same  ;  he  was  to  resort  again  to 
the  turning  process,  and  Johnston  did  his  best  to 
block  his  way.  The  Union  division  of  Jefferson  C. 
Davis  had  as  a  precautionary  measure  occupied 
Rome,  capturing  the  forts,  mills,  and  heavy  guns. 
From  the  inception  of  the  movement  down  to  this 
time  there,  had  been  incessant  fighting.  All  portions 
of  Sherman's  army  had  been  engaged.  He  now 
gave  them  a  needed  rest  of  a  few  days  before  ad 
vancing  upon  New  Hope  Church,  where  Hood  with 
a  very  large  force  was  strongly  fortified. 

The  relative  numbers  of  the  two  opposing  armies 
were  as  two  to  one — the  three  armies  commanded 
by  Sherman  numbering  about  a  hundred  thousand 
men.  But  the  disparity  was  somewhat  neutralized 
by  the  fact  that  Johnston  was  not  only  on  the  inte 
rior  line,  but  that  he  had  the  choice  of  positions  in 
his  efforts  to  obstruct  Sherman's  Southern  move 
ments  and  resist  his  attacks. 

It  was  therefore  the  policy  of  the  Union  general 

*  On  the  25th  of  May  Thomas  marched  his  corps  by  four 
roads  converging  upon  Dallas,  and  so  timely  were  his  movements 
that,  when  Geary's  advance  was  strongly  resisted,  abundant  re- 
enforcements  were  at  hand.  We  may  pause  to  observe  that,  so 
severe  had  been  the  fighting  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  that 
during  the  month  of  May  alone  it  had  lost  over  a  thousand  killed 
and  nearly  seven  thousand  wounded. 


208  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

to  turn  his  positions,  and  as  far  as  possible  to  force 
him  to  attack  if  he  declined  to  retreat.  Both  of  the 
generals  performed  their  allotted  tasks  remarkably 
well. 

We  thus  reach  the  next  great  step  in  the  cam 
paign,  which  was  the  turning  of  the  Allatoona  Pass. 
The  same  tactics  were  employed  as  before  :  strongly 
threatening  the  enemy  in  front  while  making  a  cir 
cuit  still  more  strongly  to  the  right.  On  the  i2th  of 
May,  in  pursuance  of  this  plan,  McPherson  moved 
directly  upon  Resaca.  The  army  of  Thomas  fol 
lowed  him,  but  was  soon  deflected  to  the  Confeder 
ate  left,  and  following  the  Dalton  and  Calhoun  road, 
they  came  up  to  connect  on  McPherson's  right. 
Schofield  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  moved  still  far 
ther  to  the  right  and  came  into  line  on  Thomas's 
right.  The  operations  of  Johnston  were  just  the 
converse.  He  made  a  desperate  effort  to  turn  the 
left  of  Schofield.  For  a  brief  space  it  seemed  as  if 
his  attack  on  Williams's  division  would  be  success 
ful;  but  it  failed.  And  so  on  the  night  of  the  i5th 
of  May  Johnston  abandoned  Resaca,  which  was  oc 
cupied  the  next  morning  by  Thomas  with  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland. 

Not  a  minute  was  lost.  On  the  iyth  Thomas 
moved  forward  with  the  divisions  of  Palmer  and 
Hooker;  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  marched  on  his 
right  in  echelon,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  on  the  left 
moving  in  full  force  upon  Kingston  and  threatening 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 


209 


the  railroad.  Never  was  a  general  more  beset  and 
hampered  than  Johnston.  He  would  have  given 
battle  at  Cassville,  and  Hardee  was  in  favor  of  doing 
so,  but  Polk  and  Hood  both  opposed  it,  and  John 
ston  therefore  abandoned  the  idea,  crossed  the  Eto- 
wah  River,  and  fell  back  upon  Allatoona  Pass. 
There  at  least  the  Confederate  generals  agreed  in 
their  councils.  They  would  defend  Dallas  to  the 
last  extremity. 

On  the  25th  of  May  the  Union  army  moved, 
Thomas  in  advance.  They  marched  by  four  roads, 
and  their  celerity  was  such  that  they  saved  the 
bridge  over  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek.  Pushing  on  to 
New  Hope  Church,  they  found  the  enemy  very 
strongly  intrenched  both  there  and  at  Dallas,  Har 
dee  on  their  left,  Hood  on  the  right,  and  Polk  in  the 
center.  At  the  church  was  fought  one  of  the  most 
terrible  battles  of  the  war.  The  aim  of  the  enemy 
was  to  turn  the  Union  left,  and  so  the  troops  were 
rapidly  moved  to  re-enforce  that  portion  of  the  field. 
For  a  time  Cleburne  almost  succeeded  in  turning 
Wood's  division  on  the  left.  The  battle  raged  with 
apparently  doubtful  results,  but,  under  cover  of  a 
fierce  evening  attack  on  McPherson,  Johnston,  fear 
ing  lest  the  railroad  should  be  struck,  again  retired, 
and  so  Allatoona  Pass  was  turned. 

It  was  indeed  high  time  to  give  the  troops  a  little 
additional  rest,  at  least  from  actual  fighting.  It  was 
now  the  5th  of  June,  and  no  movement  was  made 


210  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

until  the  loth.  The  railroad  was  repaired ;  the 
bridge  over  the  Etowah  was  rebuilt ;  Allatoona  Pass 
was  fortified  and  made  a  temporary  base  of  supplies. 
Additional  comfort  as  well  as  strength  was  afforded 
by  the  arrival  of  General  Blair,  on  the  gth  of  June, 
with  nine  thousand  additional  men. 

But  notwithstanding  the  success  that  had  attend 
ed  the  Union  arms  thus  far,  a  more  difficult  struggle 
was  awaiting  them  not  far  distant.  Johnston  occu 
pied  a  very  strong  position  in  front  of  Marietta. 
The  ridge  of  the  Kenesaw  Mountains  is  made  up  of 
connected  conical  peaks  with  outlying  spurs.  The 
chief  of  these  latter  are  Pine  and  Lost  Mountains. 
The  position  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  to  assault 
which  can  be  conceived.  There  were  continuous 
high  fortifications  on  Pine  and  Lost  Mountains, 
and  Gilgath  Church  on  the  railroad  was  also 
strongly  fortified.  The  terrain  was  intersected  by 
ravines,  rendering  approach  to  the  fortifications 
particularly  difficult ;  but  Sherman  was  not  intimi 
dated  by  them.  Thomas  moved  directly  to  the 
front,  while  McPherson  attempted  to  turn  Kenesaw. 
Again  a  severe  contest  took  place,  for  Johnston  had 
contracted  his  line  and  met  the  advance  of  Thomas 
with  a  very  strong  force.  The  fighting  was  desper 
ate  on  both  sides.  Newton  and  Wood  brought  their 
divisions  very  near  to  the  enemy's  works.  At  3  p.  M. 
Hood  made  an  attack  in  triple  line,  his  troops  loudly 
shouting  as  they  advanced.  It  was  repulsed  by  a 


THE   ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN.  2II 

tremendous  artillery  fire  from  the  Union  line;  but 
the  carnage  was  great.  It  was  then  that  Thomas, 
with  his  usual  sagacity,  suggested  that  McPherson 
should  advance  at  once  to  the  attack  of  Marietta, 
which  was  covered  by  these  strong  fortifications. 

On  the  i4th  of  June,  General  Polk  was  killed 
while  inspecting  his  troops  on  the  front  line.  It  was 
by  the  second  shot  fired  from  a  rifled  section  of  the 
Fifth  Indiana  Battery,  which  exploded  in  a  group 
of  Confederate  officers.  Our  signal  men  deciphered 
at  once  the  signal  made  from  Pine  Mountain  to 
Marietta. — "  Send  our  ambulance  for  General  Polk's 
body."  General  Johnston  thereupon  abandoned  Lost 
Mountain  and  contracted  his  lines.  There  was  un 
ceasing  fire  on  the  picket  line,  notwithstanding  the 
incessant  rain.  Sherman  now  determined  to  assault 
Kenesaw  Mountain.  But  the  objection  of  Thomas, 
"  to  butting  against  breastworks  twelve  feet  thick, 
strengthened  by  abatis,"  proved  to  be  sound  judg 
ment,  for  the  attack  on  Kenesaw  failed  signally,  and 
once  more  resort  was  had  to  the  turning  process. 
That  was  successful  as  before. 

On  the  3d  of  July  Johnston  abandoned  Kenesaw 
and  left  Marietta  to  be  occupied  by  the  Union  troops. 
At  8  A.  M.  on  the  3d  of  July  Thomas  was  in  Marietta, 
and  rapid  preparations  were  made  for  a  combined 
movement  against  the  enemy  at  Atlanta. 

The  Chattahoochee  River  flows  in  front  of  At 
lanta,  four  or  five  miles  distant.  A  very  strong  tete-de- 
15 


212  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

pont  covers  the  railroad  crossing  on  that  stream  near 
Peach  Tree  Creek.  The  main  stream  and  this  tribu 
tary  form,  therefore,  a  very  strong  line  protecting  the 
railroad. 

It  will  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  constant  object  of 
Johnston  was  to  neutralize  the  superior  numbers  of 
Sherman,  while  the  purpose  of  the  latter  was  to  over 
whelm  his  adversary  by  these  greater  numbers ;  and 
this  was  best  done  by  the  tactics  already  so  success 
fully  employed.  This  time  the  first  step  in  the  turn 
ing  process  was  by  the  Union  left.  Schofield  crossed 
the  river  above  Peach  Tree  Creek  and  made  a  strong 
demonstration  on  Johnston's  right  flank,  the  result 
of  which  was  inevitable.  The  Confederate  general 
abandoned  the  Chattahoochee  and  fell  back  upon 
Atlanta. 

Dire  was  the  consternation  in  that  devoted  city 
and  throughout  the  South.  The  inhabitants  of  At 
lanta  had  fondly  hoped  that,  whatever  other  defenses 
might  fail,  the  Chattahoochee  was  a  magic  line  which 
could  not  be  passed.  But  the  circle  of  the  hunt  was 
being  reduced  to  its  center.  Sherman  crossed  the 
river  in  two  places.  Schofield  was  at  Decatur,  fol 
lowed  closely  by  McPherson,  and  Thomas  had  passed 
the  boasted  line  of  Peach  Tree  Creek. 

This  last  Confederate  disaster  exhausted  the  pa 
tience  of  their  authorities.  It  was  at  this  critical 
moment  that  Mr.  Davis  resolved  upon  what  proved 
to  be  a  fatal  change  of  commanders.  By  order  of 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  213 

July  1 7th  Johnston  was  relieved  of  the  command,  and 
Hood  was  put  in  his  place. 

Apart  from  the  application  of  the  Western  prov 
erb,  "  It's  no  time  to  think  of  swapping  horses,"  the 
change  was  in  itself  a  mistaken  one.  Johnston  was 
a  model  soldier  and  an  excellent  general.  Hood  was 
a  fine  solder  too,  but  a  very  poor  general.  Johnston 
was  expected  to  perform  impossibilities,  and  when  he 
failed  Mr.  Davis  turned  in  desperation  to  the  fiercest 
fighting  man  in  that  army.  Thus  it  was  that  Hood's 
dashing  valor  was  an  element  of  weakness.  I  only 
express  my  own  honest  judgment.  I  am  aware  that 
there  are  many  who  think  that  the  change  was  wise, 
and  that  the  choice  of  Hood,  with  an  active  aggres 
sive  policy,  presented  the  only  chance  left  the  Con 
federacy.  Hood  certainly  failed  in  part  because  his 
battalions  were  not  heavy  enough,  as  well  as  from 
rashness  and  the  want  of  proper  support  from  his 
lieutenants. 

The  military  student  looks  in  vain  to  find  faults 
and  mistakes  in  the  masterly  retreat  of  Johnston. 
He  will  find  many  in  the  foolhardy  assaults  of  Hood. 
The  change,  however,  presented  to  the  citizens  of 
Atlanta  a  new  chance  and  a  new  hope.  By  a  less 
Fabian  policy  than  that  of  Johnston,  the  task  of 
Hood  was  to  save  that  city,  with  the  forty-one  thou 
sand  infantry  and  ten  thousand  cavalry  turned  over 
to  him  by  Johnston.  Hood  lost  no  time,  but  went  to 
work  in  fierce  warrior  style  to  accomplish  this  task. 


214 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


The  Union  army  was  gradually  but  surely  marching 
down  upon  him — Thomas  on  the  right,  Schofield  in 
the  center,  and  McPherson  on  the  left.  In  order  to 
stay  them,  Hood  made  two  successive  attacks,  each 
a  rapid  and  somewhat  unexpected  blow.  On  the 
i8th  of  July,  Thomas  having  crossed  the  creek, 
Hood  approached,  for  some  distance  concealed  from 
view  ;  Hardee  fiercely  attacked  the  divisions  of  New 
ton  and  Geary  in  turn,  but  some  artillery  which  had 
been  prudently  posted  by  Thomas  checked  them  and 
caused  them  to  retire.  For  a  time  he  had  partial 
success  in  both,  but  he  was  finally  driven  back  dis 
comfited.  General  Johnston  had  considered  the 
Union  position  on  Peach  Tree  Creek  as  practically 
unassailable,  but  regarded  the  most  opportune  mo 
ment  for  attack  to  be  when  Sherman  was  crossing 
the  river  and  the  creek.  It  would  have  been  better 
had  Hood  adopted  his  views,  for  when  he  had  failed 
in  his  attack  he  was  obliged  to  fall  back,  leaving  his 
dead  and  wounded  upon  the  field — nearly  five  thou 
sand  in  number.  The  fierceness  of  the  battle  may 
be  known  from  the  fact  that  Thomas's  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  alone  lost  sixteen  hundred  men.  Thus 
it  was  that  Hood  was  beaten,  principally  by  Thomas, 
at  Peach  Tree  Creek. 

In  order  to  give  some  practical  idea  of  the  work 
done  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  the  following 
order  of  Thomas  is  inserted,  bearing  date  of  July 
25,  1864 : 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  215 

"  The  major  general  commanding  congratulates 
the  troops  upon  the  brilliant  success  which  has  at 
tended  the  Union  arms  in  the  late  battles,  and  which 
has  been  officially  reported  as  follows : 

"  In  the  battle  of  the  2oth  inst.,  in  which  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  one  division  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
and  part  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  was  engaged — total 
Union  loss,  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  seventeen 
hundred  and  thirty-three.  In  front  of  the  Twenti 
eth  Corps  there  were  put  out  of  the  fight  six  thou 
sand  rebels.  Five  hundred  and  sixty-three  of  the 
enemy  were  buried  by  our  own  troops,  and  the  rebels 
were  permitted  to  bury  two  hundred  and  fifty  addi 
tional  themselves.  The  second  division  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  repulsed  seven  assaults  of  the  enemy, 
with  slight  loss  to  themselves,  which  must  swell  the 
rebel  loss  much  beyond  six  thousand.  Prisoners 
captured,  three  hundred,  and  seven  stand  of  colors. 
No  report  has  yet  been  received  of  the  part  taken  in 
this  battle  by  the  Fourteenth  Army  Corps. 

"In  the  battle  of  the  226.  the  total  Union  loss 
in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  thirty-five  hundred, 
and  ten  pieces  of  artillery.  Rebel  loss — prisoners 
captured,  thirty-two  hundred.  Known  dead  of  the 
enemy  in  front  of  the  Fifteenth  and  Sixteenth  Corps 
and  one  division  of  the  Seventeenth  Corps,  twenty- 
one  hundred  and  forty-two.  The  other  division  of 
the  Seventeenth  Corps  repulsed  six  assaults  of  the 
enemy  before  it  fell  back,  which  will  swell  the  rebel 


2l6  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

loss  in  killed  to  at  least  three  thousand.  There  were 
captured  from  the  enemy  in  this  battle  eighteen 
stand  of  colors  and  five  thousand  stand  of  arms." 

The  Battle  of  Peach  Tree  Creek.— As  this,  more 
than  perhaps  any  other  battle  in  the  open  field,  had 
displayed  the  great  generalship  and  splendid  valor 
of  Thomas,  who  with  a  portion  of  his  army — four 
divisions  and  one  brigade — had  resisted  and  hurled 
back  the  furious  assault  of  the  entire  Confederate 
force,  impelled  by  the  spirit  of  their  new  com 
mander,  Hood,  it  will  be  well  to  dwell  a  little  more 
at  length  upon  it. 

Peach  Tree  Creek  is  a  considerable  stream,  the 
north  and  south  forks  of  which  mingle  their  waters 
about  two  miles  and  a  half  from  the  point  where  the 
creek  thus  formed  empties  into  the  Chattahoochee 
River  in  front  of  Bolton.  It  forms  one  of  the  natu 
ral  out-lying  defenses  of  Atlanta.  The  creek  is  wide 
and  muddy,  and  it  was  necessary  in  crossing  it  that 
the  Union  army  should  be  concentrated,  for  fear 
that  the  enemy  would  attack  the  force  crossing  the 
creek  in  detail,  while  the  other  portions  of  the  army 
were  too  far  distant  to  co-operate.  This,  it  will 
be  seen,  is  just  what  happened.  Sherman's  order 
of  the  day,  directing  the  convergence  of  the  troops 
marching  upon  Atlanta,  found  Schofield  and  McPher- 
son  in  the  neighborhood  of  Decatur,  while  Thomas 
was  making  preparations,  to  cross  the  creek,  his  army 
being  on  the  right  branch  between  the  railroad  and 


THE    ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 

Buckhead.  Hood,  who  at  this  juncture  had  suc 
ceeded  Johnston,  on  the  i8th  of  July,  was  quick  to 
see  his  opportunity  and  to  avail  himself  of  it. 

Sherman,  not  awake  to  the  critical  character  of  the 
situation,  nor  suspecting  Hood's  purpose,  had,  how 
ever,  directed  the  left  to  oblique  to  the  right  and  the 
right  to  the  left,  in  order  to  decrease  the  separation. 
The  result  was  that  certain  of  Thomas's  troops,  in 
obedience  to  this  order,  were  detached  from  his  army 
to  the  left.  With  his  main  body,  however,  he  crossed 
the  creek  on  the  iQth,  and  so  increased  the  gap  be 
tween  the  right  and  left  wings.  On  the  morning  of 
the  2oth  his  whole  force  was  across;  but,  while  in 
readiness  to  resist  or  to  attack,  it  seems  certain  that 
neither  Thomas  nor  Sherman  expected  a  battle 
there.  Sherman's  order  of  the  day,  already  referred 
to,  simply  directing  the  whole  of  his  army  to  move 
on  Atlanta,  indeed  shows  this,  for  that  indicates  that 
he  expected  the  corps  to  converge  toward  each 
other.  But  he  had  miscalculated  distances.  Scho 
field,  with  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  was  not  able  to 
join  the  left  of  Thomas  at  once;  and  Stanley's  and 
Wood's  divisions  of  Thomas's  army,  while  moving  to 
the  left,  found  themselves  separated  from  Newton's 
by  nearly  three  miles  of  distance,  which  left  New 
ton's  flank  exposed,  while  they  in  point  of  fact  had 
joined  Schofield. 

Thus  Thomas  was  left  with  seven  divisions,  while 
Schofield  had  eleven  ;  and,  worse  than  that,  it  placed 


218  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

the  left  of  Thomas  in  the  air  just  as  Hood  was  pre 
paring  to  assault  him  in  front  and  on  the  left  flank. 
It  was  in  this  complication  of  untoward  circum 
stances  that  the  Union  general  became  fully  aware 
of  Hood's  purpose,  and  that  everything  seemed  to 
conspire  in  Hood's  favor.  He  formed  his  line  of 
battle  just  south  of  Peach  Tree  Creek,  with  Stewart 
on  his  left,  Hardee  in  the  center,  and  Cheatham  on 
his  right.  He  ordered  Cheatham  to  post  his  batteries 
so  as  to  sweep  the  intervening  ground  and  make  it 
impossible  for  McPherson  and  Schoneld  to  join  on 
to  Thomas;  then,  with  the  two  other  corps  he  pur 
posed  to  crush  Thomas,  and,  swooping  to  the  right, 
he  would  penetrate  into  the  gap  between  Thomas 
and  the  other  two  before  they  could  unite. 

Sherman  had  been  taken  at  a  disadvantage,  and 
the  plan  of  Hood  was  eminently  well  digested.  But 
by  this  time  Thomas  had  become  thoroughly  in 
formed  of  his  purpose.  A  very  short  time  before 
the  fury  of  Hood's  onset  Thomas  had  directed  New 
ton  to  ascend  a  hill  just  in  his  front.  In  doing  so 
Newton  thoughtfully  placed  two  guns  on  that  hill, 
saying,  as  he  did  so,  "  It  is  well  to  have  a  reserve." 
He  then  moved  forward,  followed  by  Geary  and 
Williams.  This  was  about  three  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon.  These  three  divisions  received  the  first  as 
sault  of  the  enemy  and  gallantly  repulsed  it.  Rid 
ing  rapidly  to  the  front,  Thomas  directed  the  action 
from  the  rear  of  Newton's  line.  Seeing  the  emer- 


THE   ATLANTA    CAMPAIGN. 


2I9 


gency,  he  hastily  ordered  two  batteries  into  posi 
tion  at  a  jump,  accelerating  their  speed,  it  is  said,  by 
using  the  flat  of  his  sword.  These  opened  upon  the 
enemy  double-shotted,  repulsed  his  attack,  and  drove 
him  from  the  field,  leaving  the  ground  heaped  with 
his  dead  and  wounded.  Quickness  of  thought  and 
splendid  valor  in  action  caused  the  battle  of  Peach 
Tree  Creek  to  be  another  of  the  great  victories  of 
Thomas,  and  led  him  to  say  that  with  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  alone  he  could  have  beaten  all  the 
troops  that  Hood  had  in  the  field.  The  gap,  how 
ever,  had  not  been  filled,  and  two  days  later  Hood 
made  a  new  trial  of  his  strength  against  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee. 

Nothing,  however,  could  resist  the  advance  of 
the  Union  troops.  The  enemy  made  but  one  more 
determined  effort,  the  failure  of  which  immediately 
preceded  the  fall  of  Atlanta. 

Jonesboro. — A  strong  force  of  the  Union  army 
was  now  intrenched  very  near  the  enemy  in  Atlanta. 
Sherman's  instructions  to  his  generals  were  that 
they  should  seek  to  find  weak  points  in  the  in 
trenched  line  which  they  could  break  through.  In  re 
sponding  to  these  directions,  Thomas  said  that  while 
he  would  certainly  look  for  such  points,  it  was  clearly 
manifest  to  him  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  break 
the  strong  intrenchments  in  front  of  Atlanta.  He 
declared  that  the  city  must  be  turned  by  its  left 
flank,  and  that  when  the  communications  by  the 


220  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Macon  road  were  cut  Hood  would  be  obliged  to 
evacuate  Atlanta.  General  Sherman  still  hoped  to 
make  a  direct  attack,  but  was  at  last  obliged  to  ac 
cept  the  turning  proposition.  As  he  moved  around 
the  town,  the  enemy  fortified  in  front  of  him  at 
every  point — at  Eastpoint,  Rough  and  Ready,  and 
particularly  with  strong  intrenchments  at  Jonesboro. 
From  the  latter  place  Hood  attacked  Howard's 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  3ist  of  August,  hop 
ing  with  two  corps  to  drive  him  across  the  Flint 
River.  He  was  repulsed.  On  the  same  evening 
Sherman  ordered  an  attack  by  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
upon  Hardee  in  his  intrenchments  at  Jonesboro,  ex 
pecting  the  co-operation  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennes 
see  upon  Hardee's  flank.  This  attack  was  eminent 
ly  successful.  He  drove  the  enemy  out  of  their  in 
trenchments,  and  took  a  thousand  prisoners  and 
eight  guns.  But  the  expected  co-operation  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee  was  not  made.  Had  it  been, 
and  had  it  been  followed  up,  it  might  have  been  fol 
lowed  by  the  capture  of  Hardee's  entire  corps  and 
the  severance  of  the  Southern  communications  of 
the  enemy.  Hood's  last  hope  of  saving  the  city 
had  expired.  He  evacuated  Atlanta  and  gave  up 
the  struggle. 

While  Sherman  moved  relentlessly  down,  draw 
ing  closer  round  Atlanta  by  his  right,  Thomas  ap 
proaching  from  the  northeast,  Schofield  directly 
from  the  front,  and  McPherson  from  Decatur, 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  22I 

Hood's  tactics  were  to  assail  the  Union  left  and,  if 
possible,  gain  its  rear.  In  this  for  a  short  space  he 
succeeded.  There  was  a  weak  point  there  which 
Hood  seized  and  took  in  flank  ;  and  when  McPher- 
son  moved  rapidly  to  set  the  line  in  order  and  pro 
tect  the  left,  he  rode  with  a  single  orderly  directly 
into  the  Confederate  line.  He  was  killed  by  a  shot 
from  the  skirmishers,  and  in  the  terrible  battle 
which  followed  his  body  was  for  some  time  in  their 
hands.*  Re-enforcements  were  rapidly  brought  up, 
however,  and  the  Confederates  were  driven  back. 
This  was  on  the  226.  of  July.  It  may  here  be  stated 
that,  although  the  temporary  command  fell  to  Gen 
eral  Logan,  the  permanent  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  vacated  by  the  lamentable  death  of 
McPherson,  was  given  to  General  O.  O.  Howard — 
much  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  General  Hooker,  who 
considered  himself  overslaughed  and  ill-treated, 
and  who  threw  up  the  command  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  to  which  General  Stanley  was  at  once  pro 
moted. 

The   details    of  the   maneuvers    around  Atlanta 
are  numerous  and  complicated.     Their  philosophy  is 


*  General  McPherson  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  very  best 
Union  generals.  He  graduated  at  the  head  of  his  class  at  West 
Point  in  1853,  and  among  his  classmates  were  Sheridan,  Scho- 
field,  and  Hood.  At  the  time  of  his  death  he  was  only  thirty-five 
years  old.  Grant  expressed  "the  highest  reverence  for  his  patriot 
ism,  his  zeal,  his  great,  almost  unequaled,  ability,  and  all  the 
manly  virtues  that  can  adorn  a  commander." 


222  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

very  simple  and  clear.  With  a  superior  army  in  his 
front,  should  his  Southern  communications  be  also 
threatened,  General  Hood  must  either  fight  or 
evacuate  Atlanta. 

To  present  these  alternatives  in  order,  Sherman 
sent,  on  the  27th,  a  large  cavalry  force  under  Stone- 
man  and  Garrard  to  cut  the  Macon  road.  The 
threat  had  its  influence,  but  the  raid  was  a  failure. 
Garrard  came  back  cutting  his  way  through  two  of 
the  enemy's  divisions,  while  Stoneman,  with  one 
division,  was  captured  by  a  small  force  of  militia. 
In  spite,  however,  of  these  partial  embarrassments, 
the  Union  army  was  closing  in  upon  the  devoted 
city,  met  and  barred  at  every  point  by  the  Confed 
erate  commander.  There  was  a  very  severe  fight  at 
Ezra  Church,  just  outside  the  city,  and  it  was  evi 
dent  to  Sherman  that  with  the  very  strong  fortifica 
tions  and  heavy  guns  it  was  proof  against  assault, 
and  must  either  be  taken  by  regular  approaches  or 
else  he  must  have  recourse  to  his  former  tactics  and 
turn  the  position.  He  chose  the  latter,  and  raised 
the  siege  in  front  of  the  town.  Once  more  he  em 
ployed  the  cavalry  to  cut  the  communications  to 
the  south,  and  moved  his  main  body  below  Procter's 
Creek.  The  Twentieth  Corps  he  sent  back  to  the 
Chattahoochee,  and  thus  deceived  Hood  into  think 
ing  that  he  was  about  to  retreat.  The  illusion,  how 
ever,  was  only  momentary,  for  he  soon  found 
Thomas's  army  moving  to  the  southeast  upon 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 


223 


Jonesboro,  and  Schofield  around  Eastpoint  to 
Rough  and  Ready.  As  soon  as  he  saw  these  move 
ments  Hood  moved  the  two  corps  of  Lee  and 
Hardee  to  Jonesboro,  leaving  but  one  corps  in 
Atlanta.  On  the  3ist  of  July  he  made  a  fierce 
attack  upon  Howard's  corps  near  Jonesboro,  which 
was  easily  repulsed,  while  Schofield  struck  the  rail 
road  and  destroyed  it.  The  critical  moment  had  now 
arrived  when  Hood  must  either  fight  or  go.  One 
more  counter  movement,  however,  he  would  try. 
While  Sherman  was  cutting  the  railroad  to  the  south 
of  Atlanta,  Hood  sent  Wheeler  with  ten  thousand 
cavalry  to  cut  Sherman's  Northern  communications. 
He  moved  rapidly  to  Dalton,  and  north  of  it,  but 
the  Union  general  could  afford  to  permit  this  raid 
in  consideration  of  the  great  prize  that  lay  almost 
within  his  grasp.  Sherman's  forces  were  now  con 
centrated  principally  at  Jonesboro.  From  Atlanta 
to  Jonesboro  the  railroad  runs  on  the  ridge  b'etween 
the  Flint  and  Ocmulgee  Rivers — a  good  position,  but 
not  unassailable.  In  spite  of  the  desperate  efforts 
of  Hood,  he  now  saw  that  Atlanta  was  untenable. 
Vigorously  shelled  in  front  by  Thomas,  and  with  its 
chief  Southern  communication  cut,  Hood  destroyed 
stores,  shops,  and  factories,  blew  up  eighty  car-loads 
of  ammunition,  and  evacuated  the  city,  and  the 
Union  troops  entered  it  on  the  3d  of  September. 
Its  loss  to  the  enemy  and  its  gain  to  the  Union 
cause  were  both  incalculable.  Several  railroads  con- 


224 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


verged  there,  and  it  was  the  principal  manufacturing 
center  of  the  South. 

What  to  do  with  it  was  a  pregnant  question. 
Sherman  decided  to  destroy  it,  and  expel  its  in 
habitants.  A  bitter  and  acrimonious  correspond 
ence  took  place  on  the  subject  between  Sherman  on 
the  one  hand  and  the  mayor  of  the  city  and  General 
Hood  on  the  other.  We  need  not  further  refer  to 
it.  Sherman  stood  firm,  and  Atlanta  was  strength 
ened  and  made  a  military  base  for  the  Union  arms 
and  a  magazine  of  supplies.  Although  temporarily 
dependent  for  supplies  on  a  single  track  from  Nash 
ville,  and  although  feeble  attempts  were  made  to  cut 
our  communications,  in  the  form  of  attacks  on 
Allatoona  and  Resaca,  the  fortunes  of  the  Union 
army  proved  brighter  and  brighter  every  day,  and 
permitted  Sherman  to  conceive  the  idea  of  leaving 
Hood  behind  and  marching  through  Georgia  to  the 
sea.  Our  history  leaves  him  substantially  at  this 
point,  but  it  may  be  confidently  asserted  that  the 
Atlanta  campaign,  ending  in  his  capture  of  that 
stronghold,  presents  a  larger  claim  to  military  dis 
tinction  than  the  famous  march  to  the  sea. 

In  the  rapid  and  complicated  movements  of  that 
campaign  it  is  difficult  always  to  discern  the  exact 
part  taken  by  a  subordinate  commander,  but  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  under  its  heroic  leader, 
played  no  secondary  part,  and  had  become  so  inured 
to  war  as  to  promise  great  successes  in  the  future. 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  225 

The  news  of  the  capture  of  Atlanta  was  received 
throughout  the  land  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm. 
Under  date  of  September  3d  and  4th,  "the  applause 
and  thanks  of  the  nation  "  were  telegraphed  by 
President  Lincoln  and  General  Grant  to  all  en 
gaged  in  it,  and  salutes  were  fired  in  all  the  princi 
pal  cities.  On  the  loth  of  January  a  resolution  of 
Congress  was  passed  to  the  same  effect. 

For  a  very  succinct  epitome  of  what  had  been 
accomplished  by  this  army,  the  order  of  General 
Thomas  dated  September  9,  1864,  and  written  in 
Atlanta,  is  given  : 

"  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBER 
LAND  :  The  major  general  commanding,  with  pride 
and  pleasure  congratulates  you  upon  the  fact  that 
your  achievements  during  the  campaign  which  has 
just  closed,  in  connection  with  those  of  the  armies 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Ohio,  have  received  such  dis 
tinguished  marks  of  appreciation  as  the  thanks  of 
the  President  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  major 
general  commanding  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi. 

"  Your  commander  now  desires  to  add  his  own 
thanks  to  those  you  have  already  received,  for  the 
tenacity  of  purpose,  unmurmuring  endurance,  cheer 
ful  obedience,  brilliant  heroism,  and  all  those  high 
qualities  which  you  have  displayed  to  an  eminent 
degree  in  attacking  and  defeating  the  cohorts  of 
treason,  driving  them  from  position  after  position, 
each  of  their  own  choosing,  cutting  their  communi 
cations,  and  in  harassing  their  flanks  and  rear,  dur- 


226  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ing  the  many  marches,  battles,  and  sieges  of  this 
long  and  eventful  campaign. 

"  It  is  impossible,  within  the  limits  of  an  order 
like  this,  to  enumerate  the  many  instances  in  which 
your  gallantry  has  been  conspicuous,  but  among 
them  may  be  mentioned  the  actions  of  Rocky  Face 
Mountain  and  before  Dalton,  fought  between  the 
8th  and  i3th  of  May  ;  of  Resaca,  on  the  i4th  and 
i5th ;  of  Adairsville,  on  the  iyth;  of  New  Hope 
Church,  on  the  25th  of  the  same  month ;  of  Gulp's 
Farm,  June  22d;  Peach  Tree  Creek,  July  2oth  ;  and 
the  crowning  one  of  Jonesboro,  fought  September 
ist,  which  secured  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Atlanta, 
the  goal  for  which  we  set  out  more  than  four  months 
ago,  and  furnished  a  brilliant  termination  to  your 
struggles  for  that  long  period. 

"  Let  these  successes  encourage  you  to  the  con 
tinued  exercise  of  those  same  high  qualities,  and  to 
renewed  exertions  in  the  cause  of  our  country  and 
humanity,  when  you  shall  again  be  called  upon  to 
meet  the  foe ;  and  be  assured  the  time  is  not  far  dis 
tant  when  your  prowess  will  conquer  what  territory 
now  remains  within  the  circumscribed  limits  of  the  re 
bellion.  A  few  more  fields  like  those  whose  names 
now  crowd  your  standards,  and  we  can  dictate  the 
terms  of  a  peace  alike  honorable  to  yourselves  and 
our  country.  You  can  then  retire  to  your  homes 
amid  the  plaudits  of  your  friends,  and  with  the  proud 
consciousness  that  you  have  deserved  well  of  the 
country.  Our  rejoicings  are  not  unmixed  with  a 
proud  regret  for  our  brave  comrades  who  have  fallen. 
Their  graves  mark  the  spots  where  they  went  down 
amid  the  din  and  roar  of  battle,  dotting  every  fjeld 
and  hillside,  or  lying  beneath  the  spreading  boughs 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 


227 


of  the  forest  along  our  route ;  they  will  in  future 
days  serve  like  finger-boards  to  point  out  to  the  trav 
eler  the  march  of  your  victorious  columns.     Those 
silent  mounds  appeal  to  us  to  remain  true  to  our 
selves  and  the  country,  and  so  to  discharge  the  high 
duty  devolving  upon  us  that  their  lives,  which  they 
so  freely  offered  up,  may  not  prove  a  useless  sacrifice. 
"By  command  of  Major-General  Thomas. 
"WILLIAM  D.  WHIPPLE, 

"  Assistant  Adjutant  General." 

A  few  words  may  be  aptly  quoted  to  complete 
the  modest  recital.  In  the  opinion  of  Van  Home : 
"  In  this  campaign  General  Thomas  approved  of  no 
movement  which  was  a  failure  ;  he  disapproved  of 
none  which  was  a  success;  and  whenever  his  advice 
was  rejected,  the  outcome  proved  that  his  plan  would 
have  met  with  every  condition  of  success." 

By  an  order  of  General  Sherman  dated  May  4th, 
measures  were  taken  without  loss  of  time  to  circum 
vent  the  enemy  in  his  manifest  intention  to  force 
Sherman  out  of  Georgia  by  falling  upon  his  commu 
nications,  and  by  a  counter  movement  to  run  a  race 
with  him  to  the  line  of  the  Ohio.  Thomas  was  di 
rected  to  occupy  Chattanooga  with  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  while  the  armies  of  the  Ohio  and  the 
Tennessee  were  directed  to  move  in  concert  and 
cover  his  rear. 

Whatever  plans  were  now  to  be  proposed,  one 
thing  was  certain,  and  that  was,  that  although  Atlanta 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  Union  troops,  the  Confeder- 
16 


228  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ate  army  was  still  in  existence,  active  and  defiant, 
under  a  dashing  leader,  to  whom  success  was  an  ab 
solute  necessity,  without  which  he  would  join  the  list 
of  superseded  generals  who  had  been  unable  to  stem 
the  tide  of  Federal  invasion. 

It  is  curious  to  observe  at  this  time  that  while 
Hood  thought  Sherman  to  be  in  retreat,  Sherman 
believed  Hood  to  be  retiring.  He  was  soon  unde 
ceived,  however.  On  the  2oth  of  September  Hood 
moved  from  Lovejoy  Station,  following  on  the  heels 
of  Thomas,  and  on  the  2Qth  he  crossed  the  Chatta- 
hoochee.  It  almost  seemed  that  Thomas  was  run 
ning  away  from  him  ;  the  two  armies  were  traversing 
the  same  ground  as  in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  but  in 
inverse  order.  This  was  permitted  by  Sherman,  how 
ever,  while  he  was  perfecting  his  plans  for  again 
marching  southward.  Two  points  he  must  hold  in 
tact — Atlanta  and  Chattanooga. 

It  must  be  conceded  that  at  this  time  Hood  ex 
hibited  his  best  skill  as  a  general,  but  his  success  was 
extremely  evanescent.  He  was  indeed  operating  be 
tween  Sherman  and  his  base,  and  captured  a  number 
of  towns  between  these  two  cities,  among  which  the 
most  important  was  Dalton.  At  this  time  his  great 
need  was  men,  and  his  main  hope  was  that  he  might 
receive  large  re-enforcements  from  the  trans-Missis 
sippi,  with  which  he  could  make  a  successful  invasion 
of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  This  hope  was  not 
destined  to  be  realized,  although  it  constantly  lured 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN.  229 

him  on,  even  to  the  wildly  rash  attack  upon  Thomas 
at  Nashville. 

It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  dwell 
upon  the  great  diversity  of  operations  on  this  field 
during  the  month  of  October,  1864.  On  the  2yth 
Hood  laid  siege  to  Decatur,  but  so  terrible  was  the 
artillery  fire  of  the  Union  garrison  and  so  vigorous 
the  resistance  that  he  abandoned  the  attempt  on  the 
29th.  He  seems  up  to  this  time  to  have  been  en 
tirely  ignorant  of  the  scheme  which  was  ripening  in 
the  brain  of  Sherman,  and  he  thought  that  by  a  rapid 
movement  he  could  turn  the  Union  flank  and  move 
successfully  northward. 

When  Sherman  was  about  to  start  on  his  famous 
march,  and  Thomas  had  received  his  instructions  to 
fall  back  rapidly  toward  Nashville  and  there  put 
himself  in  condition  for  a  new  advance,  Hood  deter 
mined  to  leave  Sherman  and  abandon  Georgia,  not, 
however,  dreaming  of  the  march  to  the  sea;  and  to 
follow  Thomas  at  top  speed,  constantly  threatening 
his  flank  and  rear,  to  overtake  his  army,  compel  it  to 
fight,  and  destroy  it.  This  done,  he  could  march  tri 
umphantly  to  the  line  of  the  Ohio,  and,  being  largely 
re-enforced  by  an  enthusiastic  uprising  on  his  line  of 
march,  he  would  threaten  and  perhaps  accomplish  a 
Northern  invasion  which  would  give  essential  aid  to 
General  Lee  in  his  defense  of  Richmond,  and  put  an 
entirely  new  face  upon  the  whole  theater  of  war.  It 
should  also  be  observed  as  of  practical  importance 


230  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

that  the  task  of  Hood  was  made  easier  by  the  un 
commonly  low  water  in  the  Tennessee,  which  pre 
vented  the  gunboats  from  doing  their  share  of  the 
great  work. 

These  general  remarks  will  prepare  us  to  enter 
upon  the  brilliant  double  campaign  which  was  now 
imminent.  Indeed,  up  to  this  very  moment  when 
Hood  was  between  Sherman  and  Thomas,  and  be 
fore  the  scheme  which  had  been  excogitated  had 
been  made  patent  to  the  world,  according  to  the 
simile  of  Napoleon,  "  the  chess  board  was  very  much 
befogged." 

Hood's  manifest  difficulty  would  be  the  want  of 
numbers;  and  although  Jefferson  Davis,  after  ac 
knowledging  that  he  had  depleted  the  other  armies 
to  the  greatest  extent,  still  hoped  that  recruits  would 
gather  in  his  train,  every  day  proved  that  it  would 
be  a  vain  hope. 

On  the  other  hand,  while  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  Sherman  gave  Thomas  his  fair  proportion 
of  that  army  for  the  work  which  lay  before  him,  and 
while  even  that  proportion  was  to  some  extent  hy 
pothetical,  made  up  of  garrisons  and  small  detach 
ments  all  over  the  ground  on  which  he  moved,  and 
while  still  further  it  must  be  acknowledged  that 
everything  was  to  be  experimental,  yet  it  soon  be 
came  clear  that  Thomas's  force  would  increase 
rapidly  as  he  retired  and  outnumber  Hood  when  he 
should  make  his  grand  stand  and  deliver  battle. 


THE   ATLANTA   CAMPAIGN. 


23I 


Just  before  we  reach  the  time  when  the  division 
between  the  two  Union  commanders  was  to  be  made 
it  may  be  well  to  stop  and  cast  a  glance  upon  the 
position  "and  composition  of  the  Union  forces  under 
Thomas.  He  had  the  Fourth  Corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  two  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  Corps 
of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
and  the  Twenty-third  Corps.  With  these  should  be 
enumerated  the  widely  scattered  forces  of  recruits 
and  convalescents  which  Sherman  had  left  behind 
for  him  to  gather  up,  and  such  forces  as  might  join 
him  from  the  North.  The  Fourth  Corps  was  com 
manded  by  General  Stanley,  the  Twenty-third  by 
General  Schofield,  the  divisions  of  the  Sixteenth  by 
General  Andrew  J.  Smith,  and  all  the  cavalry  by 
General  James  H.  Wilson. 

All  this  looked  very  well  on  paper,  but  the  dif 
ferent  commands  were  scattered,  and  it  would  re 
quire  time  and  assiduity  to  unite  them.  Van  Home 
says — and  he  speaks  for  General  Thomas — that  had 
the  Fourteenth  Corps  been  given  to  Thomas  instead 
of  the  Twenty-third,  he  would  have  had  five  thousand 
more  men,  and  the  unpleasant  questions  with  regard 
to  rank  as  between  Schofield  and  Stanley  would 
have  been  avoided. 

It  seems  now  that  Sherman  could  have  treated 
Thomas  a  little  more  generously.  He  set  him  a  Her 
culean  task  to  perform,  and  scarcely  force  enough 
with  which  to  do  it.  Thus  it  is  that  the  reader  of 


232  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

the  campaign  of  Nashville  should  be  prepared  be 
forehand  to  understand  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
Thomas,  his  inadequate  numbers,  his  scattered  divi 
sions,  the  heterogeneous  nature  of  his  troops,  his  un 
mounted  cavalry,  his  solicitude  as  to  supplies,  and 
the  very  grave  character  of  the  issues  dependent  upon 
his  action.  And  with  this  foreknowledge  he  will 
not  limit  his  judgment  of  Thomas's  great  merits  to 
the  splendid  sortie  at  Nashville,  but  will  observe  his 
careful,  difficult,  and  excellent  dispositions  in  spite 
of  numerous  obstacles  from  the  moment  his  com 
munications  were  cut  with  General  Sherman,  and  he 
found  himself  for  the  first  time  since  Mill  Springs, 
and  on  a  far  grander  field,  an  entirely  independent 
commander. 

We  may  pause  for  a  moment  to  catch  a  glimpse 
of  his  personality  at  this  time.  The  following  anec 
dote  is  told  by  Sherman  :  He  saw  one  of  his  men 
roasting  ears  of  corn,  and  stopped  to  talk  to  him. 
"  What  are  you  doing  ?  "  he  said.  "  Why,  general, 
I  am  laying  in  a  supply  of  provisions."  Thomas, 
always  anxious  about  supplies,  rejoined,  "That  is 
right,  my  man,  but  don't  waste  your  provisions."  As 
he  turned  away  the  man  murmured,  "  There  goes  the 
old  man,  economizing  as  usual." 


CHAPTER   XI. 

ON    TO    NASHVILLE. FRANKLIN. 

Doubts  as  to  the  movement  of  Hood — Sherman's  march  to  the 
sea — Who  first  proposed  this  scheme  ? — Thomas  and  Hood 
compared — Hood's  hopes  of  re-enforcement  vain — Without  it 
his  movement  very  rash — Opinions  of  Sherman  and  Grant — 
Thomas's  force  increases  to  about  fifty  thousand — Hood's 
about  the  same — Nashville  the  objective  point  for  both — Co 
lumbia  and  Spring  Hill — Schofield  at  Franklin — The  battle 
— Opdycke's  gallant  charge — Schofield  eludes  Hood  and  joins 
Thomas — Hood's  criticism  of  Franklin — He  invests  Nashville 
on  December  2d — Description  of  the  field — Urgency  from 
Washington — Halleck,  Grant,  Stanton  —  Thomas  will  not 
move  until  ready. 

DISPATCHES  from  General  Grant  at  this  time 
show  his  concern  at  first  on  account  of  the  erratic 
but  brilliant  movements  of  Hood,  which  did  not  yet 
disclose  his  final  purpose,  because  that  depended  to 
some  extent  on  the  Federal  plans  and  movements  not 
yet  made  manifest.  This  concern  was  shared  by  the 
entire  North.  It  seemed  still  doubtful  what  Hood 
meant,  and  it  was  feared  that  large  numbers  would 
flock  to  his  standard,  re-enforcing  him  so  greatly 
that  he  could  afford  to  let  Sherman  go  and  rush 
torrent-like  upon  Tennessee.  It  was  very  soon  after 
the  capture  of  Atlanta  that  the  new  scheme  had  been 


234  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

devised — to  which  all  movements  now  were  tending 
— for  dividing  the  army  of  Sherman,  one  part  of  which 
was  to  be  employed  in  the  famous  march  through 
Georgia  to  the  sea,  while  the  other  should  take  care 
of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  and  the  line  of  the  Ohio  : 
and  this  was  to  be  confided  to  Thomas.  Between  the 
two,  with  the  choice  which  he  would  attack  and  im 
pede,  was  Hood,  but  without  regard  to  his  decision 
the  Union  plan  was  in  process  of  arrangement,  in 
consonance  with  the  campaign  of  Grant  in  Virginia, 
and  indeed  with  all  parts  of  the  great  field. 

Thus,  on  the  grand  chessboard  of  the  war  Grant 
would  hold  Lee  in  check  at  Richmond,  and  either 
capture  him  there  or  force  his  evacuation  of  that 
capital,  with  the  certainty  of  capturing  him  or  de 
stroying  him  afterward  ;  Sherman  with  a  large  army 
would  march  through  Georgia  and  strike  for  the  sea- 
coast  ;  while  Thomas,  placed  in  temporary  command 
of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  in  succes 
sion  to  Sherman,  with  the  remnant  of  the  force  left 
by  Sherman,  consisting  at  first  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
and  the  surrounding  garrisons,  but  afterward  re- 
enforced  by  the  Twenty-third  Corps  under  Schofield, 
and  the  cavalry,  mounted  and  dismounted,  under  Wil 
son,  would  hasten  to  Nashville  to  defend  the  frontier 
of  Kentucky,  and  there  await  the  coming  of  the  ene 
my  if  he  should  be  rash  enough  to  follow  him ;  and 
put  an  end  at  once  to  his  schemes  and  his  hopes. 

It  seems  unwise  and  unnecessary  to   moot  the 


ON    TO   NASHVILLE.  235 

question  who  conceived  this  plan.  There  is  no  such 
great  originality  and  merit  about  the  conception, 
in  our  judgment,  as  to  make  it  worth  the  contro 
versy.  The  champions  of  Grant  ascribe  it  to  him, 
at  least  in  first  suggestion.  Those  of  Sherman  de 
clare  that  he  was  the  originator  of  the  scheme,  and 
had  been  turning  it  over  in  his  mind  long  before  it 
was  accepted  and  arranged.  Sherman  says  in  refer 
ence  to  a  letter  of  Thomas,  written  October  17,  1864, 
"At  that  date  neither  General  Grant  nor  General 
Thomas  favored  any  proposed  plan  of  campaign." 
The  admirers  of  General  Thomas  have  also  given 
him  credit  for  this  proposed  arrangement  of  the 
campaign,  at  least  in  the  rough  plan.  This  he  never 
claimed,  however.  In  the  striking  of  balances  Sher 
man  probably  deserves  the  credit  of  proposing  the 
scheme,  which  is  at  once  merged  into  his  greater 
achievement ;  and,  after  all,  it  would  seem  patent 
enough  to  suggest  itself  to  most  minds.  It  was 
manifest  that  Sherman  must  either  join  Grant  or 
debouche  somewhere  on  the  coast.  Grant  did  not 
want  him.  The  Confederate  army  under  Hood  did 
not  need  so  large  a  force  as  Sherman's  entire  army 
to  oppose  it.  His  conclusion  as  to  the  exact  route 
was  logical  from  these  premises.  His  march  to  the 
South  would  demonstrate  the  true  condition  of  things 
in  the  Southeast,  already  suspected :  the  lack  of  troops 
and  resources,  the  waning  enthusiasm — "  the  begin 
ning  of  the  end." 


236  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

What  Hood  would  do  was,  as  we  have  seen,  for 
some  time  a  question.  Would  he  seek  to  cut  Sher 
man's  Northern  communications  ?  Sherman  was 
already  planning  to  abandon  them,  holding  on,  how 
ever,  to  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta.  Would  he  try  to 
impede  his  march  southward  ?  Sherman  could  beat 
him  at  that  game  with  excess  of  numbers ;  and,  if  he 
did  try  it,  General  Thomas  was  on  his  flank,  a  real 
thorn  in  his  side. 

It  was  soon  evident  that,  considering  Thomas  the 
easier  prey,  he  would  leave  Sherman  and  march  after 
Thomas  at  once,  follow  close  on  his  tracks,  bring 
him  to  bay  before  he  could  reach  Nashville  or  con 
centrate  his  forces,  gain  his  rear,  scatter  his  army, 
press  at  once  across  Kentucky  into  Ohio,  and  thus 
make  a  tremendous  diversion  in  favor  of  Lee  at 
Richmond  while  Sherman  was  marching  southward 
and  could  render  no  assistance. 

Let  Sherman  take  Savannah  if  he  could ;  there 
was  a  splendid  chance  for  the  Confederacy.  If  Hood 
could  only  turn  the  tables  and  annihilate  Thomas, 
it  would  be  giving  a  Roland  for  an  Oliver.  One 
thing  is  certain:  as  late  as  November  ist  Grant  was 
still  in  doubt  even  as  to  the  propriety  of  the  move 
ment.  He  could  not  indeed  know  the  situation  as 
well  as  Sherman,  who  was  on  the  ground,  but  he 
wrote  to  Sherman  at  that  date:  ".If  you  can  see  the 
chance  for  destroying  Hood's  army,  attend  to  that 
first,  and  make  your  other  movements  secondary." 


ON    TO   NASHVILLE. 


237 


The  answer  of  Sherman  was  prompt  and  enthusi 
astic  :  "  We  have  now  ample  supplies  at  Chatta 
nooga  and  at  Atlanta  to  stand  a  month's  interrup 
tion  to  our  communications,  and  I  don't  believe  the 
Confederate  army  can  reach  our  lines  save  by 
cavalry  raids;  and  Wilson  will  have  cavalry  enough 
to  checkmate  that.  I  am  clearly  of  the  opinion  that 
the  best  results  will  follow  me  in  my  contemplated 
movement  through  Georgia."  The  next  day  Grant 
gave  his  permission. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  destitution,  in  a  military 
point  of  view,  of  the  country  through  which  Sherman 
was  to  march.  It  was  one  of  Hood's  blunders  to 
permit  such  a  disclosure ;  he  does  not  seem  to  have 
thought  of  it,  and  we  now  wonder  that  the  Confed 
erate  authorities  did  not  direct  him  to  obstruct  Sher 
man's  march  to  the  utmost.  The  destitution  was 
chiefly  in  troops;  Sherman  seems  to  have  found 
abundance  of  supplies. 

The  following  order  issued  by  General  Sherman 
on  the  26th  of  October,  1864,  clearly  sets  forth  the 
powers  of  General  Thomas  after  his  separation  from 
Sherman  : 

"  HEADQUARTERS,  MILITARY  DIVISION  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
"!N  THE  FIELD,  GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  October  26,  1864. 

"  In  the  event  of  military  movements  or  the 
accidents  of  war  separating  the  general  in  command 
from  his  military  division,  Major-General  George  H. 
Thomas,  commanding  the  Department  of  the  Cum- 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 

berland,  will  exercise  command  over  all  troops  and 
garrisons  not  absolutely  in  the  presence  of  the  gen 
eral  in  chief.  The  commanding  generals  of  the  de 
partments  and  armies  of  the  Ohio  and  Tennessee,  will 
forthwith  send  abstracts  of  their  returns  to  General 
Thomas  at  Nashville,  in  order  that  he  may  under 
stand  the  position  and  distribution  of  troops;  and 
General  Thomas  may  call  for  such  further  reports 
as  he  may  require,  disturbing  the  actual  condition 
of  affairs  and  mixing  up  the  troops  of  separate  de 
partments  as  little  as  possible,  consistent  with  the 
interests  of  the  service." 

We  may  pause  for  a  moment  just  here  to  con 
sider  the  two  men  now  to  be  pitted  against  each 
other — Thomas  and  Hood.  They  were  both  splen 
did  soldiers,  but  were,  however,  otherwise  in  great 
and  striking  contrast.  Thomas,  characterized  by 
Sherman  as  "  the  man  best  qualified  to  manage  the 
affairs  of  Tennessee  and  North  Mississippi,"  was 
cool-headed,  cautious,  careful,  valiant,  and  tenacious 
of  purpose,  when  once  his  purpose  was  settled ; 
forecasting  and  considering  everything,  leaving 
nothing  to  chance,  as  far  as  it  was  possible  to 
eliminate  chance  from  military  operations. 

Hood  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point  in  McPher- 
son's  class,  large  of  frame,  full  of  vigor  and  impulse, 
a  manly  and  dashing  soldier,  industrious  and  ener 
getic,  a  soldier  by  intuition  as  well  as  by  profession ; 
enthusiastic  and  impulsive  ;  brave  to  a  fault ;  having 
lost  an  arm  and  leg  in  the  forefront  of  battle,  the 


ON    TO    NASHVILLE.  239 

one  at  Gettysburg  and  the  other  at  Chickamauga ; 
inconsiderate,  ready  to  risk  all  his  other  members 
and  his  life  on  similar  conditions. 

Sanguine  by  temperament,  and  trusting  his  sub 
ordinates,  sometimes  foolishly,  he  hoped  to  recruit 
his  rather  inadequate  force  by  an  enthusiastic  rising 
of  the  people  at  his  call  as  he  marched.  They 
would  certainly  rally  to  his  standard  if  they  shared 
his  hopes.  In  this  he  was  to  be  sadly  mistaken. 
The  Confederate  enthusiasm  was  now  rapidly  wan 
ing.  The  people  did  not  join  him  in  what  now 
really  appeared  to  be  the  losing  cause.  The  region 
of  the  farther  South  was  itself  clamoring  for  troops. 
Like  boasting  Glendower  in  the  drama,  the  Confed 
erate  Government  could  "call  spirits  from  the  vasty 
deep,"  but  they  would  no  longer  come. 

When  his  eyes  were  opened  to  this  state  of 
things  Hood  had  already  cast  all  upon  the  hazard 
of  the  die,  and  it  was  no  time  for  him  to  change  his 
purpose.  His  great,  his  last  hope  was,  by  forced 
marches  to  get  in  rear  of  Thomas  before  he  could 
reach  Nashville,  to  bring  him  to  a  stand,  and  to 
rout  his  army.  "  These  convictions,"  he  says, 
u  counterbalanced  my  regret  that  Sherman  was  per 
mitted  to  traverse  Georgia  unopposed,  as  he  himself 
admits."  And  again,  "Had  I  not  made  the  move 
ment,  I  am  fully  persuaded  that  Sherman  would 
have  been  upon  General  Lee's  communications  in 
October  instead  of  at  this  time." 


240 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


While  Thomas  was  gathering  together  the  dis 
jecta  membra  of  his  command,  we  shall  see  that  from 
first  to  last  Hood's  great  difficulty  was  to  be  want 
of  numbers;  he  lacked  weight ;  but  he  still  hoped 
against  hope. 

All  this  seems  logical  enough,  but  the  military 
critic  dissents  from  his  judgment ;  and  that  this  is 
not  an  opinion  after  the  facts  is  proved  by  the  con 
current  views  of  Sherman  and  Grant,  both  of  whom 
were  disposed  to  do  justice  to  his  real  merits.  Sher 
man's  opinion  of  these  movements  is  not  very  flatter 
ing  to  Hood.  In  speaking  generally  of  his  rashness, 
and  prior  to  his  final  movement,  he  says :  "  I  did  not 
suppose  that  General  Hood,  though  rash,  would  ven 
ture  to  attack  fortified  places  like  Allatoona,  Resaca, 
Decatur,  and  Nashville ;  but  he  did  so,  and  in  so 
doing  played  into  our  hands  perfectly."  General 
Grant  is  equally  outspoken,  and  more  directly  to  the 
point  at  issue.  He  says :  "  Hood,  instead  of  fol 
lowing  Sherman,  continued  his  move  northward, 
which  seemed  to  me  to  be  leading  to  his  certain 
doom.  At  all  events,  had  I  had  the  power  to  com 
mand  both  armies,  I  should  not  have  changed  the 
orders  under  which  he  seemed  to  be  acting." 

It  is  worthy  of  consideration  whether,  if  Hood 
had  followed  Sherman  and  constantly  harassed  his 
rear,  while  Hardee,  with  his  fifteen  or  twenty  thou 
sand  men,  had  come  rapidly  up  to  meet  him  and 
thus  retard  his  advance,  and  then  if  there  had  been 


ON    TO    NASHVILLE. 


241 


a  rising  in  Hood's  favor,  the  result  might  have  been 
different,  not  in  the  long  run  but  for  the  time  being. 

So  much  in  brief  as  to  Sherman  and  his  plans. 

It  now  rested  with  Thomas,  the  separation  hav 
ing  been  made,  to  demonstrate  the  justness  of  these 
views  by  retiring  slowly,  gathering  his  command 
together,  resisting  Hood's  advance,  luring  him  on  to 
Nashville,  and,  when  perfectly  ready,  turning  upon 
him  and  driving  his  beaten  army  scattered  through 
the  Southern  territory,  never  to  be  again  consoli 
dated  into  a  fighting  force  of  any  importance. 
Could  he  do  these  things?  On  November  12,  1864, 
the  last  Hnk  of  telegraphic  communication  between 
Sherman  and  Thomas  was  broken.  It  was  the  first 
and  only  time  since  Mill  Springs  that  the  latter 
found  himself  in  supreme  control  at  the  head  of  an 
army,  albeit  the  parts  of  it  were  widely  scattered ;  it 
was  his  grand  opportunity,  and  he  seized  it  with 
great  discretion  and  skill.  His  first  thought  was 
duty ;  his  second,  his  reputation  as  a  general. 

Thomas's  command  now  consisted  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  comprising  three  divisions,  commanded  at 
first  by  General  Stanley  and  afterward,  when  Stan 
ley  was  disabled,  by  General  Thomas  J.  Wood  ;  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  under  Schofield,  which  was  to 
join  him  at  once  ;  and,  more  fortunate  than  Hood, 
he  was  to  receive  large  re-enforcements  from  various 
points.  Among  them  was  a  force,  under  General 
Washburne,  of  forty-five  hundred  troops,  new  regi- 


242  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ments  sent  forward  to  replace  the  old  whose  term 
of  service  had  expired,  and  of  men  who  had  gone 
North  to  vote.  On  October  i3th  Halleck  had  in 
formed  him  that  two  old  regiments  and  several 
new  ones  were  to  report  to  him  at  Nashville. 
General  A.  J.  Smith  joined  him  later  with  a  large 
detachment  from  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  con 
sisting  of  three  divisions  under  Generals  John  Mc- 
Arthur  and  Kenner  Garrard  and  Colonel  Jonathan  B. 
Moore;  and  there  were  several  thousand  convales 
cents  fit  for  garrison  duty  who  would  occupy  the 
lines  at  Nashville  and  leave  the  well  troops  free  to 
act.  There  was  also  a  force  of  twelve  thousand 
cavalry  under  General  James  H.  Wilson,  with  com 
petent  division  commanders;  but  most  of  them  were 
yet  unprovided  with  horses,  having  become  dis 
mounted  by  the  hard  and  destructive  service  in 
which  they  were  engaged.  These  made  in  all,  but 
not  yet  concentrated,  about  fifty-six  thousand  men. 
He  had  discharged  fifteen  thousand  unfit  for  service 
or  whose  time  had  expired. 

Hood,  as  we  have  seen,  had  not  received  the  re- 
enforcements  he  expected  ;  and,  with  his  army  not 
much  larger  than  that  of  Thomas,  it  might  have 
seemed  rash  for  him  to  follow  Thomas  to  Nashville, 
and  even  risk  the  chance  of  being  turned  upon  before 
reaching  it ;  but  at  that  time  Thomas's  forces  were 
yet  too  widely  scattered  to  make  it  as  dangerous  as 
it  at  first  sight  appeared.  Had  Hood  moved  earlier, 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE. 


243 


his  chances  of  success  would  have  been  greater  ; 
but  he  was  delayed  more  than  a  month,  waiting  for 
necessary  supplies. 

The  army  of  Hood  was  arranged  in  three  corps, 
commanded  respectively  by  Generals  Lee,  Cheatham, 
and  Stewart,  each  containing  three  divisions.  It 
numbered  from  forty  thousand  to  forty-five  thou 
sand  infantry,  to  which  must  be  added  a  cavalry 
corps  of  from  ten  thousand  to  fifteen  thousand  men, 
all  in  excellent  condition,  the  latter  commanded  by 
General  Forrest,  one  of  the  most  brilliant  cavalry 
generals  developed  on  either  side  during  the  war. 
It  was  evident  that  Hood's  policy  was  to  beat 
Thomas's  force  by  detachments  and  before  they 
could  be  united  into  a  strong  whole. 

The  strategy  of  the  campaign  was  simple  in 
extreme,  but  the  grand  tactics  were  changing  an 
kaleidoscopic  to  a  remarkable  degree. 

Nashville  was  the  supremely  important  point  for 
both  armies.  For  Thomas,  Nashville  was  a  place 
already  occupied  and  strongly  fortified  in  order  to 
protect  the  line  of  the  Ohio  ;  in  which  to  recruit,  re 
organize,  and  plan,  and  from  which  to  attack  the 
advancing  enemy.  It  constituted  his  strong  base  of 
operations.  For  Hood  it  was  the  Union  stronghold 
to  be  captured  after  cutting  Thomas's  re-enforce 
ments  off  from  his  line  of  retreat  ;  and  if  he  could 
destroy  the  Federal  army  and  occupy  Nashville,  it 
was  to  be  a  point  from  which  to  invade  the  North 
17 


244  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

and  make  a  grand  diversion  in  favor  of  General  Lee 
at  Richmond. 

Thomas  had  marched  with  a  portion  of  the 
Fourth  Corps,  and  had  entered  Nashville  on  Octo 
ber  3,  1864;  and  from  that  as  a  point  of  observation 
he  took  command  of  all  the  troops  and  operations 
in  Tennessee.  His  first  thought  had  been  to  de 
fend  the  line  of  Duck  River  and  the  Chattanooga 
and  Nashville  Railroad,  but  the  enemy  was  so  close 
at  his  heels  that  the  scheme  was  abandoned,  and  the 
determination  made  to  strengthen  the  intrenchments 
at  Nashville,  which  were  already  strong,  and  await 
Hood's  arrival.  The  preliminary  movements  had 
now  begun.  Hood  had  crossed  the  Chattahoochee 
on  the  5th  of  October,  and  was  waiting  for  supplies 
and  preparing  to  manifest  his  purpose  ;  and  on  the 
29th  of  October  he  made  a  feint  toward  Decatur, 
and  crossed  the  Tennessee  with  a  portion  of  his 
army.  In  the  meantime,  after  Hood  began  his 
movement,  everything  was  done  by  the  Union  army 
to  hinder  his  advance.  The  roads  were  obstructed 
by  felled  timber,  and  his  march  was  impeded  by  par 
tial  attacks,  mainly  by  the  cavalry,  and  thus,  notwith 
standing  the  apparent  vigor  of  his  movements,  his 
whole  force  was  not  across  until  November  Qth,  and 
the  concerted  movement  made ;  he  took  eleven  days 
to  accomplish  what  might  have  been  done  in  three. 
On  October  3oth  the  Twenty-third  Corps  had  be 
gun  its  march  to  join  Thomas  at  Nashville,  and 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  24$ 

Hood  followed  in  what  proved  to  be  a  very  rapid 
pursuit,  with  the  purpose  of  cutting  that  corps  off 
from  Columbia.  The  Union  troops  had  been  scat 
tered  throughout  that  region,  but  were  soon  collect 
ed  together  under  Schofield,  and  were  directed  to 
fall  back,  until  Thomas  could  unite  A.  J.  Smith's 
corps  with  Steedman  and  Granger,  and  push  them  to 
the  front.  Smith's  delay  and  General  Hood's  rapid 
advance  were  the  cause  of  the  stop  at  Franklin,  and 
the  ultimate  concentration,  as  we  shall  presently  see, 
at  Nashville. 

When  Schofield  arrived  at  Franklin  he  stopped  to 
await  the  instructions  of  Thomas,  who  would  either 
largely  re-enforce  him  and  fight  there,  or  order  him 
to  fall  back  upon  Nashville.  Thomas  was,  as  has 
been  said,  already  settled  in  the  latter  plan,  while 
Grant  from  City  Point  was  urging  him  to  move  for 
ward  and  meet  Hood.  This  was  due  to  a  want  of 
knowledge  of  the  situation.  The  route  was  along 
the  railroad  by  Columbia  and  Spring  Hill  to  Frank 
lin.  It  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to 
give  in  detail  the  maneuvers  and  partial  actions  in 
cluded  in  this  movement  toward  Nashville.  The 
danger  was  becoming  greater  every  moment  that 
Schofield  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  a  few  ad 
ditional  troops,  would  have  his  communications  with 
Nashville  cut. 

The  peril,  which  might  have  been  avoided  by 
greater  promptitude,  was  indeed  extreme,  and  was 


246  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

only  averted  by  good  fortune  and  the  bad  general 
ship  of  Hood's  lieutenants.  General  Hatch  made 
a  partial  diversion  at  Lexington,  but  the  Confed 
erate  advance  could  not  be  checked  there.  Stan 
ley,  by  a  rapid  march,  reached  Columbia,  where  he 
was  engaged  by  the  enemy,  and  although  intrench- 
ments  were  thrown  up,  it  was  not  thought  possible 
to  hold  the  line  of  Duck  River,  as  the  enemy's  in 
tention  to  turn  the  position  became  manifest,  and  his 
superior  numbers  made  it  appear  feasible.  Perhaps 
the  delay  of  twenty-four  hours  at  Columbia,  which 
now  seems  to  have  been  unfortunate,  imperiled  the 
army,  and  made  the  escape  from  Spring  Hill  and  the 
desperate  fighting  at  Franklin  necessary. 

After  three  days'  stay  at  Columbia,  while  Hood's 
column  was  crossing  Duck  River  above  him,  Scho- 
field  marched  to  Spring  Hill,  the  enemy  relentlessly 
following.  It  was  a  race  to  Spring  Hill,  Stanley 
arriving  only  two  hours  before  Hood.  Here  the 
purpose  of  Hood  was  again  manifest — to  envelop 
and  destroy  the  Federal  army  at  that  point. 
Through  want  of  energy  and  clear  intelligence  on 
the  part  of  General  Cheatham,  Hood's  opportunity 
was  there  lost.  That  general  failed  to  throw  his 
corps  across  the  turnpike,  facing  south,  which  he  had 
ample  time  to  do  before  the  head  of  Schofield's  col 
umn  arrived  there,  and  when  an  attack  would  have 
been  entirely  disastrous  to  Schofield's  force.  Mak 
ing  a  show  of  resistance,  Schofield  availed  himself 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE. 


247 


of  the  darkness  and  withdrew  to  Franklin,  under 
the  very  guns  and  within  sound  of  the  voices  of  the 
enemy.  He  reached  it  with  the  head  of  the  column 
before  dawn.  "  Never,"  says  Van  Home,  "  has  an 
army  escaped  so  easily  from  a  peril  so  threatening." 
The  situation  at  Franklin  was  not  the  most  desir 
able,  but  it  was  all  that  Schofield  could  make  it. 
With  both  flanks  posted  on  the  Harpeth  River,  Scho- 
field's  forces  occupied  the  old  intrenchments  there, 
under  the  personal  supervision  of  General  J.  D.  Cox, 
and  batteries  were  well  posted  on  both  sides  of  the 
river  to  repel  the  assaults  in  front  and  flank.  There 
he  received  orders  from  Thomas  to  fall  back.  It 
was  now  evidently  the  object  to  retard  Hood's 
march  while  Thomas  was  making  his  plans,  organ 
izing  his  re-enforcements,  and  strengthening  his  in 
trenchments  at  Nashville.  Franklin  is  twenty-seven 
miles  from  Columbia,  but  only  eighteen  miles  from 
Nashville.  The  opportune  moment  for  Hood  had 
passed  when  Schofield  had  been  permitted  to  pass 
by  Spring  Hill  without  being  attacked.  He  hoped 
to  find  another  chance  at  Franklin,  for  it  was  a 
doubtful  question  whether  Schofield  could  with 
draw  from  Franklin ;  certainly  not  without  fighting. 
Franklin  is  a  small  town  on  the  southern  bank  of  the 
Harpeth,  lying  in  a  bend  of  the  river,  and  forming  a 
station  of  the  Nashville  and  Decatur  Railroad. 
Schofield  had  about  seventeen  thousand  men,  includ 
ing  six  thousand  cavalry  under  Wilson.  Hood  had 


248  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

followed  so  closely  that  Schofield  could  not  at  once 
get  all  his  troops  across,  which  was  his  first  inten 
tion.  He  was  obliged,  therefore,  to  face  the  enemy 
and  repel  him.  He  repaired  the  railroad  bridge  and 
constructed  a  foot  bridge,  and  awaited,  not  without 
great  concern,  the  attack  of  Hood,  which  he  must  re 
ceive  and  paralyze  before  he  could  retreat.  He  had 
sent  the  Third  Division  of  the  Fourth  Corps  (Wood) 
across  the  river,  on  the  right,  to  watch  the  attempt 
of  the  enemy  to  cross  and  turn  the  flank,  but  was 
unable  to  withdraw  the  remainder  of  the  force  in 
immediate  following,  so  closely  was  he  pressed  by 
Hood,  whom  he  must  hold  at  bay.  The  Twenty- 
third  Corps  was  on  the  left  and  center,  and  the  First 
Brigade  of  the  Second  Division  of  the  Fourth  Corps 
was  behind  it.  Wilson's  cavalry  was  on  the  north 
side  of  the  Harpeth  above  Franklin,  watching  the 
fords,  and  one  brigade  was  below  watching  the  cross 
ings  on  that  flank.  The  remaining  disposition  was 
as  follows :  The  First  Division  of  the  Fourth  was 
on  the  right  abutting  on  the  Harpeth  River ;  and, 
whether  by  design  or  overlooked  in  the  rush  of  af 
fairs,  the  Second  and  Third  Brigades  of  the  Second 
Division  of  the  Fourth  were  considerably  advanced 
in  front  of  the  center.  This  was  a  great  mistake, 
as  the  result  shows.  Upon  them  fell  the  brunt  of 
the  attack.  At  four  o'clock  that  afternoon  Hood 
launched  his  columns — two  entire  corps — upon  the 
divisions  advanced  in  front  of  the  Federal  left  and 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  249 

center  with  such  impetuosity  that  they  were  driven 
back  in  confusion,  with  the  loss  of  one  thousand  men 
and  several  guns,  while  he  suffered  very  little.  For 
rest's  cavalry  was  kept  in  check  by  General  Wilson, 
or  matters  would  have  been  in  a  worse  condition 
still.  In  this  imminent  peril  order  was  restored  by 
the  great  gallantry  of  Colonel  Opdycke,  of  Stanley's 
corps,  and  of  Stanley  himself,  both  of  whom  rushed 
to  the  breach  and  re-established  the  line.  It  is 
worthy  of  note  that  Stanley  wrote  that  day  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas  that  Opdycke's  timely  movement  saved 
the  army  from  a  ruinous  defeat. 

Stanley  was  in  conference  with  Schofield  when 
the  loud  sound  of  the  firing  reached  him.  He  at 
once  galloped  to  the  front,  and  would  have  ordered 
Opdycke  to  charge,  had  he  not  seen  that  that  gallant 
officer  needed  no  order,  but  was  already  in  rapid 
career  with  his  brigade.  Stanley's  report  throws 
light  upon  the  entire  action.  According  to  that, 
when  Wagner's  division  was  driven  back,  Opdycke 
was  in  reserve  on  the  Columbia  pike.  At  the  critical 
moment,  he  says : 

"  Could  the  enemy  hold  that  part  of  the  line, 
he  was  nearer  our  two  bridges  than  the  extremi 
ties  of  our  line.  Colonel  Opdycke's  brigade  was 
lying  down  about  one  hundred  yards  in  rear  of 
the  works.  I  rode  quickly  to  the  left  regiment  and 
called  to  them  to  charge ;  at  the  same  time  I  saw 
Colonel  Opdycke  near  the  center  of  his  line,  urging 


250 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


his  men  forward.  I  gave  the  colonel  no  order,  as  I 
saw  him  engaged  in  doing  the  very  thing  to  save 
us — namely,  to  get  possession  of  the  line  again." 
Colonel  Opdycke  added  luster  to  reputation  already 
established  on  many  fields,  and  which  was  to  be  fur 
ther  enhanced  by  his  gallantry  at  Nashville.  He  was 
distinguished  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  Chickamauga, 
Chattanooga,  and  in  the  Atlanta  campaign.  He  de 
serves  special  recognition  here,  because,  in  the  opin 
ion  of  Thomas  and  Stanley,  his  charge  at  Franklin 
without  orders  saved  the  army. 

The  tables  were  entirely  turned.  Opdycke  re 
captured  many  of  the  guns,  took  several  hundred 
prisoners  and  battle  flags,  and  re-established  the  line. 
Hood's  desperate  attacks  failed  chiefly  for  want  of 
weight  in  his  columns.  His  first  assault  seemed  to 
be  overpowering,  but  he  could  not  keep  it  up.  "A 
few  thousand  more  men,"  says  a  competent  critic, 
"would  have  enabled  him  to  win  the  battle." 

Never  was  more  distinguished  valor  displayed 
than  by  both  armies  on  that  occasion.  The  Con 
federates  made  four  attacks  on  that  position,  all  of 
which  failed,  but  the  character  of  which  may  be 
judged  of  by  the  fact  that  they  lost  five  generals 
killed,  among  whom  was  the  intrepid  Cleburne,  six 
wounded,  and  one  a  prisoner  of  war.  General  Stan 
ley  himself,  one  of  the  most  gallant  soldiers  of  the 
war,  was  severely  wounded  on  that  occasion,  and 
General  T.  J.  Wood  took  command  temporarily  of 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  251 

his  Fourth  Corps.  The  failure  of  these  Confederate 
attacks  so  paralyzed  their  army  that  Schofield  was 
enabled  to  do  what  he  had  intended — to  cross  the 
Harpeth  and  retreat  in  good  order  by  a  night  march 
and  to  join  Thomas  at  Nashville.  But  for  the  defeat 
of  Forrest  by  Wilson  at  the  same  time,  it  is  extreme 
ly  doubtful  whether  Schofield  could  have  retreated. 
It  should  further  be  observed  that,  while  the  battle 
of  Franklin  was  being  fought,  A.  J.  Smith's  corps 
was  just  reaching  Thomas  at  Nashville. 

Thus  far  Hood  had  been  altogether  baffled  in  his 
purposes ;  he  followed  Schofield  to  Nashville,  and  as 
that  general  entered  the  intrenched  line  Hood  made 
a  defiant  parade  in  front  of  the  city,  trumpets  blow 
ing,  drums  beating,  colors  flying,  and  bands  playing 
Dixie.  It  was  indeed  a  great  and  most  hazardous 
stake  for  which  he  was  playing  at  Nashville,  and  he 
announced  it  in  this  boasting  manner.  Should  he 
succeed,  the  end  of  the  war  would  have  been  put  off 
for  some  time.  We  can  hardly  think  he  expected  to 
succeed,  but  he  was  thus  keeping  up  the  courage  of 
his  men  and  cherishing  a  "forlorn  hope." 

It  will  be  well  to  pause  for  a  moment  and  look 
back  a  little  more  in  detail  at  the  Confederate  move 
ments  up  to  this  point  in  the  campaign,  taking  for 
our  guide  Hood's  own  account  ;  this  by  way  of 
recapitulation  and  a  thorough  intelligence  of  the 
situation,  which,  indeed,  is  the  most  important  in 
the  military  history  of  Thomas. 


252  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

When,  after  some  delay,  he  had  started  from 
Tuscumbia  and  Florence  to  move  upon  the  Union 
troops  in  their  retreat  to  Nashville,  he  had,  as  has 
been  stated,  the  purpose  to  thrust  his  army  be 
tween  that  town  and  Schofield's  force,  at  Columbia 
or  Spring  Hill  or  Franklin,  and  to  cut  off  the  Union 
retreat,  and  he  had  apparently  a  good  chance  of 
succeeding.  This  he  had  tried  to  do  at  Columbia 
and  had  failed.  His  orders  were  then  very  explicit, 
that  a  more  vigorous  attempt  should  be  made  at 
Spring  Hill,  where  he  would  either  bring  Schofield 
to  battle  and  beat  him  by  superiority  of  numbers,  or 
cut  his  communication  with  Nashville  if  he  declined 
to  fight.  Here  he  might  have  entirely  succeeded, 
for  his  plans  were  well  laid.  This  project  failed, 
however,  through  the  want  of  proper  energy  or  at 
tention  on  the  part  of  General  Cheatham,  who,  it  is 
said,  did  not  receive  the  lucid  instructions  of  Hood, 
because  he  was  absent  from  the  camp,  and  therefore 
made  no  demonstration  against  Schofield's  line,  as 
he  marched  rapidly  northward  ;  but  he  was  allowed 
to  escape  and  intrench  himself  strongly  at  Franklin. 
There  was  still  an  apparent  chance  left  for  Hood 
to  cut  his  line  between  Franklin  and  Nashville, 
but  it  soon  melted  into  thin  air,  because  Wilson's 
cavalry  barred  his  way  and  guarded  the  line  of 
retreat.  By  a  rapid  forced  march  at  night  Scho 
field  passed  the  astonished  Hood  and  took  his 
place  in  front  of  Nashville,  where  Thomas  had 


ON   TO    NASHVILLE.  253 

been  gathering  his  forces  and  strengthening  his  in- 
trenchments. 

Most  battles  have  so  much  in  common  that  their 
description  becomes  monotonous.  Of  its  class  and 
kind,  however,  the  battle  of  Franklin  was  extraor 
dinary,  and  evoked  the  unqualified  admiration  even 
of  the  gallant  enemy. 

The  vigorous  fighting  at  Franklin,  especially  that 
of  Opdycke  and  Stanley,  enabled  the  Union  force 
to  withdraw  in  good  order  to  the  intrenchments  at 
Nashville.  It  chimed  in  with  Thomas's  larger  plan. 
"  The  important  result,"  says  General  Thomas,  "  of 
this  signal  victory  [at  Franklin]  can  not  be  too 
highly  appreciated,  for  it  not  only  seriously  checked 
the  enemy's  advance  and  gave  General  Schofield 
time  to  move  his  troops  and  all  his  property  to 
Nashville,  but  it  also  caused  deep  depression  among 
the  men  of  Hood's  army.  .  .  .  Not  willing  to  risk  a 
renewal  of  the  battle  on  the  morrow,  and  having  ac 
complished  the  object  of  the  day's  operations — viz., 
to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  his  trains — General  Scho 
field,  by  my  advice  and  direction,  fell  back  during 
the  night  to  Nashville."  Doubtless  this  "  advice 
and  direction  "  were  given  because  General  Andrew 


*  The  writer  heard  a  lieutenant  general  of  the  Confederate 
army  who  was  at  Franklin,  at  a  dinner  of  the  Aztec  Club,  and  in 
presence  of  General  Schofield,  declare  that  the  fighting  and  the 
retreat  at  Franklin  were  among  the  most  brilliant  specimens  of 
military  skill  and  valor  in  the  records  of  the  war. 


254  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

J.  Smith  could  not  reach  Franklin  in  time  to  make 
its  tenure  certain. 

Not  diverted  from  his  purpose,  however,  by  his 
want  of  success  at  Franklin,  Hood  determined  to 
move  without  a  moment's  delay  upon  Nashville — 
"  to  beard  the  lion  in  his  den."  He  had  given  up 
almost  entirely  the  hope  of  re-enforcements  from 
Texas,  while  he  constantly  heard  of  accessions  to 
the  army  of  General  Thomas.  From  day  to  day  his 
task  became  more  difficult ;  the  disparity  of  numbers 
was  disappearing,  but  he  would  still  attempt  its  ac 
complishment. 

If  it  be  true  that  "  those  whom  the  gods  wish  to 
destroy  they  first  render  mad,"  it  really  seems  that 
Hood  was  now  inspired  by  a  Berserker  fury  akin 
to  madness,  in  venturing  to  attack  an  army  com 
posed  in  part  of  veteran  troops,  strongly  intrenched, 
at  least  equal  if  not  superior  in  numbers  to  his  own, 
and  with  more  to  fight  for  than  had  been  presented 
to  any  general  in  any  battle  of  the  war.  Such 
prominence  does  Nashville  assume  at  this  juncture. 
Thomas  was  to  be  accused  of  being  too  slow,  but  the 
tremendous  issues  of  the  conflict  demanded  his  cau 
tion.  Hood,  playing  indeed  for  as  desperate  a  stake, 
was  certainly  too  fast.  What  he  calls  "the  unfor 
tunate  affair  at  Spring  Hill,  the  short  duration  of 
daylight  at  Franklin,  and,  finally  and  most  important 
of  all,  the  nonarrival  of  expected  re-enforcements 
from  the  trans-Mississippi  department  of  the  Con- 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  255 

federacy,"  should  have  warned  him  to  pause  and 
deliberate  before  arraying  himself  in  front  of  the 
breastworks  and  guns  of  Nashville. 

And  thus  we  come  to  that  partial  siege  and  the 
great  battle  which  was  still,  however,  delayed  by  cir 
cumstances.  Hood  began  to  establish  his  line  to  the 
south  of  Nashville  on  the  26.  of  December,  and  there 
would  either  await  Thomas's  attack,  which  he  was 
ready  to  meet  with  a  riposte,  or  boldly  assault  the 
intrenchments,  and  endeavor  to  capture  the  town. 
In  order  to  understand  the  subsequent  movements 
we  must  now  pause  for  a  moment  to  take  a  view  of 
the  field  of  battle. 

Nashville  is  situated  on  the  south  bank  of  the 
Cumberland  River,  and  near  the  center  of  the  town 
the  Louisville  and  Nashville  Railroad  crosses  the 
bridge,  running  southwest  to  Johnsonville.  The  rail 
roads  to  Murfreesboro  and  to  Franklin,  respectively 
running  southeast  and  south,  both  cross  Brown's 
Creek,  a  small  tributary  emptying  into  the  Cumber 
land  east  of  the  city.  The  principal  turnpike  roads 
from  the  Federal  left  to  the  right,  by  which  Hood 
had  arrived  and  which  were  of  chief  importance  in 
the  coming  action,  were  the  Lebanon  road,  the  Mur 
freesboro  pike,  the  Nolensville  pike,  the  Franklin 
pike,  the  Granny  White,  the  Hillsboro,  the  Hardin, 
and  the  Charlotte  pikes.  Thomas  had  established 
two  lines  of  intrenchments,  enveloping  the  city  from 
river  bank  to  river  bank,  and  along  these  lines  were 


256  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

earthen  redoubts,  the  principal  of  which  were  called 
Fort  Gillem,  Fort  Donaldson,  Fort  Houston,  Fort 
Casino,  and  Fort  Martin.  These  were  strong  points 
in  the  line  and  supported  each  other.  It  had  re 
quired  time  and  industry  to  construct  these ;  and 
the  intervening  lines  had  employed  Thomas  with 
out  a  moment's  rest  until  Hood  arrived,  and  even 
after  the  Confederates  had  established  themselves. 
Thomas  was  obliged  to  delay  still  longer,  however, 
because  Wilson's  cavalry,  which  had  joined  him,  was 
as  yet  to  a  great  extent  unmounted  and  destitute  of 
equipments.  Convalescent  horses,  and  those  gath 
ered  in  a  random  way,  were  coming  in  but  slowly. 
Thus,  with  a  force  including  Steedman's  command  of 
five  thousand  men,  consisting  of  detachments  which 
had  for  a  time  been  left  behind  at  Chattanooga  and 
which  reached  him  December  ist,  and  A.  J.  Smith's 
corps  from  Missouri,  he  had  an  army  which  at  the 
last  numbered  in  all  about  fifty-two  thousand  in 
fantry,  to  which  the  cavalry  and  quartermaster's  men 
must  be  added  ;  in  all,  from  sixty-five  thousand  to 
seventy  thousand.  Hood's  army,  which  was  in  posi 
tion  in  front  of  Nashville  on  December  3d,  was  thus 
disposed  around  the  city  in  the  nature  of  an  invest 
ment ;  Cheatham's  corps  was  on  his  right,  Lee's  in 
the  center,  and  Stewart's  on  the  left.  Montgomery 
Hill  and  Overton  Hill  are  prominent  irregular  eleva 
tions  of  the  Brentford  range,  which  were  occupied  on 
December  4th,  and  fortified  by  the  Confederates. 


ON    TO    NASHVILLE. 


257 


Thus  posted,  Hood  awaited  the  sortie  of  Thomas 
with  impatience ;  it  would  help  to  develop  his  own 
plans.  On  the  same  day  (the  4th)  Hood  made  a 
diversion  away  from  this  field  by  ordering  an  attack 
on  Murfreesboro,  without,  however,  dislodging  its 
garrison ;  and  also  by  an  unsuccessful  assault  on  a 
blockhouse  erected  on  Overall  Creek. 

And  now  everything  seemed  in  readiness  in  the 
Union  army  at  Nashville.  What  was  the  cause  of 
the  further  delay  ?  Certainly  it  was  more  painful  to 
Thomas  than  to  any  one  else.  He  had  expected  to 
fight  on  December  yth  ;  but  he  found  his  cavalry  not 
in  condition  nor  ready  to  move  until  the  9th,  notwith 
standing  the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  mount  and 
equip  them.  Military  men  know  how  difficult  it  is 
to  organize  cavalry,  and  how  impossible  it  is  for  an 
army  to  operate  without  cavalry.  The  task  accom 
plished  by  Wilson  in  a  few  days  was  the  ordinary 
Jabor  of  months. 

Then,  when  everything  was  in  readiness,  there  set 
in  a  storm  of  sleet  and  freezing  weather  which  made 
it  impossible  for  either  army  to  move.  The  ground 
was  a  verglas,  or  sheet  of  ice,  so  slippery  that  men 
and  horses  could  not  stand.  This  state  of  things 
was  not  relieved,  but  continued  for  six  days,  until 
December  i4th.  The  elements  seemed  to  conspire 
against  Thomas. 

On  the  evening  of  that  day  Thomas  called  for  his 
generals  and  gave  them  detailed  instructions  for  the 


258  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

next  day.  He  informed  them  that  at  a  given  signal 
at  six  o'clock  the  next  morning  he  would  move  out 
and  attack  the  enemy  according  to  these  instructions, 
with  such  modifications  as  circumstances  might  ren 
der  necessary. 

Meanwhile  there  had  been  the  greatest  impa 
tience  at  Washington.  "  Why  does  he  not  move  ?  " 
The  correspondence  at  this  period,  both  in  its  impa 
tience  and  its  utter  disregard  of  military  propriety, 
forms  a  sad  page  in  the  history,  and  one  of  which 
its  participants  should  have  been  greatly  ashamed. 
They  seemed  to  remain  willfully  ignorant  of  the  im 
provised  character  of  Thomas's  force — the  three 
corps  from  distinct  military  departments,  and  men 
drawn  in  small  detachments  from  many  organiza 
tions — scanty  in  numbers  at  first,  and  with  a  lack  of 
cavalry,  even  for  the  ordinary  needs  of  learning  the 
enemy's  positions  and  plans. 

And  now  was  heard  from  the  Government  au 
thorities — the  President,  Mr.  Stanton,  Secretary  of 
WTar,  and  General  Halleck,  at  Washington,  and  Gen 
eral  Grant  at  City  Point — such  a  jargon  of  grum 
bling,  scolding  voices,  such  howls  of  impatience,  such 
vulgar  innuendoes  as  never  before  beset  a  poor  gen 
eral,  who  knew  his  duty  and  was  trying  his  utmost 
to  do  it,  feeling  sure,  besides,  that  the  fault-finders 
did  not  know  anything  about  it.  They  were  the 
blunderers,  not  Thomas. 

"  This  looks,"  telegraphed  Mr.  Stanton,  with  a 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  259 

fling  at  patriotic  men  who  had  only  failed  by  reason 
of  circumstances,  "this  looks  like  the  McClellan 
and  Rosecrans  strategy  of  do  nothing  and  let  the 
enemy  raid  the  country."  Grant's  opinion,  less  in 
sulting  but  equally  unreasonable,  was  that  Thomas 
should  attack  at  once,  and,  indeed,  should  have  gone 
out  and  attacked  immediately  after  the  battle  of 
Franklin.  On  December  6th  he  wrote :  "  Attack 
Hood  at  once,  and  wait  no  longer  for  a  remount  for 
your  cavalry." 

Thomas  read  this  telegram  to  the  army  and  corps 
commanders,  requiring  him  to  move.  General  Scho- 
field  and  the  rest  sustained  him  in  his  decision  to 
wait  until  he  was  ready ;  but  the  latter  part  of  the 
telegram  was  not  shown,  which  presented  the  alter 
native  that  he  would  be  superseded  if  he  did  not  move. 

This  is  the  more  astonishing  as  General  Grant 
knew  as  well  as  any  man  the  absolute  necessity  of 
cavalry  in  such  a  conflict,  especially  to  prevent  Hood 
from  passing  around  Nashville  to  invade  Tennessee. 
And  Wilson's  splendid  use  of  that  arm  when  the 
time  came  thoroughly  vindicates  Thomas's  judg 
ment.  With  regard  to  his  attacking  Hood  at  or  just 
after  Franklin,  Thomas  had  telegraphed  from  Nash 
ville  under  date  of  December  2d  :  "I  had  at  this 
place  (Nashville)  but  about  five  thousand  men  of 
General  A.  J.  Smith's  command,  which,  added  to  the 
force  under  General  Schofield,  would  not  have  given 
me  more  than  twenty-five  thousand  men."  It  would 
18 


260  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

certainly  have  been  madness  to  attempt  such  a  thing 
at  that  time. 

The  following  dispatch  from  Mr.  Stanton  to 
General  Grant  is  a  disgrace  to  military  correspond 
ence.  Under  date  of  December  ;th  he  telegraphed  : 
"  Thomas  seems  to  be  unwilling  to  attack  because 
it  is  hazardous.  If  he  waits  for  Wilson  to  get  ready, 
Gabriel  will  be  blowing  his  last  horn."  To  these 
and  other  urgent  messages,  which  we  are  sure  the 
reader  will  be  glad  to  be  spared,  Thomas  could  only 
reply  that  he  could  not  move  sooner,  notwithstand 
ing  his  best  efforts.  On  the  pth,  the  day  when  he 
was  ready  to  move  but  for  the  storm  of  sleet  and 
rain,  the  following  general  order  was  actually  issued 
at  Washington,  but  was  suspended  for  a  short  time 
longer.  The  order  was,  "that  Major-General  Scho- 
field  relieve  at  once  General  G.  H.  Thomas  in  com 
mand  of  the  Department  and  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land."  Several  other  generals  were  also  proposed 
to  supersede  him.  On  the  i3th  an  order  was  issued 
by  General  Grant  from  City  Point,  couched  in  these 
words :  "  Major-General  John  A.  Logan  .  .  .  will 
proceed  immediately  to  Nashville,  Tennessee,  re 
porting  by  telegraph  to  the  lieutenant  general  his 
arrival  at  Louisville,  and  also  at  Nashville."  What 
Logan  was  to  do  at  Nashville  was  not  an  open  se 
cret.  Unless  by  special  assignment,  had  Logan  gone 
to  Nashville,  Schofield,  who  ranked  him,  would  still 
have  been  in  command. 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  26l 

On  the  i5th,  the  very  day  of  the  battle,  General 
Grant  left  City  Point  for  Washington  en  route  to 
Nashville,  to  take  temporary  command  in  person, 
and  perhaps  permanently  supersede  Thomas.  It  was 
then  he  heard  of  the  first  day's  success,  and  returned 
to  City  Point. 

On  the  pth,  Thomas  had  telegraphed  to  Halleck  : 
"  I  feel  conscious  that  I  have  done  everything  in  my 
power  to  prepare,  and  that  the  troops  could  not  have 
been  gotten  ready  before  this.  If  General  Grant 
shall  order  me  to  be  relieved,  I  will  submit  without 
a  murmur.  A  terrible  storm  of  freezing  rain  has 
come  on  since  daylight,  which  will  render  an  attack 
impossible  till  it  breaks."  Was  ever  man  so  beset  ? 

It  is  some  alleviation  of  this  treatment  to  feel 
reasonably  sure  that  the  great  President  Lincoln  did 
not  share  these  sentiments.  In  the  Life  of  Lincoln, 
by  Nicolay  and  Hay — wThich,  as  these  gentlemen 
were  near  his  person,  may  be  considered  as  giving 
the  President's  views — we  are  pleased  to  find  the 
following  statement  (X,  28) :  "  Thomas  nowhere  ap 
pears  to  greater  advantage,  not  even  on  the  hills  of 
Chickamauga,  opposing  his  indomitable  spirit  to  the 
surging  tide  of  disaster  and  defeat,  than  he  does 
during  this  week,  opposing  his  sense  of  duty  to  the 
will  of  his  omnipotent  superior,  and  refusing  to 
move  one  hour  before  he  thought  the  interests  of 
the  country  permitted  it,  even  under  threat  of  re 
moval  and  disgrace."  And  in  the  opinion  of  Gen- 


262  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

erals  Sherman,  William  F.  Smith,  James  H.  Wilson, 
and  Robert  N.  Scott,  he  had  at  this  time  acquired 
a  greater  knowledge  of  strategy  than  any  of  the 
generals  or  officials  by  whom  he  was  surrounded. 

We  need  not  multiply  these  dispatches  and  opin 
ions.  There  are  many  more  of  them,  and  we  find  in 
the  answers  of  Thomas  the  firm  stand  of  an  intelli 
gent  and  well-informed  will — of  one  man  against 
the  clamorous  cabal  of  persons  in  authority  hun 
dreds  of  miles  away,  some  of  them  in  blissful  igno 
rance  of  the  first  principles  of  the  military  art ;  like 
the  war-horse,  but  with  other  purpose,  "  smelling 
the  battle  from  afar."  A  weaker  man  than  Thomas 
would  have  yielded  to  the  importunity  and  attacked 
before  he  was  ready.  Indeed,  there  seemed  little 
discretion  in  the  matter.  He  was  ordered  to  attack 
at  once.  If  he  obeyed,  the  best  interests  of  the 
country  were  endangered.  If  he  did  not,  he  was 
liable  to  the  charge  of  "disobedience  of  orders." 
The  firmness  of  General  Thomas,  therefore,  assumes 
the  proportions  of  a  martyr's  faith  ;  he  would  die 
for  the  cause,  for  the  honor  of  the  profession  of 
arms,  and  for  his  own  spotless  character,  rather  than 
obey  the  orders. 

Comparisons  are  frequently  odious,  but  sometimes 
necessary.  Why  did  not  the  Administration,  on  sev 
eral  occasions  of  a  lull  in  the  war  around  Richmond, 
urge  Grant  with  great  insistency  to  hurry  and  take 
the  Confederate  capital  ?  Simply  because  he  had 


ON   TO   NASHVILLE.  263 

the  confidence  of  the  Administration,  and  even  Mr. 
Stanton  did  not  dare  to  gainsay  his  words  or  actions. 
Grant,  it  is  known,  was  a  pushing  and  a  tenacious 
man — so  much  so  that  on  several  occasions  he  sac 
rificed  men  to  experiment.  But  still  he  went  on,  re 
gardless  of  his  partial  failures.  On  the  other  hand, 
Thomas  was  cold,  quiet,  careful  in  his  movements,  a 
nice  calculator  of  chances,  but  always  intending  to 
win  all  that  could  be  won.  The  men  were  unlike,  to 
some  extent  antagonistic,  and  Grant  could  not  un 
derstand  the  steady  and  logical  scheme  of  Thomas, 
who,  from  the  time  he  left  Sherman,  had  been  col 
lecting  his  scattered  forces,  and  in  the  short  period 
of  two  months  had  fully  accomplished  what  he  had 
purposed  for  the  good  of  the  country,  while  he  had 
been  stormed  at  and  humiliated  by  the  military  au 
thorities  at  Washington. 

Among  the  splendid  deeds  of  Thomas  in  our 
great  war,  I  consider  his  masterly  delay  and  his  fail 
ure  to  obey  urgent  but  vague,  and  what  the  French 
call  "  impossible,"  orders  at  Nashville.  If  this  be 
called  negative  merit,  it  demonstrated  a  powerful 
will,  a  greatness  of  soul,  a  tenacity  of  purpose,  plac 
ing  him  in  the  immortal  category  of  the  Roman 
poet's  hero — Justum  et  tenacem  propositi  virum. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    NASHVILLE    AND    RESULTS. 

Union  line— A.  J.  Smith — T.  J.  Wood — Steedman — Twenty-third 
Corps  first  in  reserve,  and  then  to  extreme  right — J.  H.  Wil 
son — The  gunboats — Steedman's  attack — Smith  and  Wilson 
dislodge  the  enemy — McArthur's  brilliant  charge— Second 
day — Thomas  inspects  the  whole  line — Wood's  attacks — The 
right  in  concert — The  enemy  breaks — Pursuit — Hood  retires 
from  command — Changed  tone  of  Washington  dispatches- 
Thomas,  Major-General,  United  States  Army — Peace  and 
reconstruction. 

To  the  cool  and  philosophical  mind  of  Thomas 
there  was  not  the  urgent  necessity  of  haste  thus 
ejaculated  from  Washington.  Every  day  increased 
the  danger  to  Hood,  while  it  improved  the  condition 
of  the  Union  army.  Why  take  desperate  chances 
while  a  reasonable  delay  would  render  the  issue  cer 
tain  and  successful  ?  Nothing  was  lost,  much  was 
gained,  by  delay.  We  return  now  to  the  projected 
attack  of  Thomas  on  the  morning  of  the  i5th  of  De 
cember.  By  the  i4th  the  ice  had  melted  and  the 
movement  became  feasible.  The  troops  were  in 
position  at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning,  but  were  still 
further  retarded  by  a  dense  mist,  which  did  not  clear 
off  until  about  nine.  The  following  was  the  forma- 


THE   BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS.  265 

tion,  which  had  been  communicated  to  the  principal 
generals  verbally,  and  also  put  in  the  form  of  an  or 
der  of  the  day : 

General  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  flanked  and  sup 
ported  on  the  right  by  Hatch's  division  of  Wilson's 
cavalry,  which  held  ground  from  the  Nolensville 
pike  to  the  Cumberland  River,  formed  the  right ; 
General  T.  J.  Wood,  who  had  been  in  command  of 
the  Fourth  Corps  since  Stanley  was  wounded,  was 
in  the  center,  across  the  Hillsboro  pike  ;  and  Gen 
eral  Steedman's  troops  formed  the  extreme  left  of 
the  Federal  line.  Admiral  Lee,  of  the  navy,  directed 
the  patrolling  of  the  river  above  and  below  the  city 
by  gunboats  under  Lieutenant -Commander  Leroy 
Fitch.  General  Schofield's  Twenty-third  Corps  was 
at  first  held  in  reserve  in  rear  of  Smith  and  Wood, 
but  was  soon,  however,  to  move  through  his  line, 
and  by  a  detour  take  post  in  front  of  Smith  on  his 
right.  Hammond,  with  the  First  Brigade  of  Knipe's 
cavalry  division,  was  temporarily  detached  to  Gal- 
latin  to  watch  and  impede  any  attempts  of  Hood  to 
cross  the  river  in  that  direction.  The  troops  in  and 
immediately  around  the  city  of  Nashville  occupied 
the  nearest  intrenchments  as  they  were  vacated  by 
the  advancing  columns. 

There  were  during  these  six  days  of  ice  and  sleet, 
which  beset  Hood  as  well  as  Thomas,  grave  doubts 
and  speculations  in  Hood's  camp.  So  complete  were 
Thomas's  preparations  to  receive  him  that  he  dared 


266  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

not  attempt  a  direct  attack,  and  he  began  even  to 
question  his  plan  of  going  past  Nashville  into  Ken 
tucky.  His  further  speculations  were  rendered  un 
necessary,  however,  by  the  shock  of  the  Union  at 
tack,  which  was  now  imminent. 

Concealed  by  the  undulating  nature  of  the  ground, 
the  Federal  attack  was  made  before  Hood  had  any 
accurate  knowledge  of  its  intention.  A  demonstra 
tion  was  made  by  Steedman's  troops  against  the 
Confederate  right  lying  on  Brown's  Creek,  beyond 
the  Nolensville  pike.  This  was  of  the  nature  of  a 
feint,  and  had  the  desired  effect,  causing  Hood  to 
re-enforce  his  right  in  great  haste.  When  this  was 
accomplished,  General  Smith,  with  Wilson's  cavalry, 
marched  rapidly  on  the  Hardin  pike,  and  made  a 
partial  wheel  to  the  left  to  confront  the  enemy's 
lines  on  the  Hillsboro  pike,  at  one  point  of  which  a 
heavy  stone  wall  had  been  used  by  the  Confederates 
as  a  rifle  pit. 

The  enemy  was  struck  and  dislodged  from  this 
position,  a  portion  of  Smith's  command  and  Wilson's 
cavalry  dismounted,  the  latter  leading,  taking  two 
redoubts,  one  after  the  other,  with  guns  and  pris 
oners.  It  was  then  that  Thomas  ordered  Schofield, 
with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  which  had  been  in  re 
serve,  to  take  post  on  Smith's  right  to  strengthen 
that  flank,  and  permit  Wilson,  by  giving  him  very 
prompt  and  vigorous  support,  to  endeavor  to  strike 
the  enemy's  rear  with  his  cavalry.  Under  these  cir- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS. 


267 


cumstances  the  Fourth  Corps,  under  General  Wood, 
with  the  Third,  Second,  and  First  Divisions  in  line 
from  left  to  right,  made  a  direct  attack  in  front  upon 
Montgomery  Hill,  the  strong  salient  of  Hood's  po 
sition.  This  was  entirely  successful.  It  was  now 
manifest  to  Hood  that  the  purpose  of  Thomas  was 
to  turn  his  left  flank.  He  had  been  driven  out  of 
his  original  line,  and  had  fallen  back  to  the  base  of 
Harpeth  Hill,  his  line  of  retreat  being  still  secure  by 
the  Granny  White  pike. 

As  the  Twenty-third  Corps  had  not  yet  fully  or 
ganized  for  attack — and  there  was  a  consequent 
delay  in  its  movements — General  McArthur,  com 
manding  Smith's  first  division,  asked  permission  to 
attack  a  salient  point  in  front  of  Schofield's  com 
mand.  As  there  had  been  unexplained  delay  in  the 
movements  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  Thomas,  who 
was  in  rear  of  the  left  center,  rode  rapidly  to  the  right 
to  learn  the  reason.  When  McArthur's  request  was 
preferred  to  him  by  A.  J.  Smith,  he  refused  the  per 
mission,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  due  to  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  to  let  it  make  the  attack  in  its  front. 
While  he  was  talking  to  Schofield,  McArthur,  having 
received  no  answer  to  his  request,  took  silence  for 
consent,  carried  the  point,  drove  back  the  enemy, 
and  thus  gave  a  rapid  conclusion  to  the  fortunes  of 
the  day,  without  the  immediate  co-operation  of  the 
Twenty-third.  The  efficiency  of  McArthur's  charge 
by  successive  brigades — the  front  brigade  being  half- 


268  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

way  up  the  hill  when  the  second  and  third  were  put 
in  motion — with  Wilson's  dash  with  his  dismounted 
cavalry,  was  recognized  by  Hood  as  a  serious  blow, 
the  forerunner  of  imminent  disaster  soon  to  fall  upon 
him.  "  Our  line,"  he  says,  "  thus  pierced,  gave  way  ; 
soon  thereafter  it  broke  at  all  points." 

No  advance  of  the  infantry  on  the  right  was  made 
until  after  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Wilson's 
cavalry  had  been  working  on  the  left  and  rear  of 
Hood's  main  line  from  ten  o'clock  until  that  hour, 
and  after  many  urgent  requests  to  Thomas  to  seize 
the  opportune  moment  by  the  advance  of  the  in 
fantry,  Wilson  went  in  person  and  pointed  out  por 
tions  of  his  command  entering  the  rebel  works,  and 
only  needing  re-enforcements  to  roll  back  and  double 
up  Hood's  left.  It  was  then  that  Thomas  ordered 
Schofield  to  advance.  But  the  work  had  been  already 
done.  This  turning  movement  of  the  cavalry,  en 
veloping  the  enemy's  left  and  rear  for  a  mile  or 
more,  drove  Hood  to  seek  safety  for  his  communica 
tions  by  rapidly  retiring. 

The  enemy  attempted  a  riposte,  but  by  this  time 
General  D.  N.  Couch,  of  Schofield's  corps,  threw  for 
ward  one  brigade  after  another  and  drove  them 
back  with  great  loss.  When  night  fell  the  main  body 
of  Thomas's  troops  lay  along  the  Hillsboro  pike,  al 
most  at  right  angles  to  their  original  position,  hav 
ing  crowded  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy  back  upon  its 
center.  The  dismounted  cavalry  was  placed  in  force 


NASHVILLE 

December  IS  A-  Id,  18G4 


THE  BATTLE  OF   NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS.  269 

upon  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union  army  on  the 
Hillsboro  pike.  It  was  now  manifest  that  Thomas 
would  attempt  to  turn  both  flanks,  or,  by  threaten 
ing  their  right,  make  the  attack  easier  on  the  left. 

Thus  ended  the  first  day  of  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
Hood  having  been  driven  back  to  seek  a  new  line 
at  the  Harpeth  Hills,  which  he  strongly  intrenched 
during  the  night.  That  night  Thomas  telegraphed  : 
"Attacked  enemy's  left  this  morning;  drove  it  from 
the  river  below  the  city  very  nearly  to  Franklin  pike — 
distance  about  eight  miles."  The  good  news  spread 
on  lightning  wing  throughout  the  country,  North  and 
South.  This  was  not  a  moment  too  soon  for  Thom 
as's  welfare,  for  Grant,  having  determined  to  super 
sede  him,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  en  route  to  carry  out 
that  purpose.  While  on  his  way  he  received  the 
above  dispatch,  which  so  relieved  his  concern  that 
he  turned  back,  leaving  General  Thomas  to  com 
plete  his  great  victory. 

It  was  a  cold  and  dark  December  night  that  fol 
lowed  that  first  day  of  battle,  and  the  troops  of  both 
armies  spent  it  mainly  in  busy  preparation  for  the 
next  morning.  The  Union  troops  were  elated  by 
their  success  and  confident  for  the  morrow,  while 
the  Confederates  had  much  to  repair — indeed,  to  re 
organize,  and  but  little  hope  of  carrying  out  their 
purpose.  If  they  could  neither  beat  Thomas  nor 
flank  him  and  go  into  Kentucky,  they  would  at  least 
retire  with  sullen  dignity.  Alas  for  them  !  They  were 


270 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


not  to  be  permitted  to  do  this.  Then  Hood's  second 
thought,  if  he  must  abandon  the  plan  of  capturing 
Nashville,  was  to  hold  the  line  of  Duck  River,  repair 
damages,  and  make  ready  for  a  new  advance ;  but 
that  was  also  to  be  impossible.  The  Union  army 
was  organized  for  advance,  battle,  and  pursuit.  He 
had  not  a  moment's  rest. 

At  an  early  hour  on  the  i6th  of  December  Thomas 
rode  along  the  line,  the  order  of  which  from  left  to 
right  was  Steedman,  Wood,  Smith,  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  drawn  up  in  a  semicircle  concave  to  the  ene 
my.  The  cavalry  was  on  the  left  flank  and  rear  of 
the  enemy's  position.  To  meet  the  new  line  of  the 
Federal  advance,  Hood  now  withdrew  Cheatham's 
corps  from  the  extreme  right  to  the  left  flank.  This 
left  the  ground  in  front  of  Wood's  Fourth  Corps 
comparatively  unoccupied  ;  and  so  that  general 
pushed  forward,  with  General  Steedman,  to  cover 
his  left  flank. 

The  Union  army  was  thus  in  a  very  compact 
order — Schofield  on  the  right  toward  the  enemy's 
left  flank  and  almost  at  right  angles  to  Smith ;  Wood 
in  contact  with  Smith,  and  Steedman  on  the  left.  A 
portion  of  Wilson's  cavalry  had  now  gained  Hood's 
rear,  across  the  Granny  White  pike.  The  enemy, 
during  the  night  of  the  i5th,  had  occupied  Overton's 
Hill  and  fortified  it  strongly ;  it  constituted  their 
right  point,  while  their  left  was  on  the  hills  border 
ing  the  Granny  White  pike.  The  Union  line  was 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS. 


2/1 


now  very  close  to  the  Confederates  at  all  points. 
Early  in  the  afternoon,  and  under  cover  of  his  bat 
teries,  after  a  reconnoissance  by  Colonel  P.  Sidney 
Post,  General  Wood  ordered  an  assault  upon  the 
north  slope  of  Overton's  Hill  with  two  brigades 
commanded  by  Colonel  Post.  The  enemy,  in  expec 
tation  of  this,  had  re-enforced  that  point ;  and  the 
assailing  party  met  with  such  a  withering  fire  as  they 
advanced  that  they  were  obliged  to  fall  back  and 
reform  for  a  new  attack.  Colonel  Post  was  severely 
wounded.  Schofield  and  A.  J.  Smith  then  made  the 
grandest  diversion  in  his  favor  by  a  most  vigorous 
attack  in  their  fronts ;  they  carried  all  the  enemy's 
positions;  drove  him  back  pell-mell,  captured  all  his 
artillery,  took  thousands  of  prisoners,  among  whom 
were  four  general  officers,  and  all  this  with  very  little 
loss.  The  panic  flight  of  the  enemy's  left  was  expe 
dited  by  an  attack  of  Wilson's  dismounted  men  on 
his  extreme  left,  which  had  already  threatened  to 
cut  him  off  from  his  retreat.  It  was  then  that  Hood 
sent  word  to  General  Chalmers  "  that  unless  they 
could  be  driven  from  his  left  and  rear  all  was 
lost."  By  this  time  Wood  was  ready  to  renew  his 
attack  on  Overton's  Hill  on  their  right,  where  the 
Confederates  were  still  in  great  strength.  He  was 
received  with  a  terrible  fire,  and  for  a  time  held  in 
check  ;  but  nothing  could  resist  the  impetuosity  of 
his  charge.  The  enemy  swarmed  out  of  his  intrench- 
ments  to  the  rear  and  fled  in  disorder,  and,  as  soon 


2/2  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

as  their  line  broke,  the  Fourth  Corps  advanced  at 
once  in  rapid  pursuit  of  them.  The  supreme  mo 
ment  had  now  arrived.  All  the  pikes  were  in  requi 
sition.  Wilson's  cavalry  pursued  along  the  Granny 
White  pike,  encountering  the  Confederate  cavalry 
under  Chalmers  one  mile  in  rear  of  the  line  of  battle, 
which  it  scattered  in  every  direction,  and  then  con 
tinued  the  pursuit  until  midnight,  making  large  cap 
tures.  The  Fourth  Corps  pressed  forward  by  the 
Franklin  road,  in  pursuit,  as  far  as  the  Harpeth 
River,  where,  the  bridges  being  destroyed,  new  ones 
were  improvised.  Hood  crossed  that  stream  on  the 
i8th.  The  pursuit  was  then  continued  to  Duck 
River,  the  cavalry  pressing  close  upon  their  rear 
and  bringing  them  frequently  to  bay ;  the  line  was 
promptly  abandoned,  and  on  the  2;th  the  discom 
fited  Confederates  crossed  the  Tennessee  and  fell 
back  as  far  as  Tupelo,  on  the  Mississippi.  The  last 
stand  was  made  at  Sugar  Creek,  and  then  the  pur 
suit  was  also  abandoned.  This  was  on  the  26th  of 
December.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  enormous 
losses  with  accuracy.  There  were  two  thousand  de 
serters,  and  to  these  must  be  added  the  large  number 
who  fell  in  the  fierce  battle. 

We  should  not  fail  to  notice  the  perfect  symme 
try  of  the  battle  of  Nashville  ;  the  admirable  dispo 
sitions  of  Thomas,  leaving  no  weak  point  in  the 
entire  line  ;  his  constant  supervision  of  all  parts  of 
the  field  ;  the  splendid  energy  of  his  subordinates  of 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS. 


273 


all  grades,  inspired  with  his  spirit  and  fighting  under 
his  eye.  A  single  partial  repulse,  magnificently  re 
versed  by  a  splendid  charge  ;  a  pursuit  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  third  day,  without  a  moment's  delay ; 
supplies,  rations,  ammunitions,  everything  being  in 
readiness  by  reason  of  that  admirable  forecast  and 
"  delay  "  which  was  thus  vindicated  in  the  eyes  of 
all  at  that  time,  and  has  passed  into  history  in  spite 
of  the  scoffs  and  cavils  of  the  wirepullers  at  Wash 
ington.  General  Thomas  says :  "  During  the  two 
days  of  the  battle  the  Federal  army  took  four  thou 
sand  four  hundred  and  sixty-two  prisoners,  two  hun 
dred  and  eighty-seven  officers,  including  one  major 
general  and  three  brigadiers,  fifty-three  guns  and 
twenty-five  flags,  and  many  thousand  small  arms, 
with  a  large  number  of  wagons." 

The  enemy's  losses  in  the  two  days'  battle  of 
Nashville  were  so  great,  and  the  means  of  calcu 
lating  them  so  uncertain,  that  there  can  be  no  ex 
act  statement  made.  By  an  estimate  of  those  scat 
tering  in  all  directions  and  by  capture,  there  were 
thirteen  thousand  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine,  in 
cluding  seven  generals,  seventy-two  guns,  and  sev 
enty  standards.  Those  of  Thomas  were  three  thou 
sand  and  fifty-seven,  all  told,  at  Nashville,  and  in 
the  whole  campaign,  from  the  time  that  he  cut  loose 
from  Sherman,  not  more  than  ten  thousand. 

Thomas  intended  to  put  his  army  into  winter 
quarters — "  for  lack  of  argument  "  ;  they  had  noth- 


274  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

ing  to  oppose  them.  The  Fourth  Corps  took  post  at 
Huntsville  and  Athens,  the  Twenty-third  at  Dalton  ; 
A.  J.  Smith's  force  went  to  Eastport,  and  Wilson's 
cavalry  were  at  Huntsville,  and  moved  thence  to 
Eastport  and  Gravelly  Springs.  But  this  arrange 
ment  was  not  agreed  to  by  General  Grant.  That 
general  was  guarded  in  his  congratulations  on  the 
great  victory,  but  retained  his  opinion  that  Thomas 
had  been  too  slow  before  the  battle.  He  therefore 
was  indisposed  to  give  Thomas  much  power  for  the 
future,  but  employed  his  forces  in  various  partial 
expeditions  under  subordinate  commanders.  The 
truth  remains,  however,  that  up  to  that  time  Nash 
ville  was  the  only  battle  of  the  war,  except  perhaps 
the  Vicksburg  campaign,  in  which  the  Union  army 
had  defeated,  dissipated,  routed,  and  destroyed  a 
Confederate  army  in  logical  sequence  from  the  be 
ginning  to  the  end. 

After  the  battle  and  the  pursuit  Hood  had  his 
headquarters  for  a  few  days  at  Tuscumbia,  and  dur 
ing  January  his  infantry  was  rallying  at  Tupelo. 
Forrest  was  in  command  of  all  the  cavalry,  and  for 
his  dashing  movements  he  was  created,  on  February 
24th,  a  lieutenant  general.  It  proved  a  barren  hon 
or.  At  Tupelo,  a  broken  man  in  health  and  spirits, 
Hood  retired  from  the  command,  turning  it  over 
to  General  Dick  Taylor  on  January  23d.  Hood 
was  an  honest  man,  and  has  written,  in  admirable 
tone,  a  volume  called  Advance  and  Retreat,  in  his 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS. 


275 


own  vindication.  Much  of  it  is  controversial  as  to 
his  relations  to  J.  E.  Johnston.  In  it  he  is  frank 
enough  to  say :  "  Our  line,  thus  pierced  (by  the  Fed 
eral  charge),  gave  way ;  soon  thereafter  it  broke  at 
all  points,  and  I  beheld  for  the  first  and  only  time  a 
Confederate  army  abandon  the  field  in  confusion." 
Detailing  the  difficulties  which  had  beset  him,  he  as 
sumed  the  entire  responsibility  for  the  defeat,  and 
left  the  command  of  the  army  just  before  the  entire 
dissolution  of  the  Confederacy,  which  was  even  now 
imminent.  From  first  to  last  Hood's  greatest  want 
was  men  and  weight  in  his  columns. 

We  have  seen  how  at  the  first  the  vexed  question 
of  loyalty  to  the  Union  presented  itself  to  the  minds 
of  all  men  of  Southern  birth  in  the  army  when  the 
war  broke  out ;  how  many  excellent  and  honorable 
men,  like  Lee  and  Stonewall  Jackson,  were  swept  into 
the  Confederate  ranks  by  the  whirlwind  of  passion, 
and  the  consequent  storm  of  public  opinion  in  the 
States  seceded  from  the  Union.  Such  temptations 
must  undoubtedly  have  presented  themselves  to  the 
mind  of  Thomas,  and  we  have  seen  how  he  nobly 
settled  the  matter  in  favor  of  our  whole  country. 
We  give  greater  praise  to  his  conduct,  or  rather  we 
are  the  more  thankful  for  his  loyalty,  when  we  see 
how  in  several  great  emergencies  he  may  be  said  to 
have  saved  the  country.  The  victory  of  Nashville 
had  a  magnificent  correlation  to  other  great  designs 
and  events.  It  utterly  destroyed  Hood's  army  as  an 
19 


2/6  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

effective  whole,  so  that  it  was  of  little  further  service 
whatever  to  the  Confederacy,  while  it  left  the  South 
at  the  mercy  of  the  Union  troops.  It  inaugurated 
"the  beginning  of  the  end."  It  left  but  one  consid 
erable  Confederate  army  in  the  entire  field,  which, 
so  closely  was  it  beleaguered  in  and  around  Rich 
mond,  it  was  manifest  must  soon  lay  down  its  arms. 
In  so  doing  it  prevented  a  Northern  invasion,  which 
might  have  prolonged  the  war.  It  chimed  with  Sher 
man's  successful  expectation,  which  captured  Savan 
nah,  and  it  led  to  the  capitulation  of  Johnston  in 
North  Carolina.  It  dashed  the  last  hopes  of  Lee  in 
Virginia,  and  hastened  the  surrender  at  Appomattox 
Court  House.  In  a  word,  it  stands  alone  as  a 
unique,  thorough,  magnificent,  and  far-reaching  vic 
tory,  achieved  by  the  skill  and  firmness  of  one  man, 
who  had  acquired  the  confidence  of  his  officers  and 
men,  so  that  they  fought  for  him  as  well  as  for  the 
cause.  Among  the  many  actual  defeats  or  drawn 
battles  which  the  Union  army  had  suffered,  and  the 
humiliation  of  which  was  emphasized  and  contrasted 
with  the  success  at  Nashville,  it  stands  without  a  rival. 
Had  Thomas  fought  at  Franklin,  unprepared  as 
he  was,  and  met  with  only  partial  success,  the  strug 
gle  would  have  been  prolonged  ;  the  enemy  would 
have  had  time  to  recruit,  and  perhaps  be  re-enforced. 
We  contend  that  the  plan  of  fighting  at  Nashville, 
and  when  ready,  was  the  best ;  at  least  it  settled  the 
question  at  one  vigorous  blow.  One  other  thought 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS. 


277 


may  be  permitted  in  this  connection.  Let  us  suppose 
that  the  decision  of  Thomas,  at  the  breaking  out  of 
the  war,  had  been  otherwise  ;  that  he  had  espoused 
the  Confederate  cause  ;  that  he  had  attacked  instead 
of  defending  the  fearful  position  at  Chickamauga  ; 
that  he,  instead  of  Hood,  had  conducted  the  Confed 
erate  campaign  into  Tennessee.  The  results,  we  may 
readily  conceive,  would  have  been  widely  and  disas 
trously  different.  Thus  it  is  not  by  what  he  accom 
plished  alone,  but  by  what  might  have  reasonably 
been,  in  case  of  his  defection,  that  his  character  as  a 
man  and  a  patriot  and  his  skill  as  a  general  shine 
with  double  luster.  It  was  well  that  the  last  impor 
tant  action  of  his  military  life  should  have  such  sig 
nificance  as  this  ;  that  he  was  commander  in  chief, 
and  without  interferences,  once  at  least ;  that  by  this 
signal  victory,  all  his  own,  he  should  manifest  his 
greatness,  and  set  the  seal  to  his  splendid  and  con 
sistent  career.  Providence  had  been  good  to  him  in 
this  respect. 

It  will  throw  further  light  upon  this  great  battle 
if  we  present  a  part  of  the  General  Order  No.  169, 
issued  by  General  Thomas  to  his  army,  and  dated — 

"  PULASKI,  December  29,  1864. 

"  SOLDIERS  :  The  major  general  commanding  an 
nounces  to  you  that  the  rear  guard  of  the  flying  and 
dispirited  enemy  was  driven  across  the  Tennessee 
River  on  the  night  of  the  2yth  instant.  The  impass 
able  state  of  the  roads,  and  consequent  impossi- 


278  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

bility  to  supply  the  army,  compels  a  closing  of  the 
campaign  for  the  present. 

"  Although  short,  it  has  been  brilliant  in  its 
achievements,  and  unsurpassed  in  its  results  by  any 
other  of  this  war,  and  is  one  of  which  all  who  par 
ticipated  therein  may  be  justly  proud.  That  veteran 
army  which,  though  driven  from  position  to  posi 
tion,  opposed  a  stubborn  resistance  to  much  superior 
numbers  during  the  whole  of  the  Atlanta  campaign, 
taking  advantage  of  the  absence  of  the  largest  por 
tion  of  the  army  which  had  been  opposed  to  it  in 
Georgia,  invaded  Tennessee,  buoyant  with  hope,  ex 
pecting  Nashville,  Murfreesboro,  and  the  whole  of 
Tennessee  and  Kentucky  to  fall  into  its  power  an 
easy  prey,  and  scarcely  fixing  a  limit  to  its  con 
quests.  After  having  received  at  Franklin  the  most 
terrible  check  that  army  has  met  with  during  this 
war,  and  later  at  Murfreesboro,  in  its  attempt  to 
capture  that  place,  it  was  finally  attacked  at  Nash 
ville,  and,  although  your  forces  were  inferior  to  it 
in  numbers,  was  hurled  back  from  the  coveted  prize 
on  which  it  had  been  permitted  to  look  from  a  dis 
tance,  and  finally  sent  flying,  dismayed  and  disor 
dered,  whence  it  came,  impelled  by  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation,  and  thinking  only  how  it  could  re 
lieve  itself  for  short  intervals  from  your  persistent 
and  harassing  pursuit,  by  burning  the  bridges  over 
the  swollen  streams  as  it  passed  them,  until  finally 
it  had  placed  the  broad  waters  of  the  Tennessee 
River  between  you  and  its  shattered,  diminished,  and 
discomfited  columns,  leaving  its  artillery  and  battle- 
flags  in  your  victorious  hands — lasting  trophies  of 
your  noble  daring,  and  lasting  monuments  of  the 
enemy's  disgrace  and  defeat. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND   RESULTS.  279 

"  You  have  diminished  the  forces  of  the  rebel 
army  since  it  crossed  the  Tennessee  River  to  invade 
the  State,  at  the  least  estimate,  fifteen  thousand  men, 
among  whom  were  killed,  wounded,  and  captured, 
eighteen  general  officers. 

"Your  captures  from  the  enemy,  as  far  as  re 
ported,  amount  to  sixty-eight  pieces  of  artillery,  ten 
thousand  prisoners,  as  many  of  small  arms — several 
thousand  of  which  have  been  gathered  in,  and  the 
remainder  strew  the  route  of  the  enemy's  retreat — 
and  between  thirty  and  forty  flags,  besides  compel 
ling  him  to  destroy  much  ammunition  and  abandon 
many  wagons." 

To  this  may  be  added  some  extracts  from  Gen 
eral  Thomas's  report  of  the  battle  : 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  i5th  of  December,  the 
weather  being  favorable,  the  army  was  formed  and 
ready  at  an  early  hour  to  carry  out  the  plan  of  battle 
promulgated  in  the  special  field  orders  of  the  i4th. 
The  formation  of  troops  was  partially  concealed 
from  the  enemy  by  the  broken  nature  of  the  ground, 
as  also  by  a  fog,  which  lifted  toward  noon.  .  .  . 

"  Finding  General  Smith  had  not  taken  as  much 
distance  to  the  right  as  I  had  expected  he  would 
have  done,  I  directed  General  Schofield  to  move  his 
command  (the  Twenty-third  Corps)  from  position  in 
reserve,  to  which  it  had  been  assigned,  over  the  right 
of  General  Smith,  enabling  the  cavalry  thereby  to 
operate  more  freely  to  the  enemy's  rear.  This  was 
rapidly  accomplished  by  Schofield,  and  his  troops 
participated  in  the  closing  operations  of  the  day. 

"  Our  line  at   nightfall  was  readjusted,  running 


280  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

parallel  to  and  east  of  the  Hillsboro  pike — Scho- 
field's  command  on  the  right,  Smith's  in  the  center, 
and  Wood's  on  the  left,  with  Wilson's  cavalry  on  the 
right  of  Schofield  ;  Steedman  held  the  position  he 
had  gained  early  in  the  morning.  The  total  re 
sult  of  the  day's  operations  was  the  capture  of  six 
teen  pieces  of  artillery  and  twelve  hundred  prison 
ers,  besides  several  hundred  stands  of  small  arms 
and  about  forty  wagons.  The  enemy  had  been 
forced  back  at  all  points  with  heavy  loss.  Our  casu 
alties  were  unusually  light.  The  behavior  of  the 
troops  was  unsurpassed  for  steadiness  and  alacrity 
in  every  movement,  and  the  original  plan  of  battle, 
with  but  few  alterations,  was  strictly  adhered  to. 
The  whole  command  bivouacked  in  the  line  of  battle 
during  the  night  on  the  ground  occupied  at  dark, 
while  preparations  were  made  to  renew  the  battle 
at  an  early  hour  on  the  morrow. 

"  Immediately  following  the  effort  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  Generals  Smith's  and  Schofield's  commands 
moved  against  the  enemy's  works  in  their  respective 
fronts,  carrying  all  before  them,  irreparably  break 
ing  his  lines  in  a  dozen  places,  and  capturing  all  his 
artillery  and  thousands  of  prisoners — among  the  lat 
ter  four  general  officers.  Our  loss  was  remarkably 
small — scarcely  mentionable.  All  of  the  enemy  that 
did  escape  were  pursued  over  the  tops  of  Brent- 
wood  and  Harpeth  Hills.  General  Wilson's  cavalry 
dismounted,  attacked  the  enemy  simultaneously  with 
Schofield  and  Smith,  striking  him  in  reverse,  and, 
gaining  firm  possession  of  Granny  White  pike,  cut 
off  his  retreat  by  that  route.  Wood's  and  Steed- 
man's  troops,  hearing  the  shouts  of  victory  coming 
from  the  right,  rushed  impetuously  forward,  renew- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND   RESULTS.  28 1 

ing  the  assault  on  Overton's  Hill  ;  and  although 
meeting  a  very  heavy  fire,  the  onset  was  irresistible, 
artillery  and  many  prisoners  falling  into  our  hands. 
The  enemy,  hopelessly  broken,  fled  in  confusion 
through  BrenLwood  Pass,  the  Fourth  Corps  in  close 
pursuit,  which  was  continued  for  several  miles,  when 
darkness  closed  the  scene  and  the  troops  rested  from 
their  labors.  A  portion  of  Wilson's  cavalry  continued 
the  pursuit  till  midnight.  During  the  two  days'  oper 
ations  there  were  four  thousand  four  hundred  and 
sixty-two  prisoners  captured,  including  two  hundred 
and  eighty-seven  officers,  of  all  grades  from  that  of 
major  general,  fifty-three  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
thousands  of  small  arms.  The  enemy  abandoned  on 
the  field  all  of  his  dead  and  wounded." 

The  pursuit  was  for  a  short  time  delayed  by  a 
slight  blunder  in  sending  forward  the  pontoon  train. 
A  staff  officer  in  directing  it  wrote  by  mistake  that 
it  was  to  proceed  by  the  Murfreesboro  pike  instead 
of  the  Nolensville  pike,  and  it  had  already  traveled 
two  miles  before  the  mistake  was  corrected. 

It  is  always  fortunate  for  the  military  biographer 
when  he  can  find  his  criticisms  in  the  very  words  of 
the  general  himself.  Thomas  was  very  reticent  with 
regard  to  the  conduct  of  others,  but  did  not  spare 
himself.  In  a  familiar  lecture  on  the  battle  of  Nash 
ville,  which  he  delivered  before  a  scientific  club  in 
Washington  and  which  was  said  to  be  a  model  of 
clearness  and  vivid  description,  he  pointed  out  what 
he  called  a  grave  error  of  judgment,  which  was  in 
not  sending  at  the  close  of  the  first  day  a  strong 


282  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

force  round  to  the  rear  of  the  enemy  to  cut  off  his 
retreat  and  capture  his  entire  army.  He  was  the 
more  magnanimous  in  stating  his  fault,  because,  after 
such  brilliant  results  had  been  achieved,  few,  if  any, 
would  have  dared  to  advance  such  a  criticism. 
Knowing  the  field  so  thoroughly  as  he  did,  he  was 
perhaps  not  prepared  for  that  panic  rout  into  which 
the  enemy  was  driven,  and  which  so  thoroughly  sur 
prised  Hood  himself.  Just  before  the  break  it  was 
the  Confederate  purpose  to  attack  that  very  right 
flank  with  which  Thomas  would  have  made  the 
movement,  and  which  Hood  declared  to  be  in  air. 

The  history  of  the  Nashville  campaign  is  indeed 
a  triumphant  vindication  of  the  policy  and  conduct 
of  Thomas.  No  further  or  other  answer  is  needed 
to  the  antecedent  criticisms  from  Washington.  He 
could  not  have  left  Nashville  to  fight  at  Franklin 
with  any  propriety,  even  if  A.  J.  Smith  had  arrived 
in  time.  Everything  there  was  in  a  heterogeneous 
condition.  Old  troops  leaving,  new  troops  and  re 
cruits  coming  in  from  many  directions  ;  an  army  as 
yet  unorganized,  a  large  portion  of  the  cavalry  with 
out  horses,  he  was  absolutely  needed  at  that  point, 
and  every  moment  of  his  time  was  employed  in  an 
organization  and  assignment  of  positions  and  com 
mands,  and  getting  in  readiness  for  the  supreme 
moment  which  he  knew  must  soon  arrive.  It  is 
passing  strange  that  this  was  not  clear  to  General 
Grant  and  the  authorities  at  Washington. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS.  283 

Results  of  the  Battle  of  Nashville. — There  was  a 
great  revolution  of  sentiment  at  Washington.  As 
soon  as  the  victory  was  assured,  all  those  who  had 
been  assailing  him  with  impatient  remonstrances 
and  almost  abusive  urgency  had  suddenly  changed 
their  note,  and  were  as  full  of  panegyric  as  they  had 
been  of  reproach.  Lincoln  wrote  :  "  Please  accept 
for  yourself,  officers,  and  men,  the  nation's  thanks 
for  your  work  of  yesterday.  You  made  a  magnifi 
cent  beginning  ;  a  grand  consummation  is  within 
your  easy  reach." 

Secretary  Stanton  would  hardly  be  recognized  in 
the  following  dispatch,  sent  after  the  result  of  the 
first  day  : 

"  I  rejoice  in  tendering  to  you  and  the  gal 
lant  officers  and  soldiers  of  your  command  the 
thanks  of  this  department  for  the  brilliant  achieve 
ment  of  this  day,  and  hope  that  it  is  the  harbinger 
of  a  decisive  victory  that  will  crown  you  and  your 
army  with  honor,  and  do  much  toward  closing  the 
war.  We  shall  give  you  a  hundred  guns  in  the 
morning. 

(Signed)  "  E.  M.  STANTON, 

"  Secretary  of  War." 

But  Thomas  was  in  no  humor  for  accepting  this 
flattering  unction.  We  may  anticipate  by  saying  that 
the  Secretary's  former  unkind  dispatches  had  made 
such  an  enduring  impression  upon  General  Thomas, 


284  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

that  when  they  afterward  met  in  Washington,  and 
the  Secretary  told  him,  "  I  have  always  had  great 
confidence  in  you,"  the  words  were  so  in  contrast  to 
his  former  actions  that  Thomas  answered  :  "  Mr. 
Stanton,  I  am  sorry  to  hear  you  make  this  state 
ment.  I  have  not  been  treated  as  if  you  had  con 
fidence  in  me." 

General  Grant,  while  praising  him  for  his  victory, 
was  still  of  the  opinion,  however,  that  he  had  been 
slow,  and  that  he  might  have  fought  and  driven  back 
the  enemy  before  he  reached  Franklin — an  opinion 
in  which  he  has  not  been  supported  by  the  just  judg 
ment  of  the  best  military  critics.  In  speaking,  on  the 
1 5th  of  January,  of  the  chance  that  Beauregard  would 
collect  the  fragments  of  Hood's  army  and  go  against 
Sherman,  Grant  says  :  "  If  this  be  the  case,  Selma 
and  Montgomery  can  easily  be  reached.  I  do  not 
believe,  though,  that  General  Thomas  will  get  there 
from  the  North ;  he  is  too  ponderous  in  his  prepara 
tions  and  equipments  to  move  through  a  country 
rapidly  enough  to  live  off  of  it."  This  was  severe 
criticism,  and  deeply  did  Thomas  feel  it.  He  had 
never  failed,  he  had  never  been  beaten,  but  his  pon 
derous  blows  had  saved  the  army  when  many  of  the 
rapid  generals  had  used  their  fleetness  in  the  wrong 
direction. 

All  things  were  now  conspiring  against  the 
Confederacy  and  converging  to  a  crisis.  It  was 
a  foregone  conclusion  that  it  was  a  "lost  cause." 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE   AND  RESULTS.  285 

Sherman,  in  his  march  to  the  sea,  had  demonstrated 
their  weakness  in  that  whole  region,  and  was  now 
moving  through  the  Atlantic  States  against  J.  E. 
Johnston,  who  had  been  again — for  lack  of  an  abler 
man  who  could  not  be  found — reluctantly  placed  in 
command.  Thomas  had  disintegrated  the  army  of 
Hood.  Lee  was  holding  on  in  front  of  Richmond 
with  a  grip  which  was  very  rapidly  being  relaxed. 
All  the  Union  armies  were  closing  together  or  in 
close  relations,  and  it  was  manifest  that  the  end 
was  very  near.  Jefferson  Davis,  the  Confederate 
President,  was  about  to  be  captured  at  Irvinsville 
while  escaping  in  disguise. 

As  will  be  seen  by  Thomas's  order  after  the 
battle,  it  was  his  purpose  to  occupy  commanding 
points  in  the  enemy's  territory  and  let  his  army 
rest ;  but  this  was  not  to  be,  nor  can  we  think  it, 
on  the  whole,  the  wisest  course.  On  December 
3ist  Halleck  telegraphed  him:  "  Lieutenant-Gen 
eral  Grant  does  not  intend  that  your  army  should 
go  into  winter  quarters ;  it  must  be  ready  for  active 
operations  in  the  field."  General  A.  J.  Smith,  who 
had  taken  his  corps  to  Eastport,  whither  Wilson  had 
also  gone  with  his  cavalry,  was  then  put  under  the 
orders  of  General  Canby,  at  New  Orleans.  Schofield 
was  sent  with  the  Twenty-third  without  delay  to  join 
Sherman  in  his  upward  march  through  North  Caro 
lina.  What  remained  of  Hood's  force  was  divided  : 
Cheatham  and  S.  P.  Lee  marching  through  Selma 


286  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

and  Montgomery  to  harass  General  Sherman  in  rear 
and  flank,  while  the  remnant  joined  General  Richard 
Taylor  at  Meridian,  and  took  no  part  in  the  later 
movements. 

Whatever  was  the  judgment  of  his  superiors,  the 
country  at  large  now  accepted  Thomas  as  a  model 
chieftain.  On  the  24th  of  December,  1864,  the  Presi 
dent  nominated  him  as  a  major  general  in  the  army, 
a  distinction  which  he  himself  thought  he  had  de 
served  much  earlier.  "  I  suppose,"  he  said  to  a 
friend,  "  it  is  better  late  than  never,  but  it  is  too  late 
to  be  appreciated  ;  I  earned  this  at  Chickamauga  "- 
and  indeed  he  had. 

"  There  is  one  thing,"  he  said  on  another  occa 
sion,  "  about  my  promotions  that  is  exceedingly 
gratifying:  I  never  received  a  promotion  they  dared 
to  withhold.  After  Chickamauga  they  could  not  re 
fuse  a  commission  as  brigadier  general  in  the  United 
States  army,  and  after  Nashville  a  major  general's 
commission." 

On  the  3d  of  March,  1865,  by  a  joint  resolution 
of  the  two  Houses,  Congress  voted  its  thanks  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  his  officers  and  men,  for  the  victory  at 
Nashville.  On  the  2d  of  November  a  similar  reso 
lution  was  passed  by  the  General  Assembly  of  Ten 
nessee,  and  a  gold  medal  was  presented  to  him  in 
commemoration  of  the  event. 

We  may  pass  over  the  remaining  events  of  the 
war  with  the  mere  mention  of  the  proposed  move- 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND   RESULTS.  287 

ment  of  Canby  into  Alabama  ;  the  cavalry  move 
ments  of  Wilson  upon  Selma  and  the  Southern  capi 
tal,  Montgomery  ;  and  Stoneman  into  Virginia  and 
western  North  Carolina — all  to  chime  with  Sheri 
dan's  movement  upon  Lynchburg  in  February,  1865. 
The  main  features  of  Stoneman's  very  brilliant 
expedition  were  as  follows :  It  was  under  orders 
from  General  Grant  to  Thomas  that  Stoneman  was 
directed  to  move  with  a  force  of  cavalry  ten  thou 
sand  strong  with  the  utmost  celerity  into  North 
Carolina  and  southern  Virginia,  to  make  a  diversion 
in  favor  of  Sherman's  march  in  that  part  of  these 
States  beyond  his  reach.  By  the  24th  of  March  he 
had  reached  Jonesboro,  marching  without  impedi 
menta  ;  on  the  2yth  he  was  at  the  Watauga  River  ; 
thence  over  the  Blue  Ridge  he  marched  to  Salem, 
Virginia.  He  divided  his  force  for  separate  raids,  re 
uniting  again  when  the  special  work  was  done ;  and 
he  made  such  wholesale  destruction  as  belittles  for 
mer  similar  achievements  ;  supplies  of  corn,  rice,  and 
other  provisions,  guns,  small  arms,  powder,  maga 
zines,  stations  and  depots,  long  lines  of  railroads, 
bridges,  etc.,  were  destroyed  ;  the  Tennessee  and 
Virginia  Railroad,  that  grand  artery,  was  cut  at 
many  points;  many  wagon  trains  and  more  than  six 
thousand  prisoners  were  captured.  He  was  moving 
on  toward  Lynchburg,  the  object  of  Sheridan's  raid 
from  the  East ;  from  Salisbury  he  had  proceeded  as 
far  as  Asheville  ;  there  he  received  the  news  of  Sher- 


288  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

man's  armistice,  which  put  an  end  to  his  expedition. 
Stoneman  met  with  but  little  opposition,  but  did  in 
credible  injury  to  the  enemy's  territory  and  war 
material. 

We  turn  to  the  other  and  far  the  more  conse 
quential  expedition — that  of  Wilson.  Space  is  lack 
ing  to  give  details.  As  Canby  was  desired  to  take 
Mobile,  the  first  purpose  of  Grant  was  that  General 
Wilson  should  simply  co-operate  with  him  ;  to  this 
end  he  was  to  capture  Selma  or  Montgomery,  or 
both,  if  possible. 

Wilson,  a  general  by  intuition  and  a  dashing 
cavalryman,  wanted  a  little  larger  scope,  and  this, 
with  Grant's  sanction,  Thomas  granted  him.  If  he 
could  do  what  was  asked  of  him,  or  rather  what  he 
proposed,  he  might  go  farther  and  do  more.  The 
expedition  traveled  light,  but  had  a  canvas  pontoon 
train  of  thirty  boats,  and  provisions  for  forty  days. 
Taking  only  three  divisions,  because  he  required  the 
horses  of  the  fourth  to  remount  these,  he  crossed 
the  river  on  the  i8th  of  March,  and  started  on  the 
22d  from  Chickasaw  with  twelve  thousand  mounted 
men  and  fifteen  hundred  unmounted,  through  a 
country  so  denuded  of  supplies  that  he  was  obliged 
to  divide  his  force,  in  order,  while  still  within  sup 
porting  distance,  to  subsist  his  troops.  Thus  sepa 
rating  and  uniting,  he  converged  upon  Selma. 

On  April  ist  the  main  body  was  at  Plantersville. 
Selma,  an  important  manufacturing  town,  is  situated 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS.  289 

on  the  north  bank  of  the  Alabama  River,  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  miles  above  Mobile,  and  is  one  hun 
dred  feet  above  the  mean  water  level ;  it  seemed 
to  be  adequately  defended  by  Forrest  with  three 
brigades  of  Confederate  cavalry  and  a  force  of 
infantry  and  militia.  The  assault  upon  the  town 
was  gallantly  made  by  General  Long,  who  was 
wounded,  and  it  was  taken.  It  is  recorded  that 
where  the  way  of  the  assailants  was  barred  by 
stockades  the  men  in  the  rear  ran,  and,  jumping 
upon  the  backs  of  the  advanced  men,  crossed  the 
stockade  and  entered  the  inclosure  by  a  "  leap 
frog"  movement.  Forrest  requested  an  interview 
with  Wilson  at  Catawba,  on  April  6th,  to  effect 
an  exchange  of  prisoners,  without  result.  Selma 
was  almost  entirely  destroyed,  with  large  stores  of 
every  kind.  The  captures  included  thirty-one  field- 
pieces,  one  thirty-pounder,  two  thousand  seven  hun 
dred  prisoners,  three  thousand  horses  (very  much 
needed  by  Wilson  for  remounts),  and  a  large  quan 
tity  of  stores  of  all  kinds. 

On  the  loth  of  April,  in  the  exercise  of  his  roving 
commission,  Wilson  crossed  the  river  and  moved 
upon  Montgomery,  the  first  Confederate  capital, 
being  sure  that  Mobile  was  already  upon  Canby's 
list  of  conquests.  Montgomery  surrendered  on  the 
1 2th,  and  there  again  the  material  supports  of  the 
Confederacy  were  destroyed.  Nearly  one  hundred 
thousand  bales  of  cotton  were  burned  ;  steamboats, 


290 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


locomotives,  and  foundries  were  captured  and  ruined. 
Thence  a  detachment  moved  on  West  Point,  while 
the  main  part  of  the  cavalry  marched  to  Columbus, 
Georgia,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Chattahoochee, 
where  there  was  more  wholesale  destruction,  in 
cluding  the  ram  Jackson.  Still  further  unrelenting, 
the  force  proceeded  to  Macon,  which  it  reached  on 
April  2 1  st.  There  Wilson  heard  of  the  armistice 
between  Johnston  and  Sherman,  but  as  it  did  not 
come  through  what  he  regarded  as  a  reliable  source, 
he  discredited  it,  and  captured  the  city  with  its  gar 
rison,  including  Generals  Howell  Cobb,  G.  W.  Smith, 
and  Mackall.  On  the  2ist  of  April  a  dispatch  from 
Sherman  came  through  General  Thomas  announcing 
the  truth,  and  ordering  him  to  desist  from  further 
hostilities. 

This  separate  expeditionary  campaign  of  Wilson 
deserves  a  fuller  record  ;  but  the  statistics  given  are 
sufficient  to  impress  the  reader  with  its  great  merit 
and  its  potent  influence  in  bringing  about  the  close 
of  the  war.  It  has  a  remarkable  correlation  with  all 
the  great  events  of  the  period.  Sherman's  march 
through  Georgia  had  disclosed  the  rapidly  failing 
strength  of  the  Confederacy  in  men,  money,  mu 
nitions,  and  supplies.  The  brilliant  campaign  of 
Nashville  under  Thomas  had  disintegrated  their  last 
considerable  army,  except  that  of  Lee,  in  the  entire 
field.  The  bold,  independent  advance  of  Wilson  ;  his 
fierce  and  successive  assaults  of  fortified  places  ;  the 


THE   BATTLE  OF   NASHVILLE  AND   RESULTS.  29 1 

relentless  following  up  of  success ;  the  capture  of  the 
"  last  ditch  "  at  Macon,  and  the  arrest  of  the  Con 
federate  President  in  disguise,  declared  that  the  Con 
federacy  had  really  ceased  to  exist,  needing  only  the 
formal  surrender  at  Appomattox  Court  House  to 
announce  the  fact  to  the  expectant  world. 

Then  came  in  speedy  succession  the  grand  return 
march  of  General  Sherman  from  Savannah  to  re- 
enforce  the  Federal  army  in  front  of  Richmond  ;  the 
close  of  the  war  by  the  surrender  of  Lee  at  Appo 
mattox  Court  House;  the  armistice  of  Sherman  with 
Johnston's  troops,  and  the  great  controversy  there 
by  excited ;  and,  finally,  the  capture  of  Jefferson 
Davis  by  Wilson's  cavalry  troops  near  Irvinsville, 
Georgia,  on  the  nth  of  May.  With  all  these  Thomas 
had  only  indirect  connection  and  no  immediate  com 
mand,  and  they  are  treated  of  in  other  of  these 
biographies. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  Thomas  was  the  junior 
of  six  major  generals  in  the  Union  army.*  He  had 
on  the  iyth  of  January,  1865,  been  assigned  by  the 
President  to  the  command  of  the  territory  occupied 
by  the  troops  of  the  departments  of  the  Ohio  and  the 
Cumberland.  When  the  surrender  of  Johnston  was 
announced  on  the  29th  of  April,  he  attempted  at 

*  Up  to  and  including  the  rank  of  colonel  in  the  army  the 
promotion  is  lineal.  Generals  of  every  grade  are  nominated  by 
the  President  without  regard  to  their  lineal  rank.  He  may  nomi 
nate  a  lieutenant  to  be  a  general.  The  assignment  to  a  desired 
command  is  generally  regarded  the  privilege  of  relative  rank. 
20 


292 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


once  to  introduce  social  order  into  that  region.  By 
an  order  from  Washington  on  the  ;th  of  June  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Tennessee  was  created,  and 
he  was  assigned  to  the  command.  It  consisted  of 
the  five  departments  of  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Geor 
gia,  Alabama,  and  Florida. 

It  would  be  unnecessary  and  unprofitable  to  dwell 
upon  the  part  taken  by  Thomas  in  the  reconstruction 
and  restoration  of  the  seceded  States.  While  his 
Southern  birth  and  education  may  seem  to  have 
given  him  a  better  knowledge  of  the  people  and 
their  needs,  and  while  his  honesty  assured  that  his 
purpose  would  be  carried  out  without  fear  or  preju 
dice,  he  himself  seemed  to  think,  and  no  doubt  justly, 
that  his  efforts  in  that  direction  would  not  be  accept 
able  to  the  Southern  people,  who  still  looked  with 
some  bitterness  upon  what  they  considered  his  defec 
tion  from  their  cause.  It  was  due  to  this  that  he  de 
clined  the  detail  to  New  Orleans,  and  his  mind  under 
went  certain  changes  of  purpose  from  the  time  when 
he  left  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  to  assume 
command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Tennessee. 
This  was  June  22,  1865. 

In  the  beginning  of  1866  he  testified  before  the 
reconstruction  committee  in  favor  of  having  repre 
sentatives  in  Congress  from  Tennessee,  of  restrict 
ing  the  use  of  United  States  troops  to  service  when 
requested  by  the  governors  of  States,  of  keeping 
troops  in  the  departments  "both  for  their  moral 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS.  293 

effect  upon  the  lawless  portion  of  the  community, 
and  for  assistance  to  the  civil  authorities  when  re 
quired."  He  adds,  "  I  can  not  but  admit  they  are 
of  little  use  where  thk  officers  of  the  civil  law  do  not 
perform  their  duties."  He  recognizes  and  reports 
the  various  organizations  in  the  South  hostile  to  the 
Government  which  impeded  the  progress  of  peace 
and  quiet ;  and  yet  at  the  same  time  he  says  there 
is  evidence  "  that  the  mass  of  the  people  were  very 
happy  at  the  downfall  of  the  rebellion  and  at  the 
prospect  of  soon  getting  again  under  the  Constitu 
tion  and  Government  of  the  United  States."  But  no 
one  recognized  more  fully  the  fact  that  after  so  ter 
rible  a  struggle  there  must  be  after-waves,  and  that, 
while  promptness  and  firmness  were  necessary  in 
dealing  with  the  embittered  inhabitants,  every  effort 
should  be  made  by  kindness  and  tact  to  win  them 
back  to  their  allegiance.  The  wise  policy  and  tem 
perate  justice  of  General  Thomas,  combined  with 
firmness,  were  shown  when  the  rebellion  was  in  its 
last  stages,  by  his  action  with  regard  to  the  Bishop 
of  Alabama,  in  dealing  with  which  he  acted  with  pru 
dence,  firmness,  and  generosity.  When  the  sergeant- 
at-arms  of  the  Tennessee  Legislature  asked  for  the 
aid  of  Federal  soldiers  to  punish  refractory  mem 
bers,  Thomas  applied  to  the  War  Department  for 
instructions,  and,  according  to  those  instructions,  he 
declined  to  interfere  in  the  doings  of  the  State  Legis 
lature. 


294  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

On  the  1 2th  of  June,  1865,  the  General  Assembly 
of  Tennessee  adopted  resolutions  expressing  their 
sincere  pleasure  at  the  appointment  of  General 
Thomas  to  command  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Tennessee.  They  speak  of  him  as  the  model  soldier. 
They  hoped  for  early  peace  and  quiet,  and  Union 
ism  to  prevail  by  reason  of  his  appointment.  They 
thanked  the  President  and  the  War  Department  for 
assigning  him  to  them,  and  they  adopted  him  as  a 
citizen  of  Tennessee.  On  the  25th  of  August,  1866, 
the  Legislature  of  Tennessee  passed  a  resolution  to 
purchase  a  life-size  portrait  of  General  Thomas,  to 
be  placed  in  the  Capitol. 

Rapid  changes  were  made  in  the  constitution 
and  territory  of  his  division,  and  he  was,  by  order, 
on  the  26th  of  August,  1867,  and  at  his  own  request, 
placed  in  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Cum 
berland,  comprising  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  and  West 
Virginia,  with  his  headquarters  at  Louisville.  On 
the  2ist  of  February,  1868,  President  Johnson  nomi 
nated  him  to  the  United  States  Senate  for  the  bre 
vets  of  lieutenant  general  and  general.  At  that  time 
Johnson  was  in  the  midst  of  his  imbroglio  with  the 
authorities  at  Washington,  which  led  to  his  impeach 
ment,  and  it  is  probable  that  these  nominations  were 
intended  to  precede  a  blow  at  General  Grant ;  but 
that  was  not  the  ground  upon  which  Thomas  de 
clined  them.  "I  have  done,"  he  said,  "no  service 
since  the  war  to  deserve  so  high  a  compliment,  and 


THE   BATTLE  OF   NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS.  295 

it  is  now  too  late  to  be  regarded  as  a  compliment  if 
conferred  for  services  during  the  war." 

Efforts  were  also  made  at  that  time  to  make  him 
a  candidate  for  the  presidency  of  the  United  States. 
Had  he  become  so,  there  is  little  doubt  that  he  would 
have  swept  the  country.  We  can  not  better  present 
his  views  on  the  subject  than  in  a  few  words  taken 
from  letters  written  in  answer  to  such  a  request.  In 
one  he  says  :  "  I  have  too  much  regard  for  my  own 
self-respect  to  voluntarily  place  myself  in  a  position 
where  my  personal  and  private  character  can  be  as 
sailed  with  impunity  by  newspaper  men  and  scurril 
ous  political  pettifoggers  and  demagogues." 

On  the  8th  of  March,  1870,  when  the  question 
was  again  mooted,  he  writes  :  "  My  services  are  now, 
as  they  have  always  been,  subject  to  the  call  of  the 
Government  in  whatever  military  capacity  I  may  be 
considered  competent  and  worthy  to  fill,  and  will  be 
cordially  undertaken  whenever  called  upon  to  ren 
der  them.  All  civil  honors  and  duties  I  shall  con 
tinue  to  decline." 

As  to  further  promotion,  it  was  natural  that  Han 
cock,  Meade,  and  Thomas  might  each  have  hoped 
to  be  appointed  lieutenant  general  after  Sherman  ; 
but  Sheridan  had  equal  claims  and  a  very  popular 
record,  and  that  question  was  set  at  rest  by  his  ap 
pointment.  When  he  died,  all  these  distinguished 
generals  had  preceded  him  into  "  the  silent  land." 

It  has  not  been   considered  necessary  to  dwell 


296  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

upon  the  subject  of  his  later  appointments  to 
command,  complicated  sometimes  by  the  ques 
tions  of  seniority,  character  of  former  services,  etc. 
Through  the  kindness  of  Major  W.  H.  Lambert  the 
following  letter,  now  first  printed,  opens  to  the  read 
er  a  glimpse  of  the  feeling  of  Thomas  when  the  ques 
tion  of  assigning  him  to  the  command  in  New  Or 
leans  was  first  considered.  While  he  manfully  gives 
his  own  reason  for  declining  the  assignment,  his 
friends  really  think  that  the  germs  of  the  disorder 
which  carried  him  off  were  already  in  his  system, 
and  that  he  had  great  reason  for  the  utmost  care, 
although  he  did  not  appear  to  think  so. 

[COPY.] 

"  LOUISVILLE,  KY.,  September  7,  1867. 
"  DEAR  COLONEL  :  .  .  .  I  wish  to  remove  any  im 
pression  which  may  have  been  made  on  your  mind 
regarding  the  state  of  my  health.  Early  in  the  sum 
mer  Dr.  Hassen,  at  my  request,  gave  me  medicine  as 
an  alterative  after  I  had  described  to  him  a  peculiar 
sensation  which  I  had  in  my  right  side.  It  was  dis 
agreeable,  and  that  is  all  that  can  be  said  of  it ;  but 
the  doctor  thought  that  unless  I  took  blue  mass, 
to  restore  a  healthy  action  of  the  liver,  I  might 
eventually  be  attacked  with  some  disease  of  the 
liver  that  would  be  very  disagreeable  if  not  lead  to 
worse  consequences.  The  medicine  had  given  me 
great  relief,  but  in  the  course  of  time  I  had  to  go  to 


THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  AND  RESULTS. 

West  Virginia  on  official  business,  that  State  being 
now  a  part  of  my  command.  It  so  happened  that 
while  on  that  trip  the  President  issued  his  order  for 
me  to  relieve  Sheridan.  I  have  heard  that  Dr.  Has- 
sen,  as  soon  as  the  order  reached  him,  telegraphed 
to  the  adjutant  general  that  he  did  not  think  it  right 
to  send  me  to  New  Orleans  in  the  yellow  fever  sea 
son,  because  of  what  he  knew  of  my  condition.  I 
heard  of  the  order  in  Lewisburg,  West  Virginia,  and 
immediately  protested  to  General  Grant  against  go 
ing  to  New  Orleans,  not  on  the  score  of  health  or 
because  the  yellow  fever  was  in  New  Orleans,  but 
because  of  the  hostility  of  the  people  toward  me, 
making  it  impossible  for  me  to  be  of  any  service  in 
endeavoring  to  reconstruct  the  Southern  States.  In 
fact,  I  made  the  same  protest  against  going  to  New 
Orleans  that  I  did  last  May  against  taking  command 
of  the  Third  Military  District.  I  presume,  to  ease 
off  the  withdrawal  of  the  order,  it  was  stated  that, 
owing  to  the  unfavorable  condition  of  my  health,  as 
reported  by  the  Medical  Director  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Cumberland,  I  was  released  from  the 
operation  of  General  Order  No.  77,  and  Hancock 
was  detailed  to  assume  command  of  the  Fifth  Mili 
tary  District  after  being  relieved  by  Sheridan.  .  .  . 

Yours  truly, 

(Signed)  "  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS. 

"  Colonel  R.  A.  RAMSEY,  Pottsville,  Pa" 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

LAST    SERVICES    AND    DEATH. 

Eastern  military  division  given  to  Meade — Thomas  goes  to  the 
Pacific — Health  undermined — Death  at  San  Francisco,  1870 
— Apoplexy — Died  in  harness — Body  taken  to  Troy,  N.  Y. 
— General  sorrow — Committee  of  Congress — Pall-bearers — 
Monuments — Unveiling  of  the  equestrian  statue  at  Washing 
ton — Men  of  all  politics  join — Summary  of  his  character — 
High  honor — Independence — Refusal  of  gifts — Self-sacrifice 
— His  sensitiveness — Both  strategist  and  tactician — Contro 
versies  dying  out — His  ever-increasing  reputation. 

AFTER  the  war  General  Thomas  was  long  de 
sirous  to  have  command  of  the  Eastern  Division  of 
the  army;  but  as  it  had  been  promised  to  General 
Meade,  who  ranked  him  as  a  major  general  by  four 
months,  he  accepted  the  command  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Pacific,  and  reached  San  Francisco 
on  the  ist  of  June,  1869. 

It  is  said  that  the  order  assigning  Schofield  to 
that  division  had  been  actually  written,  but  that 
Schofield  declined  it  in  favor  of  Thomas.  On  the 
point  of  etiquette,  however,  it  should  also  be  said 
that  Thomas  claimed  that  assignment  as  his  right. 
With  characteristic  system  and  energy  he  made  a 
thorough  inspection  of  all  the  posts  in  the  entire 


LAST   SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 


299 


territory  of  his  command,  but  his  labors  were  ap 
proaching  their  end,  and  that  a  sudden  one.  He 
was  to  be  one  of  a  large  number  of  distinguished 
generals  who,  by  reason  of  their  hard  lives  during 
the  war,  carried  latent  within  them  the  seeds  of 
premature  death,  although  they  presented  the  ap 
pearance  of  general  health  and  vigor. 

On  the  28th  of  March,  1870,  he  had  gone  to  his 
office  in  San  Francisco,  and  was  sitting  in  his  private 
room,  when,  shortly  after  one  o'clock,  his  aid-de 
camp,  Colonel  Kellogg,  was  preparing  to  go  in  to 
obtain  his  signature  to  certain  papers.  All  the  other 
officers  having  left  the  building  for  luncheon,  Gen 
eral  Thomas  opened  the  door  of  the  inner  office, 
and,  falling  outward,  became  unconscious.  Calling 
a  messenger  to  aid  him,  Colonel  Kellogg  loosened 
his  clothing,  and  then  placed  him  upon  a  sofa,  throw 
ing  the  doors  and  windows  open  for  air.  The  day 
was  murky  and  disagreeable.  The  army  surgeons 
were  sent  for — Drs.  Murray  and  McCormick — but 
by  reason  of  a  delay  in  finding  them,  a  young  physi 
cian  who  was  nearer  was  called  in.  Slight  but  tem 
porary  relief  was  given  by  the  remedies  adminis 
tered,  and  the  general  returned  for  a  few  minutes 
to  consciousness.  Mrs.  Thomas  was  prepared  for 
the  sad  news  of  his  illness,  and  joined  him  in  his 
office  before  he  died. 

The  last  paper  issuing  from  his  pen  was  an  an 
swer  to  a  letter  in  the  New  York  Tribune  of  March 


3°° 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


12,  1870,  unjust  in  the  extreme,  and  which  had  given 
him  great  pain.  It  was  severely  criticising  the  Nash 
ville  campaign  in  the  interests  of  Schofield.  The 
closing  words  which  he  had  written  were  blurred  and 
somewhat  incoherent.  The  abrupt  close  of  the  pa 
per  reads  thus  :  "  The  necessity  existing  until  the 
army  fell  back  to  Nashville  gave  Schofield  the  op 
portunity  to  fight  the  battle  of  Franklin.  This  was 
a  very  brilliant  battle,  most  disastrous  to  the  enemy, 
and,  as  the  writer  in  the  Tribune  says,  no  doubt  ma 
terially  contributed  to  the  crowning  success  at  Nash 
ville."  Then  follow  the  blurred  and  disconnected 
lines  attempted  while  he  was  suddenly  struck  by  the 
hand  of  death. 

Soon  relapsing  into  unconsciousness,  he  died 
shortly  after  seven  o'clock  that  evening.  An  au 
topsy  made  the  next  day  determined  the  cause  to  be 
apoplexy.  Two  arteries  near  the  heart  had  been 
somewhat  ossified,  and  were  found  broken.  "  He 
literally  died,"  says  his  aid-de-camp,  "  in  harness." 
His  death  occurred  and  he  was  laid  out  in  the  office 
where  he  had  worked,  and  he  was  carried  thence  to 
the  Lick  House,  where  he  had  lived  and  where  the 
funeral  services  were  held. 

Thence  by  rail  his  body  was  taken  across  the  Con 
tinent,  from  the  Pacific  to  the  Atlantic,  to  the  fami 
ly  lot  at  Troy,  on  the  Hudson.  There  his  remains 
arrived  in  charge  of  his  personal  staff  on  the  yth 
of  April,  1870.  It  may  be  said  that  they  crossed 


LAST   SERVICES   AND   DEATH.  301 

the  Continent  amid  the  mourning  and  high  pane 
gyric  of  every  State  they  passed  through.  Taken 
at  once  from  the  station  to  St.  Paul's  Church,  they 
were  visited  by  thousands,  among  whom  were  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  with  members  of 
his  Cabinet  and  other  high  functionaries  from  all 
parts  of  the  land.  General  Thomas  had-died  on  the 
28th  of  March.  On  the  3oth  a  joint  resolution  was 
passed  by  Congress  declaring  the  national  sorrow 
for  his  loss.  At  a  meeting  held  in  the  hall  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  a  committee  of  thirteen 
— six  senators  and  seven  representatives — was  ap 
pointed  to  attend  the  funeral. 

The  public  buildings  and  many  others  were  cov 
ered  with  funeral  emblems.  The  pallbearers  were 
his  most  distinguished  comrades  of  the  war — Gen 
erals  Meade,  Rosecrans,  Schofield,  Hazen,  Granger, 
Newton,  McKay,  and  Hooker.  The  funeral  services 
were  conducted  by  William  C.  Doane,  D.  D.,  Protes 
tant  Episcopal  Bishop  of  Albany,  and  the  remains  of 
the  splendid  soldier  and  model  man  were  deposited  in 
the  funeral  vault,  in  waiting  for  a  more  blessed  im 
mortality.  The  monument  marking  the  spot  Mrs. 
Thomas*  preferred  to  erect  herself  in  Oakwood 
Cemetery ;  it  is  a  sarcophagus,  on  which  are  in 
scribed  the  dates  of  his  birth  and  death,  and  on  the 

*  This  estimable  lady,  who  made  her  residence  in  Washington 
city,  followed  her  husband  to  the  grave  on  December  26,  1890. 
She  was  found  dead  in  her  bed. 


302  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

top  a  granite  eagle  holding  a  model  of  the  sword 
with  which  he  achieved  his  great  renown. 

Honors  to  his  Memory. — At  the  time  of  his  death 
General  Thomas  was  the  President  of  the  Society 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  which  had  been 
founded  in  February,  1868.*  His  inaugural  speech 
at  Cincinnati  was  an  admirable  exposition  of  his 
character,  and  a  fine  opening  for  the  Society,  which 
exists  still  in  pristine  vigor.  At  their  first  meeting 
after  his  decease,  among  other  resolutions,  the  fol 
lowing  was  passed  :  "  That  some  fitting  monument 
should  be  erected  by  his  countrymen  to  mark  the 
spot  where  the  remains  of  our  beloved  commander 
rest,  and  that  this  Society  shall  take  the  initiatory 
steps  for  its  erection.  And  to  that  end  a  com 
mittee  of  one  from  each  State  represented  in  this 
Society  be  now  appointed  to  arrange  some  method 
to  procure  the  necessary  funds,  and  to  provide  a 
design,  specifications,  and  estimates  therefor,  and 
to  report  at  the  next  meeting."  As  has  been  seen, 
the  spot  in  Oakwood  Cemetery,  at  Troy,  was  marked 
by  the  monument  provided  by  Mrs.  Thomas.  An 
equestrian  statue  was  proposed.  Congress  appro 
priated  captured  brass  guns,  and  the  statue  was 


*  The  badge  of  the  army,  which  had  been  formally  adopted 
on  June  19,  1865,  at  Nashville,  was  a  five-pointed  star,  in  the 
center  of  which  was  a  triangle  inclosing  an  acorn  ;  the  ribbon  is 
red,  white,  and  blue,  and  on  the  pin  is  engraved  "  The  Army  of 
the  Cumberland." 


LAST    SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 


303 


made  by  J.  Q.  A.  Ward.  It  is  one  of  the  most  suc 
cessful  of  the  statues  of  our  great  soldiers. 

The  committee,  which  had  been  further  appointed 
on  the  statue  to  be  erected  at  Washington,  met  from 
time  to  time,  but  nearly  ten  years  had  elapsed  before 
they  reported  that  the  statue  had  been  cast  and  ac 
cepted,  and  the  Society  in  large  numbers  were  ready 
to  unveil  it  on  the  2oth  of  November,  1879.  The 
time  chosen  was  the  eleventh  annual  convention  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  it 
brought  together  a  great  number  of  his  former  com 
rades  of  the  society  and  representatives  of  sister 
societies.  There  was  a  general  interest,  confined  to 
no  party  or  military  class.  Letters  from  Generals 
Grant  and  Sheridan  and  other  most  distinguished 
military  men  and  statesmen,  who  were  prevented 
from  attending  in  person,  were  read.  It  was  far 
more  than  the  ordinary  nil  nisi  bonum.  The  memory 
of  his  worthy  deeds  and  august  virtues  was  still 
abroad  throughout  the  country,  and  there  was  a 
general  concurrence  of  high  honor  to  his  memory. 
One  distinguishing  mark  of  the  correspondence  was 
the  eminent  appreciation  of  Thomas  by  the  old  Con 
federate  commanders,  who,  forgetting  and  forgiving 
the  ancient  quarrel,  were  loud  in  their  praise  of  the 
man  and  the  soldier. 

Senator  Butler,  of  South  Carolina,  says  :  "  I 
should  have  great  pleasure  in  being  present  at 
your  interesting  ceremonies,  whereby  you  propose 


304 


GENERAL   THOMAS, 


to  do  honor  to  the  memory  of  one  of  the  ablest  of 
American  soldiers."  Senator  Withers,  of  Virginia, 
who  had  been  a  Confederate  general,  said  :  "  The 
occasion  is  one  of  great  interest  to  all  who  ad 
mire  manliness  and  courage,  unselfish  devotion  to 
duty,  and  military  genius  of  the  highest  order." 
The  Governor  of  Alabama  writes :  "  It  was  my 
fortune  to  fight  on  the  other  side,  but  I  none  the 
less  appreciate  the  devotion  and  sacrifices  of  the 
humane  soldier,  and  am  none  the  less  proud  of  his 
splendid  deeds  of  endurance  and  daring." 

Later,  the  Confederate  Colonel  Archer  Anderson, 
in  an  address  delivered  in  Richmond  before  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  on  October  22,  1881, 
highly  eulogizes  "  this  distinguished  Virginian, 
George  H.  Thomas,  who  was  at  the  head  of  a 
corps,"  and  declares  that  while  "there  have  been 
times  when  a  Virginian  might  not  be  trusted  to 
speak  impartially  of  this  famous  Virginian,  sixteen 
years  have  assuaged  the  bitterness  of  civil  strife  so 
that  justice  may  be  done  him."  General  Dabney  H. 
Maury  eulogizes  him,  and  General  David  H.  Hill 
says  that  Thomas  gave  the  death  blow  to  the  Con 
federacy  at  Chickamauga. 

Perhaps  the  tribute  of  General  Anson  G.  Mc- 
Cook,  the  orator  of  the  occasion,  was  at  once  the 
most  just,  splendid,  and  enthusiastic  eulogium  that 
found  utterance  at  that  time.  These  are  his  closing 
words  :  "  His  patriotism  was  not  circumscribed  by 


LAST   SERVICES   AND   DEATH.  305 

the  narrow  limits  of  his  native  State,  but  it  was  as 
broad  and  catholic  as  his  own  great  nature.  Vir 
ginia,  the  mother  of  States  and  statesmen,  has  been 
the  birthplace  of  many  whose  fame  and  virtues  are 
the  common  heritage  of  the  republic,  but  the  State 
of  Washington,  of  Jefferson,  of  Madison,  of  Mar 
shall,  and  of  Scott  never  brought  forth  a  nobler 
son,  a  better  citizen,  a  truer  soldier,  or  a  more  un 
selfish  patriot  than  George  H.  Thomas." 

The  bronze  statue  was  erected  in  the  fine  open 
space  at  the  intersection  of  Massachusetts,  Rhode 
Island,  and  Vermont  Avenues,  and  Fourteenth  and 
M  Streets.  The  eloquent  presentation  address  was 
made  by  the  Hon.  Stanley  Matthews,  and  the  statue 
was  received  for  the  nation  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States. 

By  special  invitation  of  the  Society,  General  Gar- 
field  delivered  at  Cleveland,  Ohio,  a  memorial  ad 
dress  on  his  life  and  achievements,  in  which  he  dwelt 
particularly  on  the  service  he  knew  best,  for  he  was 
with  him  then  at  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  Every 
where  his  death  was  regarded  as  a  national  calamity. 

The  author's  task  has  come  to  an  end.  A  fuller 
life  might  have  been  written,  but  the  purpose  of  this 
work  is  not  to  give  details  of  his  actions  so  much  as 
to  combine  statistics  with  the  object  of  drawing 
conclusions  as  to  his  character  and  merits.  It  is 
intended  as  a  miniature  of  the  man.  If  the  great 


306  GENERAL  THOMAS. 

deeds  and  high  character  of  General  Thomas,  as 
attempted  to  be  delineated  in  this  volume,  do  not 
fully  bear  out  the  conclusion  just  enunciated,  the 
fault  must  be  in  the  author. 

His  personality  at  the  opening  of  the  war  has 
been  already  portrayed.  He  grew  with  its  con 
tinuance  in  power,  virtue,  and  excellence.  He  was 
modest  and  retiring,  but  firm  and  exceedingly  inde 
pendent.  Always  a  man  of  refinement,  he  was  no 
anchorite,  but  lived  well  in  his  campaigns,  having 
perhaps  a  better  appointed  train  of  creature  com 
forts  than  many  of  his  companion  generals ;  he 
was  not  abstinent  but  temperate,  and  kept  a  camp 
establishment  such  as  Marmont  prescribes  for  his 
model  general  "who  fulfills  all  the  conditions  of 
command":  "He  should  constantly  dispense  hos 
pitality.  Never  should  an  officer  come  to  his  head 
quarters  on  service  without  receiving  due  recog 
nition  and  kind  reception."  He  kept  a  good  mili 
tary  household,  and  all  who  came  were  made 
comfortable.  He  had  a  naturally  high  temper, 
which  he  kept  under  good  control.  When  it  did 
explode  it  was  to  denounce  injustice  and  unman- 
liness  wherever  it  appeared  ;  he  was  at  once  an  ex 
emplar  and  a  judge.  Firm  in  the  Christian  faith, 
he  did  not  flourish  his  opinions  before  the  world, 
but  kept  them  for  his  own  self-communings — a  sacred 
secrecy  which  his  biographer  must  not  invade  or 
speculate  upon. 


LAST   SERVICES   AND    DEATH. 


307 


There  is  little  to  be  added  to  the  record  of  his 
character  and  his  fame.  He  scorned  the  very  first 
glimpses  of  sordidness  and  greed,  and  denounced 
them  in  unmeasured  terms.  Although  not  a  rich 
man,  and  although  he  considered,  be  the  truth  what 
it  may,  that  his  services  had  not  been  properly  ap 
preciated  and  remunerated,  he  constantly  refused  to 
receive  presents  from  any  source,  although  others 
were  receiving  them,  and  when  it  was  not  con 
sidered  wrong  to  accept  them.  Grateful  citizens  of 
wealth  were  offering  to  distinguished  defenders  of 
the  country  houses,  ready  money,  and  all  sorts  of 
gifts.  He  was  particularly  sensitive  on  that  score. 
Just  as  the  war  was  coming  to  a  close,  a  number  of 
his  admirers  found  no  difficulty  in  making  up  a  long 
purse  to  buy  him  a  house  in  Cincinnati,  as  houses 
had  been  bought  for  distinguished  generals  in  other 
cities.  As  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  project  he  nipped 
it  in  the  bud,  declaring  to  those  who  had  it  in  hand 
that  nothing  could  prevail  upon  him  to  accept  such 
a  present,  but  that  if  they  wanted  to  make  good  use 
of  the  money  they  might  distribute  it  to  needy  wid 
ows  of  soldiers  who  had  died  during  the  war. 

When  in  the  month  of  May,  1869,  he  was  about 
to  leave  Louisville  in  order  to  take  command  on  the 
Pacific  coast,  another  opportunity  of  showing  his 
objection  to  receiving  gifts  presented  itself.  Just 
at  the  close  of  the  war  a  considerable  number  of 
officers  of  the  Union  army,  who  had  resigned  or 

21 


308  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

been  mustered  out  of  service,  had  taken  up  their 
residence  in  Tennessee  and  the  Gulf  States.  During 
the  brief  but  stormy  reconstruction  period  they  had 
a  hard  time,  not  only  being  socially  ostracized  but 
treated  with  injustice,  and  even  with  contumely. 
General  Thomas  took  their  part,  protected  and  sup 
ported  them,  and  made  it  possible  for  them  to  retain 
their  residence  until  the  evil  days  were  over.  When 
he  was  about  to  leave  they  wished  to  acknowledge 
his  kindness  by  presenting  him  with  a  handsome 
service  of  silver.  It  was  purchased  at  Nashville, 
and  the  pieces  were  marked  with  his  name.  The 
committee,  proud  of  their  duty,  presented  them 
selves  at  his  office  and  were  about  to  offer  him  the 
service.  "  He  firmly  declined,"  says  his  aid-de-camp, 
Colonel  Kellogg,  "  to  accept  it,  and,  as  I  thought  at 
the  time,  with  considerable  and  unnecessary  asper 
ity  ;  but  the  would-be  donors,  knowing  his  charac 
teristic  in  that  particular,  did  not  take  offense  at  it, 
but  seemed  rather  amused  that  he  should  even  refuse 
to  be  the  recipient  of  a  testimonial  from  those  whom 
he  had  practically  benefited."  And  so  they  went 
back  with  the  silver,  and  nobody  knows  what  be 
came  of  it.  He  used  to  say  quietly  but  firmly  on 
such  occasions  that  he  was  satisfied  with  his  pay, 
and  could  live  on  it.  In  this  respect  he  was  one  of 
the  few  exceptions  to  the  almost  universal  custom. 

The  occasions  of  self-sacrifice  which  kept  him  at 
his  post  while  other  officers  were  taking  leaves  were 


LAST    SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 


309 


very  numerous,  but  he  never  made  a  display  of 
his  devotion  to  duty.  His  conduct  in  this  regard 
may  be  epitomized  thus :  He  never  crossed  the 
Ohio  River  to  go  northward  from  September,  1861 
— just  before  the  battle  of  Mill  Springs — until  the 
winter  of  1865,  and  during  that  period  he  was  con 
stantly  with  his  troops  and  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy.  This  is  an  unparalleled  record.  He 
never  laid  his  eyes  on  his  wife  from  August,  1861 — 
when  he  saw  her  for  a  day  or  two,  before  he  went 
southward,  at  New  Haven,  Conn.,  where  she  was 
spending  the  summer — until  he  sent  his  aid-de-camp, 
her  nephew,  to  bring  her  to  him  in  Nashville,  in  Oc 
tober,  1864,  while  he  was  preparing  for  the  great 
conflict  at  that  place.  Mrs.  Thomas  remained  one 
month  with  him  at  Nashville,  when  he  sent  her 
North  again,  while  he  remained  to  fight  the  great 
battle  there,  which  proved  him  to  be  second  in  abil 
ity  to  no  general  the  war  produced. 

It  may  give  a  clew  to  his  views  as  to  the  subject 
of  slavery  that  while  in  Texas,  where  it  was  difficult 
to  hire  a  servant,  he  bought  a  negro  woman  to  act 
as  cook,  and  felt  that  he  was  doing  violence  to  no 
principle  in  that ;  but  when  the  question  came  up  as 
to  what  he  should  do  with  her  when  he  no  longer 
needed  her  service,  he  could  not  bring  himself  to 
sell  her  again,  but  made  such  dispositions  for  her 
future  comfort  as  were  required  by  the  new  order  of 
things.  He  evidently  felt  that  as  her  master,  and 


3io 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


after  the  war  her  protector  and  that  of  her  husband 
and  children,  he  could  see  that  she  was  treated 
kindly  and  justly.  But  to  sell  her  again  would  have 
risked  the  chance  of  her  falling  into  cruel  hands,  and 
this  suffering  he  would  not  expose  her  to.  The  dis 
tinction  is  a  nice  one  and  fully  accords  with  the  view 
of  slavery  which  he  afterward  set  forth,  and  which 
men  like  Randolph  of  Roanoke  and  other  such  lib 
eral  spirits  had  held  for  a  long  time  previously,  viz. : 
To  hold  the  slaves  who  had  fallen  to  their  inherit 
ance,  to  treat  them  with  humanity  and  kindness, 
never  to  s.ell  one,  and  to  manumit  them  at  the  death 
of  the  owner. 

A  distinguished  war  correspondent — not,  however, 
himself  a  soldier — has  made  the  following  distinction 
between  Thomas,  Sherman,  and  Grant :  that  Thomas 
was  a  tactician,  Sherman  a  strategist,  and  Grant  was 
both.  We  must  dissent  in  part  from  this  opinion. 
In  the  old  times  strategy  meant  the  skillful  direction 
of  masses  upon  objective  points.  General  Grant, 
to  whom  we  have  accorded  a  high  place  in  both 
these  characters,  once  said  to  a  friend :  "  I  don't  be 
lieve  in  strategy,  in  the  popular  understanding  of 
the  term ;  I  use  it  to  get  up  as  close  to  the  enemy  as 
practicable  with  as  little  loss  as  possible."  "  And  what 
then,  General  ?  "  "  Then  up,  guards,  and  at  'em  !  " 

That  is  the  most  practical  explanation  of  modern 
strategy,  and  indeed  is  the  best  form  which  it  ever 
assumes.  Let  us  be  technical  and  didactic  in  mili- 


LAST   SERVICES   AND    DEATH.  ^n 

tary  matters.  Grand  tactics  is  the  bringing  and  the 
arrangement  of  men  upon  an  extended  field  of  bat 
tle,  while  tactics  proper,  or  battle  tactics,  is  maneu 
vering  and  fighting  these  men  when  they  are  brought 
there.  In  spite  of  his  disclaimer,  it  was  in  strategy 
rather  than  tactics  that  Grant  excelled.  Without 
making  odious  comparisons,  we  are  impelled  to  say 
that  Thomas  was  great  in  all  these  methods.  His 
conception  of  the  campaign  of  Mill  Springs  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  which  would  have  been  more 
complete  if  he  had  been  permitted  to  take  his  own 
course ;  and  his  movement  upon  Nashville  near  its 
close,  after  leaving  Sherman — with  the  intervening 
and  temporizing  battle  at  Franklin,  displayed  him  as 
a  strategist  of  no  subordinate  rank  ;  while  his  match 
less  handling  of  troops  at  Stone's  River,  "  where,"  in 
the  words  of  Garfield,  "  he  was  the  unmoved  and 
immovable  pivot  around  which  swung  our  routed 
right  wing,"  and  when,  the  right  having  been  scat 
tered,  he  formed  a  new  center  upon  which  the 
army  could  rally ;  and  his  marvelous  dispositions  at 
Chickamauga,  when  he  had  been  left  with  twenty 
thousand  men  to  bear  the  repeated  hammering  as 
saults  of  sixty  thousand  flushed  with  success,  and 
where  he  stood  like  a  rock  and  saved  the  army, 
prove  him  to  have  been  a  master  at  once  of  grand 
and  battle  tactics,  for  that  field  was  the  rarest  com 
bination  of  both  in  military  annals. 

From   his   subordinate   position  in    most  of  the 


312 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


campaigns  he  had  little  opportunity  except  in  the 
Nashville  campaign  to  show  what  he  was  as  a  strate 
gist  ;  and  so  his  record  is  that  of  a  superb  tactician 
handling  troops  on  the  field  of  battle,  promptly 
meeting  the  enemy's  unexpected  movements,  re 
fusing  his  flanks  when  they  were  threatened,  form 
ing  new  lines  when  the  first  were  untenable — in 
short,  being  ubiquitous,  judicious,  and  coolly  valiant 
in  every  action  in  which  he  was  engaged. 

While  thus  unrivaled  as  a  tactician,  he  seems  to 
have  created  opportunities  which  suggest  his  power 
as  a  strategist.  The  man  who  recast  the  field  of 
Stone's  River,  who  destroyed  the  scheme  of  the  Con 
federates  at  Chickamauga,  and  conceived  the  cam 
paign  at  Nashville,  only  needed  opportunity  to  rank 
high  in  military  annals  as  a  strategist. 

Something  has  been  said  as  to  his  disappointment 
at  being  overlooked  and  held  back  for  the  benefit  of 
others.  It  may  be  that  he  was  a  little  morbid  in  this 
respect ;  if  so,  he  only  magnified  to  some  extent  a 
grievance  which  really  existed.  He  had  been  looked 
upon  with  suspicion,  and  he  knew  it.  He  fought  his 
way  to  eminence  "  without  favor  or  affection  "  on 
the  part  of  the  Government;  we  leave  the  question 
of  "partiality,"  unsolved.  He  told  the  literal  truth 
when  he  said  they  gave  him  promotion  which  they 
dared  not  withhold,  for  he  was  one  of  the  only 
generals  of  whom  it  could  be  said  that  he  never 
had  been  defeated. 


LAST    SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 


313 


The  story  is  told  that  once  an  officer  said  to  Gen 
eral  Joe  Johnston — as  has  been  said  of  others — that 
Thomas  "did  not  know  when  he  was  whipped." 
Johnston  answered,  "  Rather  say  he  always  knew 
very  well  when  he  was  not  whipped." 

Despising  politicians  and  frequently  declaring 
that  much  of  what  the  country  was  then  suffering 
might  be  attributed  to  them,  he  never  asked  their 
aid  in  asserting  his  claims,  as  others  did.  It  is  a 
significant  fact  that  he  never  saw  Mr.  Lincoln,  for 
he  never  went  to  Washington  after  the  war  broke 
out  until  a  year  after  it  had  come  to  an  end. 

A  conqueror  upon  every  battlefield  upon  which 
he  fought,  it  may  be  said  that  he  had  not  the  op 
portunities  of  showing  his  highest  talent.  Every 
military  problem  thus  far  presented  to  him  he  had 
been  able  to  solve,  and  behind  every  one  of  his 
great  deeds  there  was  a  surplus  of  power  that  showed 
him  capable  of  greater.  Other  men,  full  of  impulse 
and  impetuosity,  dashed  and  failed,  and  dashed 
again.  Thomas,  moving  more  cautiously  in  order 
to  be  sure,  did  not  fail. 

In  bringing  his  life  to  a  close  we  find  ourselves 
lingering  over  his  many  virtues ;  for  great  as  he 
was  in  soldiership  and  generalship  and  in  military 
administration  of  all  kinds,  we  dwell  with  peculiar 
pleasure  upon  his  self-respect,  his  clear  sense  of  jus 
tice,  his  truth  and  honor,  his  modesty  and  humanity, 
and  his  moral  purity. 


314  GENERAL  THOMAS. 

The  personal  appearance  of  General  Thomas  has 
been  already  described  at  an  earlier  period  of  his 
history.  We  have  claimed  for  him  many  of  the 
moral  characteristics  of  George  Washington.  Many 
have  shared  this  opinion.  General  Jacob  D.  Cox, 
who  was  at  Franklin  and  Nashville  and  who  wrote 
a  history  of  the  campaign,  says  :  "  I  have  often  said 
I  looked  upon  him  as  the  most  Washingtonian 
character  of  our  recent  history." 

General  Garfield,  in  his  memorial  address,  finds 
coincidences  in  the  character  of  Thomas  with  Zach- 
ary  Taylor  and  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  and  then 
adds  :  "  On  the  whole,  I  can  not  doubt  that  the  most 
fitting  parallel  to  General  Thomas  is  found  in  our 
greatest  American.  .  .  .  The  personal  resemblance 
of  General  Thomas  to  Washington  was  often  the 
subject  of  remark.  Even  at  West  Point  Rosecrans 
was  accustomed  to  call  him  *  General  Washington.' 
He  resembled  Washington  in  the  gravity  and  dignity 
of  his  character,  in  the  solidity  of  his  judgment, 
in  the  careful  accuracy  of  all  his  transactions,  in  his 
incorruptible  integrity,  and  in  his  extreme  but  un 
affected  modesty."  Thomas  had  also  another  per 
sonal  likeness;  a  comparison  of  his  portrait  with 
that  of  General  Scott  in  Appletons'  Cyclopaedia 
of  American  Biography  can  not  fail  to  strike  one 
with  his  resemblance  to  that  great  general.  It 
is  more  than  a  martial  likeness  or  a  resemblance 
of  distinguished  Virginians.  In  the  lines  of  the 


LAST    SERVICES   AND    DEATH.  315 

face,  the  stern  eyes,  and  the  determined  lips  are 
found  the  indexes  of  a  similar  character  within. 
Thomas  Carlyle,  in  his  quaint  way,  might  have 
called  him  Washington-Scott,  and  the  name  would 
have  been  significant  of  his  character ;  but  his  own 
name — George  H.  Thomas — is  his  surer  passport  to 
the  temple  of  fame,  in  which,  as  in  that  "House" 
of  Chaucer,  he  will  be  placed  upon  a  pedestal  of  the 
finest  gold. 

When  Professor  Mahan,  in  1870,  announced  to  a 
section  at  West  Point  the  death  of  Thomas,  intelli 
gence  of  which  had  just  been  received,  he  said  that 
an  attempt  would  be  made  to  exalt  General  Lee  by 
comparing  him  with  Washington,  but  that  the  man 
of  this  war  who  approached  nearest  and  very  nearly 
to  the  character  of  Washington  was  George  H. 
Thomas.  Mahan  had  taught  him  as  a  cadet  and 
followed  his  career  with  great  and  detailed  interest. 

One  word  in  conclusion.  The  object  of  this 
book  is  to  individualize  Thomas,  to  display  his 
characteristics,  to  eulogize  his  merits,  and  to  present 
a  sketch  of  the  man  as  he  stood  and  lived  among 
men — the  gallant  and  courteous  gentleman,  the  cool 
and  intrepid  soldier,  the  determined  and  sagacious 
general,  the  honest  and  honorable  man  ;  but  in  such 
a  work  he  would  not  wish  the  author  to  forget,  had 
he  the  power  to  speak,  the  many  brave  officers  and 
men  who  fought  with  him  and  under  him  and  were 
contributors  to  his  renown.  Nor  should  we  do  so. 


316  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

Most  of  the  distinguished  ones  have  gone  like  him 
to  the  spirit  land.  A  few  remain,  and  whenever 
memories  of  Thomas  are  recalled  they  stand  around 
him  in  goodly  numbers,  both  proclaiming  his  glory 
and,  by  their  reciprocal  admiration,  adding  to  their 
own.  Not  one  of  them  but  is  proud  of  the  dis 
tinction  of  having  fought  with  Thomas  in  the  great 
war  for  the  restoration  of  the  Union,  and  they 
have  imparted  this  spirit  to  those  who  come  after, 
so  that  the  reputation  of  Thomas,  always  great  and 
unquestioned  from  the  first,  has  found  a  larger  area 
from  year  to  year,  and  at  the  present  time  he  stands 
in  history  without  an  enemy,  with  increasing  hosts 
of  friends,  and  with  scarcely  a  critic  of  his  high 
and  honorable  career. 

The  reader  of  this  work  will  perceive  that  the 
controversies  of  all  kinds  connected  with  the  career 
of  General  Thomas  have  been  only  referred  to  and 
considered  in  so  far  as  they  concern  his  character 
and  conduct  and  affect  his  reputation  as  a  general 
and  as  a  man. 

I  have  had  two  reasons  for  this  course.  The  first 
is  that  in  all  wars  many  conflicting  claims  are  set 
forth,  and  the  claimants  are  championed  according 
to  their  importance  by  friends  and  followers  who 
become  partisans.  To  enter  into  this  region  is  hope 
less,  and  the  philosophic  historian  keeps  as  far  as 
possible  out  of  it,  only  singling  and  succoring  his 
hero  and  hurrying  him  through  the  hurly-burly  at 


LAST   SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 

as  fast  a  pace  as  is  warrantable.  The  second  and 
stronger  reason  is  that  the  high  and  noble  career  of 
George  H.  Thomas  is  in  itself  the  best  answer  to 
all  critics  and  cavilers. 

Since  I  have  undertaken  this  task  I  have  been 
surprised  to  find  what  a  universal  sentiment  there  is 
in  his  favor.  Conceding  the  great  fame  of  Grant, 
there  are  few  now  who  share  his  opinions  of  Thomas. 
The  jargon  of  voices  which  hounded  him  at  Nash 
ville  has  now  no  supporters,  and  if  we  may  consider 
Messrs.  Nicolay  and  Hay  as  echoing  the  voice  of 
Lincoln,  it  is  manifest  that  that  illustrious  man  did 
not  share  the  opposition  to  Thomas  of  Halleck, 
Stanton,  et  id  genus  omne. 

Thus,  while  the  opponents  are  rapidly  disappear 
ing  and  have  long  been  silent,  there  cluster  around 
the  august  form  of  Thomas  a  splendid  body  guard  of 
champions,  not  only  from  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  and  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  but 
from  every  Union  army  in  the  field  during  the  war, 
and  from  a  number  of  Confederate  generals  against 
whom  he  was  pitted  in  battle  and  are  now  loud  in 
honoring  his  renown. 

Not  among  the  least  of  his  claims  to  greatness  is 
the  stern  and  uncompromising  faith  with  which  he 
kept  his  own  name  and  fame.  While  he  was  slow  to 
think  any  man  his  enemy,  since  he  gave  no  reason 
for  enmity,  when  injustice  was  clearly  intended  he 
denounced  and  resented  it. 


318  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

It  should  be  added  that  he  was  always  punctilious 
with  regard  to  the  reputation  of  others — a  fact  which 
is  clearly  to  be  discerned  in  all  his  reports,  in  which 
those  who  were  his  superiors  or  his  subordinates 
were  always  treated  with  justice  and  generosity,  the 
orders  and  instructions  of  the  former  being  distinct 
ly  mentioned  and  the  heroic  actions  of  the  latter 
cordially  presented  to  the  authorities  who  could  re 
ward  them. 

While  the  purpose  of  a  biography  should  need  to 
present  the  subject  of  it  in  his  completeness,  not  only 
as  a  hero  but  as  a  man,  the  special  duty  of  a  military 
biographer  is  manifestly  to  analyze  his  character  as 
a  soldier  and  as  a  general.  Even  at  the  risk,  there 
fore,  of  some  repetition,  it  is  deemed  proper  to  sum 
marize  the  great  actions  through  which  his  reputa 
tion  was  achieved,  to  value  and  weigh  his  successes, 
to  follow  his  trains  of  thought  and  consider  his  plans 
of  action,  to  note  whether  the  issues  were  the  just 
consequences  of  his  projected  purposes,  to  give  just 
weight  to  his  failures  and  disasters,  determining  im 
partially  to  what  extent  he  was  responsible  for  them; 
finally,  to  make  up  and  systematize  in  one  clear 
view  the  completed  work  of  his  life.  Let  us  attempt 
this  with  what  conciseness  is  possible. 

General  Thomas  was  an  educated  soldier  in  Gov 
ernment  service ;  his  loyalty  was  due  to  his  Govern 
ment,  but  he  was  also  a  Virginian,  and  in  those 
stormy  times  many  thought  his  allegiance  was  due 


LAST    SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 


319 


to  Virginia.  He  remained  true  to  the  Government, 
although  he  was  reviled  by  the  South  and  suspected 
at  the  North.  He  bore  both  forms  of  injustice 
equably,  but  he  felt  them  both,  and  by  brooding 
upon  them  became  naturally  somewhat  morbid.* 

*  The  following  communication  from  the  Hon.  Thomas  L. 
James  was  received  after  the  first  portion  of  this  work  was  printed  ; 
it  has  a  clear  and  dramatic  interest :  "  Returning  from  Cleveland 
on  the  train  from  the  dedication  of  the  Garfield  Memorial,  in  May, 
1890,  Mrs.  James  and  myself  found  ourselves  in  company  with 
General  Sherman  as  a  fellow-traveler.  During  the  journey  Gen 
eral  Sherman  conversed  freely  of  the  different  commanders  whom 
he  had  known,  both  on  the  Union  and  Confederate  side,  placing 
Johnston  and  Longstreet  at  the  head  of  the  Confederates.  After 
speaking  of  Grant,  Sheridan,  McPherson,  and  others  in  the  highest 
terms,  he  said  that,  after  all,  in  many  respects  Thomas  was  a  typ 
ical  soldier.  '  Old  Tom,'  he  said,  '  as  we  always  called  him,  was  a 
classmate  of  mine  at  West  Point,  and  was  always  a  thorough  gentle 
man,  thoughtful  and  respectful  of  other  people's  feelings,  and  who 
knew  not  only  how  to  command  but  how  to  obey.'  He  then  told 
us  this  story  of  the  way  Thomas  was  made  a  brigadier  general.  He 
said  :  '  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  the  early  part  of  the  war,  sent  for  me  to  come 
to  Washington.  While  there  he  did  me  the  honor  to  consult  me 
regarding  the  names  of  those  he  intended  to  nominate  to  the 
Senate  for  brigadier  generals.  After  hearing  the  proposed  list  I 
said  to  him,  "  Why  don't  you  nominate  old  Thomas?"  His  reply 
was  that  Thomas  was  born  in  Virginia,  and  there  were  some 
doubts  as  to  his  loyalty.  In  my  most  earnest  manner  I  protested 
indignantly  against  this  most  cruel  accusation.  I  said  :  "Mr. 
President,  Old  Tom  is  as  loyal  as  I  am,  and  as  a  soldier  he  is 
superior  to  all  on  your  list."  Mr.  Lincoln  said,  "  Will  you  be  re 
sponsible  for  him  ?  "  and  I  unhesitating  replied,  "  With  the  greatest 
pleasure."  The  President  instantly  sent  his  name  among  others  to 
the  Senate.  In  the  afternoon  of  that  day  I  went  to  the  Senate 
Chamber  to  see  my  brother,  John  Sherman,  of  Ohio,  and  he  told 
me  of  the  names  on  the  list  of  brigadier  generals  that  had  been 
sent  to  the  Senate,  and  said  they  had  all  been  confirmed,  Thomas 


320 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


Pursuing  the  even  tenor  of  his  way,  he  displayed 
from  time  to  time  his  wonderful  military  talent,  and 
thus  slowly  disarmed  Government  opposition.  At 
Mill  Springs  he  won  the  first  considerable  victory 


with  the  rest.  I  then  began  to  recollect  that  I  had  not  seen 
Thomas  for  twenty  years,  and  I  had  become  responsible  for  him. 
It  was  a  hot  day,  and  the  thing  so  worried  me  that  I  went  to  the 
War  Department  and  asked  where  Colonel  Thomas,  now  brigadier 
general,  was  to  be  found.  I  was  told,  in  Maryland,  some  eight  or 
ten  miles  from  the  city.  So  I  ordered  a  carriage  and  started  at 
once,  my  anxiety  to  see  him  impelling  me  to  urge  the  driver  to 
make  as  rapid  time  as  he  could.  When  I  arrived  at  the  place  I 
inquired  where  Colonel  Thomas  was ;  and  the  sergeant  of  the 
guard  went  with  me  to  Thomas's  tent,  and  found  that  he  was  in 
the  saddle  superintending  some  movement  of  the  troops.  Con 
trolling  my  impatience,  I  waited  in  no  easy  frame  of  mind,  that 
sultry  day,  for  his  return,  and  as  there  is  an  end  to  everything, 
Thomas  came  back  at  last  and  we  greeted  one  another  heartily. 
"  Tom,"  said  I,  "  you  are  a  brigadier  general."  "  I  don't  know  of 
any  one  that  I  would  rather  hear  such  news  from  than  you,"  he 
replied.  "  But,"  I  said,  "  Tom,  there  are  some  stories  about  your 
loyalty.  How  are  you  going?"  "  Billy,"  he  replied,  "  I  am  going 
South."  "  My  God  ! "  I  exclaimed,  "  Tom,  you  have  put  me  in  an 
awful  position  ;  I  have  be*come  responsible  for  your  loyalty."  "  How 
so?"  said  he  ;  so  I  related  to  him  the  conversation  between  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  and  myself,  when  he  leaned  back,  and  remarked, 
"  Give  yourself  no  trouble,  Billy  ;  I  am  going  South,  but  at  the 
head  of  my  men."  And  so  he  did,  and  no  nobler  man,  no  braver, 
better  soldier,  and  no  more  courteous  gentleman  ever  lived.' 

"  General  Sherman  then  gave  a  very  thrilling  description  of  the 
battle  of  Nashville,  which  he  said  itself  alone  proved  Thomas  to 
possess  all  the  qualities  of  a  great  commander.  Mrs.  James  then 
asked  him  where  he  placed  Hood  as  a  soldier — if  he  ranked  any 
where  near  Johnston  and  Longstreet.  4  No,  madam,'  energetically 
replied  General  Sherman,  '  I  don't ;  still  he  always  gave  me  a 
great  deal  of  trouble  and  annoyance  when  he  was  in  front  of 
me.  For,  madam,  there  is  no  telling  what  such  a  fellow  will  do.'  " 


LAST    SERVICES   AND   DEATH.  321 

for  the  Union  arms  and  showed  a  generalship  and  a 
spirit  which  gave  new  life  to  the  hesitating  loyalty 
of  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  Ever  constant  at  the 
post  of  duty,  he  did  unknown  and  unnoticed  work  in 
repairs  and  expeditions  with  reference  to  supplies 
and  communications  beyond,  perhaps,  any  other  gen 
eral  of  his  rank  in  the  service.  Seeking  no  promo 
tion,  he  showed  his  justice  and  generosity  in  declin 
ing  it  when  it  was  thrust  upon  him  at  the  expense  of 
his  friend  and  superior. 

At  the  battle  of  Perryville  he  was  in  a  post  of 
entire  irresponsibility,  but  at  Stone's  River  he  held 
the  key  of  the  field  and  really  won  the  victory  as 
cribed  to  his  commander. 

In  the  long  delay  after  that  battle,  while  others 
were  on  leave  in  a  series  of  rotations,  he  kept  at  his 
post,  and  when  the  colossal  campaign  of  Chicka- 
mauga  was  begun  he  was  its  controlling  genius,  the 
star  actor  in  the  magnificent  drama,  the  rock  which 
hurled  the  enemy's  forces  back  in  evaporating  spray. 
In  the  siege  and  battle  of  Chattanooga,  although  in 
a  subordinate  position,  he  was  equally  distinguished. 
He  counseled  and  conducted  his  army  with  great 
judgment  and  valor  in  the  Atlanta  campaign.  Hus 
banding  all  his  resources  and  resisting  all  clamorous 
importunities,  he  fought  with  resistless  valor  and 
achieved  an  unrivaled  success  at  Nashville.  Such 
is  his  favorable  record  as  a  general.  What  is  there 
per  contra  to  detract  from  it  ?  It  is  a  hard  question 


^22  GENERAL   THOMAS. 

to  answer.  He  was  accused  by  his  superiors  of 
being  too  slow. 

While  it  is  easy  to  conceive  of  a  more  dashing 
man,  of  a  light-hussar,  Joachim-Murat  sort  of  me 
teor  upon  the  field,  to  my  mind  the  possession  of 
such  qualities  would  have  been  injurious  to  his  char 
acter,  would  have  detracted  from  his  solid  merits.  I 
can  neither  conceive  of  General  Thomas  other  than 
he  was,  nor  desire  that  he  should  have  been  other 
than  he  was. 

The  make-up  of  two  such  different  kinds  of  char 
acter  generally  results  in  enormity.  For  his  own 
wise  reasons,  God  never  makes  perfect  men,  and  so 
we  rest  satisfied  with  the  great  preponderance  of  ex 
cellence  in  our  hero.  It  is  a  source  of  regret,  but  it 
is  due  to  the  peculiar  character  of  the  man,  that  the 
biographer  is  unable  to  find  those  incidents  and  anec 
dotes  which,  while  they  enliven  the  record,  present 
the  personality  of  the  subject  in  a  clear,  social  light. 
Most  men  have  their  moods  as  clearly  distinguished 
as  the  sunshine  and  the  twilight,  and  the  little  things 
that  they  do  and  say  in  these  moods  give  great  in 
terest  to  the  story  of  their  lives.* 

*  The  following  letter  from  General  Van  Vliet  is  in  answer  to 
a  request  for  such  details  ;  it  came  too  late  for  earlier  insertion : 

"  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  10,  1893. 

"  MY  DEAR  COPPEE  :  I  am  in  receipt  of  your  letter  of  the  5th 
instant.  I  do  not  know  that  I  can  aid  you  much.  All  who  are  named 
in  Thomas's  letter,  given  on  a  former  page,  were  classmates,  and  all 
are  dead  except  myself — Old  Van,  as  I  was  always  called.  Sher- 


LAST    SERVICES   AND   DEATH. 


323 


It  was  less  so  with  Thomas  than  with  any  of  our 
distinguished  soldiers.  Always  serious  and  dignified, 
we  look  in  vain  for  racy  anecdotes  and  sparkling 
pleasantries  from  his  lips.  I  have  questioned  many 
of  those  who  knew  him,  but  they  have  no  stories  to 
tell  concerning  him.  Even  where  an  anecdote  seems 


man,  George  H.  Thomas,  and  I  arrived  at  West  Point  on  the  same 
day,  and  all  three  were  assigned  to  the  same  room,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  old  south  barracks.  A  warm  friendship  commenced  in 
that  room,  which  continued,  without  a  single  break,  during  our 
lives.  We  were  all  three  sturdy  fellows,  which  prevented  our  be 
ing  annoyed  by  older  cadets.  They  commenced  to  haze  us,  as  was 
the  fashion  of  those  days,  but  Thomas  put  a  stop  to  it.  One 
evening  a  cadet  came  into  our  room  and  commenced  to  give  us 
orders.  He  had  said  but  a  few  words  when  Old  Tom,  as  we 
always  called  him,  stepped  up  to  him  and  said,  '  Leave  this  room 
immediately,  or  I  will  throw  you  through  the  window.'  It  is  need 
less  to  say  that  the  cadet  lost  no  time  in  getting  out  of  the  room. 
There  were  no  more  attempts  to  haze  us.  When  we  graduated 
we  consulted  as  to  the  regiments  we  should  apply  for.  The  Florida 
war  was  then  going  on,  and  we  all  concluded  that  we  would  apply 
for  some  regiment  then  in  Florida,  for  we  all  wanted  to  see  some 
actual  fighting,  and  if  we  did  not  go  to  Florida  we  should  never  see 
any  ;  so  we  all  joined  the  Third  Artillery.  History  shows  how 
near  we  came  to  the  facts  in  our  reasoning. 

"  Who  the  Democrat  was  I  can  not  imagine.  Job  Lancaster 
was  a  noble  fellow — six  feet  tall  and  large  in  proportion.  He 
was  killed  by  lightning  while  on  a  scout.  He  was  standing  up  in 
his  boat.  Hebert  was  Governor  of  Louisiana.  He  stood  at  the 
head  of  our  class.  All  whom  you  mention  were  splendid  men. 
In  Cullum's  History  of  the  Graduates  of  West  Point  you  will  find 
the  history  of  all.  Fifty-three  years — over  half  a  century — have 
passed  since  we  separated  at  West  Point,  and,  of  course,  one  for 
gets  many  things  in  that  time.  .  .  . 
"  Yours  very  truly, 

"STEWART  VAN  VLIET,  U.  S.  A. 
22 


324  GENERAL    THOMAS. 

to  promise  something,  we  see  that  he  at  least  took 
the  matter  seriously.  Prominent  among  the  insignia 
of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  the  acorn,  and 
the  story  is  told  that  General  Thomas,  who  had 
given  strict  orders  against  foraging,  caught  an  Irish 
man  on  the  river  bank  with  a  pig  which  he  had  just 
killed.  Bursting  out  with  anger  against  this  violation 
of  his  orders,  he  was  about  to  consign  him  to  the 
guard,  when  the  Irishman  turned  to  him,  saying  : 
"  You  see,  general  dear,  he  was  eating  our  corps 
badge,  and  it  was  for  that  I  killed  him."  The  gen 
eral  pardoned  him  out  of  jealousy  for  the  corps  badge 
rather  than  from  a  sense  of  pity  or  the  ludicrous. 

No,  the  humorous  side  of  Thomas's  character 
was  undeveloped,  or  at  least  no  appearance  of  it  is 
made  to  his  biographer,  however  careful  his  search 
has  been. 


INDEX. 


Allatoona  Pass,  206,  208,  210. 

Anderson,  Colonel  Archer,  ex 
tract  from  address  of,  304. 

Anderson,  General  Robert,  37  ; 
health  fails,  42. 

Appomattox  Court  House,  sur 
render  at,  291. 

Army,  Confederate,  of  Tennes 
see,  95  ;  under  Bragg,  131  ;  at 
Richmond,  276;  disintegrated, 
290. 

Army,  United  States,  increase 
of  regiments,  n,  12 ;  tabu 
lated  statement,  126. 

Atlanta  campaign,  troops  ready 
to  move,  201  ;  system  of  turn 
ings,  203. 

Atlanta  captured,  224. 

Baird,  General  A.,  177. 
Banks,  General  N.  P.,  201. 
Beauregard,  General   P.  G.  T., 

32,  76,  284. 

Blair,  General  Frank  P.,  210. 
Bragg,  General  Braxton,  15,  17, 

78,  97,  102,  107,  127, 128,  136, 

145,  157,  164,  171,  174,  181. 
Brannan,  General  J.  M.,  147. 
Breckinridge,   General     Robert 

J.,  101,  144,  174. 
Brown,  Fort,  14,  15. 


Brown,  Major  Jacob,  14  ;  killed, 

IS- 

Brown's  Ferry,  165. 
Brownlow,  William  G.,  45. 
Buckner,  General  S.  B.,  with  the 

Home  Guard,  41,  44. 
Buell,  General  Don  Carlos,  made 

brigadier,  38  ;   character,  53, 

74,  79,  82. 

Bull  Run,  32,  34,  42. 
Butler,    Matthew  C.,  eulogy  of 

Thomas,  303. 
Burnside,  General  Ambrose  E., 

179. 

Camp  Dick  Robinson,  44. 

Canby,  General  E.  R.  S.,  285, 
287,  288. 

Casino,  Fort,  256. 

Chalmers,  General  Patrick  R., 
271,  272. 

Chattanooga,  forward  to,  119  ; 
description  of,  124 ;  coinci 
dence,  126  ;  occupied,  160  ; 
"  I  will  hold  the  town  till  we 
starve,"  164  ;  plan  of  battle, 
170 ;  battle,  172 ;  retreat  of 
the  enemy,  178. 

Cheatham,  General  Benjamin 
F.,  245,  246,  252,  256,  270, 
285. 


326 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


Chickamauga,  topography  of, 
138  ;  battle  of,  140. 

Cleburne,  General,  142,  209 ; 
killed  at  Franklin,  250. 

Cobb,  General  Howell,  290. 

Columbia,  Tenn.,  245,  246,  247, 
252. 

Columbus,  Ga.,  great  destruc 
tion,  including  ram  Jackson, 
270. 

Corinth,  76 ;  occupied,  77,  78. 

Couch,  General  D.  N.,  268. 

Crittenden,  General  George  B., 
54,  55.  58,  101,  129,  136. 

Cumberland,  Army  of  the,  46. 

Dalton,  turning  of,  204. 
Davis,  General  Jefferson  C.,  148. 
Davis,  Jefferson,  24,  38,  no,  230; 

captured,  291. 
Decatur,  229. 
Donelson,  Fort,  256. 

Farragut,  Admiral  D.  G.,  201. 
Fitch,  Lieutenant  -  Commander 

Leroy,  265. 
Florida  War,  cause  of,  6  ;  Indian 

warfare,  22. 

Floyd,  General  John  B.,  74. 
Forrest,    General    Nathan    B., 

243,  251,  274,  289. 
Franklin,  Schofield  in  peril  at, 

245  ;  situation    of,    247  ;    the 

battle,  249. 
Fry,    General    S.    S.,    at    Mill 

Springs,  57. 

Garfield,  General  James  A. ,  1 54 ; 
delivers  memorial  address  on 
Thomas,  305,  314. 


Garrard,    General    Kenner,    51, 

222,  242. 

Gillem,  Fort,  256. 

Granger,  General   Gordon,  149, 

245- 

Grant,  General  U.  S.,  60  ;  at 
Pittsburg  Landing,  75  ;  at 
Vicksburg,  121  ;  on  his  way 
to  Chattanooga,  162  ;  at  Chat 
tanooga,  169  ;  Missionary 
Ridge,  177,  178  ;  gives  per 
mission  for  movement  through 
Georgia,  237  ;  order  from  City 
Point,  245  ;  impatient  with 
Thomas,  259  ;  order  to  Gen 
eral  John  A.  Logan,  260  ;  en 
route  to  Nashville  to  take  tem 
porary  command,  261  ;  opin 
ions  of  Thomas,  274,  284,  303. 

Halleck,  General  Henry  W.,  76  ; 
made  general  in  chief,  78  ; 
letter  to  Thomas,  87  ;  con 
troversy  with  Rosecrans,  109. 

Hammond  (Cavalry),  265. 

Hancock,  General  W.  S.,  295. 

Hatch,  General  Edward,  246. 

Hardee,  Major  W.  J.,  24,  174, 
214,  220. 

Hazen,  General  William  B., 
141,  166. 

Hebert,  Paul  O.,  a  classmate,  6. 

Henderson,  General,  15. 

Hill,  General  David  H.,  304. 

Hooker,  General  Joseph,  161, 
162,  176,  221. 

Hood,  General  John  B.,  206, 
209,  210,  213,  214,  217,  218, 
219  ;  evacuated  Atlanta,  220, 

223,  228,  229,  230,  233,  236; 


INDEX. 


327 


brought  to  a  last  hope,  239  ; 
lack  of  numbers  in  his  army, 
240 ;  opinions  of  Sherman 
and  Grant,  240 ;  delayed, 
waiting  for  supplies,  243  ;  ar 
rangement  of  army  under, 
243  ;  in  pursuit  of  Thomas, 

245  ;    loses    an    opportunity, 

246  ;  defiant  parade  in  front 
of  Nashville,  251  ;  determines 
to  move  upon  Nashville,  254 ; 
orders  an  attack  upon  Mur- 
freesboro,    257  ;  line   pierced 
at    Nashville,    268  ;    pursued 
across  Harpeth  River,  272  ;  at 
Tuscumbia  and  Tupelo,  274  ; 
retires   from   command,  274  ; 
extract    from    Advance     and 
Retreat,  275. 

Houston,  Fort,  256. 

Jackson,  General  James  S.,  32  ; 
killed  at  Perryville,  83. 

Johnson,  President,  45  ;  im 
broglio,  294. 

Johnston,  General  A.  S.,  24,  52, 
75  ;  killed,  76. 

Johnston,  General  J.  .E.,  32, 
182,  203,  205,  206,  208,  210, 
211,  212  ;  relieved,  213,  275. 

Jonesboro,  219,  223. 

Kellogg,     Frances      L.,      Mrs. 

Thomas,  23  ;  influence  of,  27. 

Kentucky,  political  condition  of, 

39- 
Kingsbury,    Lieutenant   C.    P., 

letter,  7,  9. 

Kiowa  expedition,  25. 
Knipe  (Cavalry),  265. 


Lauderdale,  Fort,  Florida,  7. 

Lee,  Admiral  Samuel  P.,  265. 

Lee,  General,  243,  256,  285." 

Lee,  Lieutenant  Colonel  R.  E., 
24  ;  resigns  and  takes  service 
for  Virginia,  28  ;  at  Rich 
mond,  285. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  38,  40  ;  pre 
liminary  proclamation  con 
cerning  slavery,  88  ;  views 
concerning  Thomas  at  Nash 
ville,  261  ;  compliments 
Thomas,  283. 

Logan,  General  John  A.,  260. 

Long,  General  Armistead  L., 
289. 

Lookout  Mountain,  175,  176. 

Lowell,  James  Russell,  "  Biglow 
Papers,"  12. 

Mackall,  General  William   W., 

290. 

Macon,  captured,  290. 
Magoffin,  Governor  Beriah,  40. 
Mahan,    Professor    Dennis    H., 

announces  death  of  Thomas, 

SIS- 

Marietta,  211. 
Martin,  Fort,  256. 
Mason,  John  T.,  5. 
Matamoros,  14  ;  evacuated,  15. 
Maury,    General    Dabney    H., 

eulogy,  304. 
Meade,    General     George     H., 

295  ;   given  Eastern  Military 

Division,  298. 
Meridian  Raid,  2OO. 
Mexican   War,    cause    of,     12  ; 

first  encounter,   14;   the  war 

ended,  19. 


328 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


Military  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  161,  181. 

Mill  Springs,  battle  of,  55  ;  re 
sults  of  battle,  60  ;  extracts 
from  the  report  of  Thomas, 
63 ;  extracts  from  report  of 
General  Crittenden,  68. 

Missionary  Ridge,  plan  of  at 
tack,  171, 

Mitchell,  O.  M.,  made  brigadier, 
38 ;  ordered  to  supersede 
Thomas,  49 ;  order  revoked, 

49- 

Mitchell,  Robert  B.,  95. 
Monterey,    Mexico,   15  ;    battle 

of,  16. 
Montgomery,  Ala.,  moved  upon 

by  Wilson,  289  ;  surrendered, 

289. 

Moore,  Colonel  J.  B.,  242. 
Morgan,  General  John  H.,  no. 
Murfreesboro,     description     of, 

96  ;  delay  at,  109. 
McArthur,   General  John,   242, 

267  ;  efficient  charge  at  Nash 
ville,  267. 
McClellan,  General  George  B., 

42. 

McCook,  General  A.  G.,  304. 
McCook,  General  A.  McD.,  52, 

83,  130. 

McDowell,  General  Irwin,  32. 
McPherson,  General  J.  B.,  181, 

203,    208,    210,    214 ;    killed, 

221. 

Nashville,  campaign  of,  232 ; 
plan  on  grand  chessboard  of 
the  war,  234 ;  strategy  of  the 
campaign,  243 ;  preliminary 


movements,  244  ;  Hood's  ac 
count  of  Confederate  move 
ments,  252 ;  description  of, 
255  ;  delays  before  the  battle, 
257;  impatience  at  Washing 
ton,  258  ;  Union  line,  265  ; 
battle,  266  ;  enemy  attempts 
riposte^  268  ;  panic  flight  of 
enemy's  left,  271  ;  symmetry 
of  battle,  272  ;  enemy's  losses, 
273  ;  results  of  the  battle, 
275,  283 ;  remarks,  282 ; 
Union  army  very  compact, 
270 ;  second  day  of  battle,  270. 

Negley,  General  James  S.,  99, 
no. 

Nelson,  Lieutenant  William, 
appointed  bi'igadier  general, 
44. 

New  Hope  Church,  battle  of, 
209. 

Ohio,  Army  of  the,  82. 
Opdycke,  Colonel  Emerson,  gal 
lant  charge  at  Franklin,  249. 
Orchard  Knob,  173,  176. 

Palmer,  General  J.  B.,  at  Stone's 
River,  in. 

Patterson,  General  Robert,  31 ; 
skirmish,  34 ;  supported  by 
Thomas,  37. 

Peach  Tree  Creek,  battle  of, 
214  ;  description  of,  216. 

Perryville,  battle  of,  80  :  criti 
cisms  after,  83. 

Philadelphia  City  Troop,  31. 

Pillow,  General  G.  J.,  74. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  or  Shiloh, 
75- 


INDEX. 


329 


Polk,    General    Leonidas,     95, 

137,  206,  209  ;  killed,  211. 
Post,  Colonel  P.  S.,  271. 

Resaca,  occupied  by  Thomas, 
208. 

Reynolds,  General  J.  J.,  at 
Chickamauga,  152. 

Rochelle,  Elizabeth,  mother  of 
General  Thomas,  2,  3. 

Rochelle,  James,  uncle,  4. 

Rosecrans,  General  William  S., 
42  ;  succeeds  Buell  over  the 
head  of  Thomas,  86  ;  assumes 
command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  90;  sketch  of, 
91  ;  at  Tullahoma,  106  ;  or 
der  from  Washington,  12 1  ; 
letter  to  Halleck,  122 ;  occu 
pied  Chattanooga,  129 ;  gen 
eral  pursuit,  130  ;  relieved  of 
command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  162. 

Schoepf,  General,  48,  51,  53. 

Schofield,  General  John  M.,  212, 
214,  217,  231,  241,  245,  246 ; 
escapes  peril  at  Spring  Hill, 
247,  259,  265,  266,  268,  271, 
285,  298. 

Scott,  Robert  N.,  262. 

Selma,  description  of,  288  ;  de 
stroyed,  289. 

Shepherd,  Lieutenant -Colonel 
O.  L.,  114. 

Sheridan,  General  P.  H.,  99, 
148,  154,  177,  287,  295,  303. 

Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  an 
nouncement  of  Thomas's 
death,  I  ;  classmate,  17 ; 


made  brigadier,  38  ;  succeeds 
Anderson,  42 ;  in  command 
of  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
47 ;  upholds  Thomas,  49 ; 
succeeded  by  General  Buell, 
52  ;.  on  the  way  to  Chattanoo 
ga,  161  ;  at  Fort  Wood,  169 ; 
at  Missionary  Ridge,  172 ; 
promoted  to  command  of  Mili 
tary  Division  of  the  Mississip 
pi,  181  ;  advanced  to  relief  of 
Burnside,  183  ;  moves  from 
Vicksburg  and  Memphis, 
200 ;  composition  of  army, 
202  ;  strategy,  212  ;  taken  at 
a  disadvantage,  218 ;  ordered 
an  attack  upon  Hardee,  220 ; 
raised  the  siege  of  Atlanta, 
222  ;  enters  Atlanta  and  de 
cides  to  destroy  it,  224 ;  to 
start  on  his  famous  march, 
229 ;  order  issued,  October, 
1864,  237 ;  opinion  concern 
ing  Thomas,  262 ;  moving 
through  Atlantic  States,  285  ; 
armistice,  288  ;  return  march 
from  Savannah,  291. 

Shiloh,  battle  of,  75. 

Smith,  General  A.  J.,  231,  242, 
245,  251,  254,  256,  265,  266, 
267,  271,  274,  282,  285. 

Smith,  General  E.  Kirby,  95. 

Smith,  General  G.  W.,  Confed 
erate,  290. 

Smith,  General  William  F.,  at 
Brown's  Ferry,  167. 

Smith,  General  William  Sooy, 
201. 

Smyth,  Professor,  comments  on 
Washington,  26. 


330 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


Spring  Hill,  purpose  of  Hood, 
246. 

Stanley,  General  David  S.,  231, 
241,  246,  249,  250. 

Stanton,  Secretary  E.  M.,  258, 
260,  263. 

Steedman,  General  James  B., 
150,  245,  256,  265,  266,  270. 

Stewart,  General  A.  P.,  243. 

Stoneman,  General  George,  222  ; 
brilliant  expedition,  287. 

Stone's  River,  battle  of,  96 ; 
crossing  of,  104 ;  speech  of 
Major  William  Lambert,  105  ; 
extracts  from  Thomas's  re 
port,  109. 

Taylor,  General  Richard,  as 
sumes  command  of  Hood's 
army,  274  ;  at  Meridian,  286. 

Taylor,  General  Zachary,  en 
camped  at  Corpus  Christi,  12, 
14,  16,  17 ;  battles  of  Palo 
Alto  and  Resaca,  14 ;  Buena 
Vista,  1 6. 

Tennessee,  East,  43  ;  Army  of 
the,  75. 

Thomas,  Benjamin,  brother  of 
General  Thomas,  3. 

Thomas,  General  George  H., 
eulogy,  I ;  family  history,  4  ; 
deputy  to  the  clerk  of  the 
court  of  Southampton  Coun 
ty,  4 ;  entered  West  Point 
and  graduation,  5,  6  ;  joined 
his  regiment  at  Governor's 
Island,  6  ;  Florida  War,  6-10 ; 
letter  to  Kingsbury,  7-9; 
joins  Wade's  command,  10 ; 
brevet  first  lieutenant,  10 ; 


at  Charleston,  u  ;  detailed  to 
New  York  city,  1845,  IJ  5 
with  General  Taylor,  15  ;  bre- 
vetted  captain,  15  ;  brevetted 
major,  18  ;  appearance,  20  ; 
captaincy,  22  ;  to  Forts  Inde 
pendence  and  Adams,  22  ;  de 
tailed  to  Military  Academy, 
22  ;  marriage,  23  ;  to  Benicia 
Barracks,  23 ;  to  Fort  Yuma 
and  Jefferson  Barracks,  24  ;  at 
Forts  Mason,  Texas,  San  An 
tonio  and  Belknap,  25  ;  leave 
of  absence,  25  ;  decides  to  re 
main  with  the  North,  28  ;  ac 
cident,  28  ;  to  Carlisle  Bar 
racks,  30  ;  promoted  colonel, 
30 ;  ordered  to  Valley  of  Vir 
ginia,  31  ;  letter  to  Patterson, 
35  ;  "  Rock  of  Chickamauga," 
35,  158  ;  scruples  overcome, 
and  assigned  to  command  of 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  39  ; 
assigned  to  Camp  Dick  Rob 
inson,  45 ;  letter  from  O.  M. 
Mitchell,  48  ;  at  Rock  Castle 
Hill,  51  ;  at  Crab  Orchard,  52  ; 
ordered  to  join  Schoepf,  55  ;  at 
Mill  Springs,  56;  promoted 
to  major  general,  78;  ordered 
to  join  Buell,  79  ;  refuses  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio, 
79  ;  at  Perryville,  81  ;  relieved 
by  Rosecrans,  87  ;  anecdote, 
100  ;  at  Stone's  River,  106  ; 
eulogy,  118  ;  Bragg's  strategy, 
128  ;  at  Lookout  Mountain, 
133  ;  at  Chickamauga,  137  ; 
placed  in  command  of  Army 
of  the  Cumberland,  161  ;  or- 


INDEX. 


331 


der  to  Colonel  Mackay,  168 ; 
at  Missionary  Ridge,  173  ; 
victory,  179  ;  pursuit  of  the 
enemy,  180  ;  contrast  between 
Sherman  and,  182  ;  "  Old 
Slow  Trot,"  183 ;  extracts 
from  report  of  Chickamauga, 
184-198 ;  preparing  for  At 
lanta  campaign,  199  ;  pursuit 
of  Johnston's  army,  205;  mov 
ing  upon  Resaca  and  King 
ston,  208 ;  suggests  attack 
upon  Marietta,  211  ;  Peach 
Tree  Creek,  212,  214  ;  order 
of  July  25,  1864,  215  ;  compli 
cation  of  untoward  circum 
stances,  218  ;  Jonesboro,  219; 
order  of  September  9,  1864, 
225;  directed  to  occupy  Chat 
tanooga,  228  ;  to  fall  back  to 
ward  Nashville,  229  ;  position 
and  composition  of  forces  un 
der,  231  ;  a  glimpse  of  his 
personality,  232  ;  the  tempo 
rary  command  of  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi, 
234 ;  compared  with  Hood, 
238 ;  in  supreme  control  of 
his  army,  241  ;  remarks  on 
victory  at  Franklin,  253  ;  es 
tablishes  two  lines  of  intrench- 
ments  about  Nashville,  256  ; 
complaints  against,  258;  order 
from  Grant  to  attack  at  once, 
259  ;  telegram  after  Franklin, 
259 ;  telegram  to  Halleck,  261 ; 
firmness  against  adverse  criti 
cism,  262  ;  eulogy,  263  ;  vin 
dicated,  273  ;  intends  putting 
his  army  into  winter  quarters, 


273 ;  loyalty,  275  ;  "  the  begin 
ning  of  the  end,"  276  ;  order 
issued  after  battle  of  Nash 
ville,  277  ;  extracts  from  re 
port  of  battle,  279  ;  lecture 
on  battle  of  Nashville,  281 ; 
meets  Stanton  at  Washington, 

284  ;  telegram  from  Halleck, 

285  ;  a  model  chieftain,  286 ; 
vote  of  thanks  from  Congress, 

286  ;  assigned  to  command  of 
departments  of  the  Ohio  and 
Cumberland,  291  ;  assigned  to 
Military  Division  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  292  ;  part  taken  in  re 
construction,  292 ;  wise  policy, 

293  ;   resolutions  adopted   by 
General  Assembly  of  Tennes 
see,  294  ;  nominated  by  Presi 
dent  Johnson  for  brevets  lieu 
tenant   general   and   general, 

294  ;    declines   brevets,  295  ; 
proposed  a  candidate  for  presi 
dency  of  United  States,  295  ; 
declines  all  civil  honors,  295  ; 
letter  declining  command  in 
New   Orleans,    296  ;    accepts 
command  of  Military  Division 
of  the  Pacific,  298  ;  apoplexy, 
299  ;  paper  to  New  York  Trib 
une,  300  ;  death,  300  ;  burial, 
301  ;  monument,  301  ;  honors 
to  his  memory,  302  ;  statue  at 
Washington,    303  ;    presenta 
tion  address  by  Hon.  Stanley 
Matthews,  305  ;    summary  of 
character,  306,  307  ;  declines 
gifts,  308 ;    unparalleled    rec 
ord,  309  ;  views  on  subject  of 
slavery,  309;  compared  with 


332 


GENERAL   THOMAS. 


Grant  and  Sherman,  310 ; 
disappointment  in  being  over 
looked,  312  ;  story,  313  ;  moral 
characteristics,  314 ;  resem 
blance  to  Washington  and 
Scott,  314 ;  concluding  re 
marks,  315. 

Thomas,  John,  father  of  General 
Thomas,  2,  3. 

Tullahoma,  campaign  of,  107. 

Twiggs,  General  D.  E.,  division 
commander,  15. 

United   States  annexed  Texas, 

12. 

Van  Home,  B.,  biographer,  129, 

178,  227,  232,  247. 
Van    Vliet,    General     Stewart, 

classmate,  6  ;  letter  to  author, 

322. 


Wade,  Major  Richard  D.  A., 
commander  of  campaign 
against  Seminoles,  10. 

Walker,  General,  no. 

Washburne,  General  C.  C.,  241. 

West  Point,  5. 

Wheeler,General  Joseph,  95,223. 

Wilson,  General  James  H., 
231,  242,  248,  251,  257,  262, 
265,  268,  272,  274,  287,  288, 
290. 

Withers,  Robert  E.,  303. 

Wood,  Fort,  169. 

Wood,  General  Thomas  J.,  147, 
209,  241,  250,  265,  267,  270, 
271. 

Worth,  Colonel  William  J.? 
scouting  in  Florida,  8. 

Zollicoffer,  General,  45,  47,  52, 
54,  56. 


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"I  congratulate  you  on  the  beauty  of  the  volume,  and  the  thoroughness  of  the 
work." — From  Bishop  PHILLIPS  BROOKS. 

"  Every  day's  use  of  this  admirable  work  confirms  me  in  regard  to  its  comprehen 
siveness  and  accuracy." — From  CHARLES  DUDLEY  WARNER. 

Price,  per  volume,  cloth  or  buckram,  $5.00;  sheep,  $6.00;  half  calf  or  half  mo 
rocco,  $7.00.  Sold  only  by  subscription.  Descriptive  circular,  ivith  specimen  pages, 
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JOHN    BACH   MC  MASTER. 


TTISTOR  Y  OF  THE  PEOPLE 
JLA  OF  THE  UNITED  STA  TESt  from 
the  Revolution  to  the  Civil  War.  By 
JOHN  BACH  MCMASTER.  To  be  com 
pleted  in  five  volumes.  Vols.  I,  II, 
and  III  now  ready.  8vo,  cloth,  gilt 
top,  $2.50  each. 

In  the  course  of  this  narrative  much  is  written 
of  wars,  conspiracies,  and  rebellions;  of  Presi 
dents,  of  Congresses,  of  embassies,  of  treaties, 
of  the  ambition  of  political  leaders,  and  of  the 
rise  of  great  parties  in  the  nation.  Yet  the  his 
tory  of  the  people  is  the  chief  theme.  At  every 
stage  of  the  splendid  progress  which  separates  the 
America  of  Washington  and  Adams  from  the 
America  in  which  we  live,  it  has  been  the  au 
thor's  purpose  to  describe  the  dress,  the  occupa 
tions,  the  amusements,  the  literary  canons  of  the  times  ;  to  note  the  changes 
of  manners  and  morals ;  to  trace  the  growth  of  that  humane  spirit  which 
abolished  punishment  for  debt,  and  reformed  the  discipline  of  prisons  and 
of  jails ;  to  recount  the  manifold  improvements  which,  in  a  thousand  ways, 
have  multiplied  the  conveniences  of  life  and  ministered  to  the  happiness  of 
our  race  ;  to  describe  the  rise  and  progress  of  that  long  series  of  mechanical 
inventions  and  discoveries  which  is  now  the  admiration  of  the  world,  and  our 
just  pride  and  boast ;  to  tell  how,  under  the  benign  influence  of  liberty  and 
peace,  there  sprang  up,  in  the  course  of  a  single  century,  a  prosperity  unpar 
alleled  in  the  annals  of  human  affairs. 

"  The  pledge  given  by  Mr.  McMaster,  that  '  the  history  of  the  people  shall  be  the 
chief  theme,'  is  punctiliously  and  satisfactorily  fulfilled.  He  carries  out  his  promise  in 
a  complete,  vivid,  and  delightful  way.  We  should  add  t'^at  the  literary  execution  of 
the  work  is  worthy  of  the  indefatigable  industry  and  unceasing  vigilance  with  which 
the  stores  of  historical  material  have  been  accumulated,  weighed,  and  sifted.  The 
cardinal  qualities  of  style,  lucidity,  animation,  and  energy,  are  everywhere  present. 
Seldom  indeed  has  a  book  in  which  matter  of  substantial  value  has  been  so  happily 
united  to  attractiveness  of  form  been  offered  by  an  American  author  to  his  fellow- 
citizens." — New  York  Sun. 

"To  recount  the  marvelous  progress  of  the  American  people,  to  describe  their  life, 
their  literature,  their  occupations,  their  amusements,  is  Mr.  McMaster's  object.  His 
theme  is  an  important  one,  and  we  congratulate  him  on  his  success.  It  has  rarely  been 
our  province  to  notice  a  book  with  so  many  excellences  and  so  few  defects."— New  York 
Herald. 

"  Mr.  McMaster  at  once  shows  his  grasp  of  the  various  themes  and  his  special 
capacity  as  a  historian  of  the  people.  His  aim  is  high,  but  he  hits  the  mark." — 
New  York  Journal  of  Commerce. 

"...  The  author's  pages  abound,  too,  with  illustrations  of  the  best  kind  of  histori 
cal  work,  that  of  unearthing  hidden  sources  of  information  and  employing  them,  not 
after  the  modern  style  of  historical  writing,  in  a  mere  report,  but  with  the  true  artistic 
method,  in  a  well-digested  narrative.  ...  If  Mr.  McMaster  finishes  his  work  in  the 
spirit  and  with  the  thoroughness  and  skill  with  which  it  has  begun,  it  will  take  its  place 
among  the  classics  of  American  literature."— Christian  Union. 


New  York :  D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  I,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street 


D.  APPLETON  &   CO.'S  PUBLICATIONS. 


*~rHE  HISTORICAL  REFERENCE-BOOK,   com- 

-*•  prising  a  Chronological  Table  of  Universal  History,  a  Chrono 
logical  Dictionary  of  Universal  History,  a  Biographical  Dic 
tionary.  With  Geographical  Notes.  For  the  use  of  Students, 
Teachers,  and  Readers.  By  Louis  HEILPRIN.  Fourth  edition, 
revised  and  brought  down  to  1893.  Crown  8vo.  569  pages. 
Half  leather,  $3.00. 

"  One  of  the  most  complete,  compact,  and  valuable  works  of  reference  yet  pro 
duced."  —  Troy  Daily  Times. 

"  Unequaled  in  its  field."  —  Boston  Courier. 

"  A  small  library  in  itself."  —  Chicago  Dial. 

"An  invaluable  book  of  reference,  useful  alike  to  the  student  and  the  general  reader. 
The  arrangement  could  scarcely  be  better  or  more  convenient."  —  New  York  Herald. 

"The  conspectus  of  the  world's  history  is  as  full  as  the  wisest  terseness  could  put 
within  the  space."  —  Philadelphia  American. 

"We  miss  hardly  anything  that  we  should  consider  desirable,  and  we  have  not  been 
able  to  detect  a  single  mistake  or  misprint."  —  New  York  Nation. 

"  So  far  as  we  have  tested  the  accuracy  of  the  present  work  we  have  found  it  with 
out  flaw."  —  Christian  Union. 

"  The  conspicuous  merits  of  the  work  are  condensation  and  accuracy.  These  points 
alone  should  suffice  to  give  the  'Historical  Reference-Book'  a  place  in  every  public 
and  private  library."  —  Boston  Beacon. 

"The  method  of  the  tabulation  is  admirable  for  ready  reference."  —  New  York 
Home  Journal. 

"This  cyclopaedia  of  condensed  knowledge  is  a  work  that  will  speedily  become  a 
necessity  to  the  general  reader  as  well  as  to  the  student."  —  Detroit  Free  Press. 

"  For  clearness,  correctness,  and  the  readiness  with  which  the  reader  can  find  the 
information  of  which  he  is  in  search,  the  volume  is  far  in  advance  of  any  work  of  its 
kind  with  which  we  are  acquainted."  —  Boston  Saturday  Evening  Gazette. 

"  The  geographical  notes  which  accompany  the  historical  incidents  are  a  novel 
addition,  and  exceedingly  helpful.  The  size  also  commends  it,  making  it  convenient 
for  constant  reference,  while  the  three  divisions  and  careful  elimination  of  minor  and 
uninteresting  incidents  make  it  much  easier  to  find  dates  and  events  about  which  ac 
curacy  is  necessary.  Sir  William  Hamilton  avers  that  too  retentive  a  memory  tends 
to  hinder  the  development  of  the  judgment  by  presenting  too  much  for  decision.  A 
work  like  this  is  thus  better  than  memory.  It  is  a  'mental  larder'  which  needs  no  care, 
and  whose  contents  are  ever  available."  —  New  York  University  Quarterly. 


A  CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE  OF  UNIVERSAL 

<**     HISTORY.     Extending  from   the  Earliest  Times  to  the  Year 
1892.     For  the   use  of  Students,   Teachers,  and  Readers.     By 
Louis  HEILPRIN.     i2mo.     200  pages.     Cloth,  $1.25. 
This  is  one  of  the  three  sections  comprised  in  Heilprin's    "  Historical 
Reference-Book,  "  bound  separately  for  convenience  of  those  who  may  not 
require  the  entire  volume.     Specimen  pages  sent  on  request. 

New  York:  D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  i,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street. 


T 


D.  APPLETON  &   CO.'S  PUBLICATIONS. 


GILDED  MAN  (EL  DORADO],  and  other 
Pictures  of  the  Spanish  Occupancy  of  America.  By  A.  F. 
BANDELIER.  i2mo.  Cloth,  $1.50. 

The  author  here  describes  the  adventures  and  romantic  episodes  attendant 
upon  the  early  Spanish  explorations  of  our  Southwest.  The  scene  of  the 
story  which  gives  its  title  to  the  volume  is  laid  in  Venezuela,  and  the  legend 
of  El  Dorado  is  for  the  first  time  told  accurately  in  popular  form.  With  this 
exception  the  tales  relate  to  our  own  country.  They  include  the  stories  of 
the  mysterious  "  Seven  Cities  of  Cibola,"  "  El  Quivira,"  and  others  of  equal 
dramatic  interest  and  historical  value. 

JX7ARRIORS  OF  THE  CRESCENT.  By/  W. 
*  r  H.  DAVENPORT  ADAMS,  author  of  "  Battle  Stories  from  Eng 
lish  History,"  etc.  I2mo.  Cloth,  $1.50. 

"  A.  work  without  a  rival  in  its  particular  field.  .  .  .  All  the  gorgeousness  of  the 
barbaric  East  invests  this  glowing  pageant  of  kings  and  conquerors.  .  .  .  This  is  a  re 
markably  able  book  in  thought  and  in  manner  of  presentation." — Philadelphia  Ledger. 

"A  lively,  carefully  prepared  chronicle  of  the  careers  of  quite  a  number  of  the  Mo 
hammedan  rulers  in  Asian  regions  who  made  their  marks,  one  way  or  another,  in  the 
development  of  the  peculiar  civilization  of  the  East.  .  .  .  This  author  has  selected  from 
the  long  chronicle  the  salients  likely  to  be  most  interesting,  and  has  obviously  taken 
much  pains  to  sift  the  fact  carefully  out  of  the  rather  confused  mass  of  fact  and  fable  in 
the  Moslem  chronicles." — New  York  Commercial  Advertiser. 

"  Nowhere  in  history  are  there  to  be  found  such  records  of  conquest,  such  frightful 
tales  of  blood,  such  overwhelming  defeats  or  victories,  as  in  the  lives  of  the  Asiatic 
sovereigns.  .  .  .  The  author  is  a  historian  who  tells  his  story  and  stops.  He  has  done 
his  work  faithfully  and  well."— Cincinnati  Commercial  Gazette. 

DICTURES  FROM  ROMAN  LIFE  AND  STOR  Y. 

•*•         By  Professor  A.  J.  CHURCH,  author  of  "  Stories  from  Homer," 
"  Stories  from  Virgil,"  etc.     Illustrated.     I2mo.     Cloth,  $1.50. 

"Prof.  Church  is  a  tried  and  approved  master  of  the  art  of  interesting  young  people 
in  historical  themes.  The  present  work,  while  too  thoughtful  to  be  called  strictly  juve 
nile,  treats  of  the  great  emperors  and  families  of  Rome  in  a  simple  narrative  style  cer 
tain  to  captivate  youth  and  older  people  fond  of  historic  lore." — The  Chautauquan. 

"  In  the  thirty-six  chapters  comprised  in  the  book  there  are  as  many  stories,  each 
begun  and  ended  with  the  chapter.  There  are  no  long  and  tedious  accounts.  The 
reader  gets  the  salient  points  of  history.  .  .  .  Books  of  this  kind  have  a  special  value 
by  inducting  young  people  into  a  love  of  historical  reading  and  study." — San  Fran 
cisco  Bulletin. 

"The  material  for  these  sketches  is  drawn  partly  from  the  inexhaustible  riches  of 
Plutarch,  partly  from  contemporaneous  history,  and  partly  from  letters,  edicts,  etc. ; 
and,  well  chosen  and  briefly  related,  are  interesting,  whetting  the  appetite  of  the  stu 
diously  inclined.  .  .  .  Various  illustrations  add  to  the  interest  of  the  work." — Spring 
field  Republican. 

"  Each  of  the  chapters  presents  some  striking  scene  or  personality  in  the  period  from 
Augustus  to  Marcus  Aurelius.  .  .  .  Several  of  the  chapters  are  thrown  into  the  form 
of  contemporary  letters.  The  plan  of  the  book  is  well  conceived,  and  the  subjects  are 
those  of  general  human  interest." — New  York  Critic. 


New  York :   D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  i,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street. 


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